Abu-Ali Abdur'Rahman v. Phil Bredesen, et al.
We granted review to address several issues regarding the Tennessee Department of Correction's protocol for executing inmates who have been sentenced to death by lethal injection. After our review of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the lethal injection protocol in Tennessee, which includes intravenous injections of sodium Pentothal, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride, (1) does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, (2) does not violate due process provisions under the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (3) does not deny access to the courts in violation of the United States or Tennessee Constitutions, (4) does not violate the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, (5) does not violate the Nonlivestock Animal Humane Death Act, (6) does not violate provisions governing the practice of medicine and provision of healthcare services, and (7) does not violate the Drug Control Act or Pharmacy Practice Act. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Andre Matthews v. Shelby County Government
Appellant filed suit against the county alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Approximately three years later, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lonnie M. Maclin
The Appellant, Lonnie M. Maclin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated assault. As a result of these convictions, Maclin received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Maclin raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the indictment was invalid for failure to provide “adequate notice of the offenses charged in the indictment, or the court erred in the instruction to the jury”; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for felony murder; and (3) whether his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping violates State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Angie Delene Jackson
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Angie Delene Jackson, was convicted of driving a commercial vehicle under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater, a Class A misdemeanor, and for violation of the motor carrier safety rules and regulations, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the results of her blood alcohol test; (2) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle; and (3) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to serve five percent of her effective sentence in confinement. We find that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle. We find the trial court's error harmless as to Defendant's DUI conviction, and affirm that conviction. Because we find the evidence insufficient, however, to support Defendant's conviction for violation of the motor carrier safety rules and regulations, we reverse it and dismiss that charge. We further reverse Defendant's sentence for her DUI conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gary John White, Jr., et al. v. Jerry Kelvin Farley
This appeal involves the parental rights of a father to his eight-year-old daughter. When the child was approximately 17 months old, the mother moved with the child to Ohio. The father did not know their whereabouts for many months. In the parties' divorce, the mother was awarded custody of the child and the father was awarded specific visitation privileges. The father failed to exercise his visitation rights and failed to visit or support the child for more than four months. The mother, who had remarried, filed a petition to terminate the father's rights on the grounds of abandonment. Father presented proof at trial of his meager earnings due to a physical impairment, limited education and the loss of his job. Father also presented proof that he had tried to contact the child by telephone but was unable to do so. The trial court declined to terminate the father's parental rights because there had not been proof by clear and convincing evidence of abandonment or that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. After a careful review of the record and the applicable law, we agree with the trial court that the father's lack of visitation and support was not willful and that termination of the father's parental rights was not in the child's best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Simms v. Insurance Company of North America
The issue in this case is whether the trial court correctly granted the Defendant Insurance Company of North America ("ICNA") summary judgment based on its finding that the claimant, Jason Simms, failed to follow the loss provisions of the insurance policy and that ICNA's agent did not possess authority to waive the loss provisions. We hold there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the apparent authority of ICNA's agent, and therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand for trial. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry L. Cowan v. Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
This appeal involves a prisoner's challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. After the Board denied the prisoner parole and scheduled his next hearing for the year 2016, the prisoner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The Chancery Court dismissed the petition on the grounds it was not timely filed and was not verified. We affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Thomas Gary Weston, III v. Waste Management, Inc.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusion of law. The employee appeals the trial court’s finding of no permanent disability. We conclude that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Craig Alan Dunn v. Matrix Exhibits, Inc.
In this suit by an employee, Craig Dunn, against his former corporate employer, Matrix Exhibits, Inc., for breach of written employment contract, the trial court entered judgment for Dunn based upon a finding Matrix anticipatorily breached the employment agreement. The trial court awarded Dunn three of six categories of damages he sought but denied the other claimed damages based upon a finding Dunn’s proof of the amount of such damages was speculative. Both parties appealed. Finding Matrix in actual breach of the employment contract, we affirm the award of damages for moving expenses, car allowance, and salary, but reverse the finding that Dunn’s proof of damages for 5% of Matrix’ value was too speculative, and award Dunn an additional $282,500. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Carnell Jones
The appellant, Michael Carnell Jones, appeals from the trial court's revocation of his community corrections sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dean Baugh
The appellant, Michael Dean Baugh, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of burglary and theft of property under $500. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to seven (7) years, six (6) months for the burglary conviction and eleven (11) months, twenty-nine (29) days for the theft conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal ensued. On appeal, the appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charges against him and that his sentence is excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Reggie Estes
The Appellant, Reggie Estes, was convicted by a Haywood County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication and was sentenced to fourteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Estes raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) whether he was sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington. After review of the record, we affirm. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angela Kamille Draper v. Larry H. Westerfield, et al.
