State of Tennessee v. Mickey Verchell Shanklin
A jury convicted the Defendant, Mickey Verchell Shanklin, of the sale of heroin, the delivery of heroin, the sale of fentanyl, and the delivery of fentanyl and assessed fines of $50,000 for the heroin convictions and $25,000 for the fentanyl convictions. The trial court merged the heroin convictions and the fentanyl convictions and ordered the Defendant to serve concurrent terms of thirty years for the heroin convictions and fifteen years for the fentanyl convictions as a Range III, persistent offender at forty-five percent. The trial court also affirmed the total fines of $75,000. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the fines are excessive. We remand the case to the trial court for a hearing with regard to the fines. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mickey Verchell Shanklin - Dissent
I dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority that it is necessary to remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the fines owed by the Defendant. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Trinity S. et al.
A mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. She challenges the juvenile court’s determination by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen A. Simpson
The Loudon County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Stephen A. Simpson, with one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. Following trial, a jury convicted Defendant of both counts. For the DUI count, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to forty-eight hours in confinement and the remainder to serve on supervised probation. For possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, the court sentenced Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. The trial court ran the sentences concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his DUI conviction. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re LeAnn K. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights as to five of his children. Father now appeals, contending that there was a lack of clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision. For the reasons stated in this Opinion, we vacate in part, reverse in part, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Ashley Lockhart v. Casey Dawn Higgins
A father filed a petition to change the surname of his nonmarital child. After the trial court granted the father’s petition, the mother appealed. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of establishing that a surname change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Wesley H. Luthringer v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Wesley H. Luthringer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of aggravated vehicular homicide, alleging that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new counsel and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy W. Alexander
The Defendant, Jeremy W. Alexander, appeals as of right from the Henderson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his effective twenty-seven-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his three guilty-pleaded convictions for sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his sentence and that an alternative to full incarceration should have been imposed to allow him to seek treatment for his methamphetamine addiction. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonathan Finley v. Wettermark Keith, LLC
In this legal malpractice action, the trial court determined that any duty owed by the defendant law firm to the plaintiff ceased when the law firm undisputedly terminated its representation of the plaintiff more than five months prior to expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s underlying claim. The court found that the plaintiff had ample time within which to hire new counsel before the statute of limitations would have run on his personal injury claim. The court also found that the plaintiff had failed, within that timeframe, to obtain new counsel or inquire about the status of his claim such that any damages he suffered were due to his own inaction. The court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant law firm. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Terry E. Et Al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court concluded that multiple grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights existed and that termination was in the Children’s best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grainger | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Joseph Dinguss
The Defendant-Appellant, Aaron Joseph Dinguss, pled guilty to vehicular homicide and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the Defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding enhancement factor (10) applicable without proof that anyone other than the victim was placed at actual risk by the Defendant’s conduct. We conclude that the trial court misapplied enhancement factor (10) because there was no proof of a high risk to the life of any human other than the victim, but that the nine-year sentence is nonetheless entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony W. Carrick Et Al. v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee
Following a single-vehicle accident on a road owned and controlled by the City of Shelbyville (the “City”), Tony Carrick and his wife, Linda Carrick (together, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit against the City alleging damages for personal injury, injury to property, and loss of consortium. The City moved for summary judgment on the basis that it retained its immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) because it had no actual or constructive notice of a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition on the road where the accident occurred. The trial court agreed with the City and granted its motion for summary judgment. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the City had actual or constructive notice of the condition at issue. We reverse. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Anthony Santillan
Joseph Anthony Santillan, Defendant, appeals from his convictions for second degree murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, and effective sentence of life imprisonment plus five years for his involvement in the shooting death of a Nashville tourist in September of 2016. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by limiting the questioning about a witness’s criminal history; (2) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from questioning a witness about leniency in exchange for her testimony; (3) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting evidence of Defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting gruesome crime scene photographs into evidence; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricardo Antonio Demling v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ricardo Antonio Demling, was convicted by a jury of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, for his involvement in stealing two utility trailer vehicles (UTVs), and sentenced to fifteen years as a Range III persistent offender to be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences.1 He now appeals from the denial of postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on the following grounds: (1) upon receipt of the State’s amended discovery response containing a statement by the petitioner and the name Christopher Brown, the alleged owner of a UTV, trial counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the charge, failure to suppress the statement by the petitioner, and failure to file a motion to continue the trial; (2) failure to interview and secure the testimony of Christopher Brown; (3) failure to file a motion based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tenn. 1999), concerning the alleged destruction of a dash cam recording of the instant traffic stop; (4) failure to file a speedy trial motion to dismiss based on the sixty-seven month delay between the date of the alleged crime and the date of the arrest; and (5) failure to file a motion to dismiss based upon the sixteen month delay between the date of the arrest and the trial.2 Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James D. Duncan
The Defendant-Appellant, James D. Duncan, pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for resale and was give a suspended sentence of ten years on supervised probation. The trial court later revoked the Defendant’s probation following the issuance of a violation of probation warrant and a revocation hearing. The Defendant now argues on appeal that the trial court should have sua sponte recused itself due to comments made during the probation revocation hearing. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Anderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Martin Reese v. The Waters of Clinton, LLC
This healthcare liability action was brought against a skilled nursing facility. The plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to multiple potential defendants prior to initiating the action. The plaintiff, however, failed to include as part of the pre-suit notice a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization as one of the six core elements was missing from the authorization. Following a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), the Trial Court granted the motion and dismissed the action against the defendant due to noncompliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 and as being untimely. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s request to compel discovery in this matter concerning whether the plaintiff had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirement. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the Trial Court erred by not treating the defendant’s motion as a motion for summary judgment and by preventing the plaintiff from conducting discovery regarding the plaintiff’s compliance with Section 29-26-121, as well as the resulting prejudice to the defendant. Discerning no error, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in all respects. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ahleigha C.
