State vs. James McKinley Cunningham M1999-01995-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry
The defendant was convicted by a Grundy County jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life. In this appeal, he challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the admission of a photograph of the victim's body; (3) the exclusion of testimony relating to statements made by the victim; and (4) the evidentiary rulings relating to the victim's propensity toward violence. Upon our review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Grundy
Court of Criminal Appeals
William Henderson vs. Donal Campbell M2000-00411-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This is an appeal by a prison inmate from a dismissal of his suit for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court of Davidson County. The trial court dismissed the claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-804 for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
State vs. Thomas Edward Ford M1999-2362-CCA-R3-CD
Trial Court Judge: Charles D. Haston, Sr.
The appellant, Thomas Edward Ford, was convicted of Class C felony aggravated assault and Class D vandalism. The Circuit Court of Warren County sentenced the appellant to five years for aggravated assault and two years for vandalism. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. Upon appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for review: (1) propriety of the five-year sentence; (2) imposition of consecutive sentences; (3) sufficiency of the evidence for aggravated assault; and (4) misleading jury instruction. After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Warren County is affirmed.
Warren
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Charles B. Sullivan M1999-02547-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz
Charles B. Sullivan entered guilty pleas in the Davidson County Criminal Court to three counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated burglary, and one count of rape, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifty-nine years. In this appeal as of right, the appellant contends that the individual sentences are excessive and that partial consecutive sentences are not warranted. After review, we affirm.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
City of Springfield vs. Hobson Cleaning, Inc., et al M2000-01114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: James E. Walton
This case involves a contract between the City of Springfield and defendant, United Services Unlimited, formerly Hobson Cleaning, to clean the floors of the police department. Defendant appeals whether the evidence preponderated against the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment.
Robertson
Court of Appeals
In re: K.D.D. (DOB 9/20/96) and B.T.D. (DOB 1/13/98) M2000-01554-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Barry Tatum
The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of a mother to her young children. The mother appealed, arguing that she was not given an adequate opportunity to defend those rights. We find that she voluntarily failed to avail herself of the opportunities that were offered to her, and we affirm the trial court.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Thomas Gammons v. Peterbilt Motors Company, M1999-02575-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: J. O. Bond, Judge
The trial court found the plaintiff had sustained a permanent partial disability to his right arm of sixty percent, which would entitle him to one-hundred twenty weeks of partial permanent disability. The defendant argues the trial judge erred in setting the amount of the award because the treating physician fixed the medical impairment rating at six percent, and the independent medical examiner fixed the rate at thirty-four percent; the trial judge used neither of these ratings to reach the amount awarded. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Macon
Workers Compensation Panel
Donna Marcom v. Pca Apparel Industries, Inc. and WaUSAu M2000-00377-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Tom E. Gray, Sp.J.
Trial Court Judge: John Rollins, Chancellor
The trial court found the plaintiff had suffered an injury arising out of her employment with the defendant and awarded her a vocational disability of sixty (6%) percent to the left leg. The defendant argues that the evidence does not support the award of sixty (6%) percent to the left leg based on an anatomical rating of twelve (12%) percent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Coffee
Workers Compensation Panel
Burgess vs. Tie Co. 1, LLC M1999-02232-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: L. Craig Johnson
In this slip and fall action the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment. We vacate and remand.
Coffee
Court of Appeals
Sweatt vs. Bd. of Paroles M1999-02265-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
Appellant Antonio L. Sweatt brings this Petition for a Common Law Writ of Certiorari regarding the Tennessee Board of Paroles' decision to deny him parole based on the seriousness of the offense that he committed. Appellant avers that the Board of Paroles acted illegally or arbitrarily in denying his parole because appellant asserts that his guilty plea agreement included the agreement that he would only serve thirty percent of his twenty-five-year sentence and then he would be released on parole.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Fain v. Fain M1999-02261-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Russell Heldman
In this post-divorce proceeding, Clifton Dean Fain ("Father") filed a petition seeking sole custody of the parties' minor child. Susan Lorraine Fain ("Mother") counterclaimed for a modification of the joint custody arrangement or, in the alternative, for sole custody of the child. The trial court awarded Mother sole custody. Father appeals the award of sole custody to Mother. He also challenges the award of attorney's fees to Mother and questions the fairness of the quantum of his visitation time with the child. Mother seeks attorney's fees for this appeal. We affirm.
Williamson
Court of Appeals
Cumberland Bank vs. Smith M2000-00052-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
A creditor filed an action to sell a parcel of the debtor's real estate to satisfy a judgment lien on the property. The Chancery Court of Smith County granted the relief requested. The judgment debtor asserts on appeal that the underlying judgment and a nulla bona sheriff's return are void. For the reasons set forth in our opinion below, we affirm the action of the lower court.
Smith
Court of Appeals
Arms vs. Stanton M2000-00811-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol A. Catalano
In what started out as an order of protection proceeding but later turned into a "divorce" action, the original plaintiff, James Vertner Arms, who was the counter-defendant in the "divorce" case, filed a third-party action against Richard D. Stanton, individually and doing business as Shiloh Family, Ltd. ("Stanton"). Stanton had purchased a tract of real property from the counter-plaintiff, Tammy Lou Arms, subsequent to the institution of her "divorce" action against Mr. Arms. The trial court determined that Mr. Arms and Tammy Lou Arms were not validly married; it proceeded to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance and awarded Stanton a judgment against Tammy Lou Arms for $50,000. Stanton appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in setting aside the conveyance. We reverse.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
General Bancshares vs. Volunteer Bank & Trust M2000-00231-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins
The Plaintiff, General Bancshares, Inc., filed a declaratory judgment action asking the Trial Court to declare a restrictive covenant in its warranty deed unenforceable. Defendant Volunteer Bank & Trust's predecessor in title of the property at issue originally placed the restriction on the property several years ago. Plaintiff contends, among other arguments, that the restrictive covenant does not bind it as a remote grantee because the restrictive clause does not contain specific "successors and assigns" language. Both parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment, and the Trial Court granted Defendant's Motion. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Marion
Court of Appeals
Next Generation, Inc. vs. Wal-Mart M2000-00114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
In this contract dispute, the jury awarded damages to Wal-Mart, Inc., and the Trial Court concurred. Next Generation, Inc., appealed raising issues as to the admissibility of evidence and the Trial Court's instructions to the jury. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Next Generation, Inc. vs. Wal-Mart M2000-00114-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Brothers
In this contract dispute, the jury awarded damages to Wal-Mart, Inc., and the Trial Court concurred. Next Generation, Inc., appealed raising issues as to the admissibility of evidence and the Trial Court's instructions to the jury. We affirm.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Mandrell vs. McBee M2000-00108-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Robert E. Corlew, III
This is a partnership dispute occasioned by the misappropriation of partnership funds by two of the five partners. In an earlier appeal in this case, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court awarding damages to the innocent partners but increased the amount of that judgment. This Court then remanded the case to the Trial Court, which heard further proof and made findings as to the distribution of partnership assets. In this appeal, a Defendant partner seeks reversal of the Trial Court's valuation and accounting of the partnership assets and computation of prejudgment interest. We find the concurrent findings of fact by the Special Master and the Trial Court are supported by material evidence in the record, and that the Special Master and the Trial Court properly interpreted this Court's earlier Opinion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Trial Court in all respects.
Rutherford
Court of Appeals
Associates Home Equity Svcs. v. Franklin National Bank M2000-00516-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
In this appeal Associates, a mortgage company, appeals the trial court's holding that it was not entitled to equitable subrogation to the rights and priority of earlier mortgagees whose loans it paid off. Franklin, another mortgage company, made a loan to the same property owners one day before Associates made its loan and recorded its deed of trust three days before Associates recorded its deed of trust to the same real property. Associates claims that, although Franklin recorded first, Associates is entitled to priority pursuant to the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Franklin filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which the trial court granted. We find that because the remedy of equitable subrogation is an equitable one dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the situation and the equities between the parties, judgment on the pleadings was inappropriate.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Bobby Rains v. Bend of the River M2000-00439-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
This appeal involves an eighteen year old who committed suicide with his parents' .25 caliber handgun. The parents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Putnam County against the retailer who sold their son ammunition for the handgun shortly before his death. They later amended the complaint to seek loss of consortium damages for themselves and their son's surviving siblings. The trial court denied the retailer's motion for summary judgment regarding the wrongful death claims, as well as the retailer's motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims. Thereafter, the trial court granted the retailer permission to seek a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal from its refusal to dismiss the wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. We granted permission to appeal and have now determined that the trial court erred by denying the retailer's Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 and 12.02(6) motions because, based on the undisputed facts, the suicide was not reasonably foreseeable and was the independent, intervening cause of the young man's death.
Putnam
Court of Appeals
Mayhew vs. Wilder M2000-01948-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Mayhew vs. Wilder M2000-01948-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Brenda Sandusky vs. Danny Sandusky M2000-00288-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
This appeal marks the third time that disputes over the child support provisions in the Sanduskys' 1988 marital dissolution agreement have reached this court. After we remanded the second appeal to calculate Mr. Sandusky's child support arrearage and to award Ms. Sandusky her legal expenses, Mr. Sandusky asserted new and different grounds to evade paying child support and also asserted that he should receive a credit against his arrearage because he had paid for a portion of his daughter's wedding. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court for Wayne County terminated Mr. Sandusky's child support obligations regarding both of his children and reduced his arrearage by the amount of his financial contribution to his daughter's wedding. The trial court also awarded Ms. Sandusky only a portion of her legal expenses and declined to award her any discretionary costs. Ms. Sandusky asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by relieving Mr. Sandusky of his child support obligations, by reducing Mr. Sandusky's arrearage by the amount of his contribution to his daughter for her wedding, by miscalculating the interest on Mr. Sandusky's arrearage, and by refusing to order Mr. Sandusky to pay all her legal expenses and discretionary costs. We agree with each of Ms. Sandusky's arguments. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's February 4, 2000 order and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
