Bert Viar, Jr., v. John W. Palmer
This is a legal malpractice case. Client/Appellant sued Attorney/Appellee for legal malpractice for failure to respond to a motion for partial summary judgment filed by the defendant in the underlying case. Attorney’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted and Attorney was awarded attorney fees on his Cross-Complaint. Client appeals. We reverse and remand. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Wayne Patterson
The defendant, Jerry Wayne Patterson, was convicted by jury of attempted first degree murder, a ClassA felony, and sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict for attempt to commit first degree murder. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Wayne Patterson - Concurring
The majority concludes that the defendant’s statement to Sheriff’s Investigator Lowe was voluntarily given. For the reasons expressed below, I am unable to join in this conclusion. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earl D. Mills
The appellant, Earl D. Mills, pled guilty to vehicular homicide. As a result of the guilty plea, the remaining nine (9) counts of the indictment were either merged with the vehicular homicide conviction or nolle prossed by the State. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve (12) years as a multiple offender. At the sentencing hearing, the appellant sought pre-trial jail credit for the 197 days he spent in jail prior to his guilty plea. The trial court denied the request because the appellant was serving a sentence on an unrelated probation violation charge while awaiting trial on the charges arising out of the indictment for vehicular homicide. The appellant filed a motion to reconsider. The trial court granted the motion and awarded the appellant thirty-six (36) days of jail credit. However, the appellant insists he should receive credit for the entire 197 days. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Martin E. Walker v. Howard Carlton, Warden
The Petitioner, Martin E. Walker, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment, which the habeas corpus court dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition because: (1) count one of the indictment charging him with murder is defective because it did not provide notice of the offense charged; (2) the indictment is invalid because the district attorney failed to sign it; and (3) the State failed to comply with the trial court's order for a bill of particulars. Finding no error in the judgment of the habeas corpus court, we affirm the dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derwood Scott Kendrick
The defendant, Derwood Scott Kendrick, was on probation for several convictions of attempted misapplication of contract funds and one (1) conviction of illegal voting. While on probation, the defendant was arrested for theft, misapplication of contract funds and passing worthless checks. The trial court held a probation revocation hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation. The defendant appealed this revocation on the grounds that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to divest the media privilege for a news reporter and (2) there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to revoke his probation. We have analyzed the issues and find that the trial court did not err in refusing to divest the media privilege. However, we also find that the evidence does not support the revocation of the defendant's probation. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the trial court, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William J. Carrico
The Petitioner, William J. Carico, was convicted of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) announced a new rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to his case and creates an exception to the one-year statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction petition. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: Estate of Merle Jeffers McFarland -Dissenting
I respectfully dissent. The question in this case is whether, when a will includes a residuary clause with two or more beneficiaries, a lapsed residuary gift is to be distributed among surviving residuary beneficiaries or among the testator’s intestate heirs. The majority reaffirms Ford v. Ford, 31 Tenn. 431, 435 (1852), which holds that a lapsed residuary gift passes via intestate succession. I would overrule Ford and hold that where the residue of a will is devised to two or more persons and the share of one fails, that share passes to the other residuary devisees in proportion to their residuary interests. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-606(b), 8 U.L.A. 427 (1998); see also Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 5.5 cmt. o (1999).1 Consequently, in this case I would distribute the lapsed residuary gifts proportionally among the surviving residuary beneficiaries of the McFarland will rather than via the laws of intestate succession. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamonn Lee Harris
The defendant, Lamonn Lee Harris, entered an open guilty plea to fourteen counts of forgery, Class E felonies, and one count of theft less than $500.00, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Williams Holding Company, D/B./A Raleigh Hills Apartments v. Sharon T. Willis, et al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether a defendant who was found 100% at fault in a negligence action submitted to arbitration was liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's damages where the plaintiff had already received half of the amount of damages in a settlement with another defendant. The Court of Appeals concluded that the arbitrator had exceeded his scope of authority by requiring the defendant to pay the full amount of damages and modified the judgment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority and that the defendant was not entitled to a credit based on the amount of damages received by the plaintiff in a settlement. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed, and the trial court's judgment is reinstated.
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Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Estes
The defendant, Ricky Estes, was convicted of burglary of an automobile, theft under $500.00, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a multiple offender to four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial motion for a continuance; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
DeKalb | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, et al. - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with the majority opinion that the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, that there are genuine issues of material fact as to cause in fact and proximate or legal cause. I continue, however, to adhere to my previous position that the majority’s analysis blurs the line between duty and legal causation by improperly encouraging “the trial court to usurp the role of the jury in weighing the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.” Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 339 (Tenn. 2003) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting).1 |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Shirley Hale v. Erwin Ostrow, et al.