The Juvenile Court for Cocke County (the “trial court”) entered an order terminating the parental rights of Jose G.L. as to his minor child, Ahleigha C. (the “Child”). The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s rights should be terminated for abandonment and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the Child. Father appeals. Because the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services failed to prove either ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Ahleigha C. - Dissent
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights. Based upon this Court’s decisions in prior cases, I believe that there was clear and convincing proof that Father has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child. |
Cocke | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Jerome Canzoneri v. Colleen Luella Burns
This case involves a petition to modify a permanent parenting plan for two minor children. The children’s father filed the petition, alleging that there had been a material change of circumstances since the plan was entered and that, as a result, he should be designated as the children’s primary residential parent. The children’s mother denied that there had been a material change of circumstances and filed a counter-petition to modify the father’s child support obligation. After a hearing on the parties’ petitions, the trial court found that there had not been a material change of circumstances to justify modifying the plan. However, the trial court modified several aspects of the plan. The trial court further found that the father was voluntarily underemployed and that his child support obligation should be modified accordingly. Father appealed. We affirm the trial court in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Cordalro Strickland v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment. Thereafter, the Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, concluding that the Petitioner had not proven that Counsel was ineffective, and that the Petitioner’s pleas were made knowingly and voluntarily. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dejavone Lee Woods
A jury convicted the Defendant, Dejavone Lee Woods, of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm in the attempted commission of a dangerous offense, and he received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the State failed to negate self-defense, that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, that the trial court erred in admitting testimony about a surveillance video, that the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and that he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a review of the record, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to appellate relief and affirm the judgments. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mainor Canales v. State of Tennessee
Mainor Canales, Petitioner, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration. State v. Mainor Celin Avilez Canales, No. E2017-01222- CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 2084957, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2018). This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed following a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to investigate and present an expert witness; and (2) deprived him of his right to a Rule 11 application to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Lee Richardson
The defendant, David Lee Richardson, appeals the revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his convictions of false imprisonment and domestic aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of the total effective sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward G. Jameson
The Defendant-Appellant, Edward G. Jameson, was convicted of three counts of statutory rape by an authority figure and eight counts of incest. See §§ 39-13-532 (statutory rape by an authority figure); 39-15-302 (incest). The trial court classified the Defendant as a Range II offender and imposed a total effective sentence of fifty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that 1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions in Counts One through Four; 2) the indictments for Counts One, Three, Seven, and Ten are barred by the statute of limitations; 3) the State failed to elect a specific offense in Count Ten; 4) the trial court committed plain error in sentencing him as a Range II offender; and 5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the convictions and sentences in Counts Five, Six, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen, and we reverse and vacate Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, and Ten and dismiss those indictments. We finally remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Milan Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. F/K/A Milan Express, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc. Et Al.
We granted permission to appeal primarily to consider how, if at all, the economic loss doctrine, which generally precludes recovery for purely economic losses in tort actions, applies in Tennessee to claims of fraudulent inducement. We hold that when, as here, a fraud claim seeks recovery of only economic losses and is premised solely on misrepresentations or nondisclosures about the quality of goods that are the subject of a contract between sophisticated commercial parties, the economic loss doctrine applies. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the economic loss doctrine bars the plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim. We also affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the plaintiff’s claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) is barred as a matter of law because the trucks at issue are not “goods” as that term is defined by the portion of the TCPA on which the plaintiff relied. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(7) (2013 & Supp. 2020). We, therefore, set aside the plaintiff’s award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the TCPA. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the separate grounds stated herein. |
Madison | Supreme Court |