Owen Franklin v. State of Tennessee
E2001-00610-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr.. J.
Trial Court Judge: Michael Lacy, Claims Commissioner
This case was heard in the Eastern Division of the State Claims Commission. The Commissioner who heard the case found the plaintiff had failed to prove that he received an injury to his respiratory system and allergies as a result of exposure to chemicals in the print ship at East Tennessee State University where he was employed. We affirm the judgment.

State of Tennessee v. Felicia Joann Cannon
M2001-01875-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee
After convictions for sale and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance, the trial court sentenced defendant to nine years and ten months incarceration. Defendant appeals asserting she is entitled to Community Corrections Program. We disagree and affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Eugene Rickman and William Edward Groseclose
W1999-01744-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

The appellants, Ronald Eugene Rickman and William Edward Groseclose, appeal their convictions by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of, respectively, first degree murder and being an accessory before the fact to first degree murder. In this appeal, appellant Groseclose presents the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to sever his trial from that of co-defendant Rickman; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting at trial the former testimony of Barton Wayne Mount; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony by Gary King; and (4) whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. Appellant Rickman solely challenges the introduction at trial of Mount's former testimony. Following a careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, we remand this case to the trial court for correction of the judgments to reflect the appellants' receipt of credit for time served in the Tennessee Department of Correction prior to trial. We affirm the judgments in all other respects

State of Tennessee v. James D. Newland
E2001-01055-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Phyllis H. Miller

The defendant, James D. Newland, appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his guilty plea to rape. The defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jerry Allen Ketchum
E2001-02008-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated sexual battery. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received a four-year sentence, with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the four-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that he should have received some form of alternative sentencing. Concluding that the record supports the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Roy Lane v. State of Tennessee
E2000-00310-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ben W. Hooper, II

This appeal by the petitioner, Roy Lane, involves both a delayed appeal from his first degree murder conviction and an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. In the delayed appeal, the petitioner contends that the Cocke County Circuit Court (1) improperly admitted evidence about the petitioner's prior bad acts and (2) gave erroneous jury instructions. In the post-conviction appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As to the petitioner's delayed appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. As to his post-conviction petition, we affirm the trial court's finding that the petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel.

Judith S. Cooley v. Murray Outdoor Products, Inc.
W2001-01747-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley, Judge
In this appeal, the Defendant/Appellant asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's award of seventy-five percent (75%) to the leg as Plaintiff has minimal vocational disability. As discussed below, the panel concludes that the judgment should be affirmed.

Klosterman Development v. Outlaw Aircraft Sales
M2001-02586-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
This case involves a contract for the sale of an aircraft. By amended complaint, plaintiff-purchaser sued seller and seller's agent for rescission of the contract and defendant-seller, by counter-claim, sought the amount due for repairs made on the aircraft pursuant to the contract. The trial court ordered the contract rescinded but failed to make provisions to put the parties in status quo. The purchaser, seller's agent, and seller appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court as it pertains to seller's agent, modify the judgment for rescission to include provisions of restoring the status quo of the parties. The judgment is affirmed as modified.

State of Tennessee v. Robbie Gene Powers
W2001-01950-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

The Appellant, Robbie Gene Powers, challenges his convictions for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense; driving on a revoked license, third offense; and violation of the implied consent law. The Appellant received an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with six months and five days of incarceration in the county jail. On appeal, the Appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside or declare void two prior DUI convictions, which were used for enhancement purposes; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) his sentences were excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Obion County Circuit Court.

Courtney Brown v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.
M2001-01145-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: James L. Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: J.O. Bond, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding the employee 5% permanent partial disability for disfigurement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-27(3) (E) for scarring resulting from a friction burn sustained when her left hand got caught in a conveyor belt while working for the employer. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed. JAMES L. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, J., and JOE C. LOSER, SP. J., joined. Mary M. Little, McMinnville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc. B. Keith Williams, Lebanon, Tennessee, for the appellee, Courtney Brown. MEMORANDUM OPINION Ms. Courtney Brown was 23 years old at the time of trial. She has a high school diploma and attended college for 1.5 years majoring in pre-vet. Prior to her job at Bridgestone/Firestone, she worked as a vet technician and as a truck dispatcher at a sporting goods store. She is right-handed. On August 6, 1999, she suffered a third-degree friction burn to the back of her left hand when her hand got caught in a conveyor belt at Bridgestone/Firestone. Ms. Brown was referred to Dr. Bruce Shack, M.D., Chairman of the Department of Plastic Surgery at Vanderbilt. Dr. Shack found that she had suffered a very deep injury involving a full thickness loss of the skin across the entire breadth of the back of her left hand that would require skin grafting. On August 13, 1999, he performed skin graft surgery. On June 29, 2, Dr. Shack found that Ms. Brown had reached maximum medical improvement and released her to return to work with no restrictions. He found that she had regained full range of motion and did not require any further therapy. Although he noted that her "scars were still a little bit red", he felt the scars would "go on to probably mature satisfactorily." He did state that skin grafts require more lubrication and protection than normal skin. Dr. Shack found that she did not have any limitations on the use of her hand. Dr. Shack assigned a 2% impairment to the hand based on Page 28 Table 2 Class 1 for skin disorders contained in the AMA Guides Fourth Edition. He admitted that this section of the Guides is more subjective and vague than other sections, but felt she did deserve some impairment based on the scar. On October 16, 2, Dr. David Gaw, M.D., orthopedist, performed an independent medical examination. Dr. Gaw found that Ms. Brown had a scar 6 centimeters in length and 3 centimeters in width along the top of her left hand. He also reported she had a 1.5 centimeter scar along her left index finger. Ms. Brown expressed concern about the appearance of the scar, which Dr. Gaw described as red, thickened and tender to touch. Dr. Gaw found that her index finger would not close completely to the palm in making a fist but would only go to within 3/8 of an inch of the palm of her hand. Dr. Gaw assigned 2% impairment based on slight motion loss of the index finger and 5% impairment to the left hand for disfigurement, scars and skin graft using the same section of the Guides on skin disorders as Dr. Shack had used for his impairment rating. He did not assign specific restrictions but indicated that pain would be the limiting factor on her activities. Ms. Brown testified that the scar does affect her grip strength, there is not a lot of feeling in the skin graft area, and that the range of motion in her finger bothers her sometimes. She also stated it can be very painful if she gets hit in that area. The scar appears worse in the winter and breaks out in a bad rash. Ms. Brown continues to work for Bridgestone/Firestone earning the same wage she earned at the time of the accident. When asked how this scar affected her ability to get a job or keep a job, Ms. Brown responded as follows: I'm very ashamed of it. I keep it covered up. Most of the time I'm wearing long sleeves. I try to cover them up. I don't feel I'm as outgoing as I used to be. Especially talking with my hands or doing anything with my hands. I keep them, keep it covered most of the time. -2-

State of Tennessee v. Collin J. Johnson and Jason S. Porterfield
M2001-01973-CCA-R9-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge James K. Clayton, Jr.

The state brings this interlocutory appeal in which it challenges the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court authorizing the admission into evidence of certain testimony relating to the prior sexual behavior of the alleged rape victim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. Larry D. Simmons and Tyce Renard Jackson
M1999-01388-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway, III

The appellants, Tyce Jackson and Larry Simmons, were initially charged with delinquency in a juvenile petition filed in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County. This petition arose out of two separate car jackings occurring in October of 1997. A hearing was held in the juvenile court upon the State's petition to transfer the appellants to criminal court for trial as adults. Finding that the appellants should be tried as adults, the juvenile court transferred the case to the Montgomery County Criminal Court.

