Hudgens vs. Rogers M2000-00239-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
The mother of four minor children appealed the trial court's decision to change custody from Mother to Father based on a material change in circumstances. Prior to the entry of that order, it had been determined that an agreement, originally announced to the court which awarded custody of the children to Mother, had been set aside due to the court's finding that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties as several critical issues had been left unresolved. We have determined that the court was correct in that decision. Therefore, the standard which the trial court should have applied was one of comparative fitness and best interest of the children rather than a material change of circumstances. This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Johnna Hayes vs. Jeff Hayes W1999-00445-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis
This appeal arises from a dispute between Plaintiff Johnna Lea Hayes (Beuerlein) and Defendant Jeff C. Hayes regarding the amount of Mr. Hayes' child support obligation and the enforcement of a promissory note executed by Ms. Beuerlein in conjunction with the parties' divorce. The trial court found (1) that Mr. Hayes has an annual income of $64,139.00, (2) that Mr. Hayes' child support obligation is $1,221.00 per month but that this amount should be reduced to $621.00 per month until Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is satisfied, (3) that Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage is equal to $14,940.00, (4) that Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note is equal to $39,569.85, (5) that, subtracting Mr. Hayes' child support arrearage from Ms. Beuerlein's debt under the promissory note, the net amount that Ms. Beuerlein owes to Mr. Hayes is $24,665.85 plus ten percent (10%) interest, and (6) that each party shall pay his or her own attorney's fees. For the reasons set forth below, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Talmage Crump vs. Kimberly Bell W1999-00673-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
This is a personal injury case. Plaintiff filed a complaint and issued summons, which was returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued an alias summons which was also returned "not to be found." Plaintiff issued pluries summons more than one year after the return of the alias summons. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's case for failure to comply Rule 3, Tenn.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff asserts that defendant is equitably estopped from relying upon Tenn.R.Civ.P. 3, because of action of defendant's liability insurance carrier leading him to believe that the defense would not be raised upon which he relied to his detriment. The trial court found no estoppel, and plaintiff has appealed.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Glenda Faye Tolliver v. National Health Care E1999-01017-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Lafferty, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Daryl R. Fansler, Chancellor
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225 (e)(3) for a hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff sustained an accidental injury during her employment with the defendant and that the trial court awarded the plaintiff a twelve and one-half (12-_) percent vocational disability. After a complete review of the record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court is Affirmed. LAFFERTY, SR. J., in which BARKER, J., and PEOPLES, SP. J., joined. Robert W. Knolton, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellant, National Health Care Corporation. William A. Hotz, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Glenda Faye Tolliver. MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, age 4, is a licensed practical nurse and a certified nursing assistant instructor. On March 6, 1996, the plaintiff was assisting Tracey Bunch, a nursing assistant trainee, in transferring a patient from a bed to a wheelchair in the defendant's health care center. The plaintiff testified that she felt pain in the right side of her neck, down her shoulders and at the base of her skull. The pain was in the cervical area and the right arm. The pain increased and the following day the plaintiff informed her supervisor. She was referred to Dr. Watson and then to Dr. Uzzle. The plaintiff testified that she had two past injuries, (1) in 199, she sustained a cervical strain while working. Her MRI was negative and she returned to work; (2) in 1993, she fell at the Cracker Barrel injuring her elbow, "it stoved up her neck" and she also injured her left knee. She returned to work. After treatment for her injury of March 6, 1996, the plaintiff returned to work on light duty. The plaintiff requested that her return be limited to an instructor, but she was made a supervisor on the three to eleven shift. On the same day that the plaintiff returned to work, she was fired. At the time of trial, the plaintiff was working two jobs, one as an LPN at the UT hospital and as a supervisor for Helen Ross McNabb, a rehabilitation center. The plaintiff testified that she has problems doing her work, such as giving EKG's, lifting woman's breast, and any computer work, since she must keep her head down. The plaintiff cannot work the floor, lift patients and deliver meal trays. By deposition, Tracey Michelle Bunch testified that on March 6, 1996, she was working as a nursing assistant trainee, working on her certified nursing assistant certification, when the plaintiff assisted her in moving an elderly patient in and out of bed. The plaintiff did not complain of any injury, but the following day the plaintiff was not available as the instructor. The following Monday, Ms. Bunch saw the plaintiff at work answering calls at the nurse's station. The plaintiff had to make a full body turn instead of just a simple head turn. Keri Trammell, Director of the National Health Center, testified that she hired the plaintiff as an instructor for the certified nursing assistant program and as an LPN supervisor. She stated that she was familiar with the report of March 6, 1996, and that the plaintiff was referred to see Dr. Uzzle. The plaintiff was allowed to continue to work but on light duty. About May 1, 1996, Dr. Uzzle removed these restrictions. On May 29, 1996, Ms. Trammell called the plaintiff into her office and advised the plaintiff, based upon the medical reports, that she would be returned to a supervisor's position. The plaintiff refused to accept the supervisor's position, stating that she could only work as an instructor. MEDICAL EVIDENCE By deposition, Dr. Maren L. Watson, a family practitioner, testified that he saw the plaintiff on March 11, 1996, with a complaint of neck pains as well as headaches. The plaintiff advised Dr. Watson that she was lifting a patient at the National Health Center and that evening the pain got worse. In his examination, Dr. Watson found that the plaintiff's vital signs were normal, she was in no distress and cooperative with the exam. As to the musculoskeletal exam, Dr. Watson palpated the plaintiff's neck, upper back and shoulders and found generalized mild tenderness. Although Dr. Watson found no muscle spasms, he did note that the plaintiff's right shoulder was resting one inch lower than her left shoulder. Dr. Watson opined that the plaintiff certainly sustained a cervical muscle strain due to lifting a patient and this caused some pain in her neck that had radiated to her shoulders and middle back, which warranted a few days off from work. Dr. Watson testified that the plaintiff was unhappy with his recommended course of treatment and he did not see her again. Dr. Watson could not give an opinion as to any assessment for physical impairment for the plaintiff. -2-
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Merritt vs. Yates M1999-00775-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute between Plaintiff June Yates Merritt ("Ms. Merritt") and Defendants Aileen Biron Yates ("Mrs. Yates") and Claire Biron ("Mr. Biron") regarding the proper interpretation or construction of mutual wills executed in April of 1985 by Mrs. Yates and her husband Thomas Harry Yates ("Mr. Yates"), who was the father of Ms. Merritt. After the death of Mr. Yates in December of 1985, Mrs. Yates deeded certain real property to Mr. Biron, gifted certain personal property to Mr. Biron, and established a revocable trust using money received as a result of her husband's death. In an action filed by Ms. Merritt challenging these transactions, the trial court determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact and entered a judgment in favor of Ms. Merritt. Additionally, the court denied Ms. Merritt's motion for discretionary costs. Mrs. Yates appeals the court's order granting a judgment in favor of Ms. Merritt and Ms. Merritt appeals the court's ruling regarding her motion for discretionary costs. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Manolito Jemison M1999-00752-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier
The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter on one count of first degree premeditated murder and the lesser offense of reckless homicide on one count of felony murder. The counts were merged into one conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously applied one enhancement factor and failed to apply two mitigating factors. Based upon our review, we agree that an enhancement factor was improperly applied. However, since two other enhancement factors were properly applied, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
Inscoe, et al vs. Kemper, et al M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from a suit filed by Inscoe seeking the return of earnest money held in escrow for the purchase of Kemper's residence. When Inscoe decided not to purchase the residence, Kemper refused to return the earnest money. The trial court found in favor of Inscoe and ordered the return of the earnest money. In making its finding, the court stated that Inscoe's promise to buy was illusory and there was no meeting of the minds, thus the contract was void and unenforceable. Kemper appeals.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
State v. Dwanna L. Mason M1999-02535-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Frank G. Clement, Jr.
The defendant pled guilty in Davidson County Criminal Court to vehicular homicide by reckless conduct, a Class C felony, and four lesser charges against her were dismissed. Her guilty plea was submitted without any agreement of the parties as to length or manner of service of sentence. After a sentencing hearing at which the defendant testified, the trial court sentenced her to five years and six months in continuous confinement. The defendant appeals as of right this sentence. We conclude that the imposition of a sentence of five years and six months was appropriate. We affirm the sentence as to length but modify it to show a period of confinement equal to time already served with the remaining time to be served on probation.
