The defendant, Tyler Ward Enix, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his sentences for harassing and stalking his estranged wife. The defendant contends that although he violated his probation, the trial court erred in sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Defendant, Nelson Keith Foster, pled guilty to and was convicted of violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order. The Defendant was subsequently sentenced to three years, to be served on probation. The Defendant appealed to this Court from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See State v. Nelson Keith Foster, No. E2001-01259-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 172 (Knoxville, Mar. 7, 2002). Pending the Defendant's appeal, he twice violated the terms of his probation. Still pending the outcome of the Defendant's appeal, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The Defendant now appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation. We reverse the trial court's order revoking the Defendant's probation and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
Matthew Poliak v. James Adcock M2000-02325-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Barbara N. Haynes
This appeal involves a dispute between a father and his adult daughter's live-in boyfriend. The boyfriend filed a personal injury suit against his girlfriend's father in the Circuit Court for Davidson County after the father assaulted him with a piece of two-by-four. The father admitted that he had assaulted his daughter's boyfriend but asserted the defenses of self-defense, provocation, and defense of property. In response to the boyfriend's motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court determined that the father had failed to produce evidence to substantiate any of these defenses. The father perfected this appeal after the trial court certified its order as final in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. We have determined that the trial court was correct when it determined that the father's evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the assault could not, as a matter of law, support his affirmative defenses. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
The Appellant, Adrian Patterson, appeals the decision of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his two community corrections sentences and resentencing him to the Department of Correction. On appeal, Patterson argues: (1) that his sentences were actually sentences of probation rather than community corrections and, as such, the trial court was without authority to enlarge his sentences; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support two of the alleged violations of his Community Corrections Behavioral Contract; and (3) that allowing a cooperating individual to testify about Patterson’s drug activity in a pending federal drug case impaired his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the revocation proceeding. Finding no merit to Patterson’s claims, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming: (1) the trial judge, at petitioner's original trial, should have recused himself from hearing the trial under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10, Canon 3(E); and (2) the public defender, at the original trial, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Based upon our review of the entire record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
The Appellant, Jonathan Blanchard, was convicted in 1988 of the sale or delivery of cocaine and sentenced to seven years in prison. Following the successful completion of his sentence, the Appellant was granted a pardon by the governor of Tennessee. The Appellant subsequently petitioned for an expungement of all public records relating to his arrest and conviction. The trial court denied the Appellant's petition and the Appellant appealed as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Defendant, Shirley Spina, was indicted in Sullivan County for custodial interference. On the morning of trial, the trial court dismissed the charge for lack of venue. The State now appeals. We reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Defendant, Edward Buck Franklin, pled guilty to two counts of attempted rape and one count of aggravated burglary. He received a sentence of three years for each conviction, with two of the sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to the sentence for the third conviction, for an effective sentence of six years. After receiving credit for time previously served in jail, his sentences were suspended and he was placed on probation. Thereafter, three probation violation warrants were filed against him. Following a hearing on the third warrant, the trial court revoked Defendant's probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sumner
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. James Michael Scott M2001-02000-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft
The defendant contests the sentences he received for his convictions of aggravated burglary (six years), aggravated assault (five years), and theft over $10,000 (four years). The court ordered the burglary and assault convictions to run consecutively to each other. We conclude upon de novo review that, although the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors, those remaining were properly applied and justified the sentences. Additionally, the fact that this offense was committed while on probation justified the imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments.
