State of Tennessee v. Guy Binette - Dissenting
E1998-00236-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rebecca J. Stern

I respectfully dissent. There is no need to adopt a new standard to review the videotaped evidence presented in this case. I would hold that an application of the standard of review
traditionally applied in Tennessee establishes that the officer in this case had reasonable suspicion to stop Binette.

Hamilton Supreme Court

Nps Energy Services, Inc. v. Robert Jernigan
M2000-00229-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Carol Catalano, Sp. J.
Trial Court Judge: Carol Soloman, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, NPS EnergyServices, Inc. appeals the judgment of the trial court finding that the defendant, Mr. Robert Jernigan sustained an injury within the course and scope of his employment when he slipped and fell while at work aggravating a pre-existing hip condition resulting in hip replacement surgery. The trial court found Mr. Jernigan entitled to a vocational disability of 45% to the body as a whole representing three times the 15% anatomical impairment rating given by both physicians in this matter. For the reasons discussed in this opinion we find that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause dismissed. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and Dismissed CAROL CATALANO, SP. J., in which ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR.,J., and JAMES L.WEATHERFORD SR. J., joined. Jade A. Rogers, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellant, NPS Energy Systems, Inc. David Day, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Robert Jernigan. MEMORANDUM OPINION Mr. Jernigan was 54 at the time of trial. He had completed high school and had two years of drafting courses in college. He went to trade school for four years and obtained his electrician's license to be an "electrical technician". He works through his Union for various companies in Tennessee and other states. In 1966, Mr. Jernigan broke both his femurs in a car accident and had a metal pin surgically implanted in each leg to support the broken bones. The pin in his left leg was removed six to eight months after the accident due to discomfort, but the pin in his right leg was not removed. In the early 199's, Mr. Jernigan began to notice some "twinges" in his right hip. On December 18, 1992, he saw Dr. Carl Hollman, M.D., at Upper Cumberland Orthopedic Surgery. According to Dr. Hollman's notes, x-rays indicated "severe degenerative changes of the right hip joint." Dr. Hollman prescribed anti-inflammatories, discussed treatment options, and gave Mr. Jernigan information about a total hip replacement. From 1992 to April of 1998, Mr. Jernigan did not see any more doctors concerning his right hip and was able to control occasional hip pain with pain medications. Mr. Jernigan stated that he was "happy as a lark" with this arrangement and did not see the need to consider hip replacement surgery during this time. On April 14, 1998, he returned to the Upper Cumberland Orthopedic Group and saw Dr. Sam Barnes, M.D., who prescribed pain medication. Dr. Barnes noted that Mr. Jernigan's "posttraumatic arthritis of his hip has progressed a whole lot. He has external rotation contracture and he has hip flexion contracture and apparent shortening of the extremity. We discussed total hip replacement. I think he is a candidate now for total hip replacement as he has been for some time." Mr. Jernigan considered his hip pain still manageable and was able to perform his daily personal and work activities, and it was his plan to continue to work until retirement without hip replacement. On September 13, 1998, he began working for NPS as an electrician at the TVA Cumberland City Fossil Fuel Plant making $17.2 an hour. Mr. Jernigan and his co-workers were to remove and repair a 133 ton armature from a transformer on the job site. He knew that this job was a "short duration job". On October 1, 1998, Mr. Jernigan and his co-workers began walking down a corridor with concrete floors that had been varnished recently and the whole area looked wet. Mr. Jernigan stepped into five inch wide ten inch long oblong puddle of water or oil. When he did so, both feet slipped out from under him and he landed hard directly on his right hip. After the fall he was taken to the nurses' station on a stretcher where he received some pain medication and ice. The pain had localized in his right hip, felt "like a huge bruise" and it was "very hard walking". Hoping that he had suffered only a sprain, he returned to work approximately 45 minutes later, but had to leave after his first break because the pain was getting worse. On October 11, 1998, the pain had not subsided and Mr. Jernigan went to the emergency room where he was referred for an appointment with Dr. Richard Williams M.D., an orthopedist at Upper Cumberland Orthopedic Surgery. On October 13, 1998, Dr. Williams reviewed x-rays taken after the fall that showed "severe hip degeneration [but] no obvious new bony deformityor fracture." Dr. Williams diagnosed "severe degenerative joint disease, right hip, with acute exacerbation of pain -2-

Davidson Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee v. Calvin Otis Tanksley
M1998-00683-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The appellant, Calvin Otis Tanksley, was convicted by a Davidson County Jury of one count of rape of a child and one count of attempted rape of a child. Based on his classification as a repeat violent offender, the appellant was sentenced upon each count to two consecutive sentences of life without parole. Upon appeal, the appellant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; (2) whether the court erred in ruling the defendant's prior bad acts could be introduced by the State if the defendant presented an alibi defense; (3) whether the court erred in allowing the State to introduce over four hundred pairs of women's undergarments seized from the defendant in an investigation in another county; (4) whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the photographic array; and (5) whether the appellant qualified for sentencing as a repeat violent offender. Finding no reversible error, the judgments are affirmed.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Joseph E. Suggs
M1999-02136-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Defendant, Joseph E. Suggs, pled guilty to three counts of child rape, for which he received three consecutive 25-year sentences. On appeal, the defendant raises two issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence for each count; and 2) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences on all counts. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Donald Marbley
M1999-01212-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Charles Lee

In November 1997, the Defendant, Donald Marbley, was arrested for aggravated robbery in Lincoln County. Approximately two weeks after being released on bond, the Defendant was arrested in Marshall County for attempted aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. The Defendant was found guilty by a Lincoln County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II multiple offender. The Defendant pleaded guilty to the Marshall County attempted aggravated robbery charge and was sentenced to eight years as a Range II multiple offender. The two sentences were to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of twenty-five years as a Range II multiple offender. In this consolidated appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery in Lincoln County; (2) whether the Lincoln County trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's prior criminal convictions into evidence; (3) whether the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant in both the Lincoln and Marshall County cases; and (4) whether the Defendant received effective assistance of counsel in the Lincoln County case. Finding no error in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Lincoln Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Marty W. Stanfill
M1999-02492-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The appellant/defendant, Marty W. Stanfill, appeals as of right from the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court which imposed a sentence of eight (8) years in indictment No. 97-B-1320, for the state offense of unlawful possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. The trial court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to a federal conviction, No. 3:97-00087, for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. At the same sentencing hearing, in indictment No. 99-B-865, the trial court imposed, in three separate counts, two (2) eight (8) year sentences for unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, and one (1) year for the unlawful possession of a weapon. These sentences were to be served concurrently with case No. 97-B-1320 and the federal conviction, No. 3:97-00087, imposed by the U.S. District Court for Middle Tennessee at Nashville. The defendant presents one appellate issue: Whether the trial court erred in imposing an eight (8) year sentence in case No. 97-B-1320, consecutive to federal case No. 3:97-00087? After a complete review of the record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the case for further proceedings.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

James E. Carroll, et al., v. Carolyn Whitney, M.D., et al.
W1997-00246-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Janice M. Holder

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County which allowed a jury, in an action alleging malpractice, to allocate fault to resident physicians who were immune from suit. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to apportion fault to the residents because they were immune. We then granted this appeal to decide whether the trial court erred in allowing nonparties who were immune from suit to appear on a jury verdict form. After examining the record, considering the arguments of the parties and amicus curiae, and analyzing the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the immune nonparties to appear on the jury verdict form. Accordingly, for the reasons herein, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Supreme Court

James Carroll, et al., v. Carolyn Whitney, M.D., et al. - Dissenting
W1997-00246-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Judge Janice M. Holder

The majority departs from settled principles of law in holding that a jury may allocate fault to an immune nonparty. In so doing, it refuses to apply and overrules the application in this case of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous decision just four years ago in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), that a jury may not allocate fault to an immune nonparty because the immune nonparty owes no duty to the plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has no cause of action against the immune nonparty.

Shelby Supreme Court

Jean Carolyn Dotson v. Amanda B. Blake, et al - Concurring
W1998-00710-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge William B. Acree, Jr.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to state the basis for my
concurrence. In McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992), we adopted a modified system of comparative fault in which parties contributing to the plaintiff’s injuries were to be held liable only to the extent of their relative percentages of fault. Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn. 1996), highlighted the problems inherent in the application of McIntyre to workers who sustained employment-related injuries and who filed tort actions against persons other than their employers. These workers found themselves in a unique situation. They were subject to both the tort system’s doctrine of comparative fault adopted by this Court and the workers’ compensation system’s doctrine of no-fault recovery created by the legislature.

Weakley Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Daniel Patrick Byrd
E1999-01483-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge James B. Scott, Jr.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense, and received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The defendant was ordered to serve forty-five days in continuous confinement and five days on the weekends, with the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the defendant makes the following allegations of error: (1) the trial court used an invalid judgment to elevate his DUI charge to a DUI second; (2) the trial court's initial denial of an appeal bond violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; and (3) the trial court incorrectly concluded it was not authorized to grant work release or periodic confinement during the defendant's mandatory minimum period of incarceration for DUI. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not commit the above errors and affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

Anderson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Nicholas O'Connor/Nikol Lekin
W1998-00015-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

This is a case involving two defendants: O'Connor, the mother's friend, was convicted of Aggravated Child Abuse through injury and Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect. Lekin, the mother, was convicted of Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect. We affirm the conviction of Aggravated Child Abuse through injury, as we hold that a four-year-old who received a skull fracture, epidural bleeding, swelling and bruising around the eyes and face, and the pain associated with said injuries has sustained "serious bodily injury." Further, we find sufficient evidence to support both convictions for Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect. Finally, we reject the arguments that the state was required to elect a specific "serious bodily injury" and that Aggravated Child Abuse through neglect is not an offense in Tennessee.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Ronald Weeks, Sr. - Dissenting
W1998-00022-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge James C. Beasley, Jr.

I must respectfully dissent because, while I agree that the appellant’s confession to the police should have been suppressed, I do not believe that the trial court’s admission of the confession at trial constituted reversible error.

