Momon vs. State
E1996-00007-SC-R11-PC

E1998-00176-SC-R11-CV
E1998-00176-SC-R11-CV

03C01-9812-CC-0441
03C01-9812-CC-0441
Trial Court Judge: Buddy D. Perry

State vs. David Lee Hurst
03C01-9901-CC-00011
Trial Court Judge: James B. Scott, Jr.

John Ailworth v. Roadway Express, Inc.
01S01-9808-CV-00146
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Thomas Brothers,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer contends that the trial court erred in awarding compensation for temporary total disability and permanent partial disability and in

Buford vs. TDOC
M1998-00157-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle

Crumbley vs. Crumbley
M1998-00158-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Jeffrey F. Stewart

Clark vs. Service Corp. Int'l.
M1998-00160-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Merrimack Mutual Fire Ins. Co. vs. Gloria Batts
M1999-00078-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy
This appeal involves a dispute between a homeowner and her insurance company regarding the damages to her house caused by the tornado that struck Nashville on April 16, 1998. When they could not agree on the amount of the loss, both parties invoked the insurance policy's provision for the appointment of appraisers. After the parties' two appraisers could not agree on the amount of the loss, the two appraisers selected a third appraiser who eventually agreed with the homeowner's appraiser regarding the amount of the loss. The insurance company filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was required to pay the homeowner less than one-half of the amount of the loss calculated by the two appraisers. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the insurance company's motion, concluding that the insurance policy's appraisal clause was not an agreement for binding arbitration and that the appraisers had not been empowered to determine whether parts of the claimed damage had been caused by a peril covered by the policy. The homeowner takes issue with both of the trial court's legal conclusions on this appeal. We have determined that the trial court interpreted the insurance policy correctly and, therefore, that the trial court properly concluded that the insurance company was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

M1999-00540-COA-R3-CV
M1999-00540-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Kennedy vs. Trammel
M1999-00538-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: Clara W. Byrd

Herman Holston v. State of Tennessee
W2004-00461-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: J. C. Mclin

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: R. Jerry Beck

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: James E. Beckner

Mark Griffis vs. State
03C01-9811-CR-00397
Trial Court Judge: E. Eugene Eblen

State vs. Marsha Trentham
03C01-9811-CC-00405
Trial Court Judge: Richard R. Vance

William Logan vs. State
03C01-9808-CR-00287
Trial Court Judge: Ben K. Wexler

State of Tennessee v. Terry Allen Dominy
M1995-00001-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jim T. Hamilton

The dispositive issues in this appeal are as follows: (1) whether the indictment in this case charging the defendant with aggravated rape is sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape, a “lesser grade” offense under this Court’s 1The defendant rais ed tw o oth er iss ues in this a ppeal: (1) whe ther th e trial c ourt e rred in refus ing to gran t the d efendant’s mo tion fo r recusal; and (2) w heth er the trial co urt er red in admitting into evidence a tape-recorded interview between the victim and the field supervisor of the Department of Human Services. Because we have reversed and remanded on other grounds, we need not address these issues in detail. However, we note that the proof in this record indicates that the trial judge was residing in a home owned by the assistant district attorney who prosecuted this case and was paying only the utilities and cable bills and not monthly rental. Under such circum stance s, recus al is appro priate. See Sup. C t. R. 10, Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2(A) 4(D)(5 ), and 3(E ). We also agree w ith the defen dant that th e trial court er red in allow ing the Sta te to offer into evidence the entire tape-recorded interview of the victim by the Department of Human Services field supervisor. While the State has the right to “convey the true picture of the prior statement alleged to be inconsistent,” State v. Boyd, 797 S.W .2d 5 89, 5 93-9 4 (Te nn. 1990), this rule does not form a basis for reference to portions of the statement which were not made an issue on cross-exam ination and which are not necessa ry to convey an acc urate picture of the matters discussed on cross-examination. The trial judge could have either allowed the State to question the witness concerning her prior statement to place her testimony on cross examination into context or permitted the State to use the transcript of the DHS tape to refresh the victim’s recollection. Neither the tape nor the transcript, how ever, should have been introduced as substantive evidence in this case. decision in State v. Trusty, 919 S.W.2d 305 (Tenn. 1996); and (2) if so, should this Court reconsider it decision in Trusty. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that, under Trusty, the indictment in this case would be sufficient to support a conviction for the “lesser grade” offense of spousal rape. However, upon careful reconsideration, we overrule Trusty to the extent that it recognizes “lesser grade” offenses as distinct from lesser-included offenses and permits convictions of “lesser grade” offenses that are not lesser-included offenses embraced by the indictment. In light of our overruling of Trusty, the indictment in this case is not sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape. Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s convictions, dismiss the indictments, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

