State of Tennessee v. Lacey Jones
The defendant, Lacey Jones, was convicted of four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions into the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and ordered a concurrent sentence of thirty-five years for each of the four counts. The trial court ordered the aggravated burglary sentence of seven years to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty-two years. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery violate principles of due process; that the trial court erred by merging the aggravated robbery convictions into the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions; and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of B.L.R., D.O.B. 10/14/02, a Child Under 18 Years of Age
This appeal involves the termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his infant daughter. The day after the daughter was born, the Department of Children’s Services became involved with the family and learned that both the mother and father were using methamphetamine. Shortly after the department became involved in this case, the mother took very little interest in her infant daughter. The department implemented several permanency plans calling for father to demonstrate that he remained drug free and was attending counseling to resolve his addiction. When the father failed to attend counseling on a regular basis and continually tested positive for methamphetamine, the department filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. Following a hearing on the petition, the trial court held that the department had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, all the grounds for termination alleged in the petition. The trial court also held that terminating father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Father appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the grounds for termination, however, we vacate the order and remand this case to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Becca Jo Maroney v. Brandon Lee Maroney
Becca Jo Maroney ("Mother") and Brandon Lee Maroney ("Father") were divorced in September of 2002. The parties agreed at that time for Mother to be the primary residential parent for the parties' son. In July of 2003, Father filed a petition for change of custody claiming there had been a material change in circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the minor child for custody to be transferred to Father. After a trial, the Trial Court concluded that there had been a material change in circumstances and that designating Father as the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the minor child. Mother appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings, and the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brenda Bowers
The appellant, Brenda Bowers, was convicted by a jury of theft of property worth less than $500 dollars. The trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days and ordered the appellant to serve six (6) months of the sentence in incarceration and the remainder of the sentence on probation. After the denial of a motion for new trial, the appellant appealed, presenting the following issues: (1) whether the State improperly introduced evidence of a prior bad act of the appellant; (2) whether the appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) whether the trial court correctly sentenced the appellant. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter Of: C.M.C., C.L.C., and D.A.M.
The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights based on abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and a finding that termination was in the best interests of the children. Mother appeals. We reverse. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chris Edward Smith
Defendant, Chris Edward Smith, was convicted of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in overruling Defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of the only African-American prospective juror in the venire; and (3) that the trial court erred when it mistakenly informed the jury that Defendant was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Ray Rogers
The appellant, Jimmy Ray Rogers, was convicted by a jury of introducing contraband into a penal institution, possession of marijuana, and driving on a revoked license. He received a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for introduction of contraband into a penal institution and the length of the sentence imposed for that conviction. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the appellant's conviction and sentence for introducing contraband into a penal institution should be affirmed; the appellant's conviction for possession of marijuana should merge into his conviction for introducing contraband into a penal institution; a corrected judgment should be entered reflecting that the appellant was found not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia; and the appellant's conviction for driving on a revoked license should be reinstated. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for sentencing on the appellant's conviction for driving on a revoked license and for correction of the judgments. |
Franklin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Jackson, Tennessee v. Walker-Hall, Inc., et al.
This is an action to recover for damage done to personal property. During the course of a road improvement project, the city placed some heavy equipment and debris alongside the roadway being repaired. An employee of the corporate owner of the land abutting the roadway noticed the debris and an excavator parked adjacent to the roadway during a route inspection of the property. Believing the debris and excavator to be on his employer’s land, the employee had the excavator towed. Apparently, the towing company selected by the landowner’s property manager severely damaged the excavator during the course of removing it. The city subsequently filed suit against the landowner and several other defendants claiming they had negligently harmed the city’s personal property. The trial court held that the landowner was negligent and committed a trespass against the city. The landowner appealed, and we reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Gwendolyn Flowers v. Timothy Flowers
Husband in this divorce action appeals from the judgment entered in the trial court. Absent a transcript or statement of the evidence, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
ARC Lifemed, et al. v. AMC-Tennessee, Inc.
