State vs. Zip Gillespie
02C01-9703-CR-00088

State vs. David Keen
02C01-9709-CR-00365
Trial Court Judge: John P. Colton, Jr.

Worth vs. Cumberland Mt. Property Owners
03A01-9709-CV-00442
Trial Court Judge: John J. Maddux

State vs. Jackie Ozier
W1999-01478-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

State vs. Delores Smith & David Robinson
01C01-9609-CR-00412

Ricky Brown vs. State
01C01-9708-CR-00363
Trial Court Judge: Ann Lacy Johns

State vs. Jeff Warfield
01C01-9711-CC-00504

State vs. Jeffery Holder
01C01-9801-CC-00044

D.D. Roberts, D/B/A Roberts Construction Co., et al. v.Tommy Yarbrough, et al., Thomas Lumber Co., Inc. v. Naran Patel, et al., and Tommy Yarbrough, et al.
01A01-9802-CH-00096
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol A. Catalano

Two subcontractors recovered judgments for work done on a construction project in Clarksville. On appeal the general contractor and the surety on his bond allege that the appellees were not licensed contractors and that neither complied with the notice of nonpayment statute. In addition, the appellant disputes the trial court’s version of the proof and the award of prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court.

03C01-9804-CC-00145
03C01-9804-CC-00145
Trial Court Judge: D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.

State vs. Keffer
03C01-9709-CC-00413

Gordon Carroll and Ora Hall, v. John W. Belcher and Frankie Belcher
01A01-9802-CH-00106
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor C. K. Smith

This appeal involves an easement for ingress and egress. The defendants, John and Frankie Belcher (Belcher), appeal the decision of the trial court granting the plaintiffs, Gordon Carroll (Carroll) and Ora Hall (Hall), the right to widen an easement running over their property.

Pamela L. Schenk, v. Raymond F. Lane
01A01-9804-CV-00190
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby H. Capers

Defendant Raymond D. Lane appeals a jury verdict awarding $297,000.00 to Plaintiff Pamela L. Schenk for injuries sustained as a result of an automobile accident occurring between Lane and Schenk. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in all respects.

State of Tennessee vs. Mark Crites
01C01-9711-CR-00512
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge L. T. Lafferty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

Mark Crites appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence. He challenges both the propriety of that revocation and his resentencing, arguing that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence; (2) the trial court misapplied certain enhancement factors and that his sentences are, therefore, excessive; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. After careful review of the record and arguments of counsel, we conclude the trial court relied upon improper evidence in revoking the community corrections sentence. We remand for another revocation hearing.

Daniel B. Taylor v. State of Tennessee, John Doe, State Coordinator of Elections, Ms. Bobbie White, Shelby County Registrar of Voters; and Charles W. Burson, Atty General
01A01-9707-CH-00338
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

The only question presented in this complaint is whether a law making all felonies infamous crimes can, upon conviction, be applied to crimes committed before the date of the act. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the plaintiff’s request for a declaratory judgment. We affirm.
 

State of Tennessee vs. Roy D. Nelson, Jr.
03C01-9710-CR-00454
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The defendant, Roy D. Nelson, stands convicted of burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson and possession of marijuana as a result of his efforts to blow up his ex-wife's home. Nelson received his convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Washington County Criminal Court. A Range III offender, Nelson is presently serving an effective 62-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crimes.1 In this direct appeal, Nelson claims he was improperly convicted of aggravated arson because he, rather than another person, suffered the serious bodily injury relied upon to elevate the offense from arson to aggravated arson. Having reviewed the appellate record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

State of Tennessee vs. Roy D. Nelson, Jr.
03C01-9710-CR-00454
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lynn W. Brown

The defendant, Roy D. Nelson, stands convicted of burglary, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson and possession of marijuana as a result of his efforts to blow up his ex-wife's home. Nelson received his convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Washington County Criminal Court. A Range III offender, Nelson is presently serving an effective 62-year sentence in the Department of Correction for his crimes. In this direct appeal, Nelson claims he was improperly convicted of aggravated arson because he, rather than another person, suffered the serious bodily injury relied upon to elevate the offense from arson to aggravated arson. Having reviewed the appellate record, the arguments of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Peggy Wilson v. United Parcel Service, Inc. Ohio, et al
02S01-9807-CV-00064
Authoring Judge: F. Lloyd Tatum, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. John R. Mccarroll, Jr., Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff, Peggy Wilson, sustained an injury resulting in a 16 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court also ruled all medical bills and charges associated with the treatment of Dr. Rizk be paid by the defendants and that the plaintiff was entitled to temporary total benefits from September 25, 1997 to November 24, 1997, which had not been paid by the defendants. The defendants present issues attacking the judgment of the trial court on these three findings. We will first summarize the evidence. The plaintiff testified she was 51 years of age at the time of trial. She attended high school, but did not graduate and did not obtain a GED. Her employment history prior to working for United Parcel Service was manual, unskilled labor. She had worked for United Parcel Service as a package delivery driver for the past 22 years. Her employment requires her to lift packages weighing up to 7 pounds. The plaintiff testified that on July 23, 1997, when she lifted a 62-pound box, her left arm and hand went numb, causing her to lose grip. This jerked her back, causing pain in the back. She testified the pain in her back worsened and she notified her employer. She was told to go to Med Emergency where she saw Dr. Zanone. Dr. Zanone sent her to Dr. Varner, an orthopedic surgeon. She testified Dr. Varner ordered a nerve block which was done by Dr. Kraus. This helped her for a few days, but within one and one-half weeks the pain was as severe as ever. Dr. Varner sent her back to work on September 8, 1997, but the pain in her back was so severe she was not able to do the work. Her employer returned her to Dr. Varner who told her there was nothing else he could do for her. He advised her to go back to work or get another job. Since she was unable to do the work, she contacted the employer's insurance carrier who told her to see Dr. Kellett, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Kellett gave her liquid cortisone 2

William H. Lance, Emma Lee Lance v. Larry H. Street, D/B/A Street Construction
01A01-9802-CV-00072
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Allen W. Wallace

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Doug Sizemore, Commissioner of Commerce and Insurance for the State of Tennessee, v. United Physicians Insurance Risk Retention Group - Concurring
01A01-9706-CH-00253
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch

I concur with the court’s opinion. Insurance companies have the right to assume that the risk they undertake will not later be enlarged by the courts. See Schultz v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 465, 474, 404 S.W.2d 480, 484 (1966). Accordingly, the courts are not at liberty to rewrite policies of insurance to provide coverage where no coverage was intended. See Spears v. Commercial Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 544, 548(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). Dr. Johnson did not contract for prior acts coverage when he purchased his UPI insurance policy. Accordingly, UPI never provided coverage for claims such as Blendora Ann Echols.

Robert S. Lipman v. First National Bank of Boston, and Alexander H. McNeil, J. Virginia McNeil, R. & J. Knoxville - Concurring
01A01-9803-CH-00139
Authoring Judge: Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

The trial court granted the motion of defendant First National Bank of Boston (“First National”) for summary judgment, which the plaintiff (“Lipman”] appeals, insisting that there are genuine issues of material fact.

Glenda Wright Benning v. James Russell Benning
01A01-9805-CV-00238
Authoring Judge: Judge Don T. McMurray
Trial Court Judge: Judge Marietta Shipley

In this divorce case, Glenda Benning (wife) challenges the trial court's award of permanent alimony to James Benning (husband). After the file filed for divorce and the parties separated, the hisband moved into the same apartment with one Jaylene Deen. On appeal, the wife argues that the tril court erred in finding that the statutory presumption fond at  T.C .A . § 36 - 5 - 10 1 ( a ) ( 3 ) had been rebutted by the evidence presented by the husband. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James Prince, D/B/A/ Big Jim, Inc., v. Charles Campbell, Individually and D/B/A Limosines by K.C.
01A01-9806-CV-00276
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

This appeal involves a motion to set aside a judgment. Defendant/cross-plaintiff,Charles Campbell (Campbell), appeals the judgment of the trial court awarding money damages to The day of trial, Prince filed a motion to amend the complaint to reduce the amount requested as damages from $97,000 to $77,000. There is no record as to the trial court’s action plaintiff/cross-defendant, James Prince (Prince). This case arose from a contract entered into between the parties in April 1995 in which Campbell agreed to transfer a limousine from his business to Prince in exchange for the opportunity to run Prince’s “World Famous Stagecoach Lounge.” Prince filed suit against Campbell for breach of contract and fraud in August 1995 alleging that Campbell failed to make lease payments on the property and refused to transfer the limousine agreed upon in the contract. Campbell’s answer denied the material allegations and asserted a counterclaim for conversion, fraud, and breach of contract.

State of Tennessee, Department of Childrens Services v. Tamra Leann Viar and John Fitzgeral Gross, In the Matter of Katlyn Nicole Viar
01A01-9806-JV-00275
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge William H. Inman
Trial Court Judge: Judge John B. Melton, III

We have reviewed the Petition to Rehear filed on behalf of the Attorney General and conclude that the Petition should be denied for the following reasons.

State of Tennessee, Commissioner Doug Sizemore, Commerce and Insurance v. United Physicians Insurance, Risk Retention Group State ex rel Doug Sizemore vs. United Physicians Ins.
01A01-9706-CH-00253
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Walter W. Bussart
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Carol L. McCoy

This is an appeal from a memorandum and order of the chancellor affirming and adopting the Special Master's report pursuant to Rule 53 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue is whether the lower court erred in this action. Our review is de novo upon the record accompanied by a presumption of correctness as to the findings of fact by the chancellor. Tenn.R.App.P.13(d).