Edmund George Zagorski v. State of Tennessee
We granted this post-conviction appeal to determine whether there is ineffective assistance of counsel where, at the express instruction of a competent and fully informed defendant, defense counsel does not investigate or present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. For the reasons provided herein, we hold that there is not. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Billy R. Phillips v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act. |
Supreme Court | ||
Billy R. Phillips v. State of Tennessee v. Tennessee Technological University, State of Tennessee
We granted this appeal to address whether the State may be liable for discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2) in a workers' compensation case. We hold that the State may only be taxed for costs expressly permitted by either the Tennessee claims commission statute or the Workers' Compensation Act. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
We granted this appeal to determine whether an employer is entitled to an offset of long-term disability payments against a workers’ compensation award for permanent total disability. A 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 permits offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to an employee under an employer-funded disability plan. The plaintiff’s injury pre-dated the effective date of the statute. We hold that the amendment is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset in this case. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Fay Thomas Nutt v. Champion International Corporation
This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel, and the briefs and argument of counsel; and upon consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-114 of the Workers’ Compensation Act is not retroactive and the employer is not entitled to an offset against the worker’s compensation award in this case. |
Wayne | Supreme Court | |
Baptist Hospital, et al., v. Tennessee Department of Health and Department of Finance and Administration
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Baptist Hospital v. Tennessee Departments of Health and Finance and Administration
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Tennessee claims commission has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to certain Medicaid reimbursements paid to them by the State. Upon review, we hold that the Tennessee claims commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Because the plaintiffs’ challenge is based upon an assertion that a state Medicaid regulation is invalid under federal law, the Tennessee Department of Health was the agency with subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-223 of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Darrell Wentzel
On December 6, 1996, a W illiamson County jury convicted Appellant, Darrell Wentzel, of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. After a sentencing hearing on January 31, 1997, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years for each count of aggravated robbery, twelve years for aggravated kidnapping, and six years for aggravated burglary, with all sentenc es to be served concurrently. On February 18, 1997, Appellant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, claiming that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction, that the aggravating kidnapping conviction should be dismissed because it was incidental to the robbery, that several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were erroneous, and that the trial court had misapplied enhancement factors to arrive at maximum sentences on all four convictions. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant challenges both his convictions and his sentence, raising the following issues: 1) whether the trial court comm itted plain error by adm itting the in-court identification of the Appellant by Mary Ethel Veach; 2) whether there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony of Edward Mitchem; 3) whether Appellant’s convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery constituted dou ble jeopardy; 4) whether the trial court correctly rejected Appellant’s argument that he could not be convicted of aggravated kidnapping because it was only incidental to the robbery; 5) whether the trial court correctly sentenced the Appellant. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steve Makris v. Bob Kapos
Steve Makris appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim for accrued and unpaid salaries in this partnership accounting and dissolution case. For the reasons stated hereafter, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen P. Kopels v. Katherine Annette Bryant
This is a domestic relations case. The appellant complains of the award of the residence to the appellee, and the award of the attorney’s fees. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P., RULE 13(d); Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996). Where there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material fact, the question on appeal is one of law, and the scope of review is de novo with no presumption of correctness accompanying a chancellor's conclusions of law. Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1993). |
Court of Appeals | ||
Gehl Corporation, v. Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Tennessee
Gehl Corporation filed suit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to contest an assessment by the Commissioner of Revenue of the "Amusement Tax" imposed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-6-212(a)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patsy Lorean Johnson v. James Larry Johnson
This is a divorce case. In the original divorce, years ago, the wife was awarded shares of stock from the husband’s p ension fund. Subs equently, the pension fund was distributed to the husband, with no monies going to the wife. In this action, the trial court awarded the wife a judgment for the value o f the stock at the time of the trial co urt’s order. The husband appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Todd Harmon v. Janet Harmon
Megan Harmon (“Megan” or “Appellant”), minor child born during the marriage of Plaintiff/Appellee, Todd Harmon (“Mr. Harmon” or “Appellee”) and Defendant Janet Harmon (“Mrs. Harmon”), by and through her Guardian Ad Litem (G.A.L.), appeals the decision of the trial court which found that Appellee was not the biological father of Appellant, and incorporated into the decree of divorce the marital dissolution agreement in which the parties agreed Appellee would have no further obligation to the child. |
Carroll | Court of Appeals | |
Ann S. Wing v. James E. Wing - Concurring
This is a domestic relations dispute involving money only. The trial court held that a certificate of deposit and one investment account were the separate property of Husband and declined to award Wife alimony or the total amount of her attorney fees. She appeals and presents these issues for review. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Billy Flowers and Amy Flowers v. Charles R. Horner and Reba M. Horner - Concurring
This controversy may, perhaps, be described as a boundary dispute. The development of Riverview Estates Subdivision began in 1971 with the recordation of a plat which provided for a cul-de-sac fifty feet in width centered on the West boundary of Lot 23. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee , Department of Children's Services, v. Tamra Leeann Viar, and John Fitzgerald Gross, the unknown father of Katelyn Nicole Viar, In the Matter Of: Katelyn Nicole Viarelyn Nicole Viar
The parental relationship between Tamra Viar and her daughter, Katelyn, was terminated by the Juvenile Court, the propriety of which she presents for review. Our review of the findings of fact made by the trial Court is de novo upon the record of the trial Court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. |
Cannon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Troy R. Walls
A Rutherford County grand jury indicted defendant for aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and rape of a child for incidents involving his young female cousin. A negotiated plea agreement allowed defendant to plead to one count of rape, a Class B felony, and one count of incest, a Class C felony. The agreed upon sentences were eight years for rape and three years for incest to be served consecutively as a Range I, standard offender. The sole issue on appeal is the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. However, plain error dictates that the convictions be VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings. The defendant pled guilty to incest which is neither a lesser included nor a lesser grade of child rape; nor do the acts of the defendant constitute the crime of incest. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE: Estate of Louise C. Davis, Deceased; Sarah Foster Kelley v. Sarah Hill Martin - Concurring
This appeal involves the validity of certain transactions entered into by the holder of a power of attorney. The trial court set aside the transactions finding that the attorney in fact had failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence which arose in light of these self-benefitting transactions. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee vs. Tony Randall Arnold
The defendant, Tony Randall Arnold, appeals as of right his conviction by a Benton County jury of simple assault, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101(a)(3). The trial court sentenced the defendant to six (6) months in jail to be served at 75%. The sole issue for appeal is whether the trial court properly sentenced the defendant. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
County of Benton, v. H&W Environmental Services and Waste Managment Inc. of Tennessee
Benton County appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to H & W Environmental Services, Inc. (H&W) and Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee (Waste Management) and denying summary judgment to Benton County. For the reasons stated hereafter, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Jeri St. John D/B/A Jeri's v. Beer Permit Board, a Division of Henry County
Plaintiff, Jeri St. John (“St. John” or “Appellant”) appeals the trial court’s judgment 2 in favor of Defendant, Beer Permit Board (“Beer Board” or “Appellee”) denying St. John a beer permit for her business “Jeri’s” n/k/a “The Foxy Lady.” |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
Mary M. Pawlakos v. Laurie Watson Pawlakos
Respondent Laurie Watson Pawlakos (the Wife) appeals the trial court’s order requiring her to return certain funds to the estate of her deceased husband, John T. Pawlakos (the Decedent). For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s judgment. |
Stewart | Court of Appeals | |
Allen E. Hasty, Judy Darlene Hasty v. Thomas R. Throneberry, Ind., D/B/A Throneberry Properties and Sharon Clutter
Defendant Thomas R. Throneberry appeals the trial court’s judgment in the amount of $6,000 entered in favor of Plaintiff/Appellee Allen E. Hasty after a jury trial. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Roger P. Hogan, Fred C. Dance, and Music City Dust-Tex Service, Inc., v. Coyne International Enterprises Corp. D/B/A Coyne Textile Services
This action is based on a series of contracts executed in the sale of an industrial dust control and laundry business. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the claims of the sellers, held that one of the sellers had breached one of the agreements but that the buyer had failed to prove its damages, and awarded the buyer attorneys’ fees. We reverse the dismissal of the sellers’ action and modify the award of attorneys’ fees. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carolyn Strickland
The Petitioner, Carolyn Strickland, appeals the order of the Jackson County Criminal Court dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief. In her sole issue on appeal, Petitioner argues she was incompetent to stand trial due to the medication she was taking during the trial and was, therefore , denied her right to due process and a fair trial. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and received a sentence of life imprisonment in the Jackson County Criminal Court. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Carolyn Strickland, No. 01C01-9212-CR-00390, Jackson County (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, March 23, 1995), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1995). Following the denial of her permission to appeal, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In post-conviction proceedings, the pe titioner bears the burden of proving the allegations raised in the petition by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f). Moreover, the trial court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against the judgment. Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1996); Campbell v. State, 904 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tenn. 1995); Cooper v. State, 849 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tenn. 1993). As the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition. |
Jackson | Court of Criminal Appeals |