Robert Terry Davis, et al vs. Wilson County, TN M2000-00785-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: John D. Wootten, Jr.
Wilson County sought to modify its health insurance plan providing coverage for "retired" employees. Two employees, fitting the definition of retired employees but not yet retired, challenged the modification on the ground that their rights in the prior plan had vested. The Chancery Court of Wilson County held that the employees had a vested right to continue under the prior plan. We hold that health insurance benefits are welfare benefits that do not vest absent a contractual provision that they cannot be changed. We therefore reverse the lower court's decision and dismiss the complaint.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Marika Avery vs. Thomas Avery M2000-00889-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
In this divorce case ending a 25 year marriage, the trial court classified a bequest made solely to the husband as marital property under an "implied partnership" theory and divided the bequest equally. The parties' other property was divided, and the wife was awarded alimony in futuro. The husband appeals the classification and division of property and the award of alimony in futuro. We reverse the trial court's classification of the bequest as marital property and classify the original bequest as Husband's separate property. We find the increase in value of that separate property to be marital because of the parties' contribution to its maintenance and increase. We modify the award of marital property accordingly, modify the alimony award, and decline to award Wife attorney fees on appeal.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Allison Coats v. Smyrna/Rutherford County Airport Authority M2000-00234-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant following two requests by the plaintiff pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act for certain documents relating to the Smyrna Airport negotiations with Wiggins Group, PLC./Plane Station, Inc. The plaintiff alleged a statutory right to inspect certain documents. Ultimately, the trial court ordered all of the documents released to the plaintiff, but ordered correspondence addressed to or signed by the SRCAA attorney placed under seal pending appeal. The principal issue on this appeal is whether the appellee is entitled to the documents under seal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Patricia Mora vs. Gilberto Mora W1999-02483-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos
This case involves a dispute stemming from the parties' divorce in 1991. The divorce decree provided that Ms. Mora and the parties' adult daughter could live in the marital home for thirty months following the divorce, at which time the home was to be put on the market for sale and the proceeds divided. After the thirty month period expired, Mr. and Ms. Mora attempted to settle the dispute concerning the marital home. The parties each executed documents, and a dispute arose as to which document embodied the parties' intentions. The trial court ruled on the parties' settlement dispute, and the court also appointed Ms. Mora as the adult daughter's guardian and ordered that Mr. Mora provide support for his daughter. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Defendant, Bryan Herman Dowdy, appeals his jury convictions for vehicular homicide by intoxication, two counts of vehicular assault, and felony evading arrest. He was sentenced to eight years and six months for vehicular homicide, two years for each of the vehicular assaults, and two years for felony evading arrest, with an effective sentence of ten years and six months. In this appeal, he raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether items from his vehicle were improperly admitted; (3) whether his blood alcohol test result was improperly admitted into evidence; (4) whether the underlying DUI charge should have been severed; (5) whether he was improperly denied access to an officer's personnel file during cross-examination; (6) whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to use their "common sense;" and (7) whether his sentence was excessive. After our review of the record, we find all issues to be without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Lauderdale
Court of Criminal Appeals
Musson Theatrical vs. Federal Express W2000-01247-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Plaintiffs, as shippers, sued defendant, FedEx Corporation, for fraud and misrepresentation because of defendant's practice of charging more for economy two-day service than for one-day service for certain packages. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on the basis of preemption by federal law, Airline Deregulation Act, and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Susan Sellers vs. Randall Sellers W2000-01475-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
This appeal involves a belated attempt by the appellant, Randall Lee Sellers, to obtain relief from child support obligations based upon a claim that he is not the biological father of the child. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Carroll
Court of Appeals
Lula Moody vs. Gen. Motors W2000-01658-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
Plaintiffs sued General Motors Corporation and Townsend Chevrolet-Buick-Pontiac, Inc. as a result of injuries sustained by Ms. Moody as a result of a single car accident. In a separate complaint they sued Townsend alleging that it had sold them a purportedly new vehicle when in fact the odometer had been rolled back. The cases were consolidated for trial and the accident case resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. The case involving the odometer was dismissed by the trial court. Appellants failed to present this court with either a transcript or a statement of the evidence. We affirm.
The Defendant, Bobby J. Hughes, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for the offense of attempted second degree murder. He was subsequently tried by jury and found guilty of attempted second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence four photographs of the victim's wounds; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to identify the Defendant from a photograph during trial; (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to question the Defendant about prior convictions after defense counsel concluded redirect examination; and (5) that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense was plain error and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
Stoney Mccarter v. Transportation Insurance Company, W1999-00667-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers, Judge
The plaintiff, Stoney McCarter, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Shelby County granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. The trial court held plaintiff's court-approved lump sum settlement was not entered into pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-241(a)(1) and therefore could not be reopened pursuant to _ 5-6-241(a)(2). For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Carter
Workers Compensation Panel
Rodney Stafford v. Sara Lee Corporation, W2000-00705-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge
Employee was cleaning a machine at work while it was running, in violation of safety rules, and received an injury to his hand and arm. The trial court found willful misconduct and refused worker's compensation benefits. The panel finds that the evidence fails to preponderate against the Chancellor's findings, and affirms.
