Charlotte Hull v. Emro Marketing Company 01S01-9709-CH-00201
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Don R. Ash,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the plaintiff suffered an injury by accident on February 23, 1995 and was entitled to an award of 22 percent permanent partial impairment to the body as a whole ( $14,8. for permanent partial disability and $96. for temporary total disability payable in a lump sum), medical expenses incurred after March 9, 1995, and future medical treatment caused by the injury. The trial court ruled that Emro Marketing Company ("Emro") was liable for the award because it was the employer at the time of the most recent injury that bore a causal relation to the plaintiff's incapacity. Emro raises the following issues: 1. Whether the Chancellor erred in finding the subsequent employer liable under the last injurious injury rule when the subsequent injury was not suffered in the scope of the employee's employment with the subsequent employer. 2. Whether the Chancellor erred in applying the last injurious injury rule when the employee's initial injury was the strongest causal link to the disability of the employee, who had not fully recovered from her initial injury? The plaintiff contends the trial court properly found Emro liable, but says if it is not then Kwik Sak, Inc. ("Kwik Sak") and Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") are liable. Kwik Sak and Reliance say that Emro is liable as found, but if it is not then the plaintiff has not appealed from the action of the trial judge dismissing them as defendants. We find the trial judge erred in applying the repetitive injury rule and/or the last injurious injury rule in this case and find Kwik Sak and Reliance were the insurers at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the 2
Rutherford
Workers Compensation Panel
Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr. 01S01-9706-CV-00188
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Jim T. Hamilton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). In this case, the plaintiff brought suit against Epsco, Inc. ("Epsco") and later Hughes Parker Industries, Inc. ("Hughes Parker")1, alleging that he was entitled to workers' compensation benefits as a result of developing carpal tunnel syndrome in the course of his employment. The trial court dismissed the suit against Hughes Parker and found that Epsco was not prejudiced by the plaintiff giving notice of his injury on April 3, 1996. The trial court awarded the plaintiff 4 percent permanent partial disability to both arms and seven weeks of temporary total disability. Epsco appeals and presents the following issues: 1. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the plaintiff's failure to give timely notice. 2. The plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 3. The permanent partial impairment award is excessive. 4. There is no basis for an award of temporary total disability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff timely notified and filed suit against Epsco, we modify the judgment of the trial court to find that the plaintiff can recover 2 percent permanent partial disability to each upper extremity, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court that the plaintiff is entitled to temporary total disability benefits. 1 There is no issue raised concerning the dismissal of Hughes Parker in this case. 2
Stone vs. Stone M1997-00218-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Vernon Neal
This appeal involves a former spouse's efforts to extricate himself from the spousal support obligations contained in a marital dissolution agreement. Approximately one year after the entry of the divorce decree approving the agreement, the former husband requested the Chancery Court for Putnam County to set the agreement aside because he did not have independent legal advice and his judgment was impaired by antidepressant medication when he signed the agreement. The trial court modified portions of the decree but did not relieve the former husband of his spousal support obligation. Thereafter, the former husband filed a second motion seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations because of his former wife's improved financial circumstances. The trial court again declined to relieve the former husband of his obligation to pay spousal support. On this appeal, the former husband renews his argument that he should no longer be required pay spousal support because of his former wife's improved financial circumstance and his own weakened financial condition. We affirm the trial court's decision that the former husband has failed to prove the existence of a substantial, material change in circumstances that would warrant modifying his spousal support obligation.
Albert Gregurek v. Swope Motors M2002-02854-COA-R3-CV
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith
This case involves an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. We reverse.
Bobby Lee Powers v. Aetna Casualty 03S01-9707-CH-00085
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank V. Williams, III,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found plaintiff, Bobby Lee Powers, to be 1% disabled and awarded benefits for a period of 4 weeks pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-242. The judgment recited plaintiff was "found to have a 1 percent permanent, partial disability." Defendant insurance carrier, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, was held liable for 8% of the award and the remaining 2% was allocated to the Second Injury Fund. The insurance carrier has appealed insisting plaintiff was found to be totally disabled and that the award of benefits should be paid until plaintiff becomes 65 years of age pursuant to the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-27(4)(A)(I). This would result in payments being made for 262 weeks since plaintiff reached his maximum medical improvement on July 9, 1996. Aetna also argues the trial court was in error in making the 8% allocation to it as the court failed to take into account a previous award of workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. The Second Injury Fund also contends the award should be computed under T.C.A. _ 5-6-27 rather than the provisions of T.C.A. _ 5-6-242. The state fund insists the allocation of 2% of the award to it was proper since an earlier workers' compensation award paid to the plaintiff was never approved by a court. Plaintiff was injured while working for Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. on December 1, 1994. He was 58 years old when injured and 6 years of age at the time of trial. He completed the 4th grade and began working at age 13 years. He testified he could not read or write but could change money. His work experience is mostly in the construction industry. On the day of his last injury, he was operating a bulldozer and was backing up when he suddenly struck a large rock. This caused a whiplash injury to his neck and back and the force was strong enough to break the neck rest on the bulldozer. He continued to work with a lot of pain and medication until November, 1995. He has not worked anywhere since this time. Plaintiff has suffered a number of health problems prior to this last work- related injury. In 1966 he injured his back with another employer and was 2
Knox
Workers Compensation Panel
Wm. Fletcher v. WaUSAu Ins. Co. 03S01-9708-CH-00096
Authoring Judge: Roger E. Thayer, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Frank V. Williams,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff, William Fletcher, 2% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and other statutory benefits against defendant, Wausau Insurance Company, and defendant-employer, Tanknology Corporation International. The claim was dismissed as to defendant, National Surety Corporation, and there has been no appeal from the order of dismissal. Defendant Wausau has appealed insisting (1) it was not the employer's insurer in Tennessee and therefore not subject to being sued in Tennessee, (2) that T.C.A. _ 5-6-115 has no application to the case as plaintiff's contract for hire was not made in Tennessee nor was the employment principally localized within Tennessee, and (3) the action in Tennessee should be barred under the doctrine of election of remedies. Plaintiff began employment with Tanknology during January 199 as a result of a contract for hire in Texas. He was employed as a tester and traveled with a mobilized unit conducting tests on underground storage tanks for major oil companies. He was assigned to the southeast region and this territory covered seven states including Tennessee. He testified he traveled in his work about seventy-five percent of the time and he spent about 3% of his time working in Tennessee. On March 26, 1991, he sustained a back injury while working in Asheville, North Carolina. He saw Dr. Rick Longie on March 28, 1991 in Chattanooga, Tennessee. He later was treated by Dr. Alvin Spunt in Harriman, Tennessee, because Dr. Spunt was closer to his residence in Kingston, Tennessee, where he and his family were living. Dr. Longie, a chiropractor, testified by deposition and stated his office received permission from plaintiff's employer in Houston, Texas to treat plaintiff and that Wausau Insurance Company, Houston, Texas, was identified as the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier. He forwarded claims to the insurance 2