Beavers vs. The Lebanon Democrat Newspaper M1999-02401-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from an action initiated by Plaintiffs, Mae and Jerry Beavers, against the Defendant newspaper, the Lebanon Democrat, for libel and slander. The Beavers' claim arises out of two separate articles published by the newspaper. The trial court granted the newspaper's motion for summary judgment, holding that the first article was substantially true and the second article was a non-actionable opinion. The Beavers appeal.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Michael Sample & Larry McKay W1999-01202-CCA-R3-PC
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman
The Defendants were each convicted in 1982 of two counts of felony murder. Each Defendant received two death penalties for the murders. On post-conviction, the Defendants contend that the State withheld exculpatory information and that their death penalties were predicated in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. The trial court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, finding that the Brady claims were time-barred and finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have imposed the death sentences absent consideration of the invalid aggravating circumstance. The Defendants now appeal the trial court's findings on both claims for relief. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
Jeremy Tompkins vs. Mary Rainey W1999-01218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
In this action to establish parentage, Jeremy Earl Tompkins (Father) appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding Mary Helen Rainey (Mother) custody of the parties' infant son. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State vs. Jerry Rodgers W1999-01443-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft
The defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and sentenced to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in relying on New York convictions as prior felonies in order to sentence him as a multiple offender. After review, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court's finding that the New York convictions qualified as prior felonies for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Christopher Henderson W1999-00958-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and full probation following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
State vs. Deshawn McClenton W1999-00879-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
The Defendant, DeShawn McClenton, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offenses of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction and to sixty years imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence regarding his identity as the perpetrator was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that his prior aggravated robbery conviction and his three prior attempted second degree murder convictions were admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify, and (3) that the movement and confinement of the victim were essentially incidental to the accomplishment of the aggravated robbery and were therefore insufficient to support a separate conviction for kidnapping. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Gene Logue W1999-01795-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
Defendant was convicted of theft of property over $500.00, and sentenced to two (2) years as a Range I standard offender. Defendant now appeals as of right, and raises the following issues: the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, the court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove the value of the property stolen and the venue of the crime in Benton County, and the court erred in sentencing defendant to serve two (2) years and failing to consider alternative sentencing. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Benton
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Michael W. Smith W1999-01817-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.
The petitioner pled guilty in Shelby County Criminal Court to two counts of rape, two counts of aggravated burglary, and five misdemeanor counts. He was sentenced, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to ten years for each of the rape counts; six years for each of the aggravated burglary counts; and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor counts, with all sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. The sequence of the charges was that the petitioner was arrested and charged with a rape, an aggravated burglary, and all of the misdemeanor counts, released on bail, and later arrested for the second rape and aggravated burglary, both of which occurred while he was on bail for the first set of charges. In this petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner sought to have his guilty pleas set aside on the grounds that his pleas were not voluntarily and knowingly made and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. It is unnecessary to address those issues because it appears from the record that the negotiated plea agreement was in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-20-111(b), requiring that a sentence for a felony committed while on bail be served consecutively to the sentence for the initial felony charge. Because we do not know whether the petitioner would have entered his pleas of guilty had he known of the requirement regarding consecutive sentencing, on remand the petitioner must be allowed to withdraw his pleas of guilty as to both of the rape and both of the aggravated burglary charges.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Reginald Merriweather W1999-02050-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison
The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated robbery. He raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's request for a mistrial based on a juror's response during voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a witness to answer questions on cross-examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Madison
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Freddie Norment W1999-01928-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for wounding a jail cell mate with a homemade knife. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: whether the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to examine a potential witness outside the jury's presence; and whether the trial court erred in failing to issue curative jury instructions after the allegedly improper testimony of a prosecution witness. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
State vs. Sammy Bonds W2001-02859-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
Petitioner, Sammy S. Bonds, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's pro se petition alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject Petitioner's argument and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
