Frank Crittenden vs. State of Tennessee
03C01-9707-CC-00315
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge E. Eugene Elben

The appellant, Frank Crittenden, appeals as of right the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Ann C. Short v. Charles E. Ferrell in his official capacity as the Administrative Director of the Courts
01S01-9704-OT-00078
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder

This cause comes to us on a common law writ of certiorari to review a fee dispute in a post-conviction proceeding involving an indigent defendant, David McNish. The issue is whether an attorney appointed to review the records in a post-conviction proceeding may exceed the maximum allowable rates for attorneys representing indigent defendants. We hold that: (1) Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (1996) required an attorney performing services as an "expert" to obtain prior approval for an hourly rate in excess of the hourly rate provided for attorneys in Rule 13; and (2) the trial court should have explicitly set forth the approved "expert" hourly rate in its order if such rate was intended to exceed the normal hourly rate provided for attorneys in Rule 13.

Herbert S. Moncier v. Charles E. Ferrell, in his capacity as the Administrave Director of the Courts
01S01-9704-OT-00079
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder

The defendant, Thomas Dee Huskey, has been charged on four counts of murder, eleven counts of rape, fourteen counts of kidnapping and three counts of robbery. The State filed notice of intention to seek the death penalty. In November of 1992, the petitioner, Herbert S. Moncier, and a second attorney were appointed pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 13 to represent Huskey. Tennessee Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 13 § 1 permits appointment of two attorneys for one defendant in capital cases. The petitioner sought additional reimbursement in the trial court for two additional attorneys, for paralegals and for various other expenses. The trial judge entered an order granting reimbursement for two additional attorneys not to exceed $ 10,000.00 and for paralegals at $ 15 per hour not to exceed $ 5,000.00. The order was entered nunc pro tunc to the date of the petitioner's appointment.

Special Judge Hamilton v. Gayden, Jr.
03S01-9712-CV-00138
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Richard R. Vance,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue for review is whether the claim is barred by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-23, a statute of limitations. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed. The trial court overruled the employer's pre-trial motion for summary judgment and, after a trial, found that the injury did not manifest itself until March of 1993 and awarded benefits to the injured employee. Appellate review is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(2). It is undisputed that the action was commenced on June 23, 1993. The employee or claimant, Valentine, was 5 years old at the time of the trial. She has a ninth grade education and has worked for the employer, Heekin, as a packing machine operator since 1984. In June of 1991, she twisted her neck and arm while pulling cans from the line. She immediately notified a supervisor but he did not complete a work related injury report because there was no visible evidence of injury. Instead, the employer filed a health insurance claim. The next week, Valentine took a vacation, but continued to have neck and arm pain. She went to a medical clinic, where she received pain medication and a soft neck collar. She returned to work following the vacation, but her neck and arm still hurt, so she reported the injury to a plant manager, who attributed the problem to "old age" and refused to complete a work related injury report. Concerned with the financial strain of the copayment requirement of her health insurance coverage, the claimant spoke directly to the secretary who handled workers' compensation claims for the employer. The secretary, in her trial testimony, admitted the claim was mishandled, but testified also that she only designated claims as workers' compensation claims when instructed to do so by a supervisor. 2

Danny Ray Harrell v. The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company
03S01-9508-CH-00098
Authoring Judge: Justice E. Riley Anderson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor H. David Cate

We granted this appeal to determine whether we should retain "the Distretti Rule1" adopted by this Court sixty-seven years ago. The rule provides that before a death will be considered accidental under the terms of an insurance contract, the means, as well as the result, must be involuntary, unexpected, and unusual.

State of Tennessee vs. Vincent Walker
01C01-9709-CC-00390
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Juge Jim T. Hamilton

On January 6, 1997, the trial court issued a community corrections violation warrant for failure to pay court costs, fines, supervision fees, and maintain employment. On May 5, 1997, a second revocation warrant was issued, this time for ag gravated robbery. On June 2, 1997, the trial court revoked Appellant’s community corrections placement and imposed his original sentence of incarceration.