William D. Hunley and wife, Brenda K. Hunley, and Velvac, Inc., v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co. and Tab Service Corp. - Dissenting
03A01-9902-CV-00049
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

William D. Hunley, Jr., Brenda K Hunley, & Velvac Inc., v. Silver Furniture Mfg. Co. & Tab Service Corp., - Dissenting
03A01-9902-CV-00049
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

I dissent from the majority’s holding that the workers’ compensation carrier for Mr. Hunley’s employer is subrogated, without further inquiry, to the proceeds of Mrs. Hunley’s settlement of her loss of consortium claim that arose out of the work-related injuries sustained by her husband.

State of Tennessee Henry Circuit v. Brenda Anne Burns
W1996-00004-SC-R11-CD
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

Defendant/appellee Brenda Burns was tried and convicted of criminal responsibility for the commission of first-degree murder in the death of her ex-husband, Paul Burns.1 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interview two potential defense witnesses and present the testimony of those witnesses before the jury. The State filed an Application for Permission to Appeal contesting the intermediate court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction on that basis. The defendant filed a Cross-Application for Permission to Appeal raising, among other issues, whether the trial court had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of a felony (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-403 (1991), and solicitation to commit a criminal offense (i.e., first-degree murder), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-102 (1991). We granted both Applications in order to address these important issues.

Charles w. McKinney, a resident of Smith County, Tennessee, v. Smith County, Tennessee, a county duly constituted by the State of Tennessee
M1998-00074-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby H. Capers

In this inverse condemnation action, Defendant Smith County appeals the trial court’s final judgment that suggested a $15,000 additur to the $7700 verdict rendered by the jury in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Charles W. McKinney. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this cause for a new trial on the issue of damages.

Christine Spann v. Barry Abraham, Individually, and D/B/A Sir Pizza
M1996-00003-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

This appeal involves a pregnancy discrimination claim asserted by an employee of a Nashville pizza restaurant. After refusing to accept a temporary reassignment requested by her employer, the employee quit her job and filed suit, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The Chancery Court for Davidson County granted the employer ’s motion for directed verdict at the close of the employee’s proof after concluding that she had not made out a prima facie case for disparate treatment because of her pregnancy. The employee asserts on this appeal that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for the employer and by amending its final order on its own motion. We have concluded that the trial court correctly directed a verdict for the employer in this case and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. Eric Larez
03C01-9810-CR-00379
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Jerry Beck

The defendant, Eric Larez, appeals his convictions in the Sullivan County Criminal Court on two counts of the sale of marijuana over one-half ounce and one count of the sale of over one-half gram of cocaine. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to two years confinement for each of the counts involving marijuana and nine years in that involving cocaine, all sentences to be served concurrently. He has filed a timely appeal of these convictions, alleging as error:

1. The trial court should have instructed the jury as to a“casual exchange.”
2. His rights to a speedy trial were violated by the delay of three and one-half years between his being charged with the offenses and being arrested following those charges.
3. The evidence was insufficient for a conviction as to the sale of a controlled substance.
4. He should have received a lesser or an alternative sentence.

Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Thomas Bogan v. Doris Mae Bogan
03A01-9811-CH-00393
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III

This is an appeal by Ms. Bogan (Appellant) from an Order of the Chancery Court for Sullivan County which reduced Mr. Bogan’s (Appellee) alimony payments to her from $2,300 monthly to $945 monthly after Appellee’s retirement