Lacey Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lacey Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his convictions are void and his sentence is illegal due to various errors made at trial and sentencing, including violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), evidentiary errors, improper sentencing, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy D. Scott
Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences in two other counties. After this court affirmed the judgment and the supreme court denied permission to appeal, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court granted Petitioner a delayed appeal to allow him to raise multiple evidentiary issues. In this delayed appeal, Petitioner challenges the admission of the same pieces of evidence and the testimony of three of the State’s witnesses. He also challenges the omission of evidence regarding the professional misconduct of a detective. The State contends Petitioner is entitled to no relief. The State also contends Petitioner was erroneously granted a delayed appeal because the record does not demonstrate prejudice. We are precluded from reviewing this issue based on the post-conviction court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court granting a delayed appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jacob Evan Coyne
The Defendant-Appellant, Jacob Evan Coyne, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202 (first degree murder); 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery). He received a total effective sentence of life plus 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to show (1) evidence of premeditation, (2) evidence that the victim was robbed or that the Defendant intended to rob the victim, and because (3) evidence that was favorable to the Defendant was not given appropriate weight at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Tuvarey Gilmore
The Defendant, Kevin Tuvarey Gilmore, pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to evading arrest creating a risk of death, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-603 (2018). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received a six-year sentence as a Range II offender, and the trial court would determine the manner of service. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. DeAngelo LeQuinte Berry
The Appellant, DeAngelo LeQuinte Berry, was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of life plus nine years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence from a cellular telephone and a Facebook account because the evidence was not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 901, that the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial after a witness referred to an assault rifle constitutes plain error, and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michelle Alexa Herbert v. Fabian Jesse Herbert
A review of the record on appeal reveals that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Whitaker
Defendant, Timothy Whitaker, was convicted following a jury trial of attempted second-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon, two counts of aggravated assault with serious bodily injury, and misdemeanor reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of fourteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted second-degree murder and that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering partially consecutive sentences. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve Leslie Smith
A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Steve Leslie Smith, of public intoxication. The trial court imposed a thirty-day sentence in the county workhouse to be suspended to supervised probation after five days of service. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence about a substance abuse and psychiatric facility near where the Defendant was arrested, and that the trial court committed plain error when it rejected his challenge for cause of three prospective jurors. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rhonda Lawson v. Mark Kleinman
Because appellant did not timely file a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B recusal appeal, and the order appealed does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Martin Thompson v. Christie Lee Thompson
The sole issue on appeal in this divorce action pertains to the coverture formula employed to fund the husband’s marital interest in the wife’s retirement account via a deferred distribution method. On the morning the case was set for a final hearing, the parties and their attorneys appeared in open court and announced they had agreed to the division of the marital estate with the exception of the implementing language required to fund the husband’s marital interest in the wife’s retirement account. Because the wife had a substantially larger account than the husband but lacked the financial resources to fund a present distribution of her retirement account, the parties announced in open court that they had agreed to an offset of their respective pensions and authorized the court to enter a final judgment using the coverture formula to affect a deferred distribution. Following the entry of the final order, the wife filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04 motion to set aside the order, contending that the trial court applied a deferred distribution method that did not reflect the parties’ agreement. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Richard Mack, ET AL. v. Cable Equipment Services INC., ET AL.
This appeal arises from litigation involving an incident that occurred in 2010. Suit was originally filed in 2011. After a voluntary nonsuit, the complaint was refiled in 2014. Years later, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add additional defendants. The trial court granted leave to amend but reserved ruling on whether the claims against the new parties would relate back to the date of the original complaint under the provisions of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03. The amended complaint was filed in 2018. The newly added defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that none of the elements required for relation back under Rule 15.03 had been shown to exist. After a hearing, the trial judge agreed and provided an oral ruling in favor of the defendants. Before a written order was entered to that effect, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice. The trial court subsequently entered an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial court found that at that point in the proceeding, the allowance of a nonsuit was discretionary, and permitting a nonsuit after its oral ruling would have been unfairly prejudicial to the defendants. As such, it granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the basis that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to the filing of the original or refiled complaint. The plaintiffs filed motions to alter or amend or set aside the order, arguing that the trial court lost jurisdiction at the moment the plaintiffs filed their notice of nonsuit, and therefore, the order of dismissal was void. They also argued that the trial court impermissibly relied on facts that were not found within the amended complaint in resolving the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied both motions. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth George Arnold
The defendant, Kenneth George Arnold, challenges his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of rape, aggravated sexual battery, and sexual battery by an authority figure, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kejuan King
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Kejuan King, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian C. Frelix v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Brian C. Frelix, appeals from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, for which he is serving an effective thirtyeight- year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the post-conviction court erred in not continuing the hearing until the Petitioner could appear in person following the Petitioner’s positive COVID-19 test and (2) the court erred in denying his post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for a hearing at which the Petitioner is present. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Johnny Jackson, Jr.
A Madison County grand jury indicted the defendant, Johnny Jackson, Jr., for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and domestic assault. After a trial, a jury convicted the defendant of aggravated assault by strangulation and domestic assault and acquitted the defendant on the charge of aggravated kidnapping. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of fifteen years for aggravated assault and eleven months and twenty-nine days for domestic assault to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court also affirmed the total effective fine of $2500 imposed by the jury. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erroneously relied on an inapplicable enhancement factor and failed to find any mitigation, and therefore, erred in sentencing the defendant to the maximum term of fifteen years. Additionally, the defendant claims the trial court erred in affirming the fine imposed by the jury without conducting the proper analysis and review. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we conclude the trial abused its discretion in applying one enhancement factor, failing to find any mitigation despite proof of the same in the record, and failing to conduct the proper analysis of the fine imposed by the jury. Therefore, we modify the defendant’s sentence for aggravated assault to thirteen years and remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of properly reviewing the jury imposed fine. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karen L. Hansen v. Jeremy C. Hansen
The father has appealed from an order designating the mother as the primary residential parent and adopting a permanent parenting plan. Because the order does not resolve all of the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rico Cook
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Rico Cook, of two counts of felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, one count of attempted second degree murder, three counts of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred (1) in denying the motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement, which he gave as a juvenile; and (2) in denying the motion to suppress the eyewitness identification evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julius T. Malone, et al. v. ASF Intermodal, LLC
Appellant stipulated that its employee was the at-fault driver in a motor vehicle accident involving Appellee. Appellee and his wife filed suit against Appellant for personal injuries and the issue of damages was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Appellees. Appellant appeals, arguing that the jury’s award of damages for loss of earning capacity, future medical expenses, permanent injury, and loss of consortium is contrary to the law and evidence. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm the trial court’s judgment on same. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ahmed Mote Alzamzami v. Arwa Al-Sulaihi
This is an appeal of a divorce involving children, which includes issues of default judgment, jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, the statute of frauds, and attorney’s fees. The trial court granted a motion for default judgment against the husband only as to the wife’s counter-complaint for divorce and subsequently denied the motion to set aside the default judgment. Thereafter, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce holding that the wife was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and dismissed the husband’s complaint for divorce. The trial court divided the marital estate and adopted a permanent parenting plan. Additionally, the trial court awarded a judgment against the husband in the amount of $15,000.00 for the wife’s attorney’s fees and litigation expenses incurred. The husband appeals. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wanda Cavaliere et al. v. State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from proceedings in the Tennessee Claims Commission and follows a trial concerning care received by the decedent while at the Tennessee State Veterans Home. The Claims Commission ultimately found that the claimants had failed to establish a health care liability claim and therefore dismissed the case. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of dismissal. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Nicol Cox
Defendant, Christopher Nichol Cox, was convicted by a jury of eighty-one counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape of a child, and one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The trial court merged the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child into the conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and imposed a sixty-year sentence as a Range III offender to be served at 100%, by operation of law, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that: the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance; the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify with the aid of a therapy dog without a hearing to determine the animal’s training or necessity to the victim’s testimony; the trial court improperly bolstered the victim’s testimony by allowing the victim’s entire forensic interview to be played to the jury; the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial when a witness testified that Defendant had other cases and that there were other victims; the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for rape of a child and thirty of the counts of aggravated sexual battery; the jurors did not make a unanimous decision as to which acts of sexual abuse it relied on to support his continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction; the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence by relying on an enhancement factor that is an essential element of the offense; and the cumulative effect of repeated constitutional errors denied him a fair trial. After hearing oral arguments and following our review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of aggravated sexual battery in counts sixteen through twenty-seven, counts forty-eight through fifty-four, and counts sixty-five through eighty-one and accordingly dismiss those counts and remand for entry of amended judgments. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Scott | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Hailey C.