Adolph C. Lavin and Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, Deceased, and Adolph C. Lavin, in his capacity as Administrator of the estate of Troy James Lavin, v. Ross Jordon, Susan Jordon, and Sean Jordon
01A01-9709-CV-00455
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara N. Haynes

The plaintiff, Adolph C. Lavin and wife, Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, brought this action against Ross and Susan Jordon and their son, Sean Jordon, for the wrongful death of Troy Lavin, who was shot and killed by Sean Jordon. The Trial Judge entered an interlocutory partial judgment on the pleadings limiting the recovery from the parents of Sean Jordon to $10,000.00 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102 and 103 which read as follows:

Adolph C. Lavin and Jean Lavin, Surviving Parents of Troy James Lavin, Deceased, and Adolph C. Lavin, in his capacity as Administrator of the estated of Troy James Lavin, v. Ross Jordon, Susan Jordon, and Sean Jordon
01A01-9709-CV-00455
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Barbara Haynes

The plaintiff, Adolph C. Lavin and wife, Jean Lavin, surviving parents of Troy James Lavin, brought this action against Ross and Susan Jordon and their son, Sean Jordon, for the wrongful death of Troy Lavin, who was shot and killed by Sean Jordon. The Trial Judge entered an interlocutory partial judgment on the pleadings limiting the recovery from the parents of Sean Jordon to $10,000.00 pursuant to T.C.A. §§ 37-10-101, 102 and 103 which read as follows:

James Harrison Jenkins v. Annette Carol Jenkins
01A01-9803-CV-00134
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby H. Capers

In this case James Harrison Jenkins appeals the action of the trial court in dismissing his petition to modify a final decree of divorce.

Jennifer O. Wilson (Oakley), v. Larry Arnold Wilson
01A01-9707-CV-00325
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge Muriel Robinson

In a documentary on how to complicate a simple divorce, this case would serve as a highlight film. After the trial court finally entered a final judgment, the parties on appeal argue about the trial judge’s refusal to recuse herself, a pre-nuptial agreement, the division of marital property, the award of attorney’s fees, and certain injunctions involving the custody and visitation with the parties’ minor child. We modify the judgment to give Dr. Oakley a $2,000 credit for her separate property awarded to Mr. Wilson and to make the judgment for attorney’s fees run to Mr. Wilson instead of his lawyer. In all other respects we affirm the judgment below.

Edith Stromatt, v. The Metropolitan Employee Benefit Board of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
01A01-9707-CH-00354
Authoring Judge: Special Judge Walter W. Bussart
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

The appellant in this action is Edith Stromatt, a former employee of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Tennessee. When Ms. Stromatt sought disability with the Metropolitan Employee Benefit Board ("the Benefit Board"), she was granted a medical disability pension; however, she was denied the inline- of-duty pension (IOD) that she desired. Ms. Stromatt brought suit in chancery court claiming that the Benefit Board erred in its failure to grant her an IOD pension. She also claims that the Benefit Board denied her the constitutional right to be heard prior to its decision. The trial court agreed with the conclusions of the Benefit Board and dismissed Ms. Stromatt's appeal.

Williamson County Broadcasting Company, Inc., and William B. Ornes, v. Intermedia Partners, et al.
01A01-9709-CH-00480
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd

The appellants and appellees have both filed a Petition to Rehear, which we have considered and found to be without merit. It is, therefore, ordered that the petitions be denied.

Fred E. Dean v. Donal Campbell, et al.
01A01-9711-CH-00672
Authoring Judge: Judge William B. Cain
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This case comes to us on appeal from an order dismissing Appellant Dean’s complaint against Appellees, filed apparently under the auspices of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq., alleging violation of civil rights under the color of state authority. The trial court dismissed Mr. Dean’s complaint for failure to specify the capacity of the defendants being sued. For the reasons and under the authorities recited below, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Mr. Dean’s claim with prejudice.

State of Tennessee v. Marlon Madison -Concurring
01-A-01-9711-CV-00676
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge John J. Maddux

The Juvenile Court of Pickett County found a juvenile to be delinquent for selling marijuana to a classmate. He appealed to the Circuit Court, which likewise found him to be delinquent, and placed him on probation with the Department of Childrens’ Services. We reverse the Circuit Court.

