A Cheatham County jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated burglary and theft for breaking into his neighbor's home and stealing two television sets, a VCR, and a computer. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated burglary count and as a career offender to twelve years for the theft count, with the sentences to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence; the failure of the trial court to order a mistrial based on testimony alluding to the defendant's criminal past; and the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the crime of accessory after the fact on the theory that it is a lesser-included offense of both indicted offenses. Finding the evidence sufficient and no other reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Cheatham
Court of Criminal Appeals
Gregory Childress v. Winsett-Simmonds, Inc. & Usf&G Ins. Co. M1997-00164-SC-WCM-CV
Authoring Judge: Thomas W. Brothers, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ellen Hobbs Lyle,
The appellant-employee argues that the employee proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a work-related injury which caused him permanent injury. The employee also argues that the trial court erred by ordering the appellant to pay the cost of the entire transcript. The employer argues that the trial court erred in not allowing the employer to be reimbursed for previously paid workers' compensation benefits. The employer also argues that the trial court was correct in its determination of what items were to be included in the appellate court record. As discussed below, the panel has concluded that the trial court should be affirmed on all points.
Davidson
Workers Compensation Panel
Javius vs. Javius M2000-00314-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey S. Bivins
After a stormy and sometimes violent marriage, the trial court awarded a divorce to the wife, divided the marital property, and ordered the husband to pay alimony. The husband claims on appeal that the wife's fault should have resulted in the divorce being granted to both parties; that the property was divided in an inequitable manner; and that the trial court should have ordered rehabilitative alimony rather than alimony in futuro. We affirm the grant of divorce to the wife and the property division, but modify the alimony award.
This is a post-conviction appeal. In 1988, appellant was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and received a life sentence. Thereafter, the appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, attacking his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Subsequently, the appellant filed the instant three petitions for post-conviction relief. Two of appellant's petitions attack the validity of the petitioner's convictions for grand larceny and third degree burglary, which were used to enhance his 1988 sentence for robbery with a deadly weapon. The third petition addresses the 1988 sentence and attacks the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to another of petitioner's prior convictions. The trial court summarily dismissed the petitions for failing to comply with the applicable statute of limitations and failing to state an appropriate ground upon which a successive petition could be lodged. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the petitions is affirmed.
The defendant appeals his conviction of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and vandalism under $500.00. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury, the sentence of two years was excessive, and the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant to community corrections with the condition that he serve 200 days in the county jail. We find no error and affirm the trial court.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps v. Tennessee Woolen M1998-00666-WC-R3
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: C.K. Smith, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to theSpecial Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6- 225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendants, Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. and The Travelers Insurance Company appeal the judgment of the Chancery Court of Smith County, where the Trial Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Lana Phelps, finding that there were no material factual issues in dispute on the issue of causation and that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the decedent, Joseph Phelps, sustained an injury by accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment at Tennessee Woolen Mills when he fell off a ladder and subsequently died of sudden cardiac death. The trial court incorporated its order of partial summary judgment in its final order awarding plaintiff a total recoveryof one hundred forty-five thousand two hundred and four dollars ($145,24.). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code Annotated _5-6-225 (e)(1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court; Reversed and Remanded. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., in which BIRCH, J. AND RUSSELL, J. joined. Janelle S. Evyan, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. and The Travelers Insurance Company Bratton H. Cook, II, Smithville, Tennessee and Jacky O. Bellar, Carthage, Tennessee for the appellees, Lana Phelps, individually and as next friend/guardian of her two minor children, Kurtis Tyler Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps. MEMORANDUM OPINION The decedent, Joseph Phelps, was employed by Tennessee Woolen Mills, Inc. on January 2, 1995 as an electrician. He was married to Lana Phelps and they had two minor children, Kurtis Tyler Phelps and Amanda Lee Phelps, at the time of Mr. Phelps' death at age 56. According to Safety Manager, Roger Osborn's report at approximately 1:1 to 1: 15 p.m., on January 2, 1995, Joseph Phelps was "engaged in the process of installing a folding machine in the finishing department on the second floor. In particular he was installing a metal support to which a folding machine would later be attached." Apparently, as described by workers in this area, Mr. Phelps was climbing up a ladder and about half way up when he fell. Judy Williams (sewing machine operator in the nearby area) observed Mr. Phelps falling via peripheral vision. Mrs. Williams also mentioned that she thought Mr. Phelps was carrying something in his hand. At the time Mr. Phelps made impact with the floor, a loud "bang" occurred. Several employees responded to the area after hearing this noise. Sometime thereafter, employees began to perform CPR. Approximately five to ten minutes later the ambulance arrived and transported Mr. Phelps to University Medical Center. The report also stated that, "Mrs. Hardin was the first person to see Mr. Phelps on the floor [and stated] that he `may have' hit his head on the hitch of a blanket truck in the near vicinity of the ladder." Scott Giles, D.O., Emergency Medicine Physician, treated Joseph Phelps in the Emergency Room in Lebanon, Tennessee. Dr. Giles testified that Mr. Phelps essentially had no vital signs when he arrived at the hospital and none of their resuscitative efforts were successful. Mr. Phelps was pronounced dead approximately ten minutes after his arrival. Dr. Giles assessed Mr. Phelps cause of death as "sudden cardiac death" which is caused by a massive heart attack or "an arrhythmic event." The plaintiff filed her complaint for workers' compensation benefits on April 19, 1995 alleging that the decedent sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and as a consequence of the accident, plaintiff claimed that the decedent suffered a cardiac arrest which caused his death shortly after the accident. On October 19, 1995, the plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add that the decedent's sudden cardiac death was (1) an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment with Woolen Mills, and alternatively (2) an occupational disease pursuant to Tenn. Code Annotated _5-6-31 et seq. The trial court granted the motion by order entered November 22, 1995. On April 2, 1996, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that she was entitled to judgment for statutory benefits due them as a matter of law, and filed the deposition of -2-
Smith
Workers Compensation Panel
John Paul Miller v. Fleetwood Homes of Tennessee and M1999-00275-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Thomas E. Gray, Chancellor
The plaintiff, John Paul Miller, appeals the judgment of the Chancery Court of Sumner County, where the trial court found: (1) that Mr. Miller failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a neck injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with Fleetwood Homes on or about August 4, 1997; (2) that had the neck injury occurred as alleged by Mr. Miller it was due to his own willful misconduct and his claim was otherwise barred under Tennessee Code Annotated _5-6-11 (a); (3) and that Mr. Miller was not entitled to any further benefits for his hand/wrist injury of June 13, 1997. For the reasons stated in this opinion, We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sumner
Workers Compensation Panel
Shelby Abbott, et al. v. Blount County, Tennessee, et al. E2004-00637-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
This Court granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether summary judgment was appropriately granted by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the plaintiffs were made whole by the amounts paid by Blount County and the tortfeasors. As part of this determination, we find that issues of material fact also exist regarding whether Blount County has a right to reimbursement. Additionally, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether Blount County waived its claim to subrogation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that summary judgment was inappropriate and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Blount
Supreme Court
Clarence Lewis vs. State M2000-01529-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
A prisoner in the custody of the Department of Correction suffered a severe hand injury while working in a prison industries workshop. He submitted a claim to the Tennessee Claims Commission, contending that negligence on the part of his supervisors caused his injuries. Following a hearing, the Commissioner dismissed his claim, finding that the prisoner's own negligence was more than 50% of the cause of his injuries. We affirm.