In this appeal, we must determine: (1) whether the defendant, a doctor, is immune from liability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410(a) (1996) in connection with his review of a child abuse victim's medical records as requested by authorities investigating allegations of child abuse; (2) whether the defendant has a common law duty to report suspected child abuse; and (3) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-401, et. seq. (1996) provides a private right of action for failure to report suspected child abuse. We conclude that immunity under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-410(a) is afforded only to those who actually report harm. Because the determination of whether the defendant reported harm involves a genuine issue of material fact, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this issue. We further conclude that by reviewing the victim's medical records, the defendant undertook a duty to use reasonable care in reviewing the records and reporting his findings and conclusions to the investigators. Finally, we hold that because the plaintiff did not assert a private right of action pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-401, et. seq. in her complaint, the Court of Appeals erred in addressing the issue. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sullivan | Supreme Court | |
Dan Mitchell d/b/a Eagle CDI v. John Owens, and wife Rose Marie Owens
Plaintiff filed an action to compel arbitration. Defendant filed an action for damages. The Trial Court combined the actions and denied arbitration and the parties proceeded to trial and final judgment. The Trial Court inter alia held that plaintiffs waived issue of arbitration. On appeal, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Trista Larue Denton, et al. v. Christopher Lorn Phelps
Orders of Protection were either largely ignored or scornfully defied by the defendant with the sometime quiescense of the plaintiff who was possibly afflicted with the Stockholm Syndrome. Her father intervened and presented a motion for contempt against the defendant which resulted in the defendant's conviction of eleven (11) instances of criminal contempt. The defendant refused to attend the trial because of his later asserted and ill-based fear that he would not have a fair trial, and he was tried in absentia. Days later, he was tried and convicted of another nine (9) discrete violations of the Order of Protection. The defendant assails the first convictions as violative of his constitutional rights. In light of State v. Far, 51 S.W.3d 222 (Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) "that a trial in absentia [is allowable] only when the defendant is first present at trial" the eleven (11) convictions at the first trial are reversed. The nine (9) convictions at the second trial are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph B. Thompson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Joseph B. Thompson, was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the State caused exculpatory evidence to be lost and unavailable to the Petitioner; (3) the trial court denied his right to allocution; (4) the trial court improperly limited trial counsel's time for closing argument; (5) the trial court erred when it ruled that the Petitioner could not instruct his trial counsel about trial strategy; and (6) the trial court erred by instructing the jury concerning the amount of fines to be imposed. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tina M. Lunsford v. Robert W. Lunsford
This case arose from the divorce of Tina M. Lunsford and Robert W. Lunsford, his untimely death, and a dispute between the estate of Robert W. Lunsford and Tina M. Lunsford as to the right to a pre-retirement death benefit provided by the Young Men’s Christian Association Retirement Fund in which Mr. Lunsford participated. Even though Tina M. Lunsford was the designated beneficiary of the death benefit at the time of Mr. Lunsford died, the trial court determined the intent of the parties evidenced by their marital dissolution agreement was to divest Tina Lunsford of any interest in his retirement plan. The trial court, by qualified domestic relations order, directed the death benefit be paid to the contingent beneficiaries and Tina M. Lunsford appealed. Because of the specific language of the marital dissolution agreement, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deon Larkins
The appellant, Deon Larkins, was convicted by a jury of carjacking. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve (12) years. On appeal, the appellant argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to sustain the objections regarding hearsay; (3) that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss based on a false warrant; (4) that the trial court should have granted a mistrial because the jury made a statement that was unfairly prejudicial; (5) that the appellant's constitutional rights were violated because of a "second setting" of the jury after the first panel of jurors was dismissed; (6) that the trial court erred by not "bringing" a material witness to testify; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to support the appellant's conviction; and (8) the appellant's sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the evidence, we determine that a number of the appellant's first six (6) issues are waived for failure to prepare an adequate record for our review. As to the remaining issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Paul Deskins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Steven Paul Deskins, was convicted of seven (7) counts of rape of a child and four (4) counts of aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, this Court reversed one (1) of the petitioner's convictions for aggravated sexual battery, finding that it violated due process and double jeopardy, but otherwise affirmed the remaining convictions. See State v. Steven Paul Deskins, No. M2002-01808-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21957083 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 14, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 5, 2004). The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan John Drost
The Appellant, Bryan John Drost, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and he was subsequently sentenced to ten years and six months confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fredrick Sledge v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Fredrick Sledge, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his counsel’s representation at trial was deficient because he failed to file a motion to suppress Petitioner’s statement to the police, and he failed to investigate Petitioner’s case or interview any witnesses. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marie B. Jennings v. Sewell-Allen Piggly Wiggly, et al.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant in this premises liability action in which the plaintiff alleges that she slipped and fell on a substance located in the defendant’s supermarket. The plaintiff appealed. Because the appellate record in this case is inadequate to determine the basis for the appellee’s motion or the trial court’s judgment, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael R. Harness
The defendant, Michael R. Harness, pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and the Union County Criminal Court sentenced him as a child rapist to five years to be served at one hundred percent in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors in sentencing, in denying him alternative sentencing, and in sentencing him as a child rapist to serve his sentence at one hundred percent. We hold the trial court erred in classifying the defendant as a child rapist, in applying an enhancement factor, and in failing to apply a mitigating factor based on the defendant's poor health. We modify his sentence to four years with a release eligibility of thirty percent to reflect his status as a Range I, standard offender. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, and we remand the case for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jason Crawford v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jason Crawford, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Beard
The defendant, Kenneth Beard, entered a plea of guilty to rape, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a Range I, eight-year sentence. Although the defendant was granted probation, the first year was intensely supervised and the entire term involved special conditions of release. After violating the terms of probation by testing positive for cocaine use and serving nine months in jail, the defendant was reinstated to probation. Shortly thereafter, another probation violation warrant was issued and the trial court required the defendant to serve an additional year in jail as a part of a split confinement sentence. Upon review after the one year period of incarceration, the trial court ordered execution of the original judgment, requiring service of the balance of the term in prison. The judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the cause remanded for service of the sentence on conditional probation. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |