Scott Jurgensmeyer, et al v. James F. Prater
M2000-02986-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
In this consolidated case involving claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground that he had not acted individually and his corporation had not been named as a defendant. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand the decision of the trial court.

James H. Randalls v. Stanley G. Hopp, M.D. And Tennessee
M2002-00771-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

W2002-01556-COA-R3-CV
W2002-01556-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Richard McDonald vs. Swain & Sons
W2002-00012-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
This is a retaliatory discharge case. In July 1998, the plaintiff truck driver began working for the defendant trucking company. In June 1999, the truck driver was involved in a one-vehicle accident while making a delivery for the company. Soon thereafter, the truck driver was discharged. The truck driver sued the trucking company in the court below, alleging that his discharge was not because of the vehicular accident, but rather was in retaliation for refusing to participate in or remain silent about alleged illegal activity by the trucking company. The trial court found in favor of the trucking company on all issues. The plaintiff truck driver now appeals on several grounds. No transcript or statement of the evidence was filed. The issues raised by the plaintiff require a review of the proceedings below that is not possible in the absence of a transcript of the trial proceedings or a statement of the evidence. Consequently, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Mary Saccomanno vs. Melvin Saccomanno
W2002-01267-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Daniel L. Smith
This is an appeal from a Final Order, granting the parties a divorce and dividing the marital property. Wife appeals and asserts that the division of marital property is inequitable. We affirm.

W2002-01687-COA-R3-CV
W2002-01687-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.

Gary Lindsey v. Philips Electronics, N.A.C.
E2002-00396-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: O. Duane Sloan, Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer appeals a finding of permanent and total disability asserting that the injury is to a scheduled member. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Thurman L. Whitsey and Charlie Mae Whitsey - Concurring
M2001-03127-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn
I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree, though, with the majority opinion’s view that, absent the defendant’s 1994 cocaine sale, the affidavit would have warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that cocaine or other evidence of drug offenses was located at the defendant’s house.

State of Tennessee v. Thurman L. Whitsey and Charlie Mae Whitsey
M2001-03127-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn
A Davidson County jury convicted defendants Thurman L. Whitsey1 and his mother, Charlie Mae Whitsey, of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to sell. The jury also convicted Thurman Whitsey of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of marijuana with intent to sell, and unlawful possession of a weapon. In addition, the jury convicted Charlie Mae Whitsey of facilitation of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, simple possession of marijuana, and facilitation of unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven years upon Thurman Whitsey and an effective sentence of seven years upon Charlie Mae Whitsey. On appeal, both defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an invalid search warrant. Charlie Mae Whitsey also submits the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for facilitation of unlawful possession of a weapon. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we reverse and dismiss Charlie Mae Whitsey’s conviction for facilitation of unlawful possession of a weapon and Thurman Whitsey’s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon; otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Union Planters Bank vs. Bobbye Shepard
W2002-01188-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
Executor brought this action to recover proceeds of the sale of decedent's property prior to decedent's death. Both parties moved for attorney's fees. The trial court entered judgment for defendant and awarded defendant's attorney's fees. On issues relating to decedent's property, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We reverse the award of attorney's fees and remand for a determination of reasonableness.

State of Tennessee v. Joe Charles Degrafenreid
W2002-00681-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The defendant, Joe Charles Degrafenreid, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence (DUI) as a second offender. In this direct appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for DUI and that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W2002-03016-COA-R3-CV
W2002-03016-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers

W2002-01474-COA-R3-CV
W2002-01474-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Edwin Boothe vs. Fred's Inc.
W2002-01414-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

Edwin Boothe vs. Fred's Inc.
W2002-01414-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey

W2002-00489-COA-R3-CV
W2002-00489-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Rita L. Stotts

W2002-02220-COA-R3-CV
W2002-02220-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon

W2002-03050-COA-R3-CV
W2002-03050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree

State of Tennessee v. Wendell Clarke Chambers
04-1303-CR-00
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder and reckless homicide. The reckless homicide conviction was merged with the murder conviction and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and in allowing a videotape and photograph of the crime scene into evidence.  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Amsouth Erectors, Llc v. Skaggs Iron Works, Inc.,
CH-01-0585-2
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.