We granted review to determine whether the property owners owed a duty to a person injured off the owners’ property as a result of a hazard existing on the owners’ property and if so, to determine whether the hazard was the cause of the injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant property owners, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After carefully reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to ensure that the sidewalk was not obstructed by overgrown bushes and was passable. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants’ breach caused her injury. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Permission; Judgment of the Court of Appeals Reversed; Case Remanded to the Trial Court |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Kathryn C. Black v. Stevan L. Black
We granted this appeal to determine whether the trial court properly dismissed the wife’s complaint for “fraud, deceit, and coercion” after finding that her complaint failed to state an independent action upon which to set aside a final divorce decree. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the wife failed to allege sufficient facts to support either an independent action to set aside the final divorce decree under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure or a separate common law cause of action for fraud. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment is affirmed on the grounds set forth in this opinion. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Consolidated Waste Systems, LLC v. Metro Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
A would-be developer of a construction and demolition landfill sued the Metropolitan Government after its legislative body adopted zoning amendments that would effectively preclude the proposed landfill on the property the company had leased with an option to purchase. The company attacked the ordinances on multiple grounds and was successful in having the trial court declare them unconstitutional as violative of substantive due process and equal protection. Because of the company’s limited interest in the real property, however, the court refused to grant an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the ordinances against the company or to award damages. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to the company. The Metropolitan Government appeals the holding that the ordinances were unconstitutional on the merits as well as on a number of procedural grounds and also appeals the award of attorney’s fees. The company appeals the trial court’s decision that the ordinances did not constitute exclusionary zoning. We affirm the trial court on all issues. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William F. Cain
The Appellant, William F. Cain, was convicted of misdemeanor stalking and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail. On appeal, Cain raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and (2) whether he should have received a suspended sentence. After review, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennifer Lynn Alsip, et al. v. Johnson City Medical Center, et al.
In this medical malpractice case involving the alleged wrongful death of Walter Ray Alsip ("Mr. Alsip" or "the deceased"), we granted the plaintiffs' Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for an interlocutory appeal in order to review the trial court's order allowing defense counsel to engage in ex parte dialogue with Mr. Alsip's last-illness, non-defendant treating physicians. We conclude that the trial court erred in entering the order that permitted defense counsel to have private conversations with the non-defendant physicians who treated the deceased during his last illness. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Ebbs, alias
The appellant, Chris Ebbs, pled guilty in May of 1996 to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six (6) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court suspended the sentence to probation for six (6) years conditioned upon various requirements. In June of 2001, a probation violation warrant was filed. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's suspended sentence and ordered the appellant to serve the six-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record and applicable legal authorities we conclude the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ericonta Daman Flenoid
The appellant, Ericonta Daman Flenoid, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary and robbery. He received a total effective sentence of ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation, finding that the appellant failed to comply with the terms of probation. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. The appellant appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ericonta Daman Flenoid
The appellant, Ericonta Daman Flenoid, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary and robbery. He received a total effective sentence of ten years, with one year to be served in confinement and the remainder on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation, finding that the appellant failed to comply with the terms of probation. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. The appellant appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of J.L.E.
This is a mother's appeal of the termination of her parental rights to her son. After the Tennessee Department of Children's Services took custody of her son, it prepared a permanency plan requiring Mother to obtain therapy and case management services and perform other remedial tasks within approximately twelve months. After only six months, however, the Department filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights, and the court terminated her rights. Mother appeals claiming, in pertinent part, that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to reunite mother and son and that the Department did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse. We have determined that the Department has failed to prove a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence and, consequently, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayford Demonbreun, Jr.
The petitioner, Wayford Demonbreun, Jr., appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Helen Richardson, Individually and on behalf of her Daughter and her Minor Children, Trina Richardson, Deceased v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis, et al.
This case involves the authority of the General Sessions Court to set aside its own judgment. The plaintiff’s decedent died in January 2000. In January 2001, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim in the General Sessions Court against the defendants. In April 2001, the General Sessions Court entered an order dismissing the case, without prejudice, for lack of prosecution. The General Sessions Court later determined that the order dismissing for lack of prosecution was erroneously entered. Consequently, in May 2001, the General Sessions Court entered a consent order setting aside its April 2001order. In December 2001, the plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the General Sessions lawsuit, and the General Sessions Court entered a consent order of dismissal without prejudice. In June 2002, the plaintiff refiled her lawsuit in the Circuit Court below. The defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, claiming that the plaintiff was required to refile her lawsuit within one year of the April 2001 General Sessions order, dismissing for lack of prosecution. The defendants asserted that the General Sessions Court was without authority to adjudicate the matter further after the April 2001 order of dismissal was entered. The Circuit Court disagreed and denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The defendants were granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal. We reverse, concluding that the General Sessions Court did not have the authority to set aside its April 2001 judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chester Floyd Cole
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Chester Floyd Cole, of incest, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to five years for the incest and six months for the assault1 to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the incest count pursuant to Rule 8, Tenn. R. Crim. P., and State v. Dominy, 67 S.W.3d 822 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001), and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mack T. Transou
The defendant, Mack T. Transou, stands convicted of rape and sexual battery, for which he received an effective sixteen-year sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions and sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress DNA evidence and the imposition of his sentence in violation of his right to trial by jury. Following our review upon the record, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |