Terrell K. Raley, Et Al. v. Cees Brinkman, Et Al.
This appeal arises from a business dispute between the two members of a Tennessee limited liability company, 4 Points Hospitality, LLC (“4 Points”), each owning a 50% interest. The plaintiff-member, Terrell K. Raley (“Raley”), commenced this action asserting, individually and on behalf of the LLC, inter alia, that the defendant-member, Cees Brinkman (“Brinkman”), breached the operating agreement by failing to make a $175,000 capital contribution. Brinkman asserted counter claims, individually and on behalf of the LLC, for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Raley misappropriated funds for his personal benefit and that he withheld a large portion of Brinkman’s distributions and salary. Brinkman also claimed that Raley was liable for conversion and punitive damages. Brinkman sought to terminate Raley