State of Tennessee v. Joe Scott
W2001-00589-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The defendant, Joe Scott, was convicted of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range II sentence of 19 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.

Eric Wright v. State of Tennessee
W2001-00386-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph B. Dailey

The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 11, 2000, in which he attacked convictions entered in September 1990 and upon which final appellate action was taken in 1992. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing, because it was filed outside the
statute of limitations. Concluding that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing, we reverse and remand to the post-conviction court for such a hearing.

State of Tennessee v. Mario A. Johnson
W2001-00372-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The defendant, Mario A. Johnson, was convicted of facilitation to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 20 years for facilitation of first degree murder and a concurrent sentence of 23 years for especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgments are affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Kenneth L. Boggs
M2000-02724-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The defendant, Kenneth L. Boggs, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court conviction of unlawful possession of a handgun, a Class E felony. He complains on appeal that the trial court erred in not addressing the prosecutor's exploitation of the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent following his arrest. Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm the conviction.

State of Tennessee v. Troy D. Ryan
II-599-151-B
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The defendant appeals from a conviction of theft of property over one thousand dollars. The sole issue presented for review is the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the value element of the offense. We conclude that the testimony by the owner of the stolen property was sufficient for the jury to find that the fair market value of the property was over one thousand dollars. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Charles David Vanderford
W2000-02639-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The appellant, Charles David Vanderford, appeals the order of the Circuit Court of Hardin County revoking the community corrections sentences that he received following his convictions by a jury of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. The appellant challenges the trial court's reliance upon his commission of crimes during the pendency of his appeal from his convictions of felony drug possession and prior to the commencement of his community corrections sentences. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Waldo Wiggins, Jr.
W2000-02766-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

Following transfer to circuit court for trial as an adult, the juvenile defendant, Waldo Wiggins, Jr., was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant challenges (1) whether the denial of bail by the juvenile court and subsequent bond of $ 250,000 set by the circuit court violated his right to due process of law, and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record, we affirm.

Richard Arnold and his wife, Barbara Arnold v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
01A01-9505-CV-00203
Authoring Judge: Judge Samuel L. Lewis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta M. Shipley

This is an appeal by defendant/appellant, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro"), from the judgment of the trial court against it in favor of plaintiffs/ appellees, Richard and Barbara Arnold, and crossdefendant/ appellee, Gloria Ford.

Glen D. Alcorn v. State of Tennessee Metro Police Department
01A01-9507-CH-00315
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. Allen High

Glen Alcorn, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, petitioned the Chancery Court of Davidson County for an order that he be furnished with copies of certain documents that he believed would be helpful in the appeal of his conviction. Mr. Alcorn asked the chancery court to compel the State of Tennessee to provide him with the transcript of jury voir dire in his trial, and to compel the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department to provide him with a copy of the investigative file in his case. The court dismissed Mr. Alcorn's petition on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm the dismissal.

Frank B. Chadwick, Jr., v. Clarksville-Montgomerty County Unified School System, and Clarksville-Montgomery County Unified School Board
01A01-9504-CV-00166
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Walton

This is a negligence case in which the Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's finding that Defendants did not breach their duty of care.

State of Tennessee v. Dale Godwin
W2001-00212-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree

In 1995, the Defendant pled guilty to four felony drug charges for which he received three concurrent eight-year sentences and one concurrent five-year sentence, to be served on Community Corrections. Subsequently, the trial court revoked the Defendant's Community Corrections sentences and ordered him to serve twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to re-sentence the Defendant and that the twelve year sentence was improperly imposed. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Charles William Jones
M2001-00353-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steve R. Dozier

The Defendant, Charles William Jones, was convicted of second degree murder in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court improperly applied two enhancement factors in sentencing the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wills Electric Co., Inc. v. Hassan Mirsaidi
M2000-02477-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
A general contractor withheld the final payment for work completed by his electrical subcontractor, and the subcontractor sued for breach of contract. The trial court awarded the subcontractor the contracted-for amount, as well as pre-judgment interest and consequential damages. We reverse the award of consequential damages. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Jerry Damon Williams
M2000-02592-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge James K. Clayton, Jr.

On September 25, 2000, the Defendant, Jerry Damon Williams, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401. Pursuant to Rule 37 (b)(1)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law to be reviewed by this Court. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) he properly reserved the certified question of the validity of the police's initial investigatory stop and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of the investigatory stop. We vacate the Defendant's conviction and dismiss the case.

Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc.
M2001-00506-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This dispute arises from a contract for capital improvements entered into between the plaintiff and the agent of the defendant. The primary issues on appeal are whether the agent had the authority to bind the defendant to the contract, and whether the trial court erred in limiting the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff. We affirm in part and modify the judgment.

Perry Saleem Lee v. State of Tennessee
M2001-01141-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge R.E. Lee Davies

The petitioner, Perry Saleem Lee, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Williamson County Circuit Court, which held that the petitioner's claims for relief had been either previously determined or waived. The petitioner complains about his appointed counsel and the state's purported shortcomings in the post-conviction process. He also complains about the trial court not allowing an amendment to the petition, not allowing an evidentiary hearing, and not setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law as to each ground he raised. We affirm the trial court.

Linda Frye vs. Ronnie Frye In Re: Judgment of Herbert Moncier
E2001-00732-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
This suit was filed in July of 1999 to enforce two judgments in favor of attorney Herbert S. Moncier ("Plaintiff") against Ronnie Charles Frye ("Defendant"). The Trial Court granted judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $32,242.29. In the first appeal to this Court, we concluded the action was not filed timely, vacated the judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and dismissed the lawsuit. No appeal was taken from that decision. The present appeal involves the Trial Court's holding of Defendant in criminal contempt for willfully disobeying post-judgment orders of the Trial Court to respond to discovery and appear for deposition. These orders were entered and the alleged contemptuous conduct occurred before the underlying judgment was reversed by this Court. We affirm.

In Re: K.A.Y.and A.M.Y.
E2001-00398-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
Wayne and Mary Stuart ("Stuarts"), as foster parents, had physical custody of a set of twins ("Children") for approximately a year and a half when the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed the Children from the Stuarts' home and placed them with Paul and Susan Young ("Youngs"). The Stuarts later filed a petition in Knox County Juvenile Court seeking custody of the Children. While the custody matter was pending, the Youngs filed an adoption petition in the Trial Court which was granted. The Stuarts filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the adoption decree. The Trial Court granted this motion. The Youngs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and cited three grounds in support of their motion: (1) the requirement that adoptive parents have custody of the child; (2) DCS's consent to the adoption; and (3) the statutory foster parent preference for adoption. Without deciding the Stuarts' petition for custody, the Trial Court granted summary judgment as a matter of law to the Youngs. The Stuarts appeal. We affirm.

Tom Lockett vs. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc.
E2001-01000-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Harold Wimberly
In this appeal from the Knox County Circuit Court the Defendants/Appellants, Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc., and Austin Powder Company, contest the Trial Court's award of prejudgment interest to the Plaintiffs/Appellees, Tom Lockett and his wife, Betty Lockett. In addition, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants appeal the Trial Court's denial of their requests for discretionary costs. We affirm the order of the Trial Court as to both its award of prejudgment interest to the Plaintiffs and its denial of discretionary costs to the Defendants. However, we vacate the Trial Court's order as to its denial of the Plaintiffs' request for discretionary costs and remand for consideration in accord with this opinion.

Jan Burns vs. James Burns
E2001-01039-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jacqueline E. Schulten
In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court's awards of alimony pendente lite and alimony in futuro to the wife. The record before us does not demonstrate that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

Michael Sutton vs. Larry Barnes
E2001-01911-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
The plaintiffs, Cocke County homeowners, brought this action seeking compensation for damage caused to their home by blasting activity on their neighbors' property. In response to interrogatories, the company that did the blasting identified the Cocke County Highway Commission as the provider of the explosives. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, naming Cocke County and the Cocke County Highway Commission (collectively "the County") as additional party defendants. Upon the County's motion, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint as to the County, holding that their action is time-barred. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the discovery rule applies to their action against the County, and, therefore, their claim is not time-barred. The County argues that even if the plaintiffs' action is not barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We hold that the discovery rule applies to actions against governmental entities and that there is a genuine issue for trial as to when the plaintiffs' cause of action "ar[ose]." We further hold that the complaint adequately states a cause of action, but only as to the plaintiffs' claim of common-law negligence. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

2001-00523-COA-R3-CV
2001-00523-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman

Phillip Coldwell v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.
E2000-02950-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained an accidental injury and awarded the plaintiff the replacement cost of his prosthetic foot. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Reversed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J. and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Lynn C. Peterson, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. Jana Durham Terry, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Phillip Coldwell. MEMORANDUM OPINION Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Peace v. Easy Trucking Co., 38 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 21). Facts The plaintiff, who was injured in a 1979 motorcycle accident, has an above the knee prosthesis. On December 28, 1998, the plaintiff was working for the defendant's insured. He had just dismounted a tow motor and taken a step when he heard a popping, breaking sound and the flex foot section of his prosthesis broke. The plaintiff had to leave before his shift ended in order to seek a replacement prosthetic foot, but he was able to return to work the next day. He suffered no injury to any other part of his prosthetic leg or to his body and suffered no pain when the prosthesis broke. Mr. Terry Parsons of Morristown Orthotics and Prosthetics testified that he examined the flex foot and found no visible signs of wear and tear in the foot. Mr. Parsons also testified that in May of 1998, he had recommended the entire above the knee prosthesis be replaced. He testified his recommendation was based on Medicare guidelines regarding the anticipated life of a prosthetic device as well as the fact that the plaintiff had been experiencing problems with the hydraulic knee. Mr. Parsons also stated the normal life of a prosthesis varies from person to person. The prosthesis at issue in this case was fitted on February 9, 1994, as a replacement for the original, post-accident prosthesis. The plaintiff's health insurance denied the May 1998 claim for the cost of a replacement prosthesis. The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained an accidental injury and awarded the plaintiff the replacement cost of the prosthetic flex foot system. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. Discussion The defendant argues that Tennessee's workers' compensation law does not permit recovery of the replacement cost of the plaintiff's prosthetic foot. In order to be eligible for workers' compensation benefits, an employee must suffer "an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which causes either disablement or death." TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-12. Injury includes whatever lesion or change in any part of the system that produces harm or pain or a lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or capability. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993). Tennessee case law traditionally follows the premise that some bodily harm resulting from a physical cause must be proven before the "injury" requirement is satisfied. See T. Reynolds, Tennessee Workers' Comp. Prac. and Proc., (4th ed.) _8-1. The question of whether a plaintiff may recover the replacement cost of an artificial member when the accident that damaged the artificial member does not also cause physical injury is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Generally, in the absence of an express statutory provision that allows compensation for injuries to artificial limbs or members,1 such injuries are not compensable. 9 Couch on Insurance 1 Jurisdictions with such statutes include: Alaska Stat. _23.3.395(17); Cal. Lab. Code _328; _287.2(3); Ind. Rev . Stat.; KRS 342 .1 1(1 ); R.S. M o. (19 99) ; Miss. Code Ann. _ 71 .3-3 (2 ); N.C . Gen . Stat. _97 -2-(6); N.D. -2-

Brenda L. Lee v. Hippodrome Oldsmobile, Inc., Robert E. McAdams, Steve Jackson
01A01-9705-CV-00202
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This appeal results from an employer’s recruitment and subsequent termination of an at-will employee after only two weeks of work. The employee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging breach of an implied employment contract, promissory fraud, and outrageous conduct. The trial court granted the employer’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the employee appealed. We vacate the order of dismissal because we have decided that the complaint states a claim for promissory fraud, albeit barely.

Curtis Daniels vs. Mary Daniels
E2001-00605-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
This appeal from the Circuit Court of Rhea County questions whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award Ms. Daniel any portion of Mr. Daniel's retirement benefits, whether the Trial Court erred in dividing the marital estate, and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award Ms. Daniels rehabilitative alimony. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in part and reverse in part.