The appellants appealed their transfer by way of a petition for the writ of certiorari filed in the criminal court. The criminal court denied the writ. The appellants were indicted on two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of carjacking, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of illegal weapon possession and one count of aggravated assault. Both appellants ultimately entered guilty pleas in criminal court to one count of aggravated kidnapping and one count of aggravated assault. They each received concurrent sentences of ten and six years respectively. As part of the plea agreement the appellants reserved a certified question of law concerning the standard used by the juvenile court in transferring the appellants for trial as adults. The appellants claim that because proof at the transfer hearing showed them to be "voluntarily committable" to an institution for the developmentally disabled or mentally ill they were not subject to transfer for trial as adults. In addition, Appellant Simmons alleges that the evidence at the transfer hearing failed to adequately identify him as a perpetrator of the offenses.

We find that while Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-134(a)(4)(B) prohibits the transfer to criminal court of juveniles who are "involuntarily committable" to a mental health facility, no such prohibition exists with respect to juveniles whose mental disorders might make them subject to voluntary admission to a mental health facility. In addition, we find that Appellant Simmons has failed to present this Court with a record sufficient to permit review of the issue concerning his identity as a perpetrator of the offenses at issue in this appeal. The judgments, conviction and sentences are therefore affirmed.

Ted Ray Brannan v. State of Tennessee
M2000-01668-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Buddy D. Perry

The defendant, Ted Ray Brannan, was found guilty by a Franklin County jury of aggravated burglary and theft of property. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twelve years, ten years as a Range III persistent offender for his aggravated burglary conviction to be served concurrently with his twelve year sentence as a career offender for his theft of property conviction. The defendant appealed his conviction to this Court, and we dismissed the appeal, finding that the appeal was not properly before this Court because the defendant had failed to file a timely motion for new trial or a timely notice of appeal. See State v. Ted Ray Brannan, No. 01C01-9704-CC-00148, 1998 WL 242453, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, May 15, 1998). The defendant then sought post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court found that the defendant was deprived of a direct appeal because his counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the post-conviction court granted the defendant a delayed appeal. However, the court found that the defendant's other allegations of error were meritless. The defendant is now before this Court on a delayed appeal challenging the post-conviction court's finding that his other post-conviction issues lacked merit. Although we find that the lower court should have dismissed the post-conviction petition when granting him a delayed appeal, in the interest of judicial economy, we will address the issues pertaining to the post-conviction petition as well as those in his direct appeal. Having found that all the issues in this appeal lack merit, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

In Re: Adoption of A.B.K.
E2001-02199-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
Presented with competing petitions for adoption, the trial court terminated the parental rights of W.T.D., Jr. ("the biological father") to his natural daughter, A.B.K. ("the subject child"). The trial court based termination on the failure of the biological father to visit the subject child; it made the order of termination a final judgment pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. The biological father appeals, contending, among other things, that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. The trial court has reserved a ruling on the competing petitions to adopt pending a resolution of this appeal. Under the unique circumstances of this multiple-petition case, we find that the trial court should resolve all matters, including the issue of adoption, before this case is ripe for appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's Rule 54.02 designation and remand for further proceedings.

Vivian Warner, Admin. Est. of Maude Frazier vs. Dewey Frazier
E2001-02126-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Steven C. Douglas

Vivian Warner, Admin. Est. of Maude Frazier vs. Dewey Frazier
E2001-02126-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Steven C. Douglas

Willa Huskey vs. Jerry Martin
E2001-02312-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
This is a property line dispute. The defendant Jerry Martin appeals the trial court's finding that the parties' shared boundary line is as alleged in the original complaint. Martin argues that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's factual findings regarding the location of the boundary line. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Polk County Board of Education vs. The Polk County Education Association
E2001-02390-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant
A declaratory judgment action was filed by the Polk County Board of Education ("The Board") seeking a declaration that it did not have to arbitrate two grievances filed by the Polk County Education Association ("Association") after the Board unilaterally implemented two new policies. The policies at issue involve increasing the workday of the teachers by 30 minutes by requiring teachers to perform "bus duty", and implementation of a dress code. The trial court held that lengthening the workday was a matter suitable for arbitration, but concluded the dress code was not. We affirm the trial court's conclusion as it pertains to lengthening the workday, but vacate and remand for further proceedings its decision on the arbitrability of the dress code.

