Ella Pruett vs. Wal-Mart
W1999-01026-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Plaintiff sued employer under Americans With Disabilities Act and case was tried before a jury. After a jury verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which the court granted. Plaintiff has appealed. The record reflects that defendant failed to move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all of the evidence and also reflects that no judgment was entered on the jury verdict. Appeal dismissed.

Madison Court of Appeals

Stanley Bridges v. Liberty Insurance Company of
E1999-01775-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. Vann Owens, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The chancellor ruled that the plaintiff suffered from pneumoconiosis and that the two physicians who testified the plaintiff had the condition were more credible than the physician who testified he did not. However, the judge found the plaintiff failed to carry the burden of showing he was totally and permanently disabled from the pneumoconiosis; therefore, an award could not be made under the guidelines as expressed in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 and adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-32 et. seq. However, the chancellor ruled that even though the evidence and circumstances did not support an award of one hundred percent permanent total disability under the coal worker's pneumoconiosis provisions, the court could still award permanent partial disability under the general occupational diseases provisions of the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Act. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6- 31. The court then found the plaintiff suffered from coal miner's pneumoconiosis arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant and also found the condition causally linked to the plaintiff's exposure to conditions and hazards of his employment. The plaintiff was found to be one hundred percent disabled from a combination of his arthritic condition and pneumoconiosis; however, the disabilityattributable to pneumoconiosis was found much less significant than the non- compensable arthritic disability, resulting in an award of fifteen percent permanent partial disability to the bodyas a whole. We affirm the chancellor's finding that the plaintiff's pneumoconiosis is not totally disabling but reverse the award of permanent partial disability benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Dismissed JOHN K. BYERS, SR. J., in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, and ROGER E. THAYER, SP. J., joined. Linda J. Hamilton Mowles, Knoxville, Tennessee for the appellant, Security Insurance Company of Hartford David H. Dunaway and Frank Q. Vettori, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Stanley Bridges MEMORANDUM OPINION The review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). Facts The plaintiff, forty-seven years of age at the time of trial, has a high school diploma. His work history consists of coal mining and work at the mines as a night watchman. His duties in these positions required him to shovel coal dust, pick rock, sweep, and, when in the mines, be exposed to mine effluence. He has also operated a variety of equipment and loaded supplies to take into the deep mine; when working at strip mining he would shoot powder and also work as a drill operator. The plaintiff last worked in the mines in the fall of 1989. In 1986 the plaintiff was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. As a result, the plaintiff was off work for part of 1986 and all of 1987. During that time, the plaintiff was under medical treatment in which he received gold shots and steroids. He returned to the mine as a night watchman but eventually became unable to perform those duties, and he has not been able to work since leaving his last position with the defendant. The plaintiff admitted he quit working for the defendant because of his rheumatoid arthritis, not because of his breathing difficulties. The plaintiff's wife, who testified at trial, also stated he quit working in the mines because of the rheumatoid arthritis symptoms. The plaintiff testified he does not currently know of any work he could do because of his breathing problems and his arthritis_he gets out of breath very easily and coughs and spits up sputum often; he has painfullyswollen joints on his hands and painful knots on his feet. He mainly watches television, goes for short walks and washes dishes sometimes. He testified the arthritis from which he suffers keeps him from doing just about anything, including at times such everyday tasks as holding a coffee cup, brushing his hair, buttoning his clothes and getting out of the bathtub. He cannot engage in any hobbies or activities that involve reaching overhead or behind. -2-

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Richardson vs. Miller
M1997-00205-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley

Davidson Court of Appeals

Richardson vs. Miller
M1997-00205-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley

Davidson Court of Appeals

Mills vs. Solomon
M1998-00393-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
These proceedings began when David Mills filed a complaint seeking to condemn an easement across Linda Solomon's property. In bifurcated proceedings, the jury first determined the location of Mills' easement across Solomon's property and, later, found that Solomon was entitled to an award of damages totaling $11,908 for the easement, including $9900 in incidental damages. On appeal from the trial court's judgment entered on the jury's verdict, Mills challenges only the award of $9900 in incidental damages. We agree with Mills' contention that the record fails to contain material evidence to support the award of incidental damages, and we reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment.

Cannon Court of Appeals

Kenneth L. Bonner vs. TN Dept. of Correction
M1999-00343-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition regarding the Department of Correction's calculation of his release eligibility date. An adjustment of the release eligibility date, made subsequent to the filing of this appeal, has rendered most of the petitioner's arguments moot. As to the remaining issue, we affirm the dismissal of the petition because we agree with the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Heathman-Wood vs. Wood
M1999-00341-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Leonard W. Martin
This is a post-divorce child custody case. When the mother and father divorced, by agreed order, they gave custody of their minor child to the child's maternal aunt and uncle. The aunt and uncle later petitioned the trial court to allow them to move with the child to another state. The father then sought custody of the child. The trial court found that the father had failed to prove a change in circumstances warranting a change in custody from the aunt and uncle. Consequently, the father's petition for custody was dismissed and the aunt and uncle's petition to move to another state was granted. We reverse, finding that an erroneous legal standard was used. The cause is remanded for a determination of whether granting the father's petition for custody would result in substantial harm to the child.

Cheatham Court of Appeals

Welborn vs. Sellars
M1999-00164-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This is an insurance case. The plaintiff was driving a motorcycle when he was involved in an accident with an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The plaintiff's motorcycle was not listed in his insurance policy. The plaintiff filed suit seeking damages for his injuries sustained in the accident. The plaintiff's insurance company moved for summary judgment in the case based on an exclusion in the plaintiff's insurance policy which denied uninsured motorist coverage for vehicles for which insurance was not afforded under the policy. The trial court granted the insurance company's motion and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm, finding that the policy exclusion applies to the plaintiff's motorcycle.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

State vs. Elpidio Valdez
M1999-00791-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Elpidio Valdez
M1999-00791-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Arnold K. Ward
M1999-00357-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The appellant/defendant, Arnold K. Ward, Jr., appeals as of right from a judgment of conviction and sentencing imposed by the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon jury conviction for attempted murder second degree and assault, the trial court imposed sentences of eleven (11) years for attempted murder second degree and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for assault. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. In his appellate issues, the defendant asserts that: (1) the indictment for count one is defective; (2) the defendant was denied his right to compulsory process; (3) extra-judicial communication during the trial between a witness and a juror contaminated the proceedings; (4) there was insufficient evidence for which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty; (5) the defendant was convicted of a charge that does not exist under Tennessee law; and (6) the defendant's sentence is excessive. After a review of the entire record, we find the appellate issues without merit and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

International Flight Center vs. City of Murfreesboro
M1999-00324-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Royce Taylor
This appeal arises out of a dispute between Plaintiff International Flight Center ("IFC") and Defendants City of Murfreesboro ("City") and City of Murfreesboro Airport Committee ("Airport Committee") regarding the alleged breach of a lease agreement and the nonpayment of certain property taxes. The trial court granted a judgment in favor of IFC in the amount of $174,718.00 plus ten percent prejudgment interest. Additionally, the court ruled that the City is estopped from collecting the property taxes allegedly owed to the City by IFC. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's finding that the City breached the parties' 1989 lease agreement, vacate the court's ruling regarding the jet fuel equipment that was purchased by IFC but that remained at the Airport following the expiration of the parties' 1989 lease agreement, remand the cause for further findings of fact regarding this jet fuel equipment, affirm the court's ruling regarding the matter of prejudgment interest to the extent hereinafter discussed, and reverse the court's ruling that the City is estopped from collecting the real and personal property taxes allegedly owed to the City by IFC.

Rutherford Court of Appeals

American Airlines vs. Johnson
M1999-02390-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
American Airlines, Inc., appeals the trial court's final judgment denying its request for a refund of use taxes paid on aviation fuel purchased out of state during the years 1992 through 1995. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Thomas H. Caffey vs. Kevin Myers, Warden
M2000-00200-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
Petitioner challenges the trial court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner was convicted in Davidson County in 1985 of two counts of armed robbery and felonious use of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment and an additional four years, to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to a prior Oklahoma sentence. Petitioner does not challenge the legality of the convictions underlying his current sentences, but rather asserts that equitable estoppel and a due process violation mandate that he not be required to serve his Tennessee sentences. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Wayne Court of Criminal Appeals

Ross vs. Campbell
M1999-01805-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
An inmate in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction brought an action for declaratory judgment contending that the Department failed to give him all sentence credits due. The trial court granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment and we affirm on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact was shown.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Hartsville Hospital vs. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
M1999-01276-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
This appeal arises from a dispute over the ownership of monies held in a bond fund. Hartsville Hospital Incorporated ("Hartsville") filed suit against Bay National Bank ("Bank") seeking the contents of the fund. The court below entered judgment for Hartsville, holding that Bank had no claim to the bond fund money pursuant to a release agreement between the parties and that Hartsville was not estopped from asserting ownership. Bank appeals.

Trousdale Court of Appeals

Huffer vs. State
M1999-01278-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
The claimants sought to hold the State liable for the personal injuries and deaths caused in an automobile accident on U.S. Highway 64 in Franklin County. After first holding that the State's negligence was the cause of twenty-five percent of the damages, the Claims Commissioner modified his findings and concluded that the State had a discretionary function immunity and that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the automobile in which the injured persons were riding. We affirm on the proximate cause issue.

Franklin Court of Appeals

Johnson vs. Allstate
M1999-01639-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry
Insured sued his insurer to recover policy coverage due on a fire loss to his automobile after the insurer denied coverage under the fraud provision of the policy. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict for the insured, and the insurer has appealed.

Grundy Court of Appeals

State vs. Jerry W. Yancey, Jr.
M1999-02131-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Sr. Judge L. Terry Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The appellant/defendant, Jerry W. Yancey, Jr., was convicted by the Williamson County Jury on four counts, two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of felony reckless endangerment. In count five, the defendant was found not guilty of felony reckless endangerment. Upon the defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, the trial court imposed sentences of three and one-half (3-_) years in the Department of Correction. However, the trial court placed the defendant on probation for four (4) years with certain special conditions, mainly that the defendant serve sixty (60) days, day for day, in the Williamson County Jail. In his appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that the District Attorney General did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant pre-trial diversion?; and (2) Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant full probation? Upon our review of the entire record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Wright vs. Hull
M1999-02307-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Billy Joe White
Plaintiff/Appellee, Bill D. Wright, sued to set aside a 1986 deed whereby he conveyed a certain tract of land to Defendant/Appellant, Bonnie S. Hull. He charged failure of consideration and fraud. Defendant, Ms. Hull, asserted that she and Mr. Wright cohabited without marriage for twelve years until their separation in 1998. She asserted that the property conveyance was a gift and was also conveyed to her by Mr. Wright to put the property out of the reach of his creditors. The trial court held the parties to be equal tenants in common and ordered the property sold. We reverse the trial court and dismiss the case.

Fentress Court of Appeals

Paul Wallace vs. Rhonda Mitchell
W1999-01487-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Ron E. Harmon
Tenured teacher was discharged after an evidentiary hearing before the school board upon finding that the teacher inappropriately touched students and failed to discontinue the practice after warnings. The teacher filed a petition for writ of certiorari for review by the chancery court and after the chancery court's review of the record of the school board hearing, the action of the board dismissing the teacher was affirmed. The teacher has appealed to this Court.

Decatur Court of Appeals

Walter Jefferson vs. Captain D's et al
W1999-00574-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
In this personal injury action, plaintiff timely filed suit, which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. Another suit was commenced within one year of the first dismissal. This suit was voluntarily nonsuited at a later date. A third suit was commenced within one year of the voluntarily nonsuit, but more than one year from the date of the first dismissal. The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff has appealed.

Shelby Court of Appeals

State vs. William Dozier
W1999-00243-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: William B. Acree
The defendant entered guilty pleas to three charges of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction on each charge. The court ordered that the sentences be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years and fined the defendant $2,000. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court, arguing that the court erred by denying him an alternative method of punishment. We conclude that the trial court considered all relevant factors needed to reach an appropriate sentence and that its findings are adequately supported by the record. The defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that the sentence was improper, and, accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Obion Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Carolyn L. Curry
W1999-00688-CCA-R10-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R Wade
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley

Carroll Court of Criminal Appeals

Carl O. Koella, Jr. vs. Fred McHargue, et al
E1999-02752-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
This is the second time that this case has been before us on appeal. On the first appeal, which was filed with respect to an order entered pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, we affirmed the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on the primary issue raised by the original complaint for declaratory judgment. While that case was pending on appeal, the original plaintiff, Carl O. Koella, Jr., died, and, on motion of his counsel, we entered an order substituting his widow, Maribel Koella, in his place. On remand, the plaintiff -- not otherwise identified in the pleading -- filed a motion in the trial court to dismiss the defendants' still-pending counterclaim. That motion was based on the failure of the defendants, in their capacity as counter-plaintiffs, to file a motion "to substitute the proper party for [Mr. Koella] in the trial court." The trial court granted the motion. We reverse.

Blount Court of Appeals