Davis vs. Dept. of Employment Security
M1996-00021-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

White (Deerman) vs. White
M1999-00005-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

Moore vs. Moore
M1999-01680-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

15th Jud. Dist. Unified Bar Assoc. vs. Glasgow
M1996-00020-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith

Davis vs. Dept. of Employment Security
M1996-00021-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

Kim Nuchols (Walker) vs. Benny Nuchols
03A01-9901-GS-00007

03A01-9902-CH-00045
03A01-9902-CH-00045

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Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

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Westside Health and Raquet Club, Inc., v. Jefferson Financial Services, Inc.
E1998-00412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson

Westside Health & Racquet Club, Inc. (“Westside”) filed this action against Jefferson Financial Services, Inc. (“ Jefferson”). Westside’s theory of its claim -- which theory was adopted by the trial court -- is that Westside’s transfer to Jefferson, over time, of some 495 installment sales
contracts was, in each case, part and parcel of a usurious loan made by Jefferson to Westside, rather than a sale of the contract. The trial court awarded Westside damages of $68,519.71 for usurious interest, which was enhanced by a further award of pre-judgment interest pursuant to T.C.A. § 47-14-123 (1995)1. Jefferson appeals, raising several issues. The issue that we will focus on can be stated thusly: Does the Retail Installment Sales Act, T.C.A. § 47-11-101, et seq., (“ the Act”) operate to exempt the dealings between these parties from Tennessee’s usury statutes?

Victor James Cazes v. State of Tennessee
W1998-00386-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The petitioner, Victor James Cazes, appeals as of right from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying him post-conviction relief from his 1990 convictions for felony murder,  aggravated rape and first degree burglary. The petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder conviction and received twenty-five-year and six-year sentences, respectively, for the aggravated rape and burglary convictions. The judgments of conviction were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994). In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner raises the  following issues:

State of Tennessee, et al., Coretta Scott King, v. Lloyd Jowers
W1999-00984-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Swearengen

On December 1, 1999, the State of Tennessee on behalf of the appellants Judge James Beasley, Judge Robert T. Dwyer and Mark Glankler, filed a Rule 10 T.R.A.P. application for Page 1 extraordinary appeal. Specifically, the State sought to set aside the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas served on the aforementioned appellants.

State of Tennessee vs. Ronald Wayne Smith
M1999 01439 CCA R3 CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen Wallace

The Defendant, Ronald W ayne Smith, pleaded guilty in the C ircuit Court of Dickson County to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of marijuana for resale, reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law is whether there were sufficient spec ific and articu lable facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle and/or whether the duration of the stop excessive. We find that there were not sufficient specific and articulabe facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Because we conclude that the stop was illegal, we reverse the order of the trial judge overruling the motion to suppress.

Kenneth Jones v. Itt Hartford Ins. Co., et al.
W1998-00357-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. D. J. Alissandratos,

Lila Roberson v. The Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
W1998-00374-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arose out of an automobile accident on February 1, 1996, in which the plaintiff, Lila Roberson, suffered fractures to her lower right leg and injured her face. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered these injuries during the course and scope of her employment with the defendant's insured, the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB). The court awarded the plaintiff a 4 percent permanent partial disability to the right leg and a 15 percent disability to the body as a whole for the injuries to her jaw. The defendant appeals this decision and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff carried her burden of proof to show by expert medical testimony that her jaw injury was compensable; and (2) whether the trial court erred in the amount of vocational disability benefits awarded the plaintiff for her foot injury. Our standard of review on appeal in workers' compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness of the trial court's findings, unless the evidence presented preponderates otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard of review, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

State of Tennessee vs. Ronald Reece Cross
E1998-00364-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

On July 21, 1998, Ronald Reece Cross (the “defendant”) pled gu ilty to the following charges arising out of a single incident: violating an habitual traffic offender order, evading arrest, driving under the influence of alcohol (eighth offense), running a stop sign, reckless driving, and violation of registration. Following a sentencing hearing on the above charges, the trial court denied alternative sentencing for the defendant, and instead ordered the defendant to serve an effective ten (10) year, eleven (11) month, and twenty-nine (29) day sentence. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing to the defendant, and (2) whether the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to serve consecutive sentences. Because we find that the trial court sentenced the defendant appropriately, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. Arthur Copeland
E1999-00044-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The appellant, Arthur Copeland, was convicted by a Blount County jury of one (1) coun t of simple assa ult, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail and ordered tha t the appellant’s sentence for assault run consecutively to his sentence for a prior aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) im posing sentence immediately after the jury rendered its verdict without affording the appellant a separate sentencing hearing; and (2) ordering consecutive sentences. After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that th ere is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for another sentencing hearing.

John Paul Seals vs State of Tennessee
C.C.A. 03C01-9903-CC-00
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Beckner

The petitioner, John Paul Seals, entered a guilty plea to first degree murder on December 12, 1988. The state had originally sought the death penalty. The trial court imposed a life sentence. Six years later, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, post-conviction relief. The trial court, which treated the petition as one for post-conviction relief, dismissed based upon the statute of limitations. This court affirmed on direct appeal. John Paul Seals v. State, No. 03C01-9409-CR-00319 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Feb. 22, 1995), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. 1995). On January 7, 1998, the petitioner filed this claim for post-conviction relief alleging several constitutional violations. The petitioner argued that the statute of limitations should not apply because he had been mentally incompetent since before the commission of the offense. The petitioner also contended that none of the grounds had been waived or previously determined because the first petition had been filed by someone other than himself. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition at the preliminary stage. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(a), (f). In John Paul Seals v. State, No. 03C01-9802-CC-00050 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 6, 1999), this court reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court to allow the petitioner to present evidence on the issue of his mental capacity as it related to the statute of limitations: If the petitioner carries his burden of proving facts which require tolling the statute of limitations due to mental incompetence, then the trial court shall proceed to the merits of the constitutional issues presented in the petition. On the other hand, if the petitioner does not carry his burden of proving mental incompetence as regards the statute of limitations, the trial court shall dismiss the petition as untimely. Id., slip op. at 8.

Randy Hill, v. Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
M1997-00065-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to be paroled from an eight-year sentence for aggravated child abuse. After the Tennessee Board of Paroles declined to parole him, the prisoner filed a certiorari petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed. We affirm the trial court in accordance with Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10(b).1

Terry Compton v. Tennessee Department of Correction and Nashville Community Service Center
M1997-00066-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to obtain judicial review of a disciplinary action taken by the Nashville Community Service Center. After the Commissioner of Correction upheld the finding that he been drinking while on work release, the prisoner filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. The trial court clerk refused to file the petition and required the prisoner to file a second petition because the pauper’s oath accompanying the first petition was not on the proper form and had not been notarized. Thereafter, the trial court granted the Department of Correction’s motion to dismiss the second petition because it was not timely filed. We have determined that the trial court clerk exceeded his authority when he declined to accept and file the prisoner’ petition and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the petition.

Robert Bean, Franklin Shaffer, David Autrey, Mack Roberts, Kevin Antle, Tom NIchols, Tammie P. Beasley, and Roxanne Luce, v. Ned Ray McWherter, Governor, State of Tennessee et al.
M1999-01493-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This is a constitutional challenge to an Act of the legislature regulating the possession and sale of animals. Owners, dealers, and licensed propagators of various wildlife species challenged the Act on grounds that it is vague, overbroad, and a burden on interstate commerce. The Chancery Court of Davidson County rejected the constitutional challenge. We affirm the decision on the vagueness and overbreadth charge. We think, however, that there are disputed facts bearing on the question of whether parts of the Act impermissibly burden interstate commerce. We, therefore,  remand for further proceedings on that issue.

Bellevue Properties, LLC., v. United Retail Incorporate, et al.
M1999-01480-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This case concerns the burden placed on a commercial landlord in mitigating damages caused by a commercial tenant’s abandonment of the leased property. Although our courts heretofore have required a landlord who suffers breach to use reasonable commercial methods to reduce his damages, this tenant-in-breach would read two additional duties into those reasonable commercial methods. First, the tenant would require that the abandoned property be marketed specially and apart from the landlord’s other commercial space inventory. Second, the landlord would be required to market the property at the original contract rental rather than its going market value. Under the facts as established in the record and according to the common law of this jurisdiction, we disagree.