The defendant, facing a third trial for first degree murder, has filed this interlocutory appeal. The defendant alleges that the trial court erred in disqualifying his counsel because of an appearance of impropriety. We affirm.
Having pled guilty to various counts of aggravated burglary, robbery, auto theft, and theft, the defendant appeals from his sentences. He argues that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences and that his effective twelve-year sentence is therefore excessive. After a de novo review, we affirm the sentences as imposed.
In this appeal, defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. The defendants were convicted by a Dickson County jury of criminal trespass and fined $50. Upon a review of the record, we find the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of simple assault and the consecutive five-year sentences imposed for the aggravated assaults. The defendant raises the following issues in this appeal: 1) whether evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdicts, and 2) whether the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for the two aggravated assault convictions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Henry Lee Berry appeals his Knox County conviction for second degree murder. Berry contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence two recorded 911 telephone calls and an order of protection entered against the appellant by the victim; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial when evidence of a pending rape charge in Nashville was introduced before the jury. Additionally, the appellant urges adoption of DNA testing on decomposed bodies to positively establish the identity of the victim. Although we conclude that admission of the 911 telephone calls and the order of protection was error, the error was harmless. Moreover, finding no other reversible error of law, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court.
The City of Chattanooga asserted, by counter-claim, that the franchise rights of a state-franchised water company had terminated when the original stated corporate existence of ninety-nine years expired. The Hamilton County Chancery Court found that the water company's franchise was separate from the incorporation, that perpetuity of the franchise is the appropriate interpretation when there exists no limiting language in the franchise grant itself, and that the water company had not trespassed by continuing to operate in Chattanooga past the expiration of the original ninety-nine year grant of corporate existence. The judgment of the Chancellor is affirmed.
The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation, based on his failing a drug screen and his delinquency in paying court costs. We hold that the record is insufficient to support the trial court's finding of delinquent payments. However, the failing of the drug screen served as a sufficient basis for the revocation. We affirm the trial court's order. .
Lawrence
Court of Criminal Appeals
Dorothy Taylor v. Senior Citizens Services, Inc.,
W1999-02152-WC-R3
Authoring Judge: Weatherford, Sr. J.
Trial Court Judge: Robert L. Childers, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Dorothy Taylor, appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Tennessee for the 3th Judicial District at Memphis, where the trial court found: (1) that Ms. Taylor failed to give proper notice to her employer regarding her carpal tunnel injury, (2) that if the trial court had found the carpal tunnel injury to be compensable, it would have awarded Ms. Taylor a 1% permanent impairment to each extremity and temporary total disability benefits up to May 7, 1997, (3) that Ms. Taylor had a 1% permanent impairment to the body as a whole as a result of a back injury and awarded a judgment in the amount of $6,43.2, (4) that Ms. Taylor was entitled to open medical benefits for life as they related to the specific back injury she suffered on January 31, 1994, (5) that the defendants were not required to pay for unauthorized medical bills for treatment of Ms. Taylor's back or (6) for the evidentiary deposition of John Howser, M.D. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 (e) (1999) Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed. WEATHERFORD, SR. J., in which HOLDER, J., and MALOAN, SP. J., joined. Albert G. McLean, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dorothy Taylor . Wm. B. Walk, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Senior Citizens Services, Inc. d/b/a Senior Services, and Hartford Insurance Co. MEMORANDUM OPINION The employee, Dorothy Taylor, was forty years old at the time of trial. She has an 11th grade education and later took a course and became a certified nursing assistant. Ms. Taylor worked for Senior Citizens Services, Inc. as a personal care aid from October 17, 1988 until April 27, 1994. Her daily job activities included lifting patients in and out of wheel chairs and putting them in the tub, giving bed baths, making beds, doing some house cleaning, cooking, running errands, and taking vital signs. Prior to her job at Senior Citizens Services, Inc., Ms. Taylor worked for Court Manor Nursing Home for two years where she performed the same job activities. Before working at Court Manor Nursing Home, she worked for a cleaners as a flat iron worker for about seven (7) months. Prior to that time, she and her husband had operated a restaurant lounge from 1983 to 1985 where she handled the paper work, the purchasing and inventory. She also worked behind the bar. Ms. Taylor stated that she had injured her back in 1991, but had recovered after being off work for about three months. She also testified that she hurt her right hip and shoulder in June of 1993, but was only off a few days from that injury. She never received any permanent disability benefits from either prior injury. Ms. Taylor testified that she injured her back on January 31, 1994, when she was putting a patient back to bed. Ms. Taylor had the upper part of the patient's body while another person was holding the patient's legs. When the other person dropped the patient's legs, Ms. Taylor twisted her back and she heard a "pop" in her lower back and it started to hurt "real bad." Pursuant to the company's procedures, Ms. Taylor advised the work schedulers of her injury and they in turn were to inform her supervisor. About two weeks later, Ms. Taylor personally told her supervisor, Mattie Hewlett, about the accident. Ms. Taylor testified that she stayed off work for three days and then attempted to go back to work, but was unable to do so because of back pain. She saw her family doctor, Dr. A. E. Horne, one (1) week exactly from the date of the accident. Prior to this time, she had not been given the names of any workers' compensation approved doctors. Ms. Taylor stayed off work approximately one (1) month after the accident. Senior Citizens Services authorized Ms. Taylor to see Dr. Mark Harriman, who began his treatment of Ms. Taylor in March of 1994. Dr. Harriman testified that: My exam at that time was fairly non-physiologic. I did not think that there was anything going on. She was very histrionic in her presentation. She had pain to light touch, had pain when I checked her deep tendon reflexes. Otherwise, she was neurologically intact. I felt like at that time we should just give her a few days to get ready and go back to work and sent her back to work as of the 22nd of March. Dr. Harriman also stated, "She was very jumpy on exam, exhibited signs of symptom magnification without any real physical exam findings to go along with it." -2-
Shelby
Workers Compensation Panel
Teresa Miles vs. Earl Pace
W1999-00407-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Joe C. Morris
Four tenants in common, each owning a one-eighth interest in the property, filed suit for sale for partition against the other tenant in common, owning a one-half interest. After a non-jury trial, the court found that the property was so situated that it could not be partitioned and also found that it would be manifestly for the advantage of the parties that the property be sold rather than partitioned. The tenant in common owning one-half interest has appealed. We affirm, because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the chancellor.
Madison
Court of Appeals
Larry Parish vs. Robert Marquis
W1999-02629-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: James E. Swearengen
Plaintiffs Larry E. Parrish and Larry E. Parrish, P.C. (collectively, "Parrish"), appeal the trial court's final summary judgment that dismissed Parrish's claim for malicious prosecution against Defendants Robert S. Marquis, McCampbell & Young, P.C., Ronald C. Koksal, and Butler, Vines & Babb, PLLC. The Defendants also have raised an issue on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss for improper venue. We conclude that the Shelby County Circuit Court was not the proper venue for Parrish's malicious prosecution claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Parrish's malicious prosecution claim on the alternative ground of improper venue.
State vs. Lester Douglas Giles
E1999-02236-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Carroll L. Ross
On June 21, 1999, the defendant pled guilty in the Monroe County Criminal Court to attempted rape and was sentenced to four years as a Range I standard offender. The sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation. On July 6, 1999, a probation violation was issued, alleging that the defendant had violated his probation by having contact with the victim's family. Following a hearing on August 16, 1999, the trial court ruled that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation, a ruling which the defendant timely appealed. Based upon our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the defendant's probation.
Monroe
Court of Criminal Appeals
Howell vs. Howell
M1999-00753-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John A. Turnbull
In this post-divorce case, Talisa Gayle Kelly, formerly Howell, ("Wife") filed a petition seeking to increase child support and to enforce other provisions of the judgment of divorce. The trial court ordered Gary Morris Howell ("Husband") to pay Wife the balance due her for her interest in the former marital residence. It further found Husband in contempt for failing to maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the parties' minor child and ordered him to pay Wife an amount approximating what he would have paid in insurance premiums had he maintained the policy as required by the divorce judgment. Wife was also awarded half of her attorney's fees. We reverse the trial court's award of the unpaid premiums; in all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Maury
Court of Appeals
Lineberry vs. Locke
M1999-02169-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Jim T. Hamilton
A citizen whose private photographs and video tapes were seized in the execution of a search warrant sued the sheriff and a deputy for invasion of privacy and outrageous conduct. The trial judge directed a verdict for the defendants at the close of the plaintiff's proof. Because we agree that the plaintiff did not prove either cause of action, we affirm.