A father filed a petition in Tennessee to domesticate and modify a Kentucky child-custody decree. The court later entered an agreed order granting the petition, which was not appealed. Three months later, the mother filed a motion to set aside the final judgment on the grounds of fraud and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied her Rule 60.02 motion and her subsequent Rule 59.04 motion. Because the court did not rule on the mother’s claims of fraud, we vacate the denial of the Rule 60.02 motion and remand for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Moore Freight Services, Inc. v. Grant Mize et al.
This is an interlocutory appeal involving a discovery dispute. The plaintiff corporation initiated this action to enforce a non-competition provision in an employment agreement, naming as defendants the plaintiff’s former chief operating officer and his current employer. Central to the discovery dispute, the plaintiff averred that it had terminated the chief operating officer’s employment for cause based on having learned that he had been involved in a payment scheme involving benefits and favors to an employee of one of the plaintiff’s customers. The defendants averred that the employment termination had actually been due to the plaintiff’s corporate restructuring. Prior to the chief operating officer’s employment termination, the plaintiff had retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation, and the customer whose employee had been identified as the recipient of the scheme had likewise conducted an investigation. Upon the defendants’ motion to compel discovery of materials related to the plaintiff’s internal investigation, the plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the materials were entitled to protection pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, common interest privilege, and work product doctrine. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the defendants had established, prima facie, that the plaintiff had waived the asserted privileges and protections by placing the internal investigation materials at issue in the litigation. The trial court then conducted an in camera review of specific materials presented to the court during the final day of the hearing. At the time these materials were submitted, it was undisputed that the only attorney work product included in the materials was “fact” or “ordinary” work product with no “opinion” work product included. Following in camera review, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to compel specifically as to the materials it had reviewed. Upon the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court entered an agreed order granting permission for application to this Court for an interlocutory appeal addressing the certified issue of whether the plaintiff had “waived the work product, attorney-client, and common interest privilege or protection by placing the internal investigation ‘at issue’ in this litigation.” This Court subsequently granted permission for interlocutory appeal. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ahren Presley
The Defendant-Appellant, Ahren Presley, was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and theft, two counts of felony murder in the commission or perpetration of a robbery, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of felony murder in the commission or perpetration of a theft, one count of theft of property $10,000-$60,000, and one count of theft of property $1,000 or less. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103 (conspiracy to commit theft); 39-13-202(a)(2) (felony murder in the commission or perpetration of, relevantly, a robbery or theft); 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery); 39-14-103 (theft of property). He received a total effective sentence of two life sentences plus twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that 1) the evidence was insufficient to support all of his convictions, and 2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Polk | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
New Dairy Kentucky, LLC v. Mike Tamarit
This is an action by a dairy on a sworn account against the former owner of a dairy distributor who signed a personal guaranty that obligated him to pay any past-due debts accrued by the distributorship to the plaintiff dairy. When the former owner signed the personal guaranty, he was the sole member/owner of the distributorship; however, he sold his membership interest in the distributorship in May 2015. At the time of the sale, the distributor owed $60,484.95 to the plaintiff dairy. One month later, when the plaintiff dairy learned of the sale, it created a new account for the distributor and sent both the distributor and the guarantor a demand for payment of the old account balance, the amount owing when the guarantor sold his membership interest in the distributor. Neither the distributor nor the guarantor paid the old account balance, and the dairy sued them both. The dairy later voluntarily nonsuited the distributor, with whom the dairy was continuing to do business under the new account number, leaving the guarantor as the sole defendant. Thereafter, the trial court granted the dairy’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the guarantor’s liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. After the hearing, the court entered a judgment against the guarantor for $130,102.12, including the principal debt, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the guarantor argues that the creditor breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by not seeking payment from the distribution company. We disagree. The personal guaranty obligated the guarantor to pay all amounts not paid by the distributor, whether or not the dairy sought payment from the distributor. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals |