Marta Monzon vs. Miguel Angel Monson
E2000-03155-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
The appellant, Marta Monzon, filed her notice of appeal more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court's final judgment. As a consequence of this late filing, we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Marta Monzon vs. Miguel Angel Monson
E2000-03155-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: L. Marie Williams
The appellant, Marta Monzon, filed her notice of appeal more than 30 days after the entry of the trial court's final judgment. As a consequence of this late filing, we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Sandra Krug vs. Jean Wahl
E2000-02959-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Telford E. Forgerty, Jr.
This is an appeal from the Trial Court's refusal to set aside a judgment rendered in Oklahoma which Plaintiff Sandra Krug petitions to have registered on the ground that the Defendant, Jean E. Wahl, was never served with process in connection with the Oklahoma proceedings. Because there is no transcript of the hearing below, we must conclusively presume that the evidence supported the determination of the Trial Court. We affirm

State of Tennessee v. Scott Ray Anderson
E2000-03040-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

The defendant appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Blount County revoking his community corrections sentence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the penitentiary. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

John E. Gaines vs. TN Dept. of Correction
M2001-00268-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
John E. Gaines is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction and while in custody at Middle Tennessee Correctional Complex Annex was a work release inmate. He was charged with violation of T.D.O.C. policy for failure to timely appear at his job site pickup station following the workday of May 10, 2000. Upon conviction in prison disciplinary proceedings and exhaustion of appellate remedies within the Tennessee Department of Correction, he filed, in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, a petition for a writ of common law certiorari. The Chancellor sustained a motion to dismiss under T.R.C.P. 12(6) and, upon consideration of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

State of Tennessee v. William A. Tansil
M2000-02940-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The defendant, William A. Tansil, appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but one hundred fifty days being suspended. He contends that the trial court erred in finding him to be a third-time offender, arguing that the judgment for one of his prior convictions is void on its face. We affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Robert G. Bean
M2000-02797-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter

The appellant, Robert G. Bean, challenges his conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. He presents the following issues for our determination: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's challenge for cause of prospective juror Thelma Woodard; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress the State's use at trial of the videotape of the traffic stop of the appellant's vehicle; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on adult driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in using the appellant's 1996 conviction of DUI to enhance the appellant's sentence. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Eugene L. Tindell v. Travelers Insurance Company
E2000-01488-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance, Judge
The trial judge found the plaintiff had failed to show he had suffered a compensable injury and dismissed the petition.

State of Tennessee v. Ronnie D. Denson
M2000-02583-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Burch

he defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed four-year sentence, and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant any alternative sentence and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals the trial court's judgment denying him an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Dean Kinningham vs. State of TN
M2001-00495-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Appellant was an inmate housed at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution, having been transferred to this secure facility after overpowering a guard and forcibly escaping confinement at Claiborne County Jail. He was convicted and sentences imposed upon him for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, possession of a Schedule II controlled substance for sale, possession of a handgun by convicted felon and felony escape, these sentences being imposed on August 3, 1999. Appellant was assaulted by a fellow inmate and filed claim against the State for alleged negligent custody or control of persons resulting in the inmate attack. The Claims Commission rendered summary judgment for the State and we affirm.

Ronald Dwayne Carter vs. Paulette D'Anne Carter
M2001-00692-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This is an appeal by Paulette D'Anne Carter from the refusal of the trial court to set aside a default judgment and a final judgment adjudicating divorce and custody. We affirm the trial court.

April Price vs. Kenneth Price
W2000-01471-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
This appeal follows a divorce action in which the trial court awarded custody of the parties' two minor children to the father. The mother appeals only the award of custody. We affirm.

Mitzi Lyne vs. George Price
W2000-00870-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is an intentional interference with employment case. An at-will employee worked as a secretary for a university's athletic department. The employee was discharged when she allegedly refused to cooperate with her supervisor and remain silent about conduct she believed was illegal and in violation of the university's policies. The employee filed a lawsuit against, among others, her former supervisor in both his individual and his official capacities for intentional interference with her employment with the university. The trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The employee appeals the dismissal of the claims against the former supervisor in his individual capacity. We reverse, finding that the employee's complaint states a cause of action based on the allegations that the employee's supervisor procured her discharge to further his own personal interests and for reasons unrelated to furthering the interests of the university.

Joan Schmitt vs. James Smith
W2000-01726-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This dispute arises from an action to enforce an attorney's lien in a divorce action. Appellant contends that a separate suit is required to enforce the lien, and, further, that the lien was lost through the attorney's failure to have it noted in the final judgment. Appellant also submits that the trial court erred in issuing injunctive relief without notice, hearing or bond against proceeds of marital property against which the lien was filed. We hold that the attorney's lien was lost due to failure to note it in the final judgment or by a timely Rule 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgment. We further hold that the Rule 65.07 exception to the requirements of injunctive relief in some domestic relations cases does not apply to the case at bar, where, although the original suit was a divorce action, the issue presented for resolution is essentially based on contract.

