Opinions

Cathy Hall vs. City of Gatlinburg
E2001-01470-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Rex Henry Ogle
Cathy L. Hall ("Plaintiff"), was attending a convention at the convention center of the City of Gatlinburg ("Defendant"), when she fell and sustained physical injury. Plaintiff fell in one of two separate areas just mopped by Defendant's employee. After the parties submitted proof at trial, the Trial Court found Defendant negligent. The Trial Court allocated 80% fault to Defendant and 20% fault to Plaintiff. In addition to Plaintiff's compensatory damages, the Trial Court awarded damages for loss of consortium to Plaintiff's husband, Eddie Lee Hall ("Husband"). Defendant appeals, as do Plaintiff and Husband. We affirm.

Amy Arnold vs. Kevin Arnold
E2001-00527-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
In this divorce action, husband has appealed the amount of child support awarded, the custody award, and the alimony and attorney's fees awarded to wife. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court.

Curtis Daniels vs. Mary Daniels
E2001-00605-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
This appeal from the Circuit Court of Rhea County questions whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award Ms. Daniel any portion of Mr. Daniel's retirement benefits, whether the Trial Court erred in dividing the marital estate, and whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award Ms. Daniels rehabilitative alimony. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in part and reverse in part.

Susan Cooper vs. Kent Cooper
E2001-00716-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown, III
This appeal from the Chancery Court of Hamilton County questions whether the Trial Court erred in increasing Ms. Cooper's alimony award. Additionally, it questions whether the Trial Court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Ms. Cooper and in refusing to dismiss her Answer and Counter-Complaint. We affirm the decision of the Trial Court in part and reverse in part and remand.

In Re: Estate of Hillary R. Sanders
E2001-00946-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.
In this appeal from the Claiborne County Chancery Court the Appellants, Conda Sanders, Bratcher Lee Sanders, John Sanders, Linda Blazier, Bettie Gray, Kathryne Brock and Vonna Beason, contest the Trial Court's finding that the valid and controlling will of Hillary Sanders is the will executed by him on June 22, 1992. The Appellants contend that the joint will executed by Hillary Sanders and Fairobelle Sanders on September 8, 1974, is an irrevocable contract and, therefore, it, not the will of June 22, 1992, is the valid and controlling will of Hillary Sanders. We affirm the order of the Trial Court and remand with directions.

John Poore vs. Sonya Poore
E2001-01250-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
In this custody dispute, the Trial Court awarded custody of the children to the father who was not the biological parent of one of the children. We vacate the Judgment as to that child and remand with instructions to apply the correct analysis of the evidence as to the custody of the child.

Phillip Coldwell v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.
E2000-02950-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: John K. Wilson, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained an accidental injury and awarded the plaintiff the replacement cost of his prosthetic foot. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Reversed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, J. and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Lynn C. Peterson, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. Jana Durham Terry, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Phillip Coldwell. MEMORANDUM OPINION Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Peace v. Easy Trucking Co., 38 S.W.3d 526 (Tenn. 21). Facts The plaintiff, who was injured in a 1979 motorcycle accident, has an above the knee prosthesis. On December 28, 1998, the plaintiff was working for the defendant's insured. He had just dismounted a tow motor and taken a step when he heard a popping, breaking sound and the flex foot section of his prosthesis broke. The plaintiff had to leave before his shift ended in order to seek a replacement prosthetic foot, but he was able to return to work the next day. He suffered no injury to any other part of his prosthetic leg or to his body and suffered no pain when the prosthesis broke. Mr. Terry Parsons of Morristown Orthotics and Prosthetics testified that he examined the flex foot and found no visible signs of wear and tear in the foot. Mr. Parsons also testified that in May of 1998, he had recommended the entire above the knee prosthesis be replaced. He testified his recommendation was based on Medicare guidelines regarding the anticipated life of a prosthetic device as well as the fact that the plaintiff had been experiencing problems with the hydraulic knee. Mr. Parsons also stated the normal life of a prosthesis varies from person to person. The prosthesis at issue in this case was fitted on February 9, 1994, as a replacement for the original, post-accident prosthesis. The plaintiff's health insurance denied the May 1998 claim for the cost of a replacement prosthesis. The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained an accidental injury and awarded the plaintiff the replacement cost of the prosthetic flex foot system. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. Discussion The defendant argues that Tennessee's workers' compensation law does not permit recovery of the replacement cost of the plaintiff's prosthetic foot. In order to be eligible for workers' compensation benefits, an employee must suffer "an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment which causes either disablement or death." TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-12. Injury includes whatever lesion or change in any part of the system that produces harm or pain or a lessened facility of the natural use of any bodily activity or capability. Fink v. Caudle, 856 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. 1993). Tennessee case law traditionally follows the premise that some bodily harm resulting from a physical cause must be proven before the "injury" requirement is satisfied. See T. Reynolds, Tennessee Workers' Comp. Prac. and Proc., (4th ed.) _8-1. The question of whether a plaintiff may recover the replacement cost of an artificial member when the accident that damaged the artificial member does not also cause physical injury is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. Generally, in the absence of an express statutory provision that allows compensation for injuries to artificial limbs or members,1 such injuries are not compensable. 9 Couch on Insurance 1 Jurisdictions with such statutes include: Alaska Stat. _23.3.395(17); Cal. Lab. Code _328; _287.2(3); Ind. Rev . Stat.; KRS 342 .1 1(1 ); R.S. M o. (19 99) ; Miss. Code Ann. _ 71 .3-3 (2 ); N.C . Gen . Stat. _97 -2-(6); N.D. -2-

Brenda L. Lee v. Hippodrome Oldsmobile, Inc., Robert E. McAdams, Steve Jackson
01A01-9705-CV-00202
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

This appeal results from an employer’s recruitment and subsequent termination of an at-will employee after only two weeks of work. The employee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County alleging breach of an implied employment contract, promissory fraud, and outrageous conduct. The trial court granted the employer’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the employee appealed. We vacate the order of dismissal because we have decided that the complaint states a claim for promissory fraud, albeit barely.

Daniel B. Taylor v. Donal Campbell
M2001-00479-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's sentence credits. After his request for a declaratory order was denied, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against the Commissioner of Correction and others seeking a declaration that the Department had miscalculated his sentence and had erroneously refused to classify him as a Range I especially mitigated offender. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition. We concur with the trial court's conclusion that the Department is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, accordingly, affirm the summary judgment.

Billy Lattimer v. Dept of Correction
M2000-03126-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
A prisoner filed a lawsuit against the Department of Correction and some of its employees, claiming that the employees had confiscated and destroyed his photo albums, and that their actions amounted to an unconstitutional deprivation of his due process rights. The trial court dismissed the suit without prejudice, ruling that the prisoner had only stated a claim for ordinary negligence against the State, and thus that the only forum available to him was the Tennessee Claims Commission. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Roger Thomas v. Gail Thomas
M2001-01226-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

Roger Thomas v. Gail Thomas
M2001-01226-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton

Bd. of Commissioners of Roane County vs. Joe Parker
E2001-00146-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Frank V. Williams, III
The Plaintiffs acquired a nine-acre tract of land zoned A-1, the General Agricultural District, which was the least restrictive zoning district in Roane County, and soon announced their intention to house a tiger thereon, a permissible use, which motivated the County to amend its Regional Zoning Ordinance by creating a new zoning district, A-2, with the permissible use declared to be the keeping thereon of exotic animals. Within three years the Plaintiffs had fifty or more exotic [Class I] animals on their nine-acre tract. They acquired three additional tracts which they requested be rezoned A-2 in order to expand their exotic animal sanctuary. Rezoning was refused and the Plaintiffs filed suit alleging the refusal was arbitrary and capricious; the County filed suit, seeking to enjoin the Plaintiffs from keeping more than one exotic animal

City of Knoxville vs. The Clinch Locust Garage
E2001-00297-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman
The Trial Court established the respective interests of owners and lessees in sums received in an Eminent Domain Case. On appeal, we affirm.

State v. John R. Farner, Jr.
E1999-00491-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether Tennessee law recognizes a co-perpetrator rule which bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide on the basis that the victims were co-participants in the drag race. After fully and carefully considering the record in this case in light of the relevant authorities, we conclude that no rule of Tennessee law bars the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide as a matter of law. We hold that causation in criminal cases generally is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury, that a victim's contributory negligence is not a complete defense but may be considered in determining whether or not the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of death, and that a jury's determination of the causation issue will be reviewed on appeal under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard and not disturbed so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination. Because the trial court in this case failed to provide the jury with an instruction on proximate causation, an essential element of the offense, and because the jury was erroneously provided an instruction as to criminal responsibility, a theory that the State now concedes is inapplicable, the defendant's convictions for criminally negligent homicide must be reversed.

Susan Whiton vs. Alan Whiton
E2000-00467-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

Susan Whiton vs. Alan Whiton
E2000-00467-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II

Leon Williams General Contractor, Inc. vs. Hugh Hyatt
E2001-00434-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Sharon J. Bell
In this consolidated appeal Leon Williams General Contractor, Inc., and Leon Williams, individually and d/b/a Old World Cabinets appeal orders denying their demands for arbitration. We reverse the order of the Chancery Court denying the demand for arbitration filed by Leon Williams General Contractor, Inc. and affirm the order of the Circuit Court denying the demand for arbitration filed by Leon Williams, individually and d/b/a Old World Cabinets.

Dept.of Children's Svcs vs. LaShondra Whaley
E2001-00765-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: C. Van Deacon
This appeal from the Juvenile Court of Bradley County questions whether the Trial Court erred in terminating the parental rights of Ms. Whaley. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

Stan Mosley vs. Carrie Mosley
E2001-01006-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley
In this divorce case, the husband appealed the classification and division of the parties' marital property and the basis for awarding child support. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, as modified.

Stuart Lowenkron vs. Laura Lowenkron
E2001-00957-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Thomas R. Frierson, II
The spousal support obligation of the appellant was suspended during his disability, but was ordered to resume when he returned to the practice of medicine. He disfavors the requirement that he must resume alimony payments when he returns to employment. Judgment affirmed.

Mary Henry vs. Obstertrics and Gynecology Consultants
E2001-01246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman

Mary Henry vs. Obstertrics and Gynecology Consultants
E2001-01246-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Dale C. Workman

Susan Whiton vs. Alan Whiton
E2003-01279-COA-RM-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Ben W. Hooper, II
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, it reversed our determination that the guidelines promulgated with regard to child support were unconstitutional and remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration in light of the recently-released opinion in Gallaher v. Elam, S.W.3d 2003 WL 2010731 (Tenn. May 2, 2003).f

Firefly Industries, Inc. v. Rhonda Sexton
E2001-00132-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Conrad Troutman, Jr., Circuit Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann._ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee 25 percent disability to the body as a whole. The employee has appealed insisting the award is inadequate and should be much higher. The employer argues certain medical expenses were unauthorized and that the incident in question caused no vocational disability. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to the award of disability and modified as to the allowance of medical expenses. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Modified and Affirmed THAYER, SP. J., in which ANDERSON, J. and BYERS, SR. J., joined. Charles B. Sexton, Oneida, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Rhonda Sexton. Linda J. Hamilton Mowles, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Firefly Industries, Inc. OPINION In this case the trial court awarded the employee, Rhonda Sexton, 25 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Being dissatisfied with the amount of the award, the employee has appealed. Basic Facts The record indicates the employee was 49 years of age and lacked one and one- half credits in graduating from high school. She never obtained a G.E.D. certificate but has some vocational training in a basic computer course. She was a licensed cosmetologist and had 15 years experience in this type of work. She had some training and experience as an insurance sales agent and five years experience (part-time) as a school bus driver. During her employment career, she had 15 years experience in secretarial work. At the time in question, January 13, 1998, she was employed as a secretary with Firefly Industries, Inc., a company involved in metal fabrication. On this day she was asked to go down in the plant and work with a box of metal parts. She testified the box of parts weighed about 4-5 pounds and as she attempted to pull it off the table to move the box, she said the box started to fall and she felt a pop in her back with pain running down her buttock and left leg. She called for help and supervisor Gloria Adkins came over and assisted her. She told Adkins she had hurt herself but did not need medical treatment. On January 2, she decided she had better go see a doctor and went to Dr. D. Bruce Coffey, a family practice physician, who treated her with medicine and therapy and then after a period of time referred her to several other doctors. She eventually returned to work during March 1998 but only worked a light duty job for about 1 days. As to her physical condition prior to the incident in question, she told the court she had neck and shoulder pain that had been diagnosed as fibromyalgia; she suffered from endometriosis which caused some back pain; she had upper back pain for which she took pain medication; and she had suffered from depression. She also testified she had hurt her back at work during June 1997 while lifting but never mentioned the event to her employer. Medical records (Exhibit #3) from a doctor's clinic indicate chronic back pain dating back to late 1996. At the trial she stated she could not do housework or walk very far; that because of the pain she could not really do any type work and had not looked for work. She said she was very depressed and had gained 3-4 pounds since the accident. Gloria Adkins, a supervisor in the plant, testified that before the January 13 incident, she complained all the time about back pain and she quoted the employee as saying she hurt her back (1) at home scrubbing carport concrete, (2) at a family reunion, (3) vacuuming the office, and (4) moving stuff in the office. She said the box of metal parts weighed about 2-3 pounds and that the box did not start to fall but was still resting part on and part off the table when she took it from her. Adkins also testified that before the incident the employee said she was taking six different kinds of medicine for various problems. Lester S. Webster, Sr., part owner and president of the company, testified she told him shortly after the incident she had hurt her back but she did not need to see a doctor. The incident was not reported to the workers' compensation carrier as an injury. He stated the first he realized she was claiming any injury was when one of the doctors called his office several weeks thereafter. He said she had a lot of complaints about back pain before the incident and she said she was taking six different kinds of medicine. Mr. Webster also told the court that when she stopped working she -2-