Defendant appeals the circuit court judgments denying him probation on two misdemeanor counts of passing worthless checks. We affirm pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Lincoln
Court of Criminal Appeals
Gale Smith & Co. v. The Governors Club M2001-01616-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
This is a breach of contract case. The defendant real estate developer developed a golf club. The plaintiff insurance broker entered into an insurance binder with the manager of the golf club. The "master" binder covered five separate properties with which the manager was involved. The binder listed another of the manager's entities as the insured. The manager was later terminated by the defendant and a new management company was hired to manage the golf club. The insurance broker then issued a separate policy naming the defendant as the insured and sent invoices for the unpaid premiums to the new management company. The management company declined to pay the premiums. The insurance broker then filed suit against the defendant. The trial court entered a judgment for the insurance broker for all unpaid premiums due under the insurance binder, plus interest. We affirm, finding that manager had the apparent authority to enter into an insurance contract and that there was a contract for insurance between the parties.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Vernessa Ekelem vs. Ifeatu Ekelem W2001-02986-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This is a divorce case. Both parties are physicians. Both have children from previous marriages, and they have three children together. The parties' three children were minors at the time of the divorce hearing. The father earned substantial income in 1996, which fell precipitously when he started his own medical practice in 1998. His medical practice, however, owns luxury vehicles, and the father owns a large home with significant acreage. The trial court found the father's earning capacity to be at the level of the mother's income, set child support based on that earning capacity, and established the father's parenting time with the parties' children. The father was ordered to assume the parties' tax debt, and to cease making derogatory remarks about the mother. On appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred in setting child support, in setting parenting time, in assigning the tax liability to him, and in enjoining him from making derogatory comments about the mother. We affirm as modified, and remand, awarding the mother attorney's fees for this appeal.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Daniel Goodwin vs. John Dunlap W2002-00014-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a legal malpractice action originally filed by individual plaintiff and a corporation. The individual plaintiff was acting pro se for himself and also for the corporation. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant based upon his affidavit that he complied with the standard of care representing the corporate plaintiff, that he had no attorney/client relationship with the individual plaintiff. No countervailing affidavit concerning the standard of care was filed by the plaintiffs and the dismissal of the corporation's case was also premised on the rule that a corporation cannot act pro se by a nonlawyer agent. Individual plaintiff's affidavit does not specifically refute defendant's affidavit concerning no attorney-client relationship between the individual plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Howard W. Horne
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Edward/James/Leigh Hutchinson vs. Nancy Neuman & James Day W2001-02886-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
This is a will construction case. The husband devised a life estate in land to his wife, and at her death, to his devisees. The husband devised other land in fee simple to his wife, and gave her the rest and residue of his estate. The husband died in 1954 and the wife died in 1998. The remaindermen under the husband's will argued that certain real property was included in the wife's life estate and, thus, at her death, devolved to them. The beneficiaries of the wife's will argued that the real property in question was not included in the life estate or mentioned in the husband's will, and thus the land went to the wife in fee simple by operation of the residue clause in the husband's will and should now devolve to them. The trial court found that the husband intended to include the land in question in the life estate to the wife. Therefore, the land devolved to the husband's devisees. The beneficiaries of the wife's estate appeal. We affirm.
Fayette
Court of Appeals
Felicia Webb vs. Ernest Gillespie W2001-02828-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Harold W. Horne
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Dagmar Moss vs. Alvin Moss W2001-02809-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Dewey C. Whitenton
Wife filed a complaint for divorce alleging inappropriate marital conduct and, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences, and husband filed a counterclaim for divorce on the same grounds. The chancery court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and alimony in solido in the amount of $1,000.00, to be paid toward her attorney fees, but denied wife's claim for alimony in futuro. Wife appeals. We affirm as modified and remand.
Hardeman
Court of Appeals
Norman Hamby vs. State W2002-00928-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff's fall into a ventilation pit on the University of Tennessee at Memphis (referred to herein as UT) campus when an aluminum grate covering the opening collapsed while Plaintiff was standing on it. The Commissioner of Claims of the Western Division held that the accident was not foreseeable and that UT did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the grating over the pit. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.
Court of Appeals
Connie Pugh vs. Poplar Apartments W2001-02050-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
This case involves allegations of unlawful ouster. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the defendant landlord. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Christian Yeubanks vs. Methodist LeBonheur W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: D'Army Bailey
This is a procedurally complex medical malpractice case. A child was injured in a car accident. She was taken by helicopter to the hospital, where she died. The child's mother filed suit, alleging liability on the part of three physicians, and vicarious liability on the part of the hospital for the actions of the three physicians. She also asserted that the second physician's medical group was liable for that physician's actions. The complaint was later amended to include independent allegations of liability against the hospital. The mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the first physician; however, the claim of liability against the hospital for the actions of the first physician remained. Immediately before the trial, the mother asserted that the hospital was liable for the actions of a fourth physician. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding a claim against the fourth physician was not admissible. Near the close of her proof, the mother voluntarily dismissed her claims against the second physician and his medical group. At the conclusion of the mother's proof, the trial court granted motions for directed verdict for the claims based on the independent actions of the hospital and for the claims against the hospital based on the actions of the first physician. The trial court then denied a motion for directed verdict on the claim of vicarious liability against the hospital for the actions of the third physician. The trial court then heard a motion to strike testimony related to claims against the third physician. Prior to a ruling on the motion, the mother voluntarily dismissed the claims against the third physician and against the hospital based on the actions of the third physician. The trial court awarded costs against the mother and ordered that, prior to refiling her case, the mother would be required to pay the costs. The mother appeals, arguing that consideration of the motions for directed verdict was premature, that the trial court's decision is not final and appealable, that the trial court improperly excluded evidence on claims that the hospital was liable for the actions of the fourth physician, that the trial court erred in granting the motion for directed verdict for the independent claims of negligence against the hospital, and that the trial court erred in awarding costs against the mother and in requiring her to pay those costs prior to refiling her case. We reverse the portion of the trial court's decision requiring the mother to pay the awarded costs prior to refiling her case. The remainder of the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Watson & Son Landscaping vs. Power Equip. W2002-00136-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This is a sales/UCC case. A landscaper contracted to purchase a used piece of machinery, an excavator, from an equipment company. The excavator had a defective hydraulic system. Under the terms of the sales contract, the equipment company was to repair the defective hydraulic system. The equipment company attempted to do so and delivered the excavator to the landscaper. The hydraulic system, however, did not work properly and the equipment company was unable to repair the excavator to the landscaper's satisfaction. The landscaper then had the excavator repaired by a third party. The landscaper sued the equipment company for failure to satisfy a condition precedent to the contract, and for breach of contract. The trial court awarded actual damages for the difference in value between the excavator bargained for and the excavator actually received, as well as consequential damages. The equipment company appeals. We modify the actual damages to the cost to repair the excavator, and we reverse the award of consequential damages, finding that the proof of consequential damages was too speculative to support such an award.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Sheri English vs. Chris Pretti W2001-01657-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: John R. Mccarroll, Jr.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to the Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier, finding that the carrier's liability was offset by the workers' compensation award which the Plaintiff received for her injuries. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
In Matter of R.C.V. and O.V. W2001-02102-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This is a termination of parental rights case on appeal for the second time. This Court in the first appeal reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights of the parties primarily because the trial court failed to provide counsel to the parties pursuant to Rule 39, Tenn. R. Juv. P. On remand, the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence justifying termination of parental rights pursuant to the applicable statutes and that termination was in the children's best interests. The juvenile court also held that the appointment of a special judge in this instance was not unconstitutional nor was the parent denied due process in the termination proceeding. As appealed, we affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Allen Prentice Blye E2001-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck
The Defendant, Allen Prentice Blye, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary and aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen years for the aggravated burglary, and as a Range II, violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape.The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years. The Defendant now appeals as of right, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence; erred in admitting certain testimony at trial concerning DNA evidence; that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred in refusing to grant him the services of a psychological expert for sentencing purposes; and that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors in setting the length of his sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
State of Tennessee v. Allen Prentice Blye - Concurring E2001-01227-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck
I write separately to express my concern over utilizing the ex parte search warrant process rather than an adversarial hearing to secure a blood sample from a defendant after adversarial proceedings have begun where there are no exigent circumstances. To my knowledge, this issue has not been addressed by our state supreme court.