Mitchell Anderson vs. Dr. Ken Warren
W2000-02649-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
Buyers of home sued sellers for damages resulting from numerous defects in home not disclosed to buyers and in direct contradiction of the representations made about the property. The trial court found sellers had fraudulently misrepresented the condition of the property and awarded damages. Sellers appeal. We affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Daniel Paul Batchelor
E2000-02264-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Steven Bebb

Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of hindering a secured creditor, a Class E felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Tracy Gober
E2001-00296-CCA-R9-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

The issue is how to compute the number of prior offenses available for consideration in determining multiple offender status pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(3). We conclude to compute the number of prior convictions available for consideration, the court must first determine whether the defendant has any prior convictions occurring within ten years of the date of the instant conviction. If so, all prior convictions shall be counted occurring within twenty years of the date of the instant conviction provided no period greater than ten years has elapsed between any two preceding prior convictions. An example is contained in the opinion. We reverse the trial court’s order amending the indictment to charge third offense and reinstate the original indictment charging ninth offense driving under the influence.

Harold Lee Jackson v. Jim Rout, Mayor of Shelby County,
CH-00-0776-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

State of Tennessee v. Robert Morrow
E2000-02796-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert E. Cupp

The defendant entered a best-interest guilty plea in the Cocke County Criminal Court to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the criminal exposure to HIV conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for one of the aggravated rape convictions, and as a multiple rapist to 24 years incarceration for the other aggravated rape conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the sentences for an effective sentence of 78 years incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the length of the sentences and the consecutive service imposed. Based upon our review, we affirm the sentences imposed.

Roger Wayne Braden v. State of Tennessee
E2000-03072-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

On April 29, 1999, the petitioner's status on community corrections was revoked and he was resentenced. On May 15, 2000, he filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition. The issue is whether the petition is time-barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202. Because the revocation and resentencing became final thirty days after its entry, which was May 29, 1999, as the State concedes, and we agree, the petition was timely filed. We reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CH-00-1635-3
CH-00-1635-3
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

Elvis Wayne Ivey v. Long Hollow Leasing, Inc.,
M2000-02112-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr. Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge
In this appeal, the defendant-employer contends the trial court abused its discretion by (1) awarding the plaintiff-employee a default judgment after the defendant failed to obey an order compelling discovery, and by (2) denying its motion for a new trial. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed.

Wright Medical Tech. vs. Bernard Grisoni & Biogeneration Inc.
W2000-01302-COA-R7-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This case involves the alleged use of confidential information by an ex-employee. The defendant employee worked for the plaintiff employer developing a medical product. The employee signed an agreement prohibiting the use of confidential information after his employment ended, but did not sign a non-competition agreement. The employee was terminated and thereafter began manufacturing a competing medical product. The plaintiff employer sued and obtained a temporary injunction prohibiting the ex-employee from manufacturing the product. The trial court later dissolved the injunction. Subsequently, it found the defendant employer liable for malicious prosecution and punitive damages, awarding damages of over $9 million. The employer appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part and modify. We reverse the finding of malicious prosecution, holding that the evidence is insufficient to establish malice or lack of probable cause. We also reverse the award of punitive damages. We affirm the trial court's dissolution of the injunction against the former employee, and find that the compensatory damages are limited by the amount of the injunction bond. Consequently, the award of compensatory damages is modified to this amount.

Tn Farmers Mutual vs. Ford Motor
W2001-00046-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This is a consolidated appeal of three products liability cases. Three vehicles manufactured by the defendant automobile company were destroyed by spontaneous combustion, allegedly caused by a defective steering column. No personal injuries resulted from the fires, and no other property was damaged. The plaintiff insurance company, which insured the cars, paid the owners the value of the vehicles. The insurance company, as subrogee for the insureds, then filed the actions below, seeking to recoup the payments from the defendant automobile manufacturer to the insureds on a theory of products liability. The trial court dismissed the actions, holding that the economic loss doctrine precluded recovery in tort, because the product damaged only itself in each case. The plaintiff insurance company now appeals. The appeals were consolidated for purposes of our review. We affirm the trial court in all respects, finding that the economic loss doctrine precludes recovery in these cases.

Donna Harris vs. Rulon Harris/Paige Williams vs. F. Beach Jr.
W2001-00502-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This appeal involves a realtor's commission for a failed sale of real property that was jointly owned by parties to a divorce. Upon the divorce of the property owners, the court ordered that their residence be sold. Having a listing agreement with a realtor in place, a contract for the purchase of the property was signed. After difficulty consummating the sale, the realtor and the purchaser intervened in the divorce and were granted specific performance of the contract. The court's order set a closing date and an alternative divestiture closing date in case the parties again refused to cooperate. As contemplated by the court, the divorcing property owners failed to attend the closing and a date for the divestiture closing was set. A foreclosure was to occur, however, before the divestiture closing. One hour before the foreclosure, the purchaser under the contract acquired the note and allowed the foreclosure to proceed. The purchaser then acquired the remaining interest in the property at the foreclosure. The chancery court ordered the purchaser to pay to the realtor a commission on the amount paid for the note. The purchaser appealed, and for the following reasons, we reverse.