Opinions

W1998-00455-CCA-MR3-CD
W1998-00455-CCA-MR3-CD

Trial Court Judge: James C. Beasley, Jr.

State vs. Dennis Bondon
W1999-01686-CCA-R3-CD

Trial Court Judge: Chris B. Craft

03C01-9810-CR-00376
03C01-9810-CR-00376

Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

03A01-9903-CH-00120
03A01-9903-CH-00120

03A01-9902-CH-00045
03A01-9902-CH-00045

Kim Nuchols (Walker) vs. Benny Nuchols
03A01-9901-GS-00007

White (Deerman) vs. White
M1999-00005-COA-R3-CV

Trial Court Judge: Allen W. Wallace

Moore vs. Moore
M1999-01680-COA-R3-CV

Trial Court Judge: Muriel Robinson

Continental Land Co. vs. Investment Properties Co.
M1998-00431-COA-R3-CV

Slate vs. State
M1998-00434-COA-R3-CV

Davis vs. Dept. of Employment Security
M1996-00021-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

15th Jud. Dist. Unified Bar Assoc. vs. Glasgow
M1996-00020-COA-R3-CV

Trial Court Judge: C. K. Smith

Davis vs. Dept. of Employment Security
M1996-00021-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

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X2010-0000-XX-X00-XX
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Trial Court Judge: Seth W. Norman

Westside Health and Raquet Club, Inc., v. Jefferson Financial Services, Inc.
E1998-00412-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson

Westside Health & Racquet Club, Inc. (“Westside”) filed this action against Jefferson Financial Services, Inc. (“ Jefferson”). Westside’s theory of its claim -- which theory was adopted by the trial court -- is that Westside’s transfer to Jefferson, over time, of some 495 installment sales
contracts was, in each case, part and parcel of a usurious loan made by Jefferson to Westside, rather than a sale of the contract. The trial court awarded Westside damages of $68,519.71 for usurious interest, which was enhanced by a further award of pre-judgment interest pursuant to T.C.A. § 47-14-123 (1995)1. Jefferson appeals, raising several issues. The issue that we will focus on can be stated thusly: Does the Retail Installment Sales Act, T.C.A. § 47-11-101, et seq., (“ the Act”) operate to exempt the dealings between these parties from Tennessee’s usury statutes?

Victor James Cazes v. State of Tennessee
W1998-00386-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The petitioner, Victor James Cazes, appeals as of right from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying him post-conviction relief from his 1990 convictions for felony murder,  aggravated rape and first degree burglary. The petitioner was sentenced to death for the murder conviction and received twenty-five-year and six-year sentences, respectively, for the aggravated rape and burglary convictions. The judgments of conviction were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn. 1994). In this post-conviction appeal, the petitioner raises the  following issues:

State of Tennessee, et al., Coretta Scott King, v. Lloyd Jowers
W1999-00984-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Swearengen

On December 1, 1999, the State of Tennessee on behalf of the appellants Judge James Beasley, Judge Robert T. Dwyer and Mark Glankler, filed a Rule 10 T.R.A.P. application for Page 1 extraordinary appeal. Specifically, the State sought to set aside the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to quash the subpoenas served on the aforementioned appellants.

State of Tennessee vs. Ronald Wayne Smith
M1999 01439 CCA R3 CD
Authoring Judge: Judge David H. Welles
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen Wallace

The Defendant, Ronald W ayne Smith, pleaded guilty in the C ircuit Court of Dickson County to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of marijuana for resale, reserving a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified question of law is whether there were sufficient spec ific and articu lable facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle and/or whether the duration of the stop excessive. We find that there were not sufficient specific and articulabe facts to justify the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. Because we conclude that the stop was illegal, we reverse the order of the trial judge overruling the motion to suppress.

Kenneth Jones v. Itt Hartford Ins. Co., et al.
W1998-00357-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: L. Terry Lafferty, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. D. J. Alissandratos,

Lila Roberson v. The Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania
W1998-00374-WC-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Joe C. Morris
This workers' compensation appeal was referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This case arose out of an automobile accident on February 1, 1996, in which the plaintiff, Lila Roberson, suffered fractures to her lower right leg and injured her face. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered these injuries during the course and scope of her employment with the defendant's insured, the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB). The court awarded the plaintiff a 4 percent permanent partial disability to the right leg and a 15 percent disability to the body as a whole for the injuries to her jaw. The defendant appeals this decision and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff carried her burden of proof to show by expert medical testimony that her jaw injury was compensable; and (2) whether the trial court erred in the amount of vocational disability benefits awarded the plaintiff for her foot injury. Our standard of review on appeal in workers' compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness of the trial court's findings, unless the evidence presented preponderates otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Henson v. City of Lawrenceburg, 851 S.W.2d 89, 812 (Tenn. 1993). Under this standard of review, we are required to conduct an in-depth examination of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies.

State of Tennessee vs. Arthur Copeland
E1999-00044-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Seth W. Norman

The appellant, Arthur Copeland, was convicted by a Blount County jury of one (1) coun t of simple assa ult, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days in the county jail and ordered tha t the appellant’s sentence for assault run consecutively to his sentence for a prior aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in (1) im posing sentence immediately after the jury rendered its verdict without affording the appellant a separate sentencing hearing; and (2) ordering consecutive sentences. After thoroughly reviewing the record before this Court, we conclude that th ere is no evidence in the record to support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Therefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for another sentencing hearing.