State of Tennessee v. Larry S. Reese
The defendant, Larry S. Reese, was found guilty of aggravated assault based, in part, on the violation of a protective order obtained by the victim, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(c), and public intoxication, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-310. Upon finding that the order of protection had not been served on the defendant prior to the assault, the trial court modified the aggravated assault conviction to simple assault and ordered a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days. In this appeal, the state asserts that the trial court erred by reducing the defendant’s conviction to simple assault. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry S. Reese - Dissenting
Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no valid order of protection at the time of the instant offense, I must respectfully dissent. Orders of protection are governed in general by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-3-601 through 36-3-324. Initially, an ex parte order of protection is issued, followed by a hearing to determine whether a permanent order should be entered: |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ernesto Gonsales
The defendant, Ernesto Gonsales, pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. After determining that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had a detainer out for the defendant, the trial court modified the defendant's sentence to six years' unsupervised probation and release to the INS, noting that the defendant would immediately be deported to Mexico. In this appeal, the state contends that the trial court exceeded its authority by modifying the terms of the plea bargain agreement. Because the initial judgment should not have been altered, the order of modification is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Brewer
The defendant pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and vandalism and was sentenced to five years probation. Subsequently, after the defendant tested positive for marijuana and his probation officer filed a probation violation report, the trial court revoked his probation following a hearing. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in relying upon a laboratory report showing marijuana in his urine because the accompanying affidavit had not been executed by the technician who performed the test but by the assistant laboratory director. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court revoking the defendant's probation. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mitchell Wayne Hiles
The Appellant, Mitchell Wayne Hiles, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a class B felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Hiles to an eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hiles raises the single issue of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. After review of the record, we affirm the conviction. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert G. Gassaway
The defendant, Albert G. Gassaway, appeals his conviction for DUI, second offense. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with six months to be served in the county workhouse and the remainder on probation, ordered him to pay a $600 fine, and suspended his driving privileges for two years. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI, second offense, and that the court erred in imposing more than the minimum sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Beverly A. Taylor v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc.
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Knox | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Thad Guerra v. Leonard Peeks
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Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Feldman v. Board of Medical Examiners
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
RDM v. State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services, In the Matter of: AGM
The Trial Court terminated parents’ parental rights. The father has appealed. We affirm the Trial |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Hollingsworth, Inc. vs. Ruth E. Johnson
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Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
Marie Ann Burnett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
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Henry | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Phillip Stover
The defendant pled guilty to the sale of less than .5 gram of a Schedule II controlled substance, a Class C felony, and two counts of the sale of a Schedule VI controlled substance, Class E felonies, receiving an effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's request for judicial diversion, concluding he was eligible for diversion because he had not previously been convicted of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor and his history and circumstances demonstrated he was a suitable candidate for judicial diversion. The State appealed, arguing that the defendant was eligible for diversion only because the trial court modified his prior conviction from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class C misdemeanor. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, v. State of Tennessee, Department of Safety
This case involves the seizure and forfeiture of a leased vehicle. The Department of Safety ("the Department") sent a notice of the forfeiture proceedings to the corporate owner/lessor at the address listed on the vehicle's certificate of title. Because the owner had moved two years previously and the Postal Service had ceased forwarding its mail, the unopened certified letter was returned to the Department marked "Not Deliverable as Addressed Unable to Forward." The Department took no further steps to locate the owner and summarily ordered the forfeiture of the vehicle. Upon learning of the forfeiture, the owner filed a petition for a stay and reconsideration, which the Department denied. The owner then filed a petition for review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County in which it challenged the adequacy of the notice procedure. The trial court ruled the notice procedure did not meet constitutional due process requirements under the circumstances, in which the corporate owner had a registered agent for service of process whose name and address were easily obtainable through the Secretary of State's Office. The Department appeals, arguing that due process does not require that it seek out a corporate owner that has failed to notify the Department of its change of address, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-131. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Fredrequos Damon Neal
The defendant, Fredrequos Damon Neal, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Peggy Gaston v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
We granted review to decide whether there was sufficient evidence to require a jury to determine |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Randy Arnwine v. Union County Board of Education, et al.
We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether the Union County Board of Education had authority to enter into a four-year employment contract with an assistant superintendent. The trial court found that the parties' four-year contract was valid. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that no statutory authority existed for the Union County Board of Education to enter into a multi-year employment contract with an assistant superintendent. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Union | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Michael Winters
Robert Michael Winters appeals his Hamilton County convictions of first-degree murder and aggravated robbery relative to events which culminated in the death of Vernise Sheffield, for which the defendant is serving concurrent sentences of life with the possibility of parole and 12 years, respectively. In this direct appeal, Winters alleges that his convictions are unsupported by sufficient evidence, that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on criminal responsibility, that the trial court erroneously admitted a letter from the defendant to his wife which was properly subject to the marital communications privilege, and that the trial court erroneously admitted a prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a state's witness. Because we are unconvinced that harmful error occurred, we affirm the defendant's first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery convictions. However, instructional error with respect to the first-degree premeditated murder conviction requires that we reverse that count and remand for a new trial. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Theresa C. Runion
The appellant pled guilty to simple burglary. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a two-year sentence with sixty days to be served in the county jail followed by probation. In this appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred: (1) in denying judicial diversion; and (2) in denying full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Hart
The Johnson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Tammy Hart, for child endangerment, vehicular homicide, and aggravated vehicular homicide after the Defendant's car collided "head-on" with another car, killing the other driver. A Johnson County jury convicted the Defendant of child endangerment and vehicular homicide. The Defendant waived her right to a jury trial on the third count of the indictment, and the trial court found the Defendant guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide and merged the vehicular homicide conviction with the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days for child endangerment, all of which was suspended except for thirty days, and twenty-three years for the aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress her medical records; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's medical records into evidence; (3) that the Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated by the admission of her medical records into evidence; and (4) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain her convictions. Finding no reversible error and concluding that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the Defendant's convictions, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Heard
A Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Terrance Heard, along with fourteen other members of the "Gangster Disciples" street gang, for first degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping, murder in the perpetration of a robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping after two men were kidnapped and beaten by the gang, leaving one victim dead. A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a kidnapping, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court merged the murder convictions, imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and twenty-five years for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and ordered all the sentences to run consecutively. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's motion to suppress the pre-trial identification of the Defendant made by a witness and by limiting cross-examination of the witness regarding this identification; (2) that the assistant district attorney improperly commented on the state of mind of the victim and a co-defendant during his opening statement to the prejudice of the Defendant; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify as to the victim's state of mind just prior to his murder concerning the Gangster Disciples; (4) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's request for a special jury instruction addressing the theories of duress and mere presence; and (5) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We find no reversible error and conclude that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the Defendant's convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stanley David Alford v. Pamela Ward Alford
We granted permission to appeal in this divorce case to determine: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying a "joint benefit" definition of marital debt and holding that debt incurred by Wife during the parties' ten-year separation was marital debt; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals correctly allocated this debt when it held that Husband should be required to pay Wife's marital debts. We hold that debts incurred by either or both spouses during the course of a marriage are properly classified as marital debt; therefore the debts at issue in this case are marital. In allocating marital debts, trial courts should consider the following four factors: (1) the debt's purpose; (2) which party incurred the debt; (3) which party benefitted from incurring the debt; and (4) which party is best able to repay the debt. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence to determine how the debts in this case should be allocated, this case is remanded to the trial court to determine the proper allocation of the marital debts. The trial court's determination shall be guided by the four factors set out above. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Phillip Mather
The appellant, Richard Phillip Mather, pled guilty in the Anderson County Circuit Court to criminally negligent homicide. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I standard offender to two years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred by failing to recuse himself from the proceedings; and (2) the trial court erred by rejecting the initial plea agreement. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Green
The defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant now appeals contending that (1) the trial court erred by allowing the defendant’s impeachment with inadmissible evidence, and (2) he was denied a fundamentally fair trial because of improper questions and argument by the prosecution. We hold that (1) the defendant’s impeachment was improper, however, the error was harmless, and (2) the State’s questions and argument were not improper, and even if they were improper, they did not rise to the level of plain error. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Donald Ben Henderson, Deceased, Jeff Henderson v. Kenneth Henderson
We granted review in this case to decide whether a probate court's rejection of all purported wills submitted for probate and the entering of an order finding that the decedent died intestate constitutes a final order for purposes of appeal. Jeff Henderson, the plaintiff-appellant, asserts that the trial court's order rejecting the decedent's wills and finding that he died intestate was not a final order because the trial court did not certify it as such under Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant-appellee, Kenneth Henderson, responds that the rejection of the submitted wills and the finding of intestacy represent a final judgment which must be appealed, if at all, within thirty days. The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, and held that the probate court's order rejecting the wills for probate was a final judgment that had to be appealed within thirty days. Since the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed beyond thirty days, the appeal was dismissed. After careful consideration, we have determined that the intermediate court correctly resolved the case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
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Monroe | Supreme Court |