State of Tennessee, ex rel, William L. Gibbons, v. Sherrod Jackson, Robert Williams, Nathaniel Williams, Mike Williams, Shirley Blalock, and Steven Craig Cooper
02A01-9710-CH-00247
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Floyd Peete, Jr.

Sherrod Jackson, Robert Williams, Nathaniel Williams, Mike Williams, Shirley Blalock, and Steven Craig Cooper (collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the Chancery Court of Shelby County, which granted a temporary injunction, enjoining the Appellants from permitting “lap dancing” and from permitting employees or independent contractors from engaging in “lewd and obscene exhibition of genitals.”

Shelby Court of Appeals

Jacques Bennett vs. State of Tennessee
03C01-9809-CR-00338
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Douglas A. Meyer

The petitioner, Jacques B. Bennett, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Vacate/Set Aside Judgment/Plea: and, to Declare Said Judgment/Plea Void” by the Hamilton County Criminal Court on January 9, 1998. Following a thorough review of the record, we conclude that this is an appropriate case for affirmance pursuant to Ct. of Crim. App. Rule 20.

Hamilton Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Johnny Leach
03C01-9810-CR-00373
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Lee Asbury

The defendant, Johnny Leach, appeals the order of the Criminal Court of Campbell County denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual battery. On July 2, 1998, the defendant entered his plea and received two ten-year sentences to be served concurrently. Because the defendant’s plea became final on the date of entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement, we conclude that his motion to withdraw was untimely.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

Campbell Court of Criminal Appeals

Tony Morris v. Malone Freight Line, Inc.
03S01-9808-CH-00097
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. Vann Owens,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff filed an action under the Workers' Compensation Act to recover for injuries he allegedly suffered while employed by the defendant. The defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment averring and showing by proper pleadings that it was a common carrier operating under a certificate of convenience and that the plaintiff was a leased-operator or owner-operator. The trial judge found the plaintiff was a leased-operator or owner-operator and that the defendant was operating under a certificate of convenience. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-16, in those parts applicable to this case, provides: "no common carrier by motor vehicle operating pursuant to a certificate of public convenience and necessity shall be deemed the `employer' of a leased-operator or owner-operator of a motor vehicle or vehicles under a contract to such a common carrier." Based upon this record, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial judge. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the plaintiff. _____________________________ John K. Byers, Senior Judge CONCUR: ________________________________ Frank F. Drowota, III, Justice ________________________________ Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge 2

Knox Workers Compensation Panel

Melanie v. Dillender
02S01-9902-CH-00013
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. C. Creed Mcginley,
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) (Supp. 1998) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The standard of review of factual issues in workers' compensation cases is de novo upon the record of the trial court with a presumption of correctness, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1998); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

Benton Workers Compensation Panel

In re: Brittany Swanson, a Minor, Tennessee Baptist Children's Homes, Inc., v. Harry Lee Swanson
02S01-9810-CV-00103
Authoring Judge: Justice William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Walker

This case concerns the termination of appellant Harry Swanson’s parental rights over his biological child, Brittany Swanson, who is now nine years old and in the custody of the appellee Tennessee Baptist Children’s Homes, Inc. (Baptist Children’s Home). Although Mr. Swanson’s parental rights were originally terminated by the Tipton County Juvenile Court, the circuit court of Tipton County denied the petition to terminate parental rights on an appeal by Mr. Swanson. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court and found that Mr. Swanson had “abandoned” Brittany because he had “willfully failed to support” her or “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward [her] support” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(D) (1996). We hold that the statutory definition of “willfully failed to support” and “willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child’s support” is unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the failure to provide monetary support for the four months preceding the petition to terminate parental rights constitutes abandonment, irrespective of whether that failure was intentional. This presumption violated Mr. Swanson’s federal and state constitutional right to the care and custody of his daughter. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of an order returning custody to Mr. Swanson.

Tipton Supreme Court

Town of Huntsville, Tennessee, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Tennessee, and Stanlodge, LLC., v. William I. Duncan, Richard Smith, Luke Coffey, James R. Potter
E1999-01571-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Billy Joe White

This litigation originated when the Town of Huntsville (“Huntsville”) and Stanlodge, LLC (“Stanlodge”), filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapter 1101 of the Public Acts of 1998. The plaintiffs specifically contest Section 9(f)(3)1 of Chapter 1101, which permits certain territoriesto hold incorporation elections even though these territories do not satisfy the minimum requirements for such elections as set forth in the general law. See T.C.A. § 6-1-201 (1998). On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Section 9(f)(3) is constitutional. Huntsville and Stanlodge appeal, raising   five issues:

Scott Court of Appeals

01C01-9806-CR-00265
01C01-9806-CR-00265
Trial Court Judge: Jane W. Wheatcraft

Sumner Court of Criminal Appeals

State vs. Jackie Dean Mayes, Jr.
01C01-9812-CC-00494

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Charles Gaylor vs. State
03C01-9702-CR-00066
Trial Court Judge: James W Itt

Campbell Court of Criminal Appeals

Virginia Byrd v. Cookeville General Hospital
01S01-9805-CV-00097
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John Turnbull, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employer, Cookeville General Hospital, insists (1) the trial judge erred in awarding permanent disability benefits for the employee's right leg injury and (2) the award of seventy percent permanent partial disability to the left foot is excessive. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. Because the extent of an injured worker's permanent vocational

Putnam Workers Compensation Panel

Eldridge vs. Eldridge
01A01-9808-CV-00451

Sumner Court of Appeals

Lattimer vs. TDOC
01A01-9804-CH-00200
Trial Court Judge: Carol McCoy

Davidson Court of Appeals

Wagner vs. Gaston
01A01-9804-CV-00215
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Sequatchie Court of Appeals

In re: The Adoption of female child, E.N.R.
01A01-9806-CH-00316
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Lawrence Court of Appeals

Hulshof vs. Hulshof
01A01-9806-CH-00339
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Marshall Court of Appeals

Sherlock vs. Kwik Sak, et al
01A01-9807-CV-00346
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Rutherford Court of Appeals

Nickelson vs. Sumner Co. Bd. of Ed.
01A01-9807-CV-00375
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Sumner Court of Appeals

Davis vs. Computer Maintenance Svc.
01A01-9809-CV-00459
Trial Court Judge: Walter C. Kurtz

Davidson Court of Appeals

Eldridge vs. Eldridge
01A01-9808-CV-00451
Trial Court Judge: Thomas Goodall

Sumner Court of Appeals

Haywood vs. Haywood
01A01-9808-CH-00442
Trial Court Judge: Patricia J. Cottrell

Maury Court of Appeals

Jo Ann Forman, Inc. et al vs. Nat'l Council on Compensation
01A01-9805-CH-00260
Trial Court Judge: Thomas A. Greer, Jr.

Marion Court of Appeals

Opryland Hotel vs. Millbrook Distribution Svcs.
01A01-9810-CH-00551
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Davidson Court of Appeals

Drake vs. Manson, et al
01A01-9810-CV-00525
Trial Court Judge: Bobby H. Capers

Wilson Court of Appeals

01A01-9809-CH-00504
01A01-9809-CH-00504
Trial Court Judge: Carol L. Mccoy

Davidson Court of Appeals