This is an action for breach of contract by a limited liability company against its managing member. The other members of the LLC joined as plaintiffs seeking recovery for breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. The managing member counterclaimed against the LLC for breach of contract and, in the alternative, sought recovery in quantum meruit for unjust enrichment. The trial court held the managing member to be liable to all plaintiffs on all issues and dismissed the counterclaim. The action of the trial court is reversed as to breach of fiduciary duty and negligent misrepresentation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to breach of contract and as to dismissal of the counterclaim. The findings of the trial court as to damages payable to the LLC is affirmed as is the distribution of the assets of the LLC. Prejudgment interest is disallowed, and costs are assessed to the managing member. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alfred William Smith
The defendant, Alfred William Smith, appeals from his 2004 McMinn County jury conviction of first degree premeditated murder, for which the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the admission of state-sponsored testimony. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Lee Drumbarger v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his untitled petition, treated by the trial court as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of habeas relief and further conclude that the petitioner's claim was not cognizable as a petition for writ of certiorari. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court, pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Toney Jason Hale
The defendant, Toney Jason Hale, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony, and escape from a penal institution, a Class E felony. He committed these offenses while serving an effective ten-year sentence on probation for crimes committed in Marshall County. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year, six months for each conviction, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, with the issue of consecutive sentencing to be decided by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered two of the three sentences for the burglary convictions to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentence for the third conviction. The trial court further ordered these sentences to run consecutively to his sentence for the escape offense and consecutively to his previous ten-year sentence, for an effective sentence of fourteen years, six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Prentiss Holloway
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Prentiss Holloway, of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of eleven and five years, respectively, in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentences in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawuan Stanford v. The Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Altama Footwear
This appeal arises out of a claim filed by the appellant for unemployment benefits after her termination from her employment. The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied the appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits. The appellant filed an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal of the Department, and, after a hearing, the Appeals Tribunal denied the appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits. Subsequently, the appellant filed an appeal to the Board of Review, which also denied her claim for unemployment benefits and affirmed the Appeals Tribunal. After the Board denied the appellant’s petition to rehear, the appellant sought review by the chancery court. After reviewing the record, the chancery court denied the appellant’s claim for unemployment benefits and affirmed the Board of Review. The appellant now seeks review by this Court. We affirm. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.W.M, W.W.M., S.M.M, & A.M.M. - Concurring
The evidence in this case, both as to termination of parental rights and to the best interest of the children, indicates that termination of parental rights would survive even the ultimate standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: M.W.M, W.W.M., S.M.M, & A.M.M.
This appeal involves an imprisoned mother’s efforts to retain her parental rights with regard to four of her eight children. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Lawrence County seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with regard to four of her children residing in Tennessee. Following a bench trial, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to the three older children based on abandonment under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2004) and terminated her rights to the youngest child based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). On this appeal, the mother asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusions that she abandoned the three older children and that the interests of all four childrenwould be best served by terminating her parental rights. We have determined that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the three older children and that terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of all four of the children involved in this case. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Donald Smith
The defendant, William Donald Smith, pleaded guilty to three counts charging aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and five counts charging child rape, a Class A felony. The plea agreement provided for the trial court to determine the sentences, except that the agreement provided that the aggregate sentence would not exceed 50 years and no more than one child rape sentence would be ordered served consecutively with any other sentence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to the following Department of Correction terms: for aggravated sexual battery, concurrent sentences of eight, 10, and 12 years, respectively; and for child rape, two sentences of 20 years each and three sentences of 25 years each. The trial court ran the two 20-year sentences concurrently to each other and to the aggregate 12-year sentence for aggravated sexual battery. It imposed the three 25-year sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other five sentences, for a net aggregate sentence of 45 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's sentencing determinations. After review, we affirm the judgments as modified. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Henry Jenkins
The defendant, Charles Henry Jenkins, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, a Class B felony, and one count of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to ten years for the cocaine conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the evading arrest conviction, with the sentences ordered to run concurrently. The defendant raises the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his cocaine conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in excluding from his trial exculpatory tape-recorded statements made by the confidential informant involved in the case; and (3) whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), precluded the trial court from applying an enhancement factor to increase his cocaine sentence beyond the minimum in the range. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert Fitzgerald Turner
The Defendant, Albert Fitzgerald Turner, pled guilty to statutory rape and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to two years in the Department of Correction, suspended after sixty days of service. The Defendant now appeals as of right, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him “judicial diversion.” Because the trial court failed to state adequately upon the record the basis for its refusal to grant judicial diversion, we vacate the sentence of the Defendant and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Keith Dotson
The defendant, Keith Dotson, was convicted of aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403. The trial court ordered a Range III sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient and that his sentence is excessive under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shawn Kelly v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Shawn Kelly, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Dyer County Circuit Court. He seeks relief from two convictions for the sale of one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and his concurrent sentences of twelve and fifteen years. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one drug offense and pled guilty to the other drug offense. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in both cases, that he was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury, that his guilty plea was not voluntary, and that the trial court erred in not allowing him to inspect the grand jury minutes relating to his indictments. We affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James W. Clark v. Jim Rose
Petitioner/Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. This is the second appeal before this Court arising from the Appellant’s filing of the underlying pro se petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking review of the procedures used by the Tennessee Department of Correction in reaching its decision to keep Appellant confined in administrative segregation. This Court initially remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the inmate’s status was punitive or non-punitive in nature. Upon remand, the trial court determined that his status was non-punitive. Inmate appeals. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that inmate’s status was nonpunitive and that, as such, the common law writ of certiorari was not the proper means of challenging his status, we affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
David R. McPeak v. Specialty Surgical Instrumentation, Inc., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Appellant, David R. McPeak, has appealed the action of the trial court, which dismissed his cause of |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Gary Clark v. Standard Iron, Inc. and Lumberman's Casualty Insurance Company v. Sue Ann Head, Administrator of the Second Injury Fund for the State of Tennessee
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee CodeAnnotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Second Injury Fund has appealed the action of the trial court, which determined that the Employer, Standard Iron, Inc., was responsible for payment of 25% of the award to the Worker, Gary Clark, and that the Second Injury Fund was responsible for payment of 75%. Upon our consideration of all of the evidence, we find that the trial court properly determined all issues, but we find that the award should be modified. |
Coffee | Workers Compensation Panel |