Richard Thomas Bogan, v. Doris Mae Bogan - Dissenting
03A01-9811-CH-00393
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor John S. McLellan, III

I dissent from the judgment of the majority opinion “reinstat[ing] the prior award of $2,300 monthly alimony as provided in the parties’ original divorce decree.” In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reduced Mr. Bogan’s monthly alimony obligation from $2,300 to $945. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Donald Terry Moore
01S01-9812-CR-00220
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ann Lacy Johns

We granted the appeal in this case to address the proper application of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1), which is used to sever criminal offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to sever one count of child rape based upon a finding that the offense was part of a common scheme or plan. However, we also hold that the error is harmless because the appellant was acquitted on two of the three counts of child rape, and the evidence is entirely sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction on the remaining count. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
 

State of Tennessee v. Donald Ray Shirley
03S01-9902-CR-00014
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mayo L. Mashburn

In this case we consider the proper standard of appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever offenses under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, we hold that a denial of a severance will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. We also hold that the trial 1 The first count alleged that the appellant robbed a convenience store on November 29, 1995, at 8:00 p.m. The second count alleged that ten days later on December 9, 1995, the appellant robbed a video rental store at 7:10 p.m. Counts three and four of the indictment alleged robberies of two conve nience s tores on December 10, 199 5, occu rring at 4:00 p.m. an d 4:30 p.m . respec tively. 2 court in this case abused its discretion in denying a severance because the methods used to commit the offenses were not so materially distinct or unique as to rise to an inference of identity. Because we find that this abuse of discretion was not harmless, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for new trials.

Stephen A. Wakefield v. Michael F. Crawley, MacTenn Valve Company, a Tennessee Corp., and Macaweber Systems Inc., a Tennessee Corp.
03S01-9903-CH-00029
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Chester H. Rainwater

We granted this appeal to determine whether stock in a closely-held corporation is a “security,” as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-102 (1992 Repl. & Supp. 1998)1, so that Chapter 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs its sale or transfer. In Blasingame v. American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. 1983), we concluded that closely-held stock was not a security within the meaning of Chapter 8 of the UCC. Because we have determined that the Official Comments of the 1977 version of the UCC, adopted by the Tennessee General Assembly in 1986, as well as the 1995 and 1997 amendments to the Code, overrule the reasoning in Blasingame, we now hold that closely-held stock is a security within the meaning of the UCC’s Chapter 8, and that the closely-held stock at issue in this case is governed by Chapter 8. Because the plaintiff cannot produce a signed writing that comports with the statute of frauds found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-8-319 (1992 Repl. & 1996 Repl.), nor can he satisfy one of the statutory exemptions, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and find in favor of the defendant.
 

State of Tennessee v. Charles Edward Evans, Alias
E1998-00065-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Ray L. Jenkins

The appellant, Charles Edward Evans, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation. In 1996, the appellant was convicted of one (1) count of selling less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and sentenced to eight (8) years as a Range II offender. The appellant was placed on probation by the Tennessee Department of Correction in February 1998. Subsequently, the state filed a petition to revoke the appellant’s probation, and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in revoking probation. After a review of the record before this Court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

State vs. Ricio Conner
02C01-9807-CR-00201
Trial Court Judge: James C. Beasley, Jr.

State vs. Brian Williamson
02C01-9810-CR-00305
Trial Court Judge: W. Fred Axley

State vs. Bailey Agnew
02C01-9901-CR-00015

State vs. Phillip Howell
02C01-9901-CC-00018

Gary Sanders vs. Donal Campbell
02A01-9810-CV-00299
Trial Court Judge: Joseph H. Walker, III

Wanda Borders vs. Randy Borders
02A01-9811-CH-00320
Trial Court Judge: George R. Ellis

Joy Roy/Sam Dawkins vs. W.T. Diamond
02A01-9809-CV-00247
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford

Joy Roy/Sam Dawkins vs. W.T. Diamond
02A01-9809-CV-00247
Trial Court Judge: J. Steven Stafford

Katheryn Griffin vs. Steven Griffin
02A01-9807-CH-00177
Trial Court Judge: D. J. Alissandratos

William Keith Eddlemon v. Tecumseh Products Company
02S01-9811-CH-00108
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. George R. Ellis,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff received a workers' compensation lump sum award and, upon his motion, the trial court awarded post-judgment interest for a period of 32 days. He appeals and argues that he is entitled to post-judgment interest for 99 days, from the date the lump sum award was approved by the trial court until the date he received payment. The defendant contends the plaintiff is not entitled to payment on the award until 31 days after the entry of the judgment - the time period during which a Notice of Appeal could have been filed - and therefore only 32 days of post-judgment interest is due. We find that Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225 entitles the plaintiff to an additional 3 days of post-judgment interest and modify the judgment of the trial court accordingly.1 On June 1, 1998, the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim was heard in the Chancery Court for Gibson County and the trial court made an award of permanent partial disability, which was to be paid in a lump sum. On July 7, 1998, the trial court's judgment was entered. On September 8, 1998, the plaintiff received payment of the judgment from the defendant. In Woodall v. Hamlett, 872 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1996), the Supreme Court held that judgments involving the Workers' Compensation Act are controlled by Tenn. Code Ann. 1The Supreme Court in Woodall v. Hamlett, 872 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. 1996), held the statute was applicable on this issue.

Charles D. Scott v. The Travelers Insurance Co., et al
02S01-9810-CH-00097
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton,
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff, Charles D. Scott, brought this suit against Travelers Insurance Company, the workers' compensation insurance carrier for Kraus Model Cleaners (Kraus Cleaners), and the Second Injury Fund. After hearing the evidence, the chancellor found that the plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his back injury was caused or aggravated out of or in the course of his employment for Kraus Cleaners and entered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff has presented two issues for review: 1. Did the trial court err in finding that there is not sufficient evidence to show that plaintiff's lower back problems arose out of and were incurred in the course of his employment and that defendants are not liable under the Tennessee Worker's Compensation Law? 2. Whether plaintiff's claim is barred by wilful misrepresentation and fraud in his employment application? In considering these issues, we must be mindful of certain well established principles. Our review is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code. Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). We are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of evidence lies. Thomas v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tenn. 1991). In making such determination, this Court must give considerable deference to the trial judges's findings regarding the weight and credibility of any oral testimony received. Townsend v. State, 826 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Tenn. 1992); Thomas, 812 S.W.2d at 283. However, this court may draw its own conclusions about the weight, credibility, and significance of deposition testimony. Seiber v. Greenbrier Indus. Inc., 96 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tenn. 1995). The plaintiff in a worker's compensation case has the burden of proving causation and permanency of his injury by the preponderance of the evidence using expert medical testimony. See Thomas, 812 S.W.2d at 283; Roark v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 793 S.W.2d 2

Virginia Mcconnell v. The Travelers Insurance Co.
02S01-9810-CH-00098
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Charles Mcpherson
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arises from a back injury that plaintiff sustained on the job. The court found that plaintiff made a meaningful return to work and gave her the maximum award of six (6) times the anatomical rating (6 percent vocational disability to the body as a whole) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b), rather than limiting the award to the two and one-half (2_) times cap found in _ 5-6-241(a). The defendant appealed to this Court on three issues: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial preponderates against the trial court's finding that Anderson Hickey did not return the plaintiff to her employment at wage equal to or greater than the wage plaintiff was receiving at the time of the injury as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b); (2) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that plaintiff sustained a 6 percent vocational impairment rating; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6- 241(c) when awarding plaintiff a vocational impairment rating of six (6) times the anatomical rating? We find that plaintiff's award is not limited by the two and one-half (2_) times cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(a); however, plaintiff's award is reduced to four (4) times the medical impairment rating pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-241(b) and (c). We, therefore, modify and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Our standard of review on appeal in workers' compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness of the trial court's findings, unless the evidence presented preponderates otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (Supp. 1998); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard of review, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

McKinley Brown vs. TN Dept. of Correction, et al
M1999-02519-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle
This appeal involves a dispute between an inmate and the Department of Correction regarding the Department's calculation of the inmate's sentence reduction credits. The inmate claims that when the Class X Felony Act was repealed in 1989, prior sentence reduction credit schemes were revived, and he became retroactively eligible for those credits. The inmate appeals the dismissal of his complaint seeking declaratory relief and damages. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of his case.

State vs. George Pilkinton
01C01-9809-CC-00368
Trial Court Judge: Judy G. Callahan

State vs. Marshall Simon
02C01-9902-CC-00069

State vs. Jimmy Matlock
02C01-9902-CC-00079
Trial Court Judge: Jon Kerry Blackwood

State vs. Michael A. Braswell
01C01-9807-CC-00304
Trial Court Judge: Henry Denmark Bell

Cyrus Wilson vs. State
01C01-9811-CR-00448
Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

State vs. Carlos Porto-Saes
02C01-9901-CR-00030
Trial Court Judge: Arthur T. Bennett

X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
Trial Court Judge: John W. Rollins