Lamonte Pearson v. Day International, Inc, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company 02S01-9503-CV-00023
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. J. Steven Stafford, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue for review is the trial court's determination that an amended complaint filed against the Second Injury Fund was barred by the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. On January 26, 1989, Lamonte Pearson ("Mr. Pearson") injured his back in an automobile accident that was not work related. Mr. Pearson's lawsuit was apparently unsuccessful at trial and no damages were awarded. On March 4, 1991, he again injured his back in the course of his employment with Day International, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and was treated by the same physician. A complaint for worker's compensation benefits was timely filed on April 15, 1991. The complaint alleged that Mr. Pearson "suffered, and will continue to suffer, temporary total, temporary partial and possibly permanent total disability as a result of this work related injury." His prayer for relief requested an award of "such further temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial, or permanent total disability and medical expenses to which this Court finds him entitled . . ." A motion to amend the complaint was filed on April 24, 1992, and leave to amend was granted on the same date. An amended complaint adding the Second Injury Fund was filed on May 29, 1992, more than one (1) year after the work related injury. The amended complaint further alleges that Mr. Pearson had previously sustained a permanent physical disability capable of supporting a workers' compensation award if it had arisen out of and in the course of employment and that he had become permanently and totally disabled through the subsequent work related injury. The Second Injury Fund asserted the bar of the statute of limitations. During his deposition in this case, Mr. Pearson's treating physician found him to have a permanent partial disability of 9% to the body as a whole as a result of the non-work related incident and 6% to the body as a whole as a result of the work related incident, or a 12% combined impairment rating under the AMA Guidelines. The trial court found Mr. Pearson to be 1% disabled and apportioned 45% of the award to Colonial and 55% to the Second Injury Fund; the court ruled that recovery against the Second 2
Dyer
Workers Compensation Panel
Lamonte Pearson v. Day International, Inc, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and Reliance Insurance Company 02S01-9503-CV-00023
Authoring Judge: Janice M. Holder, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. J. Steven Stafford, Judge
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Worker's Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 5-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The sole issue for review is the trial court's determination that an amended complaint filed against the Second Injury Fund was barred by the statute of limitations. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. On January 26, 1989, Lamonte Pearson ("Mr. Pearson") injured his back in an automobile accident that was not work related. Mr. Pearson's lawsuit was apparently unsuccessful at trial and no damages were awarded. On March 4, 1991, he again injured his back in the course of his employment with Day International, d/b/a Colonial Rubber Works, Inc. and was treated by the same physician. A complaint for worker's compensation benefits was timely filed on April 15, 1991. The complaint alleged that Mr. Pearson "suffered, and will continue to suffer, temporary total, temporary partial and possibly permanent total disability as a result of this work related injury." His prayer for relief requested an award of "such further temporary total, temporary partial, permanent partial, or permanent total disability and medical expenses to which this Court finds him entitled . . ." A motion to amend the complaint was filed on April 24, 1992, and leave to amend was granted on the same date. An amended complaint adding the Second Injury Fund was filed on May 29, 1992, more than one (1) year after the work related injury. The amended complaint further alleges that Mr. Pearson had previously sustained a permanent physical disability capable of supporting a workers' compensation award if it had arisen out of and in the course of employment and that he had become permanently and totally disabled through the subsequent work related injury. The Second Injury Fund asserted the bar of the statute of limitations. During his deposition in this case, Mr. Pearson's treating physician found him to have a permanent partial disability of 9% to the body as a whole as a result of the non-work related incident and 6% to the body as a whole as a result of the work related incident, or a 12% combined impairment rating under the AMA Guidelines. The trial court found Mr. Pearson to be 1% disabled and apportioned 45% of the award to Colonial and 55% to the Second Injury Fund; the court ruled that recovery against the Second 2
These cases are before the Court upon a Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief filed by Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General for the Twentieth Judicial District, and Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear. The Court having considered these matters, it is ORDERED: 1. The Motion for Leave to File an Amicus Curiae Brief is DENIED. 2. Appellant John Jay Hooker's Supplemental Petition to Rehear is DENIED.
Billy Clevinger v. Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc. 03S01-9508-CV-00092
Authoring Judge: Penny J. White, Justice
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K. Wexler
This workers' compensation appeal from the Hawkins County Circuit Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e) (3) (1995 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. The plaintiff, Billy Clevinger ("employee"), is a resident of Hawkins County, Tennessee. The defendant, Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc., ("employer"), is a trucking company with its principal place of business in Indiana. The employee, who was hired in Tennessee, worked for the employer as truck driver. On December 1, 1993, the employee was driving one of the employer's trucks from Kentucky to Arkansas. While traveling through Tennessee on the way to Arkansas, he was involved in a single vehicle accident. The employee was hospitalized for a short time due to injuries sustained in the accident. He then returned to his home in Hawkins County. On December 28, 1993, the employee signed a document sent to him by the employer's claim adjustor entitled "Agreement to Compensation of Employee and Employer." The form contained the heading "Indiana Workers' Compensation Board, . . . Indianapolis, Indiana." The document included information concerning the date of injury, the type of injury (bruised left arm and strain of lower back), the place of injury, the employee's average weekly wage, and the amount the employee would be receiving as temporary total disability. The form also contained the declaration that " [w]e (employee and employer) have reached an agreement in regards to compensation for the injury sustained by said employee . . . ." The form further indicated that the "terms of the agreement . . . shall be payable . . . until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Indiana Workers' Compensation/Occupational Diseases Acts." The employee 2
Hawkins
Workers Compensation Panel
Billy Clevinger v. Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc. 03S01-9508-CV-00092
Authoring Judge: Penny J. White, Justice
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Ben K.
This workers' compensation appeal from the Hawkins County Circuit Court has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 5-6-225(e) (3) (1995 Supp.) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. I. The plaintiff, Billy Clevinger ("employee"), is a resident of Hawkins County, Tennessee. The defendant, Burlington Motor Carriers, Inc., ("employer"), is a trucking company with its principal place of business in Indiana. The employee, who was hired in Tennessee, worked for the employer as truck driver. On December 1, 1993, the employee was driving one of the employer's trucks from Kentucky to Arkansas. While traveling through Tennessee on the way to Arkansas, he was involved in a single vehicle accident. The employee was hospitalized for a short time due to injuries sustained in the accident. He then returned to his home in Hawkins County. On December 28, 1993, the employee signed a document sent to him by the employer's claim adjustor entitled "Agreement to Compensation of Employee and Employer." The form contained the heading "Indiana Workers' Compensation Board, . . . Indianapolis, Indiana." The document included information concerning the date of injury, the type of injury (bruised left arm and strain of lower back), the place of injury, the employee's average weekly wage, and the amount the employee would be receiving as temporary total disability. The form also contained the declaration that " [w]e (employee and employer) have reached an agreement in regards to compensation for the injury sustained by said employee . . . ." The form further indicated that the "terms of the agreement . . . shall be payable . . . until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Indiana Workers' Compensation/Occupational Diseases Acts." The employee 2
Hawkins
Workers Compensation Panel
William Cantrell vs. DeKalb County, et al M1998-00964-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: John J. Maddux
This appeal involves two deputy sheriffs' response to a church's complaint that one of its members was disrupting a church assembly. After the deputy sheriffs suggested that he leave the premises, the church member filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for DeKalb County alleging that the two deputies had unlawfully detained him and had interfered with his right to practice his religion. The law enforcement officers, asserting qualified immunity, moved for a summary judgment. The trial court denied their motion. We have determined that the trial court erred because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably and did not violate any of the church members' clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, we vacate the order denying the summary judgment and remand the case with directions that it be dismissed.
