Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. Division Of Tenncare, Et Al.
This appeal involves a reimbursement limitation that TennCare imposed on “non-emergent” medical services provided by emergency department physicians. TennCare informed its managed care organizations of the reimbursement limitation via email without engaging in rule-making procedures outlined in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”). The trial court concluded the reimbursement limitation was a “rule” subject to the rule-making requirements of the UAPA and invalidated the reimbursement limitation. We hold that the reimbursement limitation falls within the internal management exception of the 2009 version of the UAPA and was therefore not subject to the UAPA’s rule-making requirements. The ruling of the trial court is reversed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tennesseans For Sensible Election Laws v. Herbert H. Slatery, III Et Al.
This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief that challenges the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-142, which criminalizes the publication of false statements opposing a political candidate. The complaint was filed by a political campaign committee that engages in direct advocacy for and against political candidates. The defendants, the Tennessee Attorney General and the District Attorney General for the 20th Judicial District of Tennessee, contended the action should be dismissed, inter alia, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the campaign committee lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court found that the committee had standing because it faced a credible threat of prosecution and, acting upon the campaign committee’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-142 contravenes the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. The court also awarded the campaign committee its attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) as the prevailing party. We have determined the campaign committee failed to establish that it had standing to challenge the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-142; therefore, we hold that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to rule on the matter. For these reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court, including the award of attorney’s fees to the campaign committee, and remand with instructions to dismiss. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Robert C. Pelt, Et Al. v. Richard E. Benjamin Et Al.
This case concerns an alleged contract for the sale of real property. Although a prior written offer regarding the property expired pursuant to its stated terms when it was not timely accepted, the trial court held that there was an oral agreement to extend the expiration date for acceptance and concluded that the Statute of Frauds did not serve as an impediment to enforcement of the parties’ alleged contract when the plaintiffs, the appellees herein, filed suit to enforce it. The trial court also concluded that no damages should be awarded under former Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-21-108 to the defendants, who had asserted a slander of title claim in the trial court. The defendants now appeal, challenging both the trial court’s contract law analysis and its decision to not award them statutory damages. Although we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, we affirm its refusal to award the defendants statutory damages for the reasons stated herein. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Elijah H.
This termination of parental rights case focuses on Elijah H. (“the Child”), the minor child of Amanda H. (“Mother”) and Kevin W. (“Father”). In March 2019, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father in the Wilson County Juvenile Court (“trial court”). The Child had previously been removed from Mother’s custody after he was born exposed to drugs. Father was incarcerated prior to the Child’s birth and has remained so continuously since that time, awaiting trial for pending criminal charges, including first degree murder. During a bench trial, Mother voluntarily surrendered her parental rights to the Child. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Child, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the Child by exhibiting wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare prior to Father’s incarceration and that Father had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father has appealed. Having determined that DCS presented insufficient evidence that Father knew of the Child’s existence at the time of his criminal behavior, we reverse the trial court’s finding that Father abandoned the Child by exhibiting wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Jabari Reynolds v. State of Tennessee
Jabari Reynolds, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. State v. Jabari Reynolds, No. E2015-00499-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 936521 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 16, 2017). Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to focus solely on a theory of voluntary manslaughter. The post-conviction court denied his petition, and Petitioner now appeals. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Prentis S. Lee v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Prentis S. Lee, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for two counts of rape resulting in a ten-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly explain the elements of two additional counts of rape in a superseding indictment. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rufus Stevens
The Defendant, Rufus Stevens, was convicted of aggravated rape, and the trial court sentenced him to serve eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because the statute of limitations had run on the offense. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erroneously limited his questioning during voir dire and that it should have granted his motion to suppress several items of evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Millard Ellis Spurgeon v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Millard Ellis Spurgeon, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2015 Sevier County convictions for burglary, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or more, and possession of burglary tools, for which he received an effective sixteen-year sentence. Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ralph Junior Lowe v. Roy Province et al.