Henry Mitchell Brummitt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems
03S01-9707-CV-00089
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James B. Scott
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged that he became totally disabled on account of anxiety and depression caused by several specific, acute and sudden stressful job-related incidents, all of which were denied by the defendant. The trial judge found that the plaintiff's mental problems were the result of a "gradual build-up of stress caused by the plaintiff's overreaction to his work," and hence not compensable. The plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his complaint. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial courts in workers' compensation cases. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). I The plaintiff is 58 years old. In June 1976 he was employed by the defendant's predecessor as a fire truck driver. Promotions came his way and in 1984 he was named maintenance officer of all the fire and guard facilities at the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge. 2

David F. Summers v. K.U.B and Larry Brinton, et al
03S01-9703-CH-00029
Authoring Judge: Joe C. Loser, Jr., Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fairly stated, the issues referred to the panel for findings and conclusions are (1) whether the chancellor erred in computing the employer's liability for permanent total disability benefits based upon a percentage of benefits payable to the employee up to age 65, (2) whether the chancellor erred in holding the employer liable for all benefits payable until the time of the employee's death, from a cause other than the compensable injury, on September 8, 1996, and (3) whether the chancellor abused his discretion by refusing to order the claimant's counsel to remit a portion of his fee because the claimant died before the expiration of 4 weeks. As discussed below, the panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed as to all three issues. The employee or claimant, Summers, was fifty-four years old at the time of the trial. He had worked for the employer, Knoxville Utilities District, since 1965. On June 2, 1993, he suffered a compensable neck injury, which injury was superimposed upon three prior disabilities, none of which entitled him to an award of workers' compensation benefits. As a result of the compensable injury, for which the chancellor found him to be thirty percent permanently disabled, combined with the pre-existing physical disabilities, the claimant is permanently and totally disabled. The trial judge so found and, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. section 5-6-28(a)(1)1, apportioned the award thirty percent to the employer and seventy percent to the Second Injury Fund, to age 65. The employer contends, by its first issue, that its liability should be limited to thirty percent the first 4 weeks of benefits. 1 5-6-28(a)(1) If an employee has previously sustained a permanent physical disability from any cause or origin and becomes permanently and totally disabled through a subsequent injury, such employee shall be entitled to compensation from such employee's employer or the employer's insurance company only for the disability that would have resulted from the subsequent injury, and such previous injury shall not be considered in estimating the compensation to which such employee may be entitled under this chapter from the employer or the employer's insurance company; provided, that in addition to such compensation for a subsequent injury, and after completion of the payments therefor, then such employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for the permanenttotal disability out of a special fund to be known as the "second injury fund" therein created.

Sarah Taylor v. Harman Automotive, Inc.
02S01-9708-CH-00074
Authoring Judge: John K. Byers, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Dewey C. Whitenton,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(2); Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). The application of this standard requires this Court to weigh in more depth the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court in a workers' compensation case. See Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Tenn. 1988). The issue raised in this case is whether the trial judge erroneously set aside a previously approved settlement of the plaintiff's workers' compensation case against the defendant. We find it was error to set this judgment approving the settlement aside. We reverse the judgment which did so and reinstate the judgment approving the settlement. Prior to April 17, 1995, the plaintiff and the defendant reached an agreement to settle the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. The parties filed a joint petition seeking court approval of the agreement. On April 17, 1995, the petition was heard by Chancellor Morris, sitting by interchange for Judge Whitenton in Hardeman County. After hearing the plaintiff and other statements, Chancellor Morris found the settlement was proper, was understood by the plaintiff, and gave her substantially what she was entitled to under the Workers' Compensation Act. On May 4, 1995, the plaintiff filed a petition to set aside the settlement because "her workers' compensation settlement was procured by fraud, or in the alternative, the settlement did not secure to her in a substantial manner the benefits under the workers' compensation law of the State of Tennessee." 2

State vs. Gary Russell
02C01-9712-CC-00475

Barbara White vs. William H. Lawrence, M.D.
02S01-9701-CV-00007

Memphis Publishing Co. vs. TN. Petroleum Underground
01S01-9710-CH-00232

Harden vs. Danek
03A01-9801-CV-00020

Longworth vs. Nunez
03A01-9709-CV-00388

State vs. Samuel Howard
02C01-9707-CR-00274

James Jackson vs. State
01C01-9609-CR-00387

State vs. Carolyn Pickett
01C01-9710-CC-00472
Trial Court Judge: J. Curtis Smith