Court of Appeals
Omawali Ashanti Shabazz, a/k/a Fred Dean vs. Donal Campbell, et al M2000-01780-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
Appellant, a prison inmate, filed suit under the Tennessee Public Records Act against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections and others seeking disclosure to him of various records alleged to be public records, together with injunctive relief. The Chancellor dismissed the complaint with prejudice and we affirm the Chancellor.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State Dept. of Children's Services vs. T.M.L. M2000-01785-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Betty Adams Green
The juvenile court granted a petition to terminate parental rights to three of the children of a Nashville woman. On appeal, the mother challenges the termination in regard to her oldest child only, on the ground that it is not in the child's best interest to be permanently separated from her. We affirm the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Lon Walker v. William Cameron M2000-01903-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: John J. Maddux
This is a legal malpractice action which was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. Fourteen months before suit was filed the plaintiff sent a holographic letter to the Disciplinary Counsel complaining, in considerable detail, of the defendant's purported shortcomings. The trial judge held that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Judgment affirmed.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Madge Fell,e t al vs. Gloria Rambo, et al M2000-02100-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Lee Russell
This case is before the Court on appeal from the action of the trial judge in overruling a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief From a Final Judgment. Non-jury trial on the merits of the case resulted in a judgment of the trial court finding no lack of capacity of Nannie Bell Crockett and no undue influence exerted upon her. That same final judgment held that Plaintiffs, as remaindermen, under the will of John E. Crockett, received at the death of Nannie Bell Crockett, the remaining proceeds from the sale of a farm during her lifetime, which farm had been willed to her for life by her husband, John E. Crockett, with unlimited power of disposition. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that the pre-1981 version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-1-106 (1993) applied to the case, and that the sale of the farm by the life tenant with unlimited power of disposition, terminated the interest of the remaindermen, and that the remaindermen were not entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the farm still remaining in the possession of Nannie Bell Crockett at the time of her death. This judgment is now final and is reported in Fell v. Rambo, 36 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). On remand, the trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion in issue on this appeal and we affirm the trial court.
Marshall
Court of Appeals
Beatrice Scott Nall v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and M1999-00375-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Loser, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace, Judge
This workers' compensation case has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee or claimant, Beatrice Nall, was 59 years old at the time of the trial, which began on October 9, 1998 and ended on October 12, 1998. She has a high school education, some business college and experience as a factory worker, waitress and secretary, as well as 16 years with DuPont, where she worked as a utility worker from 1977 until 1981, when she was promoted to a wet treatment operator. She suffered a previous injury in 1983, from which she received an award based on eighteen percent to the body as a whole. The claimant's duties as a wet treatment operator required her to unload railroad tank cars, which she had done for 12 to 15 years before suffering the present injury in 1993. Because some of the tank cars contained hazardous material, DuPont had established specific standard job procedures (SJP'S) for the unloading of railcars on the plant site. The claimant was intimately familiar with the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid cars. As the SJP'S were updated and changed, the claimant would review them again and initial them to document her review and understanding of the procedure. She last reviewed the SJP for unloading sulfuric acid from railcars on February 11, 1993, two months before her second acid related accident. All safety procedures were strictly enforced by the company. None of the several DuPont employees who testified was aware of anyone unloading acid cars without having on an acid suit. The applicable SJP required that the operator wear safety equipment and specifically required the wearing of an acid suit while unloading a railcar containing acid. On the day of her injury, the claimant attempted to inspect such a railcar, before commencing the unloading procedures, without donning the required safety equipment, particularly the acid suit. As she was doing so, she was sprayed with sulfuric acid and severely burned. The claimant initiated this action to recover medical and disability benefits as provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11 et seq. By its answer, the employer, DuPont, denied that the injury was compensable and affirmatively asserted, in general terms, that the injury was barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11. After a trial on the merits, the trial judge found that the injury was one arising out of and in the course of employment, that the employer had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant willfully violated a safety rule or refused to wear a safety device and that the claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her injuries. The award was correctly apportioned between the employer and the second injury fund. The employer has appealed, contending (1) the trial judge erred in finding that the claim is not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-11(a) and (2) the trial judge erred in entering an order finding that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. Our review of the trial court's findings is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). The reviewing court is not bound by a trial court's factual findings but instead conducts an independent examination of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.
