Doris Sanders v. Samuel Sanders, Jr. M1998-00978-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Marietta M. Shipley
This appeal involves a former spouse's right to post-judgment interest on an award of alimony in solido. After her former husband failed to pay the alimony in solido required by the final divorce decree, the former wife filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking $9,847.68 in post-judgment interest. The trial court recognized that the post-judgment interest had accrued but decided not to award the interest to the former wife unless her former husband failed to make his future periodic alimony payments in a timely manner. When her former husband began to pay his alimony payments late, the former wife renewed her request for the post-judgment interest. The trial court found that the former husband had been delinquent in his alimony payments but again declined to order the former husband to pay the post-judgment interest if he prepaid the remaining balance of his periodic alimony. The former wife has appealed from the trial court's repeated refusal to award her the post-judgment interest on her alimony in solido award. We have determined that the former wife was entitled to post-judgment interest as a matter of law and, therefore, that the trial court erred by failing to award her $9,847.68 for post-judgment interest.
Davidson
Court of Appeals
Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Roy Patterson and Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. Roy Patterson M1999-02805-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This appeal involves the efforts of two Atlantic City casinos to collect the gambling debts of a Tennessee resident. After obtaining default judgments against the Tennessee resident in New Jersey, the casinos twice attempted to file their judgments in the Chancery Court for Putnam County in accordance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. On both occasions, the trial court declined to file the judgments after finding that they were irregular and that they were not properly authenticated. On the second occasion, the trial court also concluded that its refusal to file the first set of judgments precluded the casinos from filing the second set of judgments. The casinos have appealed. We have determined that the second set of judgments meet the requirements for filing and enforcement under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act and that the casinos' unsuccessful efforts to file the first set of judgments does not prevent them from filing the second set of judgments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying the application to enforce the foreign judgments.
Michael Paul Watson v. Plumley Rubber Co., Inc., Itt Hartford Ins. Grp. 02S01-9807-CV-00067
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Julian P. Guinn,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant, Plumley Rubber Company, Inc., and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, ITT Hartford Insurance Company, have appealed from a judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff workers' compensation on the basis of twenty- five percent permanent partial vocational disability to both arms. On this appeal, the defendants present three issues: (1) whether the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury; (2) whether the trial court erred in ordering the employer to pay for unauthorized medical expenses when the plaintiff refused a panel of physicians offered him; and (3) whether the trial court's award is excessive. After a careful review of the record, we find that we must affirm the judgment of the trial court. The plaintiff testified that he was born August 2, 1955 and was the father of two minor children living at home. He had a high school education and, through Army training, was qualified as a biomedical repairman and in aircraft maintenance. He worked in maintenance for Plumley on two occasions: from 1987 to 199 and then from 1993 to June 12, 1996. He testif ied that, while working for Plumley, he did various types of work. He changed molds, as well as working on machines and setting up machines. He worked with lasers and robots. He testified that he worked "ten, twelve, sixteen hours" each day. He testified that he used wrenches constantly, loosened and tightened bolts. He tightened small bolts and large bolts, and much of this work was strenuous. He testified that he had no difficulty with his hands before he went to work for Plumley in 1993. Around June 15, 1995, while breaking a bolt loose, he felt his right wrist "give." The plaintiff testified that he reported this incident to his supervisor, and the supervisor sent him to Dr. Terry O. Harrison, a panel doctor for the defendant. Dr. Harrison diagnosed the plaintiff's condition as carpal tunnel syndrome and told him to use his left hand to perform his job. The plaintiff testified that he complied with Dr. Harrison's 2
Henry
Workers Compensation Panel
Ladonna Moore v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 02S01-9806-CH-00056
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is an appeal by the employee/plaintiff, LaDonna Moore, from a decision of the Chancery Court of Madison County holding that plaintiff failed to prove that her carpal tunnel syndrome arose out of and in the course of her employment for defendant's insured, Latham's Meat Market. On this appeal, she presents two issues: (1) the preponderance of the evidence established that her carpal tunnel syndrome was causally related to her work for Latham's Meat Market, and (2) the last injury rule is applicable, in that the defendant is liable for the carpal tunnel injury, even if her injury may have begun at a former employment. After reviewing the record, we find that the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. The plaintiff testified that she was 31 years of age and was working at that time for Pierce Distribution Company. She had a tenth grade education. She first had symptoms with her left arm in the early 199s while working for Ekco/Glaco, where she assembled bread pans that involved repetitive type work with her hands. She testified that her left hand went numb and that it felt like a sprain to her wrist. She went to her family doctor, Dr. Murphy, and missed about one week of work. She saw Dr. Murphy two or three times before he sent her to a nerve specialist. A brace was prescribed for her left arm. When she was released by her doctor to return to work, she left the employment of Ekco/Glaco "because [her] wrist was still bothering her," and she "felt she couldn't do the job" due to her wrist pain. After working at several other jobs without difficulty, she began working for Latham's Meat Market in 1993 as a "cashier, cook, just anything." She testified that she cooked, made and wrapped sandwiches, wrapped meat, washed dishes by hand, used a can opener, and sliced ten pounds of potatoes, two bags of carrots, and six or seven onions each day. She testified that she began having problems with her left hand after working at 2
State vs. Robert Sission W2001-01666-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry Smith
Trial Court Judge: Carolyn Wade Blackett
The appellant, Robert A. Sisson, pleaded guilty to third offense driving under the influence of an intoxicant and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days with actual incarceration for 120 days followed by probation. The appellant, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), reserved a certified question of law for appeal to this court. That question is whether the 1998 amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(1) regarding penalties for D.U.I. convictions violate the ex-post facto and/or due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Those amendments increase from ten to twenty years the age of prior D.U.I. convictions that may be used to enhance D.U.I. penalties. Because we find that the defendant committed the instant offense after the effective date of the amendments in question, we find no ex-post facto or due process violations occurred in this case. The judgment of conviction is therefore affirmed.
Shelby
Court of Criminal Appeals
State vs. Joe Green 02C01-9711-CC-00429
Trial Court Judge: C. Creed Mcginley
Glenda Johnson v. North Park Hospital 03S01-9803-CH-00031
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. R. Vann Owens,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special W orkers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The trial judge found the plaintiff to be permanently disabled and ordered payments to be made until the plaintiff reaches the age of 65 years. This case has some convoluted proceedings in the trial court, as well as in the filing of the appeal. However, the essential matters for us to determine are whether the trial judge's finding that the plaintiff suffered permanent vocationaldisability and whether the trial court properly ordered the defendant to pay a medical bill in the amount of $7,84.6.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