City of Sevierville vs. Bill Green
E2001-02467-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
This appeal from the Sevier County Circuit Court questions whether the Trial Court erred in awarding landowners compensation for incidental damages to their property because the City of Sevierville changed the frontage access to their property from unlimited access to restricted access. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Michael Watkins v. Greg Fitzgerald
M2000-03197-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman
This case originated in the General Sessions Court of Davidson County wherein Greg Fitzgerald filed an unlawful detainer warrant against Michael Watkins relative to real property at 1127 Delmas Avenue in Nashville. Then, Michael Watkins filed an action against Fitzgerald for wrongfully evicting him from the same property. Mr. Watkins then filed a civil warrant against Constance Regina Wilson and Curtis Sharp, Jr. for breach of contract asserting an agreement between the parties relative to the same real estate. Judgments of the general sessions court were appealed to the circuit court, consolidated and heard in circuit to the end that circuit court judgments were rendered in favor of Fitzgerald, Wilson and Sharp, and against Michael Watkins. From these judgments Watkins appeals and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Kathy Jean Berry v. Sara Lee Corporation d/b/a Jimmy
W2001-00041-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford, Chancellor
In this appeal, Defendants/Appellants asks: (1) Did the trial court err in finding that Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury to her shoulder?; (2) Did the trial court err in finding that Plaintiff sustained a second and distinct compensable injury to her right elbow?; and (3) Did the evidence presented at trial preponderate against the amount of the permanent partial disability benefits awarded by the trial court, with respect to the shoulder injury and the second right elbow injury? As discussed below, the trial court did not err and this panel has concluded that the judgment should be affirmed.

James Williams v. Salvadore Valdez v. TAPCO Underwriters
M2001-00666-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman
In an action brought by an insured against his insurer for indemnity, the trial court entered judgment after the defendant insurer moved for involuntary dismissal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. We vacate the judgment and remand. In an action brought by an insured against his insurer for indemnity, the trial court entered judgment after the defendant insurer moved for involuntary dismissal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02. We vacate the judgment and remand.

David Ralph Liles, et al. v. Rebecca Sue Mitchell, et al.
M2001-02037-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd
Mark Steven Blair appeals the action of the trial judge in granting custody of his minor child, born out of wedlock, to the maternal grandparents. Finding that a substantial risk of harm might occur to the minor child if custody was placed with Mr. Blair and that the biological mother of the child was incarcerated, the trial court vested custody of the child in the maternal grandparents with substantial visitation rights given to Mr. Blair, the biological father. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Carol Soloman v. Klebber Murrey
M2001-00806-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Donald P. Harris
Before their marriage, the parties signed a pre-nuptial agreement, which among other things, declared their intention to "equally divide any and all living expenses." When they divorced, the trial court enforced the agreement, and ordered the husband to reimburse the wife for her far greater contribution to such expenses during the course of the marriage. The husband argues on appeal that the living expenses provision should not have been enforced, because it is contrary to public policy. We affirm the trial court.

Hilton Jeffries v. TDOC
M2001-02300-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves a prison disciplinary proceeding. A prisoner at the Southeast Regional Correctional Facility was charged with four serious disciplinary infractions. He pleaded guilty to three charges, and a prison disciplinary board found him guilty of the fourth. The board placed the prisoner in punitive segregation for five days and ordered him to pay $810 in restitution from his inmate trust fund account. The prisoner filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County alleging (1) that his guilty pleas had been coerced and (2) that he had been denied due process on the fourth charge by the board's failure to provide him twenty-four hours notice of the hearing and its interference with his opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. The trial court granted the Tennessee Department of Correction's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the prisoner's petition. We have determined that the trial court erred by granting the summary judgment with regard to the $810 restitution order because the record contains material factual disputes regarding whether the prisoner waived his right to twenty-four hours notice of the hearing and whether the board refused to permit him to call an exculpatory witness.