Scott
Workers Compensation Panel
Shirley Loope v. Institutional Jobbers Co., Inc. E1999-02503-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl L. Fansler, Judge
The trial court found a work-related injury and awarded a ten percent whole body impairment. The defendant argues the evidence preponderates against the finding of compensability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This appeal arises from the sentence that the Shelby County Criminal Court imposed upon James M. Williams, after a previous appeal to this court resulted in a modification of his original two-year incarcerative sentence to a sentence ordered to be served on probation. The defendant contests the trial court's authority to resentence him to serve 60 days in a correctional facility, with the balance of his two-year sentence to be served on probation. The defendant also challenges his new sentence as the product of judicial vindictiveness, and he claims that he is entitled to full probation based on the facts of the case. After a review of the record, we reverse the split-confinement sentence, order that the defendant serve his sentence on full probation with conditions, and remand for defendant to begin immediate service of his sentence.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Kathy Kay Scott v. Cantech Industries, E2000-00728-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Jean A. Stanley, Circuit Court Judge
The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered carpel tunnel syndrome as a result of her work with Contech Industries, Incorporated, that the disability should be converted to an injury to the body as a whole, and that the plaintiff had sustained a forty-two percent vocational impairment to the body as a whole. The trial judge found that Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company was the workers' compensation carrier at the time the plaintiff became unable to continue to work, and therefore, was the carrier responsible for the coverage. Wausau raises the issue of whether the trial judge properly found it, rather than Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, liable for the award to the plaintiff. Wausau and Contech Industries Incorporated further argue the trial court erred in finding the plaintiff gave sufficient or timely notice of the carpel tunnel syndrome injury. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Scott
Workers Compensation Panel
Earl Wagner v. The Tennessee Coal Company E2000-01013-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: John Mcafee, Judge
The trial court found the plaintiff sustained a ten percent permanent partial medical impairment as a result of a compensable injury and awarded him forty percent whole body vocational disability. The defendant says the evidence does not support the finding that the plaintiff suffered any permanent impairment and further says if he did, the award should have been restricted to two and one-half percent times the medical impairment because the plaintiff had a meaningful return to work. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Donald Picklesimer v. Mckee Foods Corporation E2000-02694-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Thayer , Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: W. Frank Brown III, Chancellor
The trial court awarded the employee 72 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employee appealed insisting his disability was 1 percent. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The Defendant, Aaron Bernard Gray, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he asserts that he should have been granted post-conviction relief because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, because the trial court abused its discretion by finding the victim competent to testify, and because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial. We hold that the Defendant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his other two issues are either waived or previously determined. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiffs/Appellants sought the return of several items, including a shotgun, tiller and lawn mower, as well as $1,500 in damages to a 1980 Ford pick-up truck, from Defendant/Appellee. The Trial Court found the matter too speculative and dismissed the case. We have no transcript and no Statement of the Evidence. Accordingly, we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have contained sufficient evidence to support the Trial Court's factual findings. Judgment of the Trial Court affirmed.
Campbell
Court of Appeals
Melissa Suzanne Dew v. ProTemp, et al. E2000-01750-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William E. Lantrip
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment to Pro-Temp ("Defendant"), a temporary employment agency. Melissa Suzanne Dew ("Plaintiff") brought suit against her employer, Defendant, and Eagle Bend Manufacturing, Inc. ("Eagle Bend"). Defendant assigned Plaintiff to work in a temporary position at Eagle Bend where Plaintiff sustained a work-related injury. A few months later, Plaintiff received a reprimand from her Eagle Bend supervisor related to Plaintiff's work performance. Thereafter, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's assignment at Eagle Bend. Plaintiff claims Defendant terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her worker's compensation rights. Plaintiff argues there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment to Defendant. We affirm.
This is an appeal from an award of damages by the Chancery Court of Davidson County for a breach of a contract. The defendants assert that the individual executing the contract did not have the authority to bind the corporation and that the contract ended when the corporation sold its assets. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This cause is before the Court on the petition for rehearing filed by the respondent, Michael
H. Sneed. The crux of the petition is Sneed’s request for a period of thirty days within which to
“wind down [his] practice and to prepare for the transition of any remaining cases to substitute
counsel.”
This is a dispute over the validity of an easement between River City Resort, Inc. (“River City”), and Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Railroad”) which is across a certain property owned by River City. River City brought this declaratory judgment against the Railroad and JIT Terminal, Inc. (“JIT”), an adjoining landowner who derives benefit from the easement.
