Richard Lynn Norton v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00305-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The petitioner, Richard Lynn Norton, appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

Carl Bland v. American Freightways Corporation
W2002-01122-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Kay Spaulding Robilio, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident to his body as a whole arising out of and in the course of his employment, (2) the trial court erred in not applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the facts of the case; and (3) the trial court erred in assigning vocational disability to the appellee because there was no expert proof. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the appeal is without merit. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Ronald L. Harper and R. Scott Vincent, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, American Freightways Corporation Lincoln A. R. Hodges, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Carl Bland MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Bland, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for an injury that occurred in the course of his employment with the employer, American Freightways. After a trial on the merits, the trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 3 percent to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Mary Frances Wynn v. Heckethorn Manufacturing Co.,
W2002-00565-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the award of benefits based on 55 percent to the body as a whole is inadequate and seeks an increased award. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. Jay E. DeGroot, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mary Frances Wynn James H. Tucker, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Heckethorn Manufacturing Co., Inc. and Vigilant Insurance Company MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Wynn, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation benefits for an accidental injury to her left shoulder and neck occurring on March 5, 1998, while she was performing production welding. Following trial on November 28, 21, the trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 55 percent to the body as a whole. The claimant has appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied bya presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Arthur Stigall v. Bronson M. Lyle, et al.
M2001-00803-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Leonard W. Martin

The plaintiff filed this action in the Chancery Court of Houston County seeking to quiet title to a parcel of property located there. The court granted the defendants' Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, and imposed sanctions pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11. Although the appellant raises legitimate issues as to the grounds cited for dismissing the complaint, we nevertheless affirm, finding that the complaint conclusively shows that the plaintiff has no colorable title to the subject property.

Boyd Stinson, et al., v. Brenda Sue Bobo
M2001-02704-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor R.E. Lee Davies

This appeal involves a conflict between neighbors over whether the Stinsons have a right to use a dirt lane that runs across the edge of Mrs. Bobo's property and connects the Stinsons' property to a county road. The trial court found a prescriptive easement was proved. Mrs. Bobo appeals that judgment to this court on two grounds: (1) that the Stinsons failed to show exclusive use of the easement during the prescriptive period; and (2) that there was no acquiescence to the Stinsons' claim of right to use the easement by the prior owners of what is now Mrs. Bobo's property during the prescriptive period. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Bobby Bobbitt, et al., v. Dorothy B. Shell, Commissioner, et al.
M2002-00512-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Appellants, state employees, were subjects of a Reduction In Force ("RIF") and appeal the order of the chancery court dismissing their petition for review of the Commissioner of Personnel's decision that their respective positions were correctly resolved in the RIF.

Joe H. Parks v. George Eslinger, et al.
M1999-02027-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Jim T. Hamilton

This second appeal in this dispute involves the trial court's modifications of a special master's report regarding the liabilities of the parties after the dissolution of their partnership. The special master reported that one partner, Mr. Eslinger, owed the other partner, Mr. Parks, $10,051.30. Mr. Parks objected, and the trial court modified the special master's report, awarding Mr. Parks an additional $45,427.04, and ordered that Mr. Eslinger pay the costs of the special master. Mr. Eslinger now appeals the trial court's modifications and award of costs. Because the record does not support the trial court's modifications, we reverse and reinstate the master's findings as amended. We modify the award of the costs of the special master.

State of Tennessee v. Jessie Jones
W2001-02774-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Fred Alxey

The defendant, Jessie Jones, appeals as of right his conviction by a Shelby County jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years in the Department of Correction. The defendant contends (1) that the trial court should have instructed the jury on self-defense and (2) that attempted second degree murder is not an offense in Tennessee. Although we hold that attempted second degree murder is an offense, we reverse the conviction because the failure to instruct on self-defense is plain error. We remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

Crystal Rena Sturgill v. State of Tennessee
E2002-00385-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The petitioner, Crystal Rena Sturgill, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court's denying her post-conviction relief from her convictions for three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of Class D felony theft. Essentially, she contends (1) that her guilty pleas were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, (2) that due process was violated by the mass sentencing procedure, and (3) that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In Re: Estate of Adam James Burress
E2002-00320-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge James L. Cotton, Jr.

This appeal involves several issues regarding the disposition of certain assets of and relating to the estate of Adam James Burress ("Decedent"), who died intestate in a one-car accident on March 5, 2001. The Trial Court imposed an equitable lien on the insurance proceeds of an automobile collision policy in favor of Eva Burress, the Decedent's grandmother, in the amount which the Court found she loaned to Decedent in order to purchase the automobile, which was totally destroyed in the accident. The Appellant, Sue Michelle Burress ("Widow"), Decedent's wife, argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred in failing to award her the insurance proceeds, and in ruling that payment of the funeral expenses should take precedence over the spousal support allowances and all other claims. The Appellees, Roy and Eva Burress, Decedent's grandparents, and Jeff and Linda Burress, Decedent's parents, have appealed the Court's ruling that the mobile home in which Decedent and Widow lived prior to their separation was not permanently affixed to the grandparents' land and thus was the Widow's personal property. We modify the judgment so as to provide that the Widow's statutory year's support allowance is exempt from claim against the estate for reimbursement of funeral expenses. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all other respects.

In the Matter of: R.L.H., A Child under Eighteen (18) Years of Age, State of Tennessee Department of Children's Services, v. Darlene Medley Hall
M2002-01179-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Floyd Don Davis

Department of Children’s Services filed petition to terminate parental rights of mother of abused, dependent and neglected minor child. Department’s termination petition was based on allegations of abandonment, mother’s failure to substantially comply with a permanency plan, the removal of the child for at least six months with little likelihood that the conditions causing removal would be remedied, and the best interests of the child. Juvenile Court granted petition terminating mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed and Remanded
 

State of Tennessee v. John Leslie George
M2001-01213-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and  theft of property valued over $500. The Defendant pled guilty to facilitation of aggravated rape and to aggravated robbery.  Following a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven years for facilitation of aggravated rape and to eleven years for aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court ordered that the two sentences run concurrently. However, the trial court ordered that the sentences run consecutively to prior sentences in Humphreys and Dickson Counties. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Rodriques McPhearson
W2002-00416-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

After the defendant, Jeremy Rodriques McPhearson, pled guilty to several unrelated offenses, the trial court ordered an effective sentence of eleven years to be served on supervised probation. When the defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated assault and trespass, the state filed a probation violation warrant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Byron Looper
E2001-01550-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Steve Daniel

The defendant, Byron Looper, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He timely appealed, presenting as issues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of witnesses who would have testified as to his location following the homicide, violating his right to due process; (2) the trial court erred in keeping under seal the psychological records of one of the State's witnesses; and (3) the evidence did not support application of the aggravating factor that the homicide was committed because the victim was a state official. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and the imposition of life without the possibility of parole.

Mortgage Management, Inc., v. Eller Media Company
E2001-3099-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Howell N. Peoples

Mortgage Management Inc. (“Mortgage Management”) sued Eller Media Company (“Eller”) claiming ownership of two billboards located on land purchased by Mortgage Management. Mortgage Management filed a motion for partial summary judgment and submitted proof showing it had purchased the land upon which the billboards were located at a foreclosure sale in 1993. Eller responded to the motion for partial summary judgment by claiming it was the owner of the billboards and submitting proof in support of its position. The Trial Court granted Mortgage Management’s motion for partial summary judgment and, after a trial on damages, awarded Mortgage Management a judgment in the amount of $149,721.14. We hold there is a genuine issue of material fact with regard to who owns the billboards. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated; Case Remanded
 

State of Tennessee v. Frankie Donald Releford
E2002-00110-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The defendant, Frankie Donald Releford, appeals his effective eight-year sentence of incarceration. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced him to confinement following his guilty pleas to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine for resale, a Class B felony; possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; possession of dihydrocodeinone, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property valued under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant contests the manner of service of his sentences, contending that the trial court erroneously denied him probation or an alternative sentence. We affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

Richard Manson v. Anthony Gross
M2000-03206-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
This appeal concerns Western Surety Company's liability on a bond it executed with Anthony Goss. The trial court entered judgment against Western Surety Company on the bond. This Court affirms the judgment of the trial court.

Sylvester Young v. Nashville & Davidson County
M2000-02455-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman
A prisoner allegedly slipped and fell on a wet floor in the Davidson County Jail, injuring his back. He brought suit against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for deprivation of civil rights and negligence. The Chancery Court dismissed his civil rights claim on a Rule 12.02(6) motion, and transferred the negligence claim to Circuit Court. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court dismissed the negligence claim. We affirm.

Joyce Mullins v. Crotty Corp.,
M2002-00159-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wooten, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer questions the trial court's findings as to causation, permanency, extent of vocational disability and mileage reimbursement. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP. J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SP. J., joined. Kirk L. Clements, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Crotty Corp. and Employee Benefit Insurance Company Edwin Sadler and James D. Madewell, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Joyce Mullins MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Ms. Mullins, initiated this civil action to recover workers' compensation for an alleged work related injury by accident. After a hearing on all issues raised by the pleadings, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on 75 percent to the left arm and reimbursement of $2,313.3 for mileage incurred to receive authorized medical treatment. The employer, Crotty Corp., and its insurer have appealed. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Kenny Searcy v. Unipres U.S.A., Inc.,
M2002-00245-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Sp .J.
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists (1) the trial court erred in concluding the plaintiff's impairment was the result of his work related injury and (2) the award of permanent partial disability benefits based on 35 percent to the body as a whole is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (22 Supp.) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed JOE C. LOSER, JR., SP .J., in which FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C. J., and JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., joined. M. Clark Spoden and Irene L. Wolfe, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant Unipres U.S.A., Inc. Clinton L. Kelly, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kenny Searcy MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee or claimant, Mr. Searcy, initiated this civil action against the employer, Unipres, to recover workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an alleged work related accident occurring on July 2, 1999. By its late filed answer, the employer admitted liability but questioned the extent of its liability for permanent disability benefits. Following a trial on December 27, 21, the trial court awarded, among other things, permanent partial disability benefits based on 35 percent to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed. For injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1985, appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (22 Supp.). The reviewing court is required to conduct an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

John Hessmer v. Fernando Miranda
M2001-02056-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
This appeal involves a state prisoner's efforts to pursue medical malpractice and wrongful death claims arising from the death of his mother. The prisoner filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court for Davidson County against his mother's treating physician and a nurse. The defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment supported by their own affidavits. The trial court granted the prisoner additional time to obtain opposing affidavits and then dismissed the prisoner's complaint after he was unable to do so. The prisoner complains on appeal that his incarceration prevented him from obtaining the opposing affidavits and asserts that the trial court erred by declining to appoint a "special master" to aid him in the discovery process. We have determined that the prisoner was not entitled to the assistance of a special master and that the trial court properly dismissed the prisoner's complaint because he failed to demonstrate the existence of a material factual dispute that would warrant a trial.

Newell Smith v. Brenda Smith
M2001-02231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Charles K. Smith
Wife filed petition for civil contempt against former Husband for failure to pay alimony as set forth in the Martial Dissolution Agreement and final decree. Husband responded, arguing that he did not have the ability to pay the alimony as agreed. The trial court found Husband in willful contempt of the previous order of the court due to his failure to pay the first two alimony installments and ordered Husband incarcerated if he did not appeal or make those payments within thirty days. Because the trial court found that Husband did not have the ability to pay at the time of the contempt hearing, we vacate the order incarcerating Husband if he does not pay.

Vincent D. Carson (Cason) v. Richard M. Gilleland
M2002-01082-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
This personal injury action by an undercover law enforcement officer resulted in judgment against appellant and two co-defendants. Appellant is an inmate with the Department of Corrections and after filing a pro se answer to the complaint took no further action in defense and more than two years after his answer was filed the case was heard in his absence and resulted in a judgment for $5,000,000.00. Plaintiff appeals and we affirm the action of the trial court.

Naomi Hausler v. Discounts R. Us
M2002-01465-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
Plaintiff, pro se, appeals the action of the trial court in denying her Petition in the Nature of a Petition to Vacate a Void Judgment and Collateral Attack. We affirm the trial court.

Dwight James v. State
M2002-01557-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves Dwight James' unsuccessful attempt to qualify as a candidate for Hickman County Road Superintendent and be placed on the August, 2002, election ballot. The trial court granted the Tennessee Highway Officials Certification Board's summary judgment motion, finding that the Board had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or illegally in not certifying Mr. James as qualified to run for the office of County Road Superintendent. We have determined that the appeal is moot.