 

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee vs. Eugene A. Turner
W1999-01866-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

Defendant appeals his jury convictions on two counts of premeditated first degree murder for which he received concurrent life sentences. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in disallowing impeachment evidence against a state witness; (3) whether the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of defendant being a beneficiary of life insurance policies on one of the victims; (4) whether the trial court erroneously admitted inflammatory evidence relating to the crime scene; (5) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of alleged threats made by the defendant; (6) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of a prior argument between the defendant and one of the victims; and (7) whether the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of defendant's failure to flee and avoid arrest. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

McNairy Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Philip Shead, Jr.
W2000-00106-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The appellant, Phillip Shead Jr., appeals from the order of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation and reinstating his original eight year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

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Supreme Court

Antonio Bonds v. State of Tennessee
W2006-00343-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Paula L. Skahan

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Dyron H. Yokley
M1999-00290-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Jones
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dyron Yokley, the defendant and appellant, entered "best interest" pleas to four (4) counts of aggravated robbery. The plea agreement provided that the "[d]efendant is to receive an [eight] 8 year package with a sentencing hearing to determine any alternative sentencing, if applicable." Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years for each count, concurrently, as provided in the plea agreement. Relying primarily on the defendant's criminal history and previous sentences of probation, the court ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Corrections. The defendant now appeals, arguing that all parties were unaware that the defendant was statutorily ineligible for probation and that his plea was thus involuntarily given. Because we find this matter is a post-conviction issue rather than one properly raised at this time, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Lawrence Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Douglas Canady
M1999-02135-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
Defendant, Douglas Canady, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Hickman Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. George O. Mears
M1999-01229-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Don Ash
The appellant, George O. Mears, appeals his conviction in the Cannon County Circuit Court of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. Pursuant to the appellant's conviction, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Cannon County Jail, suspending all but six months of the appellant's sentence and placing him on probation. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to comment to the jury about the appellant's failure to call a witness and in providing a "missing witness" instruction to the jury; (2) whether the evidence adduced at the appellant's trial is sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt; and (3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing the appellant. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

Cannon Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Damon Theodore Marsh
M1999-01879-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: W. Charles Lee
Defendant, Damon Theodore Marsh, appeals his conviction for second degree murder, for which he received a sentence of 23 years and 6 months. On appeal, the defendant raises the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We conclude that the issue raised by the defendant in this appeal is without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Michael A. Janosky
M1999-02574-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Cheryl A. Blackburn
Michael Janosky appeals from his conviction of driving under the influence. In this direct appeal, he challenges his conviction based upon (1) erroneous admission of breath alcohol test results which he contends were involuntarily obtained and (2) the results of the breath test were not administered in accordance with the requirements of State vs. Sensing. As to issue (1), we hold that, absent a motorist's express refusal, consent to a breath test is deemed voluntary as a matter of law. With reference to issue (2), the improper administration of the breath test, we find this issue waived because it was not included in the appellant's motion for new trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(e). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered by the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

S.E.A., Inc. vs. Southside Leasing Company and Moss W. Yater
E2000-00631-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John F. Weaver
S.E.A., Inc. brought suit in Knox County Chancery Court seeking an injunction and alternatively, damages, against its lessor, Southside Leasing Company, and Southside's secured creditor, Moss W. Yater, regarding a non-disturbance agreement. Yater is also Southside's majority shareholder, president and director. S.E.A.sought to sublease a portion of the property. Pursuant to the terms of the lease between S.E.A. and Southside, Southside consented to the sublease and executed the requested non-disturbance agreement. However, Yater, Southside's secured creditor, refused to execute the non-disturbance agreement unless Southside received a portion of the rent from the sublease. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment which were granted by the Trial Court. S.E.A. appeals the Trial Court's granting of summary judgment to the Defendants. We affirm.

Knox Court of Appeals

State vs. Richard Allan Frye
E1999-01564-CCA-R9-RL
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Phyllis H. Miller
This appeal arises from the order of the Sullivan County Criminal Court upholding the district attorney general's refusal to accept the application of the defendant for pretrial diversion. The defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to determine that the district attorney general abused his discretion by relying on facts not supported by the evidence and by failing to consider all relevant factors. We conclude that substantial evidence was before the district attorney general to support the validity of each of the four factors relied on in denying pretrial diversion and that the district attorney general considered all relevant factors. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Joy A. Stinson
E1999-02082-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.
The defendant was convicted of one count of theft of property over $1,000 for her unauthorized charge of items at a retail store to her former employer's account. The trial court sentenced her to four years imprisonment, with three years suspended. On appeal, the defendant presents the issues of whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce the testimony of an alibi rebuttal witness whom the State did not identify as a witness prior to trial, and in allowing the State to present evidence which she alleges tied her to an uncharged crime. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anderson Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Raymond Jackson Collins
E1999-00233-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck
The defendant appeals from his conviction of, and four-year sentence for, violation of a habitual traffic offender order, failure to stop for a red light, and violation of the seat belt law. He asserts that insufficient evidence supported the verdict, that the imposed sentence was excessive, and that the trial court improperly denied alternative sentencing. We affirm the convictions and sentence, holding that sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals