In the Matter of: J-Bar Corporation, A Tennessee Corporation, Ben A. Dicke, et al. v. Ronald Lee Parrish, et al.
Appellants Ben and Janice Dick ("the Dickes") appeal the trial court's grant of pre-judgment interest against the J-Bar Corporation ("J-Bar") on a promissory note issued by J-Bar to Appellees Ronald and Judith Parrish. Because we find that the Dickes lack standing to appeal this issue, we dismiss. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Fields
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Eric Fields, was convicted of the following offenses and received the following concurrent sentences: aggravated robbery of Yousef Nahhas, a Class B felony, twelve years; conspiracy to possess more than three hundred grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, a Class A felony, twenty-five years; attempted second degree murder of Officer Dariet Wallace, a Class B felony, twelve years; aggravated robbery of Officer Wallace, a Class B felony, twelve years; and unlawful possession of a handgun, a Class E felony, two years. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, for his conspiracy drug conviction, and as a Range II, multiple offender, for his remaining convictions. The convictions were the result of a jury trial, and the total effective sentence of twenty-five years was the result of a negotiated agreement of the parties done in lieu of a sentencing determination by the trial court. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrea Spencer v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was convicted of one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of sexual battery and received an effective sentence of eighty-four years as a multiple offender. His convictions were affirmed and his sentence was reduced to eighty years on direct appeal by this court. State v. Andrea Spencer, No. W2002-01483-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22204526, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2003), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2004). On February 24, 2004, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance at trial because his counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare the defense. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tyrus A. Rogers v. David Mills, Warden
The petitioner, Tyrus A. Rogers, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for attempted second degree murder. Because the petitioner has failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Griffin v. State of Tennessee
We accepted review of this cause under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, in order to address a question of first impression: whether the right to DNA analysis created by the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 may be waived by implication. Because the clear language of this Act provides that a petition for analysis may be filed at any time, we hold that the filing of such a petition is not subject to implied waiver. This holding, however, affects only eligibility to file the petition; the requirements set forth in the Act must be met before relief may be granted. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to this opinion. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie Gaston
The Defendant, Eddie Gaston, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty-five years for each of the other convictions, and it ordered that all the sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it ruled on several different evidentiary issues; and (3) the trial court committed sentencing errors. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Peoples, alias
On appeal, the defendant, Larry Peoples, contends that: (1) the State improperly impeached defense witnesses by failing to request a jury-out hearing before cross-examining them regarding prior bad acts, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608; and (2) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court denied his request for a mistrial or a curative instruction. We conclude that, while the State certainly should have requested a jury-out hearing prior to impeaching the witnesses, the defendant waived the issue by failing to raise a timely objection. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sterling Pollard v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that: (1) the post-conviction court erred in modifying the illegal probationary period rather than vacating it; and (2) his plea to a violation of the Motor Vehicle Offender Act was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon thorough review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief but modify the petitioner's probationary period from five hundred fifty-two days to five years, one hundred eighty-seven days. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lloyd McPherson v. Tennessee Board of Probation & Parole
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking custodial parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole denied his request, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Northcott v. Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole et al.
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking to be released on parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to grant him parole, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed, and the prisoner appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Miley Hoyt Bell ex rel. Roberta L. Bell v. Tennessee Department of Human Services
This appeal involves a dispute between a widow and the Tennessee Department of Human Services regarding the Department’s denial of her deceased husband’s application for Medicaid nursing home benefits. The widow filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court for Robertson County asserting that the Department erred by classifying as available resources four tax deeds for real property in Georgia being held in her revocable trust. The trial court found that the Department’s classification of the four tax deeds as available resources was supported by substantial and material evidence. The widow asserts on this appeal that the tax deeds should not have been classified as available resources because they were “unavailable” and because they were income-producing property. Like the trial court, we have determined that the Department’s classification of the four tax deeds for real property in Georgia was correct. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Wayne Davidson v. Quenton White et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Tennessee Department of Correction regarding his eligibility to be considered for parole. The prisoner filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against the Department and three of its employees seeking declaratory relief and damages because he had not been declared eligible to be considered for parole. The Department's employees moved to dismiss the complaint because the prisoner had failed to specify whether they were being sued in their personal or official capacities. The court dismissed the complaint after being informed that the prisoner had been considered for and had been denied parole. We have determined that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert L. Lamar v. Donna Blackburn et al.
This appeal involves a prisoner seeking to be released on parole. After the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole declined to release him on parole, the prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board's decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not timely filed, and the prisoner has appealed. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the petition was not timely filed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mable B. Beal, et al. v. Walgreen Co.
In 2001, a pharmacy, when filling the plaintiff’s prescription, gave the plaintiff the wrong medication. The plaintiff began taking the medication as directed, but she soon developed symptoms related to taking the wrong medication. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy alleging negligence, misrepresentation, and strict liability, and she sought compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages. The pharmacy served the plaintiff with discovery requests specifically designed to discover the basis for the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and the plaintiff responded. The pharmacy deemed the plaintiff’s responses inadequate, and it filed a motion to deem facts admitted, a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, and a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s negligence claim. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the motions for summary judgment. At a hearing on the pharmacy’s motion to deem facts admitted and the plaintiff’s motion to strike, the trial court orally indicated its intention to grant the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. Thereafter, the plaintiff orally stated that she wished to take a voluntary nonsuit of her remaining claims. The plaintiff has filed an appeal to this Court asking us to review the grant of partial summary judgment to the pharmacy on her claim for punitive damages. We have determined that, due to the plaintiff’s decision to nonsuit her remaining claims, the present appeal is presently moot. Moreover, we find that this appeal is so devoid of merit that it warrants the imposition of damages for the filing of a frivolous appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rodney M. Butler v. Quentin White, Commissioner, et al.
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Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Townsend Scientific Trust v. Food Technology Investors, L.P., et al. v. Townsend Scientific Trust and John Townsend
This case stems from a business deal gone sour. This is the third time that these parties have brought identical claims against one another. In the previous versions of this suit, the cases were dismissed without prejudice. At this trial, both the plaintiff’s claims and the defendants’ counter claims and third-party claims were dismissed with prejudice based on the doctrine of laches. Upon a motion to alter or amend judgment, the trial court modified its order to dismiss all claims without prejudice based on a failure to prosecute. In this appeal, appellants ask this Court to determine (1) whether the chancery court erred when it amended its judgment with prejudice granting the appellants’ motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of laches to a judgment without prejudice based on a failure to prosecute and (2) whether the chancery court erred when it dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte. The appellants argue that the chancery court should not have amended its judgment dismissing the defendants’ counter and third-party claims because the facts presented at trial warranted a dismissal based on the doctrine of laches. Further, the appellants argue that the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint sua sponte based on the doctrine of laches because the defendants did not demonstrate at trial any undue prejudice to them. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie Eugene Asbury
The defendant, Freddie Eugene Asbury, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's order revoking his probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that although he violated his probation, the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Medley v. State of Tennessee
This is an appeal as of right from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Mark Medley, was convicted of one count of rape of a child pursuant to a guilty plea. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to fifteen years imprisonment. The Petitioner now appeals denial of his petition for post-conviction relief raising the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that his trial counsel's failure to inform him that the charge to which he pled guilty may have been time-barred amounted to deficient representation which resulted in prejudice to him. We reverse the post-conviction court's conclusions of law regarding the statute of limitations applicable to this case and remand for further findings of fact pertaining to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. |
Cannon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Fallon L. Tallent
The Defendant, Fallon L. Tallent, was convicted by a Wilson County Jury of two counts of first degree murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) allowed Kathleen Griffith, a witness not listed in discovery, to testify; and (2) ordered the Defendant's two life sentences to be served consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Dee Roberts v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Johnny Dee Roberts, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which the petitioner had attacked his 2002 convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery. The post-conviction court determined that (1) the petitioner failed to establish either the deficient performance of trial counsel or that he was prejudiced by the actions of counsel and that (2) the issue of prosecutorial misconduct had been previously determined on direct appeal. Because the record supports the post-conviction court's ruling, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Paul Sutphin v. Sally Ann Osborne Sutphin
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred when it modified the original custody order between the parties. Appellant contends that there are no material changes of circumstances to warrant modification of the original custody order. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Ernie Lynnwood Eaton v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Ernie Lynnwood Eaton, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, as amended after the appointment of counsel, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's plea of guilty to three counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony. Petitioner also alleged that his effective sentence of four years and six months violates the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-211(1) and is therefore illegal. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s petition. In his appeal, Petitioner challenges only the post-conviction court’s finding that Petitioner’s sentence was authorized by law. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony D. Brown
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Anthony D. Brown, was convicted of one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of carrying a knife with the intent to go armed, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to fifteen years for his aggravated burglary conviction and thirty days for his misdemeanor conviction. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence or the trial court’s sentencing determinations. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial pursuant to Rule 31(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure when one of the jurors indicated to the trial court that she did not agree with the verdicts after the jury had been polled and discharged. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelly K. Houston v. Asian Import and Manufacturing Group, Inc.
This appeal involves an employment dispute. Following his termination, the employee filed suit against his former employer in the Circuit Court for Williamson County alleging retaliatory discharge, breach of contract, and conversion. The trial court directed a verdict for the employer at the close of the employee's case-in-chief, and the employee appealed. We have determined that the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict was proper. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
William M. Hensley, et al. v. Robert Carrier
William M. Hensley and Mary Hensley ("Plaintiffs") sued Robert Carrier ("Defendant") regarding the use of a driveway. The case was tried without a jury and the Trial Court found and held that it was the intent of the original grantors that the driveway be a joint driveway; that if this holding was incorrect, that the Plaintiffs had established a right to the driveway through adverse possession; that if the prior two holdings were incorrect, that Plaintiffs had proven a prescriptive easement or an implied easement to use the driveway. Defendant appeals claiming that the Trial Court erred in finding a prescriptive easement or an implied easement, and also that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing Plaintiffs' claims based upon the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals |