Charles Kendall Duty, et al v. Farah Dabit, et al
M2001-00586-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: C. L. Rogers
This appeal involves a suit brought by the purchasers of a new home. The seller and purchaser entered into a contract of sale, wherein the seller agreed to construct a home on a parcel of real property. Having no construction experience, the seller hired a contractor to construct the home. Upon the completion of the home and closing on the property, the purchasers discovered numerous defects that were allegedly caused by a failure to construct the home in a workmanlike manner. The purchasers filed suit against the seller and the contractor. The seller and the contractor hired an attorney, but the attorney eventually withdrew from the case. Four months after the attorney's withdrawal, the case proceeded to trial. The seller, acting pro se, arrived at the trial several hours late. By the time the seller had arrived, the contractor and purchaser had completed voir dire and the contractor had been dismissed through a judgment on the pleadings. With the trial judge acting as finder of fact, the trial proceeded and a judgment was entered against the seller in the amount of $22,182.84. After the trial, in an attempt to amend his pleadings to assert a cross-claim against the contractor, the seller moved the court for a new trial or to set aside the judgment. The trial court denied the seller's motion and for the following reasons, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. James Bradley Warner
M2001-01371-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell
The defendant was convicted of theft of property over $500, after being observed leaving a Wal-Mart store with merchandise for which he had not paid. In his appeal, he alleges that the proof of the value of the items was insufficient and that the trial court erred in ruling that certain of his prior convictions could be used for impeachment and in sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Anthony L. Rogers
M2001-01729-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John W. Rollins

The defendant, Anthony L. Rogers, was indicted for attempted second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. He pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As his sole issue on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ralph Richards v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.
M2000-01255-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins
We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel erred in concluding that the evidence preponderated against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the employee's injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. We therefore reject the Panel's findings and conclusions and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Clement Bernard, M.D. v. Sumner Regional Health Systems
M2000-01478-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Don R. Ash
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
On or about March 26, 1999, the appellee Sumner Regional Health Systems, Inc. revoked appellant Clement F. Bernard, M.D. privileges to practice medicine at Sumner Regional Medical Center. Consequently, Dr. Bernard filed a complaint on March 29, 1999, alleging procurement of breach of contract and defamation. On February 9, 2000, Sumner Regional Health Systems filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Dr. Bernard could not establish viable claims for procurement of breach of contract or defamation. The trial court granted Sumner Regional's motion. On June 12, 2000, Dr. Bernard filed a Notice of Appeal and this litigation resulted.

Robert Davis, et al v. Wilson County
M2000-00785-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
We granted this appeal to determine whether county employees had a vested interest after retirement in health care benefits provided under resolutions passed by the Wilson County Commission. The chancellor found that the appellants had a vested interest in health care benefits because they were county employees who met the requirement of ten years of service and eight years of continuous service with Wilson County under a 1992 resolution. The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor's judgment, concluding that the health care benefits were welfare benefits in which the appellants did not have a vested interest. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we hold that the health care benefits were welfare benefits that did not vest automatically and that there was no clear and express language in the resolutions that the health care benefits were intended to vest or could not be terminated. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment.

E2001-01963-COA-R3-JV
E2001-01963-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Suzanne Bailey

T.H. Engineering & Mfg. & Ron Tourte vs. Chris Mussard
E2001-02406-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
Plaintiff sued on promissory note. Defendant counterclaimed on grounds of breach of contract, violation of Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraud. The Trial Court entered Judgment for plaintiff and defendant has appealed. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey - Dissenting
2002-00030-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

As acknowledged by the majority in its carefully considered opinion, trial judges are vested with broad discretionary powers in the conduct of a trial. Courts must monitor all attorney conduct and may direct a remedy if the performance impedes the orderly administration of justice. United States v. Dinitz, 538 F. 2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1976). That authority necessarily includes the supervision of appointed counsel for indigent defendants. Moncier v. Ferrell, 990 S.W.2d 710
(Tenn. 1998). An extraordinary appeal to this court on any issue relative to the supervision of the trial which requires immediate appellate review may be granted only in limited circumstances: (1) when the trial court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require intervention; or (2) if necessary for a complete determination of the case. Tenn. R. App. P. 10.

State of Tennessee v. Jerry B. Graves
E2001-00123-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant was convicted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent punishment of life imprisonment and twenty-three years, respectively. In his appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in not remanding the matter for another preliminary hearing after it was discovered that the first hearing had not been recorded; in limiting his cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses as to pending matters; and in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim's head, with the scalp pulled back, to show the gravity of his wound. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Thomas Dee Huskey
E2002-00030-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, brings this extraordinary appeal in which he challenges the order of the Knox County Criminal Court removing his lead counsel of record for his retrial on four counts of first degree murder. The defendant asserts that the trial court’s action is an infringement on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We conclude that the trial court’s order violated the defendant’s right to counsel and exceeded its discretion. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

Flynt Engineering Company vs. William Cox
E2001-02457-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
This is a suit by Flynt Engineering Company against William Cox, seeking to recover the value of services rendered to Mr. Cox under the terms of a written contract. The trial judge granted a summary judgment in favor of Flynt Engineering in the amount of $115,753.15. We affirm.