This appeal concerns the administration of a husband and wife’s intestate estates, consisting of several tracts of real property that the husband and wife owned as tenants by the entirety. They were both found deceased in their home several days after they had died. The wife’s heir at law, her brother, filed a petition seeking a declaration that the husband died first, that the wife, as the survivor, owned the real property at her death, and it passed to her heir at law. The husband’s heirs at law responded to the petition, contending the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the couple died in any order other than simultaneously. The only witness at the trial was the medical examiner who conducted the autopsies. He testified that it was more probable than not that the husband died first based on the causes of death and medical histories of the spouses. After considering the expert witness testimony, the trial court concluded that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the husband and wife died otherwise than simultaneously. This appeal followed. Having determined that the trial court was not bound by the medical examiner’s speculative opinion as to who died first, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Myron Lorenzo Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Myron Lorenzo Johnson, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and sentenced the Petitioner to life plus sixty years. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition requesting DNA analysis of evidence pursuant to the |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacobe Lamone Snipes
The defendant, Jacobe Lamone Snipes, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of gang enhancement, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Earlesa McClellan
This is an Appeal by the State in which we are ask to conclude that a dismissal by a general sessions court for lack of probable cause is subject to de novo review by a circuit court, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-108. After the Madison County General Sessions Court dismissed the charge against Defendant, Earlesa McClellan, the district attorney general forwent a grand jury indictment and instead appealed to the Madison County Circuit Court. Finding that an appeal of a general sessions court’s probable cause determination to the circuit court is not proper procedure, the circuit court dismissed the appeal. The State now appeals to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mario Bowles v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Mario Bowles, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, that the post-conviction court judge was prejudiced against him, that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and that the trial and post-conviction courts lacked jurisdiction over the case. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shaughn Walker - Dissent
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a continuance and additional funding for an eyewitness identification expert. This case rested almost entirely on the victim’s identification of the Defendant as the perpetrator. Upon being notified by defense counsel the first day of trial that Dr. David Ross would not testify unless additional funds were provided, the trial court was understandably frustrated and concerned about further delay in this case. However, for the reasons that follow, I do not believe the trial court’s concerns about delay and expense warranted the severity of the sanction imposed on the Defendant. Because this case hinged on the victim’s identification and because the Defendant had already demonstrated a “particularized need” for state-funded expert assistance in the field of eyewitness identification, I believe the trial court erred in not granting a continuance and additional funds for a new expert. At the very least, I believe the trial court erred in not allowing testimony in some form from Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz, who was available if the trial court had simply granted a one-day continuance. Because these errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shaughn Walker
A jury convicted the Defendant, Shaughn Walker, of robbery, and he was sentenced to serve ten years in the Community Corrections program. The Defendant appeals, asserting the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification from a photographic lineup; that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the Defendant to sit at the table with counsel during trial; that the trial court erred in denying a continuance, additional funding, or other relief after eyewitness identification expert Dr. David Ross used the allocated funding prior to trial and refused to testify absent additional payment; and that he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB Et Al. v. Thomas S. Jackson
This appeal arises from an action for default on a promissory note. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as certificate trustee on behalf of Bosco Credit II Trust Series 2010-1 (“Plaintiff”), filed suit against Thomas S. Jackson (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (the “trial court”), alleging causes of action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a note executed in 2006. Defendant moved the trial court for summary judgment, alleging that he defaulted on the note in 2007 and that the property was foreclosed in 2008. Defendant averred that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when Defendant’s remaining debt was accelerated in 2008 and that Plaintiff’s cause of action was therefore time-barred by Tennessee’s six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract actions. Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion but failed to cite to any facts in the record that created a dispute as to Defendant’s statements and failed to produce any countervailing evidence. Accordingly, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and Plaintiff filed a timely appeal to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Smith
Aggrieved of his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of attempted domestic assault, the defendant, Zachary Smith, appeals, arguing that the trial court should have dismissed Count 1 of the indictment as duplicitous. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Universal Fire and Casualty Insurance Company Et Al.
Universal Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, acting as the Surety in the criminal cases of Shalisha Monique Settles (“defendant”), appeals from the judgment of the Williamson County Circuit Court ordering final forfeiture of her bond in the amount of $40,000. On appeal, the Surety argues it is entitled to relief based on its belief that the defendant was incarcerated under an alias in another state, making it “impossible” to fulfill its bond obligation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. LaVonte Lamar Douglas
The Defendant, LaVonte Lamar Douglas, appeals as of right from his convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because his involvement was based upon uncorroborated accomplice testimony and no direct evidence linked him to the offenses; (2) his right to confront a witness was violated when a police witness referenced a nontestifying co-defendant’s statement; and (3) his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional in light of his status as a juvenile at the time of the offenses. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Green v. Timothy Thomas Et Al.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing an inmate’s petition for common law writ of certiorari. Because the inmate did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Moore v. Tennessee Board of Parole
An inmate petitioned for a writ of certiorari after the Tennessee Board of Parole denied him parole. The Board moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court concluded that, in the absence of a verification attesting to the truth of the contents of the petition and proper notarization of the petition, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. So the court dismissed the petition. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James G. Akers v. Dyck-O'Neal, Inc. Et Al.
Appellant sought an injunction to stop foreclosure on real property. Appellees, the lienholder, the lienholder’s law firm, and the substitute trustee, filed motions to dismiss, which the trial court granted. After Appellant filed this appeal, Appellee lienholder filed a release of its lien on the subject property. As such, Appellant’s appeal is moot, and the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. Nancy J. Strong
This is but the latest appeal in what has been a prolonged course of litigation between the parties. In a prior appeal, this Court ruled in favor of Ms. Strong on all issues raised by the professional corporation and also held, among other things, that an injunction regarding disputed funds in the case should be dissolved. On remand, the trial court accordingly dissolved the injunction and ordered the court’s Clerk & Master to pay the disputed fund proceeds to Ms. Strong and her attorneys. The professional corporation now appeals from this decision. We affirm and hold that the funds should be immediately disbursed to Ms. Strong pursuant to the trial court’s order. Further, finding the professional corporation’s appeal to be frivolous under Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, we remand the case for a determination of Ms. Strong’s damages incurred on appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Madylynn C. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Appellants, the children’s biological mother and father, appeal the trial court’s termination of their respective parental rights to the four children on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv); (2) substantial non-compliance with the requirements of the permanency plans, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); (3) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); (4) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. §36-1-113(g)(14). Appellants also appeal the trial court’s determination that termination of their respective parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
Brian Adams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brian Adams, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery and the resulting ninety-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately cross-examine the victim and failed to object to hearsay evidence from hospital personnel. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief. |
Court of Criminal Appeals |