Dyer
Workers Compensation Panel
Alfredia J. Leach v. Henry I. Siegel Company, Inc., W1999-00923-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: W. Michael William Michael Maloan, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn, Judge
The defendants, Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. and Royal Insurance Company (H.I.S.), appeal the judgment of the Circuit Court for Carroll County awarding the plaintiff, Alfredia Leach (Leach), fifty percent (5%) permanent partial disability to her right arm and twenty percent (2%) permanent partial disability to her left arm as being excessive. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but modify the award to a single award of thirty-five percent (35%) permanent partial disability to both arms.
Henry
Workers Compensation Panel
David Coleman v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company W2000-01168-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Joe H. Walker III, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans, Chancellor
Employee was injured when a sofa fell on him at work, and was awarded twenty five percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the award was affirmed, but the court determined that the evidence supported a finding of permanent partial disability for a psychiatric injury, and remanded to the trial court for a determination as to the percentage. Coleman v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 2 Tenn. LEXIS 98; 2 WL 236424 (Tenn., March 2, 2). On remand the Chancellor determined that plaintiff was entitled to fifty percent permanent partial disability total for both shoulder and psychiatric injuries.
In matter D.I.S., W2000-00061-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: George E. Blancett
This case involves the termination of parental rights. The juvenile court, sua sponte, dismissed the petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother at the end of the petitioner's proof. The petitioner appeals. We affirm, finding that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of the mother's parental rights would not be in the child's best interest.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Steve Mairose vs. FedEx W2000-00076-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Walter L. Evans
This appeal arises from a breach of contract claim brought by the Appellants against the Appellee. Following a six week jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the Appellants. The Appellee filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. The Chancery Court of Shelby County granted the Appellee's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, granted a conditional new trial. The Appellants appeal the grant of the Appellee's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the grant of a conditional new trial by the Chancery Court of Shelby County. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Donald Blackburn vs. Betty Blackburn W2000-00393-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Donn Southern
Executor of deceased's estate appeals the probate court order closing the deceased's conservatorship. The final order closing the conservatorship, among other things, set aside a part of the order appointing conservator which ordered the appointed conservator to convey to the ward real estate owned by the ward that she had previously conveyed to herself as attorney in fact for the ward. Executor appeals.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Timothy Ellington vs. Linda Maddox W2000-00948-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: J. Roland Reid
Natural father filed a petition to obtain custody of his son against the maternal grandmother and her husband, the child's custodians by previous court order. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied father's petition and retained custody in the maternal grandmother and husband. Father appeals, and we reverse.
Haywood
Court of Appeals
Carroll Co. Waste vs. Odillion Collins W1998-00754-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
This case involves a dispute over issues surrounding Carroll County's imposition of a garbage collection fee on its residents. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, and the Defendant appeals.
Larry M. Grigsby entered guilty pleas to one count of promoting prostitution and two counts of criminal simulation. The manner of service, including entitlement to probation and/or Community Corrections, was submitted to the trial court. The trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing based upon Grigsby's extensive prior criminal history and the failure of previous measures less restrictive than total confinement. On appeal, Grigsby argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After review, we conclude that the record supports the trial court's sentencing decision. The judgment, accordingly, is affirmed.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
Ch-00-0152-2 Ch-00-0152-2
Trial Court Judge: Floyd Peete, Jr.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Billie Mae Manis vs. Donald Ralph Manis E1999-01927-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
Wife sought a divorce after 41 years of marriage on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct. With Husband acting pro se, the parties filed a Marital Dissolution Agreement. After retaining counsel, Husband withdrew the agreement and filed a counterclaim for divorce, also alleging inappropriate marital conduct. The Trial Court appointed a Special Master, who conducted two hearings and filed a lengthy and comprehensive Special Master's Report. Both parties filed Objections to the Report, and the Special Master held a third hearing addressing the issues raised in the parties' objections. Husband filed Objections to the Special Master's Amended Report. Wife had no objections to the Amended Report. The Trial Court held a fourth hearing, at which arguments of counsel and Husband's offer of additional proof were made. The Trial Court's Final Judgment adopted the Report of the Special Master, as amended, and affirmed the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Special Master with minor exceptions. Husband raises ten issues, primarily involving the Special Master's valuation and distribution of marital assets and the amount of alimony he was ordered to pay. Wife contests the amounts awarded to her for periodic alimony and for her interest in the marital estate, and also claims that the Trial Court erred in not placing more restrictions on Husband's future business transactions so as to more fully protect her interest in her marital share. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
Sevier
Court of Appeals
Zahreddine vs. Choi M2000-01281-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
This appeal involves the timeliness of a personal injury complaint. Two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs' lawyer placed an envelope containing a complaint and summons in a commercial delivery service's drop-off receptacle in Williamson County. Even though the envelope bore the courthouse address of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County, the commercial delivery service delivered the envelope to a central governmental mail room on the day the statute of limitations expired. However, the central mail room did not physically deliver the envelope to the trial court clerk's office until three days later. The defendant later filed a motion for summary judgment in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, asserting that the complaint was time-barred. The trial court denied the motion but granted the defendant permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We have determined that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiffs' complaint was not timely filed with the trial court clerk as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3.
