Tina Rogers Et Al. v. Adventure House LLC Et Al.
This negligence action arose from approximately 102 events of food poisoning or illness purportedly related to numerous patrons (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) who dined at or visited Adventure House, LLC d/b/a River Drifters Restaurant and River Drifters Adventure Center (“the Restaurant”), located on real property owned by Robert L. Newman (“the Premises”). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Restaurant; Mr. Newman; and Charles and Renee Eich, the owners of the Restaurant. Upon Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the action as a class action, the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”) denied Plaintiffs’ motion upon a determination that Plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to prove the commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation elements required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.01. The trial court further determined that if those elements were met, the class could maintain its certification pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 23.02(1)(b). However, based on its determination that the class did not satisfy the threshold certification requirements under Rule 23.01, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify the litigation as a class action. Plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Rukia B. Et Al.
Nathan B. (“Father”) and Kendra B. (“Stepmother”) appeal the judgment of the Campbell County Circuit Court (the “Trial Court”) denying their petition for termination of the parental rights of Hannah B. (“Mother”), as to Mother’s two biological children. Because the Trial Court’s final order does not contain sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the best interests of the children, this Court is unable to engage in meaningful appellate review, and the judgment of the Trial Court is vacated and remanded. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
Friendship Water Co. v. City of Friendship, Tennessee
Subsequent to the grant of partial summary judgment in the trial court, we granted an application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Having reflected upon the specific issue for which our Rule 9 order granted review, we are of the opinion that the present appeal was improvidently granted as framed. In addition, we observe that the trial court’s partial summary judgment order fails to clearly articulate the legal grounds upon which that order is based. Given our conclusion that the interlocutory appeal was improvidently granted, we dismiss the appeal. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. The Blumberg Trust Et Al.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of its Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 24 motion to intervene. Because the trial court’s order does not state the basis for its denial of the motion, we cannot review the ultimate decision. Vacated and remanded. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Wolf Organization, Inc. v. TNG Contractors, LLC
This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s enrollment of Appellee’s Pennsylvania judgment. In enrolling the foreign judgment, the trial court omitted the 1.5% interest awarded by the Pennsylvania court and entered judgment only for the principal amount of the foreign judgment. In seeking to enforce its judgment, Appellee filed a bank levy against Appellant, wherein Appellee included the 1.5% interest. Because neither party raised an issue in the first appeal concerning whether the trial court’s omission of the interest was error, the question is waived, and Appellee is entitled to only post-judgment interest under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-14-121(a). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to quash Appellee’s bank levy in the amount of $40,482.03. The case is remanded for calculation of post-judgment interest consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Raylan W.
After Mother failed to timely appeal the final order terminating her parental rights, she sought relief pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the motion, and Mother timely appealed from that order. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Mother’s Rule 60.02 motion, we proceed to consider the correctness of the trial court’s final order terminating Mother’s parental rights. But we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest. We therefore affirm the |
White | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ruben Walton
A Shelby County jury found the defendant, Ruben Walton, guilty of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, two evidentiary rulings of the trial court regarding threatening statements the defendant made prior to the murder, and his sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cordell Ash v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Cordell Ash, of especially aggravated robbery, attempted first-degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years in confinement. In this delayed appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the victim made a reference to the defendant’s alleged gang activity. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Thompson
Defendant, Zachary Thompson, was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on self-defense and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teal Properties, Inc. v. C&H Commercial Contractors, Inc.
Relief under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(5) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Outcomes, specifically judgments, occasioned by a party’s own inaction or lack of attention are not extraordinary. And a court does not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60.02(5) motion when a judgment results from such circumstances. So we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Horizon Trades, Inc. v. Aubrey Givens, Et Al.
The defendant in a malicious prosecution action moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He contended that the prior suit that engendered the malicious prosecution action was not terminated on its merits. The plaintiff responded that the prior suit was dismissed on multiple grounds and that one of those grounds was on the merits. The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to dismiss. We do as well and affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Nevaeh B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court found the sole ground raised by the Department for termination against the child’s father of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child or assume financial responsibility pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) had been established. The court further found that the termination of father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Father filed a timely appeal. On appeal, we vacate the trial court’s order terminating father’s parental rights due to the court’s failure to consider all required elements of the statutory ground for termination. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Laurel Martin Griffin v. Kevin Michael Griffin
After seventeen years of marriage, a wife filed a complaint for divorce. The husband answered and filed a counter-complaint for divorce. The trial court granted the wife a divorce, named her primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, classified and divided the marital estate, ordered the husband to pay the wife $1,941 per month in child support, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $6,000 per month. The husband appealed. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Wife as the primary residential parent and the division of the marital estate as modified. We vacate the award of child support and the amount of alimony and remand for recalculation. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Demetrice A. Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demetrice A. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2017 |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jim Daniel Story, Jr. v. Heidi Rebekah Nussbaumer-Story
A husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido to his wife for a period of eight years. Having examined the record and the trial court’s analysis of the statutory factors, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision. We further award the wife her reasonable attorney fees on appeal |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trin Villa Suttles, III
The defendant, Trin Villa Suttles, appeals his 2019 Hamilton County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded conviction of leaving the scene of an accident, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve his sentence of 11 months and 29 days in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Surber v. Mountain States Health Alliance d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center - Concurring
I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County. I write separately to explain what I think is an additional crucial difference in this case from Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. 2010). In addition to what is stated in this Court’s Opinion, I believe what distinguishes this case from Barkes is the respective plaintiff’s proof as to the defendant hospital’s duty of reasonable care to its patients and the applicable standard of care relative to that hospital’s duty. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Blount Memorial Hospital v. Eric Glasgow
This appeal arises from a hospital’s action against a patient to recover payment for medical services. After a bench trial, the court determined there was not an enforceable contract between the parties, but the hospital was entitled to recover the value of its services under a quantum meruit theory and ruled that the charges billed to the patient represented the actual value of the hospital’s services. The court based its determination on the testimony of the hospital’s witness that, because the rates that a hospital could charge were set by Medicare, the amount charged to the patient was comparable to what other hospitals would charge for the same or similar services. The patient appeals and asks this court to consider whether the hospital proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount it charged for medical services represented the actual value of those services. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Knapp v. Jason Boykins
This appeal involves the issuance of an order of protection based on allegations of stalking. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Surber v. Mountain States Health Alliance d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center
This is a medical malpractice action1 in which the plaintiff filed suit against the hospital for treatment he received following an eye injury, raising claims of direct and vicarious liability. The case proceeded to a jury trial, at which the court granted a directed verdict on the claim of direct liability at the close of the plaintiff’s proof. The plaintiff filed this appeal, claiming the trial court erred in limiting his expert witness testimony. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Jackson D.
Ricky D. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Jackson D. (“the Child”). In July 2018, Heather M. (“Mother”) and her husband, Jason M. (“Stepfather”), filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child in the Bradley County Chancery Court (“Trial Court”). Following a trial, the Trial Court found that Mother and Stepfather had proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of Father’s ten-year sentence entered when the Child was younger than eight years old and that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jose Sifuentes, D/B/A Jose's Electric v. D.E.C., LLC
A general contractor hired a subcontractor to install wiring and machinery for a bowling alley. The subcontractor completed the work, but the general contractor failed to pay the subcontractor’s last five invoices. The subcontractor sued the general contractor for breach of contract, quantum meruit, promissory estoppel, and promissory fraud. The general contractor moved to dismiss, asserting that the subcontractor was unlicensed. The trial court granted the motion based on the subcontractor’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 62-6-103(b) (2019). Applying the standard of review applicable to a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the quantum meruit claim based upon the statute. We affirm in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Alex Greer
The Defendant, James Alex Greer, was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, by a Putnam County Criminal Court jury. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree premeditated murder), 39-17-1324 (2014) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony). The trial court imposed sentences of eighteen years and six years, respectively, and ordered mandatory consecutive sentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(e)(1), for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s mid-trial request to withdraw based upon the Defendant’s attempt to waive the right to counsel and the Defendant’s demand to proceed pro se. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lavar R. Jernigan v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, LaVar R. Jernigan, appeals the order of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief from his convictions for six counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. See State v. LaVar Jernigan, No. M2016-00507-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1019513 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2017). The Petitioner argues the State failed to disclose the existence of a “notebook” compilation containing over 6000 text messages between the victim and the Petitioner, in violation of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). He additionally argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) advise the Petitioner of the existence of the notebook thereby resulting in the Petitioner’s rejection of a four-year offer by the State to settle the case; (2) object to the admission of the “notebook” at trial; and (3) prepare and preserve the record in his direct appeal. Upon our review, we vacate the Petitioner’s convictions, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, and remand this matter for a new trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andy F. Nunez
Andy F. Nunez, Defendant, and two co-defendants, Joseph Santillan and Daniela Cruz, were indicted for first degree murder, felony murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment after a Nashville visitor was shot and killed while walking with his friend in September of 2016. Prior to trial, the State entered into a use immunity agreement with co-defendant, Ms. Cruz. Her case was severed from Defendant’s and Mr. Santillan’s case and she ultimately testified for the State. Prior to trial, counsel for Defendant subpoenaed the ten most recent use immunity agreements in first degree murder cases where a testifying co-defendant’s indictment was severed and the case proceeded to final judgment. The State filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The trial court granted the motion. The case proceeded to trial. Based partly on co-defendant Cruz’s testimony, Defendant was convicted as charged. He received an effective sentence of life plus five years. After trial, Ms. Cruz entered into a plea agreement to a reduced charge. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to quash the subpoena. After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |