Dexter Williams vs. State E1999-00871-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
Blount
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Laconia Lamar Bowers E1999-00170-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Baumgartner
Knox
Court of Criminal Appeals
Lana R. Woods v. Modine Manufacturing Company 03S01-9807-CH-00143
Authoring Judge: Howell N. Peoples, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jean A. Stanley
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). At the time of trial, the plaintiff was 24 years of age. He had a high school diploma and some college hours. Prior to working for the defendant, the plaintiff worked as a salesperson in retail stores.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Oca Crai v. Thomas & Betts Corporation 03S01-9903-CV-00026
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Lawrence Puckett,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Thomas & Betts Corporation, has appealed from the action of the trial court in awarding plaintiff, Oca Crain, 1% permanent disability to her right foot. The only issue is whether the 1% award to the foot is excessive. Mrs. Crain sustained a work-related injury on July 9, 1996, when a forklift truck ran over her foot and then backed up and ran over the foot a second time. She was 63 years of age at the time of the accident and 65 years old at the time of the trial. She completed the 1th grade and had worked for defendant for about 27 years. At the time of her injury, she was working as an "assembler" which required standing on her feet most of the time. After being off work for about three months, she returned to light duty work. The defendant attempted to accommodate her work restrictions and changed her job to a "bagger" which permitted her to sit down and afforded her an opportunity to elevate her injured foot. She worked at this job for about nineteen months until she fell at home and injured her shoulder. At the trial below, she had not returned to work and did not think she could return. She testified that after returning to work from the foot injury, she still had problems with her foot such as pain, swelling, tingling toes and numbness; that she had to keep her foot elevated 75% of the time and that her production rate was not at the required level; that she could not do her housework, mow her yard and many other things she enjoyed doing before the accident. She said she had planned to continue working as long as she could as her income was limited since she lived by herself. Plaintiff came under the care of Dr. William J. Drury, an orthopedic surgeon, who testified by deposition. He saw her eleven times during the seven month period of treatment. Dr. Drury testified she had a severely crushed foot with fractures of two toes; that the fractures did not heal and probably would not heal properly due to poor circulation in her foot; that this resulted because blood vessels were severely damaged and surgery would not be helpful. His prognosis was that although the bad 2
Farley vs. Leblanc M1999-02155-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Barry R. Brown
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Doyle vs. Cole and NES M1999-02115-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Soloman
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Cannon vs. March M1999-02123-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith
Wilson
Court of Appeals
El Ahkeen vs. Tony Parker W1998-00640-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
Lisa Norton vs. Max Norton W1999-02176-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
Madison
Court of Appeals
Robert Stewart vs. Lynda Stewart W1999-02185-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
Madison
Court of Appeals
Lillie Mays vs. Fred's Inc. W1999-02189-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: George H. Brown
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Tommie Faye Burnette v. Olan Mills, Inc. 03S01-9807-CH-00081
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Van Owens
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The plaintiff alleged she suffered from an occupational illness, to wit, reactive airways disease. The trial judge found the plaintiff did not have an industrial illness but that she had asthma, bronchitis and emphysema, which was aggravated by the conditions under which she worked. The trial judge found the plaintiff had sustained a 6% whole body disability as a result of the aggravation of her pre-existing condition. The defendant says the evidence does not support the finding and further claims the plaintiff failed to give notice of her injury as required by TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-35. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Edward Ray Howell, Jr. v. Php Companies, Inc. and Tennessee Department of Labor, Second Injury Fund 03S01-9809-CH-00108
Authoring Judge: Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald, Chancellor
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frederick D. Mcdonald,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Edward Ray Howell, Jr., has appealed from the action of the trial court in dismissing his claim for benefits. The Chancellor found that the injury in question did not aggravate his previous physical condition to the extent of constituting an anatomical change as a result of the accident. Plaintiff was 39 years of age and was employed as a mail sorter for defendant, PHP Companies, Inc. In this appeal he contends he was injured on September 3, 1996, while lifting a large bag of mail out of the trunk of his supervisor's automobile. He sought a determination that he was totally disabled claiming both physical and mental injuries. Prior to the incident in 1996, he had sustained numerous injuries to his body and some were work-related. During this prior period of time, he was also seen and treated for psychiatric problems which resulted in hospitalization during 1992. The following would generally summarize his prior physical problems: In 1985 or 1986, he suffered neck and back injuries as a result of an auto accident; in 1988 he sustained a work-related injury to his right shoulder resulting in 3% disability award; in 1989 he sustained injuries to his left femur, right knee and facial injuries from an auto accident; in 199 he slipped and fell while at work for another employer and was awarded 1% disability; in 1991 he began having problems with his left shoulder which resulted in surgery being performed in 1992; in 1993 he sustained injuries to his neck and back in an auto accident; and in 1996, prior to the incident in question, he injured his right arm and shoulder by falling at a Burger King restaurant, which resulted in surgery shortly after the incident in question. Plaintiff testified that he had total of 26 surgical procedures for various problems prior to the September 3, 1996 accident and three surgical procedures (knee injuries, right shoulder and left shoulder) after the event. The evidence is quite clear that after receiving the 1% award of disability for the 199 injury, he entered a rehabilitation program and over a period of time 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
James Nay v. Resource Consultants, Inc. and The Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. M1996-00016-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Irvin H. Kilcrease
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference.
This appeal involves a dispute over the obligation of a member of a group health insurance plan to reimburse the plan for medical payments made on behalf of the member’s dependent. The plan’s administrator requested the member and her dependent to reimburse the plan for the medical payments after discovering that the dependent had received a financial settlement from the person who caused the dependent’s injuries. When the member and the dependent refused to reimburse the payments, the plan filed suit in the Circuit Court for Sumner County against both parties. The trial court granted the plan’s motion for summary judgment and ordered both the member and her dependent to reimburse the plan for medical payments. We have determined that the plan was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law against the member and accordingly vacate the summary judgment against her.