Jeffery A. Wright v. Johnston Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper
E2000-02542-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court found the plaintiff suffered a 5 percent permanent medical impairment as a result of an injury sustained while working for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jeffery A. Wright v. Johnston Coca-Cola & Dr. Pepper
E2000-02542-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor
The trial court found the plaintiff suffered a 5 percent permanent medical impairment as a result of an injury sustained while working for the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Heirs of Neil Ellis v. Estate of Virgie Ellis
M1999-00897-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: David Loughry
The issue in this case is whether property held in a tenancy by the entirety is subject to the 120-hour survival rule contained in section 31-3-120 of the Tennessee Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Three days after her husband's death, Mrs. Ellis died of unrelated natural causes, and her will was admitted to probate. The husband's heirs sought to intervene in the probate proceeding, claiming that because Mrs. Ellis did not survive her husband for 120 hours, section 31-3-120 deems both to have died "simultaneously." Consequently, they argued, Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-3-104 authorized them to seek a one-half interest in the entireties property. The trial court denied the motion to intervene, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal to this Court, we hold that section 31-3-120 does not require one spouse to survive the other by 120 hours in order to obtain fee simple title to property formerly held by the entirety. We also hold that the General Assembly, in enacting section 31-3-120, did not intend to define the term "simultaneously" in section 31-3-104 as meaning "within 120 hours." Instead, we conclude that the legislature intended that this term should continue to receive its ordinary construction, meaning "at the same time." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

State of Tennessee v. Robin Davis
W2000-03137-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John P. Colton, Jr.

The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and theft over $1000, receiving a life sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive two-year sentence for the theft conviction. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, he filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his murder conviction, he argues that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to misstate law during voir dire; in not allowing defense counsel to question potential jurors about their personal experiences with crime; in allowing hearsay evidence to be presented at trial; in allowing the State to introduce evidence of uncharged crimes; and in allowing the prosecutor to make improper statements during closing argument. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Lue J. Holcomb
W2001-00743-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. C. Mclin

The appellant, Lue J. Holcomb, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of aggravated burglary. The trial court imposed a sentence of three and one-half years and ordered that six months of the sentence be served in confinement with the balance on probation. The appellant timely appealed, arguing that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tony Walker
W2001-00929-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood

The Appellant, Tony Walker, appeals the verdict of a Fayette County jury finding him guilty of attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, Walker raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. After a review of the record, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Gregory Scott Allison
E2001-00248-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant, Gregory Scott Allison, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's revoking his probation that was ordered for his sentences for burglary and theft. The defendant contends that although the trial court may have been justified in finding that he violated the terms of his probation, it erred in sentencing him to confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Corey L. Malone v. State of Tennessee
M2001-02133-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.
The petitioner originally pled guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery for an effective sentence of twenty years. The petitioner filed a post-conviction relief petition, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal, the petitioner contends (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After review, we affirm.

Mario Lambert v. Jack Morgan, Warden
M2002-00172-CCA-RM-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The Defendant, Mario Lambert, appealed as of right from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. This Court held that the trial court was without authority to sentence the Defendant as a Range I standard offender with a thirty percent release eligibility for the offense of second degree murder. We therefore concluded that, based on the record before us, the sentence imposed appeared to be an illegal sentence. We therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. See Mario Lambert v. Jack Morgan, Warden, No. M1999-02321-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 599 (Nashville, Aug. 7, 2001). On January 23, 2002, our supreme court remanded this case to us, directing us to reconsider our opinion in light of State v. Burkhart, 566 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. 1978), and further directed us, on remand, to "clarify the action to be taken by the Criminal Court pursuant to the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals when the case is remanded to the trial court." We again reverse the judgment of the trial court summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

State of Tennessee v. James Wesley Strombergh
E2001-00199-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Stephen M. Bevil

A Hamilton County jury found the Defendant guilty of third offense driving under the influence and imposed a fine of $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days' incarceration, ordered him to attend an alcohol rehabilitation program, and revoked his license for a period of five years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his restricted driver's license. Although we conclude that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the Defendant's conviction, we conclude that evidence concerning the Defendant's restricted driver's license was improperly admitted at trial. We therefore reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

Robert Brown v. Dept of Labor and Workforce Development
M2001-01625-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
The appellant suffered an injury while on the job. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development denied him workers' compensation benefits. Appellant sued the state for monetary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

Columbia Advertising v. Ralph Isenhour
M2001-01627-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge James L. Weatherford
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
In this suit to collect payments for advertising services allegedly rendered to defendant pursuant to an oral agreement, the plaintiff failed to file an order setting the case for trial within the time period allowed by an agreed scheduling order. Shortly thereafter, the trial court dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion seeking relief from the order of dismissal on the grounds that by mistake, counsel had failed to calendar the scheduling deadlines. The trial court found that plaintiff failed to offer an adequate basis to grant relief from the order of dismissal under Rule 60 and denied the motion. For the reasons set out in this opinion, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for a trial on the merits.

Dawn Larsen Niceley v. James Jacob Niceley, IV
M2001-02182-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
After a sixteen-year marriage and one child, Husband and Wife both filed for divorce. After hearing the evidence, the trial court fashioned a parenting plan which named Husband the primary residential parent during the school year and named Wife the primary residential parent during the summer and most holidays and school breaks; valued and divided the marital property; and awarded Wife attorney's fees as alimony in solido. We affirm the parenting plan and the distribution of marital property but reverse the award of attorney's fees because the trial court found Wife was not economically disadvantaged.