Wilson
Court of Appeals
Wilson vs. Wilson
M1999-02045-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson
This is an appeal from the trial court's refusal to modify Mr. Wilson's child support obligation after he was terminated from his place of employment. We reverse the trial court's judgment.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Freethy vs. Maconi
M2000-00107-COA-R9-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: L. Raymond Grimes
This Rule 9 interlocutory appeal consists of the singular issue of whether Steven Maconi has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, thus requiring him to defend a paternity action brought in Tennessee. The Trial Court held that Mr. Maconi had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee, and thus, it could exercise personal jurisdiction over him. We reverse the finding of the Trial Court and hold that Mr. Maconi does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Tennessee for it to exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
Montgomery
Court of Appeals
Taylor vs. Campbell
M2000-00217-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.
Daniel B. Taylor filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the Commissioner and several other employees of the Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that he is entitled to various sentence reduction credits and that his sentence is void and illegal. The trial court dismissed Taylor's petition. We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Mona Koja vs. Abed Koja
W1999-00993-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Karen R. Williams
Wife was granted a divorce and received a division of marital property and alimony in futuro. The trial court denied Wife attorney fees and expenses. Wife has appeal. The trial court's order denying an award of attorney fees and expenses is reversed. The case is remanded for entry of an order awarding one-half of the attorney fees and expenses.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State vs. Carl Couch
W1999-00645-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
The defendant appeals his split sentence of 60 days confinement plus 1 year and 4 months of probation for the offense of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The defendant contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in denying him total probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Hardin
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Robin Vanhoose
W1999-00708-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
The defendant was convicted by a Hardin County jury of aggravated assault and received an eight-year sentence as a Range II multiple offender. He now appeals his conviction alleging (1) the indictment does not state an offense; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support aggravated assault. We conclude the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the offense charged, and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to conclude he was guilty of aggravated assault. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Hardin
Court of Criminal Appeals
Glenda Tate vs. Baptist Memorial
W1999-00553-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
Hospital employee was accused of negotiating payroll checks of other employees and was discharged. Employee filed defamation suit, and trial court granted summary judgment because the pleadings and affidavits established that there was no publication of the alleged defamatory words since all communication thereof was to hospital employees.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
Glenda Tate vs. Baptist Memorial
W1999-00553-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Kay S. Robilio
Hospital employee was accused of negotiating payroll checks of other employees and was discharged. Employee filed defamation suit, and trial court granted summary judgment because the pleadings and affidavits established that there was no publication of the alleged defamatory words since all communication thereof was to hospital employees.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State vs. Selina Harrelson
W1999-00521-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
The defendant, Selina G. Harrelson, was convicted of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell. She contends that the officer did not have probable cause to search the truck with the drug detection dog; that the evidence is insufficient to show that she possessed crack cocaine; and that the trial court should have imposed a sentence alternative to incarceration. We hold that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck to contest the search and that, in any event, the officer had probable cause. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court properly sentenced the defendant to incarceration. We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Hardin
Court of Criminal Appeals
TN Farmers vs. Roger Hostetler, et al
W1999-00368-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action filed in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court by Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company. The complaint sought a declaration that Tennessee Farmers was not obligated to defend or indemnify its insureds against a wrongful death lawsuit filed by James Drake, executor of the estate of Mattie Lee Drake. After both sides filed motions for summary judgment, the trial court ruled that coverage did not exist under the Personal Liability Insurance Policy and entered summary judgment in favor of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company.
Lauderdale
Court of Appeals
State vs. Bobby Perkins
W1999-01368-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford
The defendant, Bobby Earl Perkins, appeals his conviction for especially aggravated robbery, contending that the trial court erred (1) by allowing a witness to testify about the defendant's statement a year before the robbery that he planned to rob the victim, (2) by allowing a police officer to testify to statements the victim made regarding the defendant, and (3) by sentencing the defendant to twenty-one years. We affirm the conviction, but we modify the sentence to twenty years.