State of Tennessee v. David Wayne Fountain
E2002-01066-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas W. Graham

David Wayne Fountain, who pleaded guilty to Class E felony attempted theft, appeals from the Rhea County Circuit Court's determination that he serve a two-year, split-confinement sentence for his crime. He claims that he should have received a minimum, one-year probationary sentence. We disagree and affirm the lower court's sentencing pronouncement. However, we modify the sentence imposed to the extent that it mandates day-for-day confinement.

The Oceanics Schools vs. Clifford Barbour, Jr.
E2002-00181-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
This matter is before us on the petition of the plaintiff for a rehearing pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 39.

Bobbie Jean Satterfield v. Lions Volunteer Blind
E2002-00969-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Kendall Lawson, Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 75 percent disability to each arm. The employer has appealed insisting the award is excessive. The judgment is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed. THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, J., and BYERS, SR. J., joined. David J. Silvus, of Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant, Lions Volunteer Blind Industries. Danny M. Hryhorchuk, of Morristown, Tennessee, for Appellee, Bobbie Jean Satterfield. MEMORANDUM OPINION The employer, Lions Volunteer Blind Industries, has appealed from the trial court's awarding the employee, Bobbie Jean Satterfield, 75 percent permanent partial disability to each arm. Facts The facts of the case are not in dispute. At the trial the employee was sixty- eight years of age. She had completed the eleventh grade in school and later obtained a G.E.D. certificate. She had been working for this employer for about fifteen (15) years and was employed as a sewing machine operator. This work involved a lot of repetitive actions of the arms and hands and during September 1997, she developed severe problems with her hands and arms. She duly reported the problems to her employer, saw several doctors and ultimately came under the care of Dr. Robert E. Ivy. After undergoing surgery on each arm, she continued to have problems when she worked even though her employer accommodated her inability to perform her work duties normally. She has continued to work because she said she liked the people she works with and is afraid of becoming depressed if she stops work. She testified that her hands still hurt and cramp and sometimes tingle and become numb. She said she was not able to perform in the open labor market. Several company witnesses testified. One official stated she was an excellent employee and that her work load was lighter as they had attempted to accommodate her inability to perform normal functions of a sewing operator. Another company representative said she continued to work a normal schedule unless production was down. Dr. Robert E. Ivy, an orthopedic surgeon specializing in hand disorders, testified by deposition. He stated he first saw her on October 22, 1997 when she was complaining of numbness and tingling in her hands; his diagnosis was bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and he first tried treatment involving cortisone injections, writ splints and medication. This treatment did not help much and he performed surgery on the right arm on January 19, 1998 and on the left arm on October 28, 1998. The doctor was of the opinion she had a 5 percent medical impairment to each arm. He stated she should consider changing to a different type job and he did not specify any restrictions. He indicated he did not have any other treatment to offer her. Dr. Foster T. Hampton III, also an orthopedic surgeon, did an independent medical examination on April 18, 21 and testified by deposition. His testimony and/or written report indicated the employee (1) had recurrent carpal tunnel syndrome after surgery; (2) recurrent tendinitis flexor tendons of both wrists; (3) recurring problems with trigger thumbs bilaterally; and (4) some residual nerve loss. He gave a 5-1 percent medical impairment to each arm and also recommended she should find another type job which would avoid repetitive action of her arms. Dr. Julian Nadolsky, a vocational disability consultant, testified before the trial court and stated he did not think the employee had any transferable job skills as she was an unskilled worker and that he was of the opinion her vocational disability was 95 percent. He stated she could perform as an usher, ticket taker, greeter, gate tender, etc. Standard of Review We are required to review the case de novo with a presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct unless we find the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-255(e)(2). Analysis The employer contends the 75 percent award to each arm is excessive. The extent of vocational disability is a question of fact to be determined from all of the evidence, including lay and -2-

Patsy A. Holcomb v. Memorial Healthcare Systems, Inc.
E2002-01226-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 6 percent permanent partial disability to her right leg. The employer contends the award of disability is excessive. The judgment is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, J., and BYERS, SR. J., joined. James T. Williams and Lynda Motes Hill, of Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant, Memorial Healthcare Systems, Inc. Harry Weill, of Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellee, Patsy A Holcomb. MEMORANDUM OPINION The employer, Memorial Healthcare Systems, Inc., has appealed from the trial court's ruling awarding the employee, Patsy A. Holcomb, 6 percent permanent partial disability to her right leg. Facts The employee, age fifty-two years, was employed at the defendant's hospital as a registered nurse with duties in the operating room as a circulating nurse. On May 11, 1999, she fell while working in the heart room and landed on her right knee, elbow and shoulder. Within a few days, she came under the care of Dr. Ballard who performed an arthroscopy procedure on her knee. She was off work about three weeks and upon returning was assigned to light duties involving paperwork. At the time of the trial below, she was working in the pretesting or pre- admission office. She testified that she was not able to return to work as a surgical nurse because she could not stand for long periods of time and because of other restrictions. She said she could not go up and down steps good and could not do her yard work anymore. She had been advised that she needs knee replacement surgery but she has not had that surgery because she is fearful of "too many things that can go wrong" and also because it would be something that would have to be repeated within five to twelve years. Dr. William T. Ballard, an orthopedic surgeon, testified by deposition and stated he performed an arthroscopy on her knee on May 14, 1999, which involved removing torn cartilage. His diagnosis was partial torn medial meniscus. He felt she reached her maximum medical improvement on about September 15, 1999 and said she should not be squatting or standing longer than ten (1) minutes an hour; that she should not climb more than five (5) steps at a time; that she had medium degenerative changes in her knee and the accident had aggravated this condition; and that she probably needed knee replacement surgery. He gave her a 2 percent medical impairment to her right leg. Dr. Edward D. Johnson, a general practitioner, appeared at the trial and testified and his deposition was also filed in evidence. He saw the employee on April 5, 21 and examined Dr. Ballard's records. He stated that if the patient's knee joint had basically stabilized after surgery, she would have a fairly normal joint and her impairment to the leg would be 2 percent. He was of the opinion her condition and impairment was not in that category. He said the tear had caused the knee joint to become unstable and the ligament was lax and not supported. The doctor indicated this condition caused abnormal motion in the knee joint and that her whole knee was deteriorating and would continue to get worse. He stated she needed a knee replacement and feared having it. He said her impairment was 2 percent to her leg and at a later point said it could be as high as 4-5 percent. He did not agree with Dr. Ballard that she had arthritis in the knee. Dr. Diana Boyd, a certified independent medical examiner specializing in occupation medicine, testified by deposition and said she examined the employee on January 8, 22 and reviewed the various reports of other doctors. She agreed with the 2 percent impairment rating but was of the opinion the injury did not aggravate her pre-existing degenerative joint disease. Dr. Sai H. Oh, a certified medical examiner, saw the employee on February 4, 22 and again at a later date. On the first visit, she felt the medical impairment was about 1 percent to the leg but on the second visit, she estimated the impairment at 2 percent due to abnormal motion of her knee. Standard of Review The review of the appeal is de novo accompanied by a presumption that the findings of the trial court are correct unless we find the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). -2-

State of Tennessee v. Jeffery Wayne Robertson
M2001-02131-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The defendant was found guilty of first degree premeditated murder by a Lawrence County jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, the trial court erred in allowing opinion testimony of a lay witness based on an experiment regarding the canning of green beans in a pressure cooker, and erred by allowing the statements of three witnesses to be read aloud by the witnesses to the jury and then become exhibits. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.