Norman Mayes, et ux., v. Claude Yow, et ux., and William Scarboro, et ux.
03A01-9706-CV-00203
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Harold Wimberly

This appeal results from a suit brought by Normal Mayes and his wife, Ruth Mayes, against Claude Yow and his wife, Frances Yow, Willard Scarbro and his wife, Cleo Scarbro, who was added as a party Defendant subsequent to the filing of the original complaint, and Partners & Associates, Inc.

William Michael Anderton vs. Evelyn Adele Morgan Anderton - Concurring
01A01-9701-CH-00013
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Henry Denmark Bell

This is the second appeal concerning a husband’s support obligations following the dissolution of a 23-year marriage. The Chancery Court for Williamson County originally directed the husband to pay $1,731 per month in child support and $5,500 per month in spousal support for five years and then $5,000 per month thereafter. On the first appeal, this court remanded the case to the trial court to revisit the child support and spousal support awards. Even though the trial court concluded that the husband’s income had decreased significantly, it increased the husband’s child support to $2,000 per month and left its original spousal support order unchanged. It also awarded the wife judgments for a sizeable spousal support arrearage and a nominal child support arrearage. On this appeal, the husband again takes issue with the amount of his spousal support and child support obligations and also insists that he is entitled to retroactive relief on his spousal support arrearage and to the lifting of the injunction with regard to his 401k plan. We vacate the child support and spousal support awards and remand them to the trial court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

Holland D. Lane and wife, Cynthia Lane; Bobby Jo Knight and Kay Grimes, v. Willie Lee Barr and wife Dorothy Sue Barr, et al.
01A01-9708-CH-00449
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Allen W. Wallace

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Holland D. Lane, Cynthia Lane, Bobby Joe Knight, and Kay 2 Grimes, appeal the judgment of the trial court dismissing their complaint, finding that appellants lacked standing to bring an action under Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208(a)(2) and that the use of their land by defendants/appellees, Willie and Dorothy Barr, as a tire landfill was a prior non-conforming use. For reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Villages of Brentwood Homeowners' Association, Inc., v. Steven J. Westermann and wife Maria A. Westermann
01A01-9708-CH-00388
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

This appeal involves the enforcement of the restrictive covenants in a Nashville subdivision. After two residents began to construct improvements on their property without first obtaining approval of the subdivision’s architectural committee, the homeowners association filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking injunctive relief to enforce the architectural control provisions in the subdivision’s restrictive covenants. The trial court heard the case without a jury and issued an injunction directing the residents to cease the construction and to restore their property to a condition consistent with the subdivision covenants. The residents have appealed. Since neither party has filed a verbatim transcript of the proceedings or a statement of the evidence, we have reviewed the papers filed in the trial court and have determined that they contain no basis for reversing the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Michael A. Thompson v. Tennessee Board of Paroles, et al.
01A01-9710-CH-00572
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

Michael A. Thompson, a prisoner in the custody of Tennessee Department of Correction has appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his petition for certiorari for judicial review of a decision of the Tennessee Board of Paroles denying parole.

State of Tennessee vs. Eric Florence
02C01-9709-CC-00366
Authoring Judge: Judge Gary R. Wade
Trial Court Judge: Judge Julian P. Guinn

The defendant, Eric M. Florence, entered pleas of guilt in the General Sessions Court of Benton County to possession of marijuana and unlawful possession of alcohol. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail; all but two days were suspended on each count. The sentences were to be concurrently served. The defendant incurred additional charges and his probation was revoked. He served a portion of his general sessions sentence and then moved the court to suspend the remainder. The general sessions court denied the motion. The defendant appealed to the circuit court. That court affirmed the decision of the general sessions court.

State of Tennessee vs. William Waylon Jackson, a.k.a. Bill Jackson
02C01-9707-CC-00267
Authoring Judge: Judge Joe G. Riley
Trial Court Judge: Judge C. Creed McGinley

The defendant, William Waylon Jackson, was convicted by a Decatur County jury of three (3) counts of the sale of marijuana over one-half (½) ounce, Class E felonies. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to concurrent terms of three (3) years for each count and denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment as it violated the mandatory joinder provision of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 8(a). He further argues that the trial court imposed excessive sentences and improperly denied alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sylvia Hudson v. Dave Shorter, Jr.
02A01-9709-CV-00232
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Swearengen

This is an automobile personal injury case. The defendant, David Shorter, Jr., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court in a bench trial awarding plaintiff, Sylvia Hudson, $9,000.00
damages. Shorter’s responsibility for the accident was stipulated, and the trial concerned only
the issue of damages.

State of Tennessee vs. Lemont E. Blair
03C01-9705-CR-00176
Authoring Judge: Judge William M. Barker
Trial Court Judge: Judge Richard R. Baumgartner

The appellant, Lemont E. Blair, appeals as of right the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Greg Swafford,M.D., v. Memphis Individual Practive Association, Southern Health Plan, Inc., The Apple Plan, et al.
02A01-9612-CV-00311
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

This is a libel suit brought by a physician against a health maintenance organization and related health insurance entities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based on the statute of limitations. The lawsuit involves allegedly false information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. In an issue of first impression, we hold that each dissemination of the allegedly defamatory information by the Data Bank gives rise to a separate cause of action. The grant of summary judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.

Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of Estate of Charles D. Hand, Deceased, v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
03A01-9704-CV-00123
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert M. Summitt

This is a suit brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act. It was brought by Plaintiff Barbara J. Hand, Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Charles D. Hand, against his employer, Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and assessed damages in the amount of $3,250,000. The Defendant appeals, raising nine separate issues. Although many do not merit a protracted discussion, others raise substantial questions.

Raymond Mitchell v. Camelot Utility District for Hawkins County, Tennessee
03A01-9709-CH-00394
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Houston M. Goddard
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson

Plaintiff  Raymond Mitchell sues Defendant Camelot Utility District of Hawkins County, Tennessee. He alleges that Camelot, in acquiring a quit claim deed from him conveying two tracts of land, one that contains an artesian well and the other equipment in connection with distribution of water to the adjacent area.  He contends that as a consideration for the quit claim deed, John Valetta, President of Camelot, represented to him that Camelot would provide water taps for two of his lots free of charge and, upon acquisition of an alternate water source, would re-convey the quit claimed lots to him.

Hon. Frank v. Williams, Iii,
03S01-9706-CH-00062
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Billy Joe White,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with T.C.A. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff filed suit in 1989 for work-related injury to his left hand and alleged a related psychiatric disability. By final judgment entered September 5, 1991, the trial court awarded accrued and future medical and psychiatric benefits and permanent partial disability to his hand but found he had failed to prove any permanent psychiatric disability. The judgment was not appealed. On January 2, 1995, plaintiff filed this suit alleging that (1) under T.C.A. _ 5-6-231 he was entitled to modification of the 1991 final judgment due to increased psychiatric impairment, or (2) in the alternative, he was entitled to benefits for a new accidental [psychiatric] injury which occurred on September 2, 1994. The trial court found that plaintiff had failed to prove that he gave timely notice to the employer of a new work-related accident, had failed to prove a new compensable injury, and was barred from reopening the prior case for modification of the award owing to the doctrine of res judicata and the statute of limitations, since the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in that case was never appealed. The plaintiff appeals, insisting that notice of a new injury was provided to the defendant in a letter to the employer from his doctor and by comments made by the plaintiff at work, and that a particular stressful incident at work was a sufficient mental stimulus to constitute a new psychiatric injury. Defendant insists the trial judge correctly decided those issues and correctly held that the denial of permanent psychiatric disability in 1991 was not subject 2

Jimmy Elliott v. Jackie Evans Trucking, Inc.
03S01-9709-CV-00108
Authoring Judge: William H. Inman, Senior Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Carroll L. Ross,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The plaintiff alleged and testified that on April 7, 1995 he jumped from a truck bed approximately four feet to the ground, twisting his left leg in the process. Sharp pain and swelling immediately occurred and he received emergency room treatment. Seven days later Dr. Robert Beasly, an orthopedic surgeon, performed a meniscectomy for a torn medial meniscus, followed by a left patellectomy and valgus osteomy with metal plate emplacement. The defendant responded that the plaintiff's knee problem pre-existed the alleged injury, and that the torn meniscus was of many years duration. The trial court found that the injury occurred as alleged, and awarded benefits based on "4 percent impairment to the lower body; 16 percent to the body as a whole," later amended to a finding of 1 percent leg impairment with benefits calculated on that basis. Both parties appealed; the plaintiff complains of the refusal of the trial judge to find whole body disability with resultant benefits, and the defendant complains that the finding of the trial court is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The judgment is affirmed. Review of the findings of fact made by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the finding, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. T.C.A. _ 5-6- 225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnville, 896 S.W.2d 548, 55 (Tenn. 1995). Although there is evidence that the plaintiff's knee problem pre-existed his alleged injury, and that it was not job-related, there is evidence accredited 2

Patricia Love v. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Div of Worker's Comp, Division of Worker's Compensation - State of Tennessee
02S01-9508-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit A. Lafon

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Patricia Love, plaintiff-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Madison County awarding her permanent total disability benefits to age 65 or until the payment of such benefits reached the maximum total benefit. The trial court apportioned the award 67.5 percent to the Second Injury Fund and 32.5 percent to the employer, American Olean Tile Company, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, defendants-appellees. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(5), affirmed the trial court. Thereafter, the employee filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel’s decision. We granted the motion for review to determine (1) whether it was error not to have awarded benefits payable to age 65 notwithstanding the maximum total benefit, and (2) whether the apportionment between the employer and the Second Injury Fund was correct. After examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we reverse the decision of the lower courts to subject the employee’s award to the maximum total benefit. However, we affirm the apportionment of the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(a).

Patricia Love vs. American Olean Tile Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and Sue Ann Head, Director of the Divison of Workers' Compensation, State of Tennessee - Concurring/Dissenting
02-S-01-9508-CV-00077
Authoring Judge: Justice Janice M. Holder
Trial Court Judge: Judge Whit A. Lafon

I rely on my concurring and dissenting opinion in Bomely v. Mid-American Corp., ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1998). While I agree with the majority's conclusion that awards of permanent and total disability are payable to age sixtyfive, I continue to disagree, as voiced in my Bomely dissent, with the majority's analysis of apportionment which discourages employers from hiring the handicapped and is contrary to the stated legislative purpose behind the Second Injury Fund legislation. An employer's liability should be limited to the first 400 weeks of benefits unless the subsequent injury would have in and of itself caused permanent and total disability in the absence of any prior injuries or disabilities. In such cases, the employer should bear responsibility for the entire award to age sixty-five.

Northwest Airlines, Inc., Federal Express Corp., American Airlines, Inc., Flagship Airlines, and Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization and CSX Transportation et al.
01S01-9702-FD-00030
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.

This Court has accepted from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, certified question of law regarding the effect of the 1996 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. §
467 - 5 - 1512 ( b ) ( 2 ) on the calculation of interest on property tax paymens and refunds. 

James J. Benson v. State of Tennessee
01S01-9704-CC-00089
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald Harris

This case presents for review the appeal by the petitioner, James J. Benson, from the judgment of the Cour tof Criminal Appeals affirming the trila court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial judge because the judge who presided over his criminal trial solicitated a bribe from him. The judment denying the petition is reversed, and the petioner is granted a new trial.

Robert Harold Bomely, Jr. v. Mid-America Corporation, D/B/A Burger King
03S01-9605-CH-00059
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank W. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frederick D. McDonald

In this workers’ compensation action the Second Injury Fund, defendant-appellant, has appealed from a judgment of the Chancery Court of Knox County which found the employee, Robert Bomely, plaintiff-appellee, to be totally and permanently disabled. The award was apportioned 65 percent to the employer, Mid- America Corporation, d/b/a Burger King, defendant-appellee, and 35 percent to the Second Injury Fund under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208(b). The trial court assessed
the employer’s liability based on 400 weeks of benefits and held the Second Injury Fund liable for the remaining 938 weeks of benefits (until the employee reached the age of 651). Thus, the employer’s liability was limited to 65 percent of 400 weeks rather than 65 percent of the total number of weeks to age 65. We transferred this case from the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel to decide whether it was proper to have limited the employer’s liability in this fashion. After carefully examining the record before us and considering the relevant authorities, we conclude that the award should be apportioned between the employer and the Second Injury
Fund based on the total number of weeks to age 65 rather than limiting the employer’s liability to a percentage of 400 weeks. Accordingly, that portion of the trial court’s judgment is reversed. We shall also address (1) whether an award of permanent total disability is subject to the monetary cap imposed by the 400 week maximum total benefit provision of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(a)(6) and (2) whether the apportionment of benefits between the employer and the Second Injury Fund in this case is controlled by subsection (a) or (b) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-208.

Win Myint and wife Patti KI. Myint v. Allstate Insurance Company
01S01-9612-CH-00238
Authoring Judge: Justice Aldolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Christina Norris

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation
of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

Win Myint and Patti Kay Myint, et. ux. v. Allstate Insurance Company
01S01-9612-CH-00238
Authoring Judge: Justice Adolpho A. Birch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Special Chancellor Christina Norris

In this cause, the insuror refused to pay a claim under a policy of insurance. The insured contends that such refusal constitutes an “unfair or deceptive act or practice,” in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101, et seq.1 In contrast, the insuror insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 56- 7-105,2 commonly known as the “bad faith statute,” is the exclusive remedy for the bad faith denial of an insurance claim. Because Title 56, Chapters 7 and 8 of the Tennessee Code comprehensively regulates the insurance industry, the insuror insists that the acts and practices of an insurance company are never subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

Castlewood Inc., v. Anderson County, Tennessee; Patsy Stair, Trustee; Owen K. Richardson, Tax Assessor, City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Tennessee State Board of Equalization
03S01-9705-CH-00053
Authoring Judge: Special Justice Lyle Reid
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor William W. Lantrip

This case presents for review the Court of Appeals' decision that the classificatin as industrial and commercial of two or more condominiums units rented by the owners to others for their use as residences does not violate Article II, Section 28 of the Tennessee Constitution. Nor does the statute violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. That decision is affirmed.

Curtis R. Thrapp vs. Mary Elizabeth Thrapp
E2006-00088-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Herschel P. Franks
Trial Court Judge: W. Dale Young
The parties were divorced in Oregon where the Court ordered the custodial arrangement for the only child of the marriage. The Mother then moved to Colorado, where she filed suit in Colorado in the custody dispute. She then moved to Tennessee, where the Father sued her over the ongoing dispute. The Colorado Court ultimately declined jurisdiction and the Tennessee Court ordered a change of the custody. The mother has appealed. We affirm the change of custody.

Dept. of Children's Svcs. vs. Stanfill
01A01-9710-JV-00616
Trial Court Judge: Andrew J. Shookhoff

Ramsey vs. Burkhalter & Ryan
01A01-9707-CH-00318
Trial Court Judge: Ellen Hobbs Lyle