State vs. Michael S. Reid M1999-00305-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Timothy L. Easter
The Williamson County grand jury indicted the appellant, Michael S. Reid, with one (1) count of driving under the influence, third offense, one (1) count of driving on a revoked license and one (1) count of criminal impersonation. The appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license and criminal impersonation and, after a jury trial, was found guilty of driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent terms of eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days, suspended after service of 180 days, for driving under the influence, third offense and six (6) months, suspended after service of ten (10) days, for driving on a revoked license. In addition, the appellant received a consecutive sentence of six (6) months, suspended after service of five (5) days, for criminal impersonation. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in (1) admitting hearsay evidence over his objection by allowing a Williamson County Sheriff's Deputy to testify as to the contents of a dispatch he received prior to stopping the appellant; and (2) allowing the state to introduce evidence concerning a prior stop of the appellant for which he was not charged. We hold that the officer's testimony concerning the dispatch was nonhearsay and relevant and, as a result, properly admissible. Additionally, we conclude that the appellant has waived the issue regarding the prior stop as a result of his failure to object to this evidence at trial and his failure to include this issue in the motion for new trial. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Williamson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Joyce Newman M1999-00161-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Thomas W. Graham
The defendant pled guilty in Sequatchie County to two counts of selling a Schedule II substance and was sentenced to confinement for four years and six months. After serving six months, she was placed in community corrections. Subsequently, an affidavit was filed by her probation officer, alleging that she had violated her Community Services Behavioral Contract in several ways, including "breaking house arrest." Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that the defendant had violated the house arrest provision of the contract and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence with the Department of Correction. The defendant timely appealed, alleging that the trial court improperly considered certain evidence and that, if she was reconfined, she should have served her sentence at the local jail, rather than with the Department of Correction. Based upon our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for a new revocation hearing.
Sequatchie
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Ronald Wayne Ashby M1999-01247-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: William Charles Lee
The defendant appeals his aggravated burglary conviction. He asserts that insufficient evidence supported the jury verdict, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of another crime, and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the verdict and that the "other crime" evidence was properly admitted. We affirm the sentence.
Lincoln
Court of Criminal Appeals
Eddie Brannon v. Pen Gulf, Inc. 03S01-9906-CH-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Howell N. Peoples
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jerri Bryant
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Travelers Insurance Company (hereafter "Travelers") appeals the granting of summary judgment dismissing Reliance Insurance Company (hereafter "Reliance") as a party defendant before trial. Travelers asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the last injurious exposure rule did not create an issue of whether Reliance, as a subsequent workers' compensation insurance carrier for Pen Gulf, Inc., may be liable for Eddie Brannon's injury. An appeal from a summary judgment in a workers' compensation case is not governed by the de novo standard of review provided by Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3), but by Rule 56, T.R.C.P. Downen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 811 S.W.2d 523, 524 (Tenn. 1991). No presumption of correctness attaches to decisions granting summary judgment because they involve only questions of law and the reviewing court must determine whether the requirements of Rule 56 have been met. Gonzales v. Alman Const. Co., 857 S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is proper when the movant demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.3, T.R.C.P. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 28, 21 (Tenn. 1993). "It is almost never an option in workers' compensation cases. In a summary judgment hearing, even where the parties have no right to a jury trial, the trial judge is not at liberty to weigh the evidence." Hilliard v. Tennessee State Home Health Services, Inc., 95 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tenn. 1997). Eddie Brannon filed this action on March 23, 1998 to recover workers' compensation benefits for "bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome which was caused by the 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Hudgens vs. Rogers M2000-00239-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Arthur E. Mcclellan
The mother of four minor children appealed the trial court's decision to change custody from Mother to Father based on a material change in circumstances. Prior to the entry of that order, it had been determined that an agreement, originally announced to the court which awarded custody of the children to Mother, had been set aside due to the court's finding that there had been no meeting of the minds of the parties as several critical issues had been left unresolved. We have determined that the court was correct in that decision. Therefore, the standard which the trial court should have applied was one of comparative fitness and best interest of the children rather than a material change of circumstances. This matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
State vs. Seria D. Ward M1998-00128-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Thomas H. Shriver
The defendant was convicted in Davidson County of especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to confinement for seventeen years. He appealed the conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the offense, that his videotaped confession should have been excluded, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Davidson
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Christopher Henderson W1999-00958-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of judicial diversion and full probation following his guilty plea to possession of cocaine under 0.5 grams with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
Lauderdale
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Deshawn McClenton W1999-00879-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Joseph B. Dailey
The Defendant, DeShawn McClenton, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offenses of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to thirty years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery conviction and to sixty years imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence regarding his identity as the perpetrator was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in ruling that his prior aggravated robbery conviction and his three prior attempted second degree murder convictions were admissible to impeach his credibility if he chose to testify, and (3) that the movement and confinement of the victim were essentially incidental to the accomplishment of the aggravated robbery and were therefore insufficient to support a separate conviction for kidnapping. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jeremy Tompkins vs. Mary Rainey W1999-01218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: A. V. Mcdowell
In this action to establish parentage, Jeremy Earl Tompkins (Father) appeals the trial court's final judgment awarding Mary Helen Rainey (Mother) custody of the parties' infant son. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Shelby
Court of Appeals
State vs. Michael Sample & Larry McKay W1999-01202-CCA-R3-PC
Trial Court Judge: Bernie Weinman
The Defendants were each convicted in 1982 of two counts of felony murder. Each Defendant received two death penalties for the murders. On post-conviction, the Defendants contend that the State withheld exculpatory information and that their death penalties were predicated in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. The trial court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, finding that the Brady claims were time-barred and finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have imposed the death sentences absent consideration of the invalid aggravating circumstance. The Defendants now appeal the trial court's findings on both claims for relief. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Jerry Rodgers W1999-01443-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft
The defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and sentenced to eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in relying on New York convictions as prior felonies in order to sentence him as a multiple offender. After review, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court's finding that the New York convictions qualified as prior felonies for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Gene Logue W1999-01795-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: Julian P. Guinn
Defendant was convicted of theft of property over $500.00, and sentenced to two (2) years as a Range I standard offender. Defendant now appeals as of right, and raises the following issues: the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, the court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove the value of the property stolen and the venue of the crime in Benton County, and the court erred in sentencing defendant to serve two (2) years and failing to consider alternative sentencing. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Benton
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Michael W. Smith W1999-01817-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.
The petitioner pled guilty in Shelby County Criminal Court to two counts of rape, two counts of aggravated burglary, and five misdemeanor counts. He was sentenced, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to ten years for each of the rape counts; six years for each of the aggravated burglary counts; and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor counts, with all sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. The sequence of the charges was that the petitioner was arrested and charged with a rape, an aggravated burglary, and all of the misdemeanor counts, released on bail, and later arrested for the second rape and aggravated burglary, both of which occurred while he was on bail for the first set of charges. In this petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner sought to have his guilty pleas set aside on the grounds that his pleas were not voluntarily and knowingly made and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. It is unnecessary to address those issues because it appears from the record that the negotiated plea agreement was in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 40-20-111(b), requiring that a sentence for a felony committed while on bail be served consecutively to the sentence for the initial felony charge. Because we do not know whether the petitioner would have entered his pleas of guilty had he known of the requirement regarding consecutive sentencing, on remand the petitioner must be allowed to withdraw his pleas of guilty as to both of the rape and both of the aggravated burglary charges.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Reginald Merriweather W1999-02050-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Cornelia A. Clark
Trial Court Judge: John Franklin Murchison
The defendant appeals his jury convictions of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and especially aggravated robbery. He raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in denying defendant's request for a mistrial based on a juror's response during voir dire; (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a witness to answer questions on cross-examination; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to certain lesser-included offenses. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Madison
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Freddie Norment W1999-01928-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood
The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for wounding a jail cell mate with a homemade knife. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: whether the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence; whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to examine a potential witness outside the jury's presence; and whether the trial court erred in failing to issue curative jury instructions after the allegedly improper testimony of a prosecution witness. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Fayette
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Sammy Bonds W2001-02859-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.
Petitioner, Sammy S. Bonds, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's pro se petition alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject Petitioner's argument and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
State vs. Michael Christopher Adams and Jerry Holt E1999-00446-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance
The defendants, Michael Christopher Adams and Jerry Holt, Jr., appeal their convictions by a Sullivan County jury. Adams was convicted of second degree murder and four counts of aggravated assault. He received a total sentence of forty-nine years. Holt was convicted of four counts of aggravated assault and received a total sentence of twenty years. Both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentencing. Adams also challenges the trial court's application of enhancement factors and failure to apply mitigating factors. We hold that the evidence is sufficient, but we hold that the trial court erred in sentencing. Adams's sentence is modified to reflect a total sentence of forty years, and Holt's sentence is modified to reflect a total sentence of twelve years.
Sullivan
Court of Criminal Appeals
Charles Montague vs. State E2000-00083-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Lynn W. Brown
Charles Montague appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his pro se post-conviction petition challenging his conviction for first degree murder. The appellant's original and supplemental petitions with attached affidavit present a myriad of claims within the trial process. The post-conviction court dismissed all claims without a hearing, finding the original and supplemental petitions were not properly verified and that the petitions failed to assert a sufficient factual basis for relief. After review of the petition, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of certain claims and vacate its dismissal as to others. The case is remanded to the post-conviction court for further review of the surviving claims.
Washington
Court of Criminal Appeals
Inscoe, et al vs. Kemper, et al M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Tom E. Gray
This appeal arises from a suit filed by Inscoe seeking the return of earnest money held in escrow for the purchase of Kemper's residence. When Inscoe decided not to purchase the residence, Kemper refused to return the earnest money. The trial court found in favor of Inscoe and ordered the return of the earnest money. In making its finding, the court stated that Inscoe's promise to buy was illusory and there was no meeting of the minds, thus the contract was void and unenforceable. Kemper appeals.
Sumner
Court of Appeals
State vs. Manolito Jemison M1999-00752-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Steve R. Dozier
The defendant was found guilty by a Davidson County jury of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter on one count of first degree premeditated murder and the lesser offense of reckless homicide on one count of felony murder. The counts were merged into one conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for voluntary manslaughter and the length of his sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously applied one enhancement factor and failed to apply two mitigating factors. Based upon our review, we agree that an enhancement factor was improperly applied. However, since two other enhancement factors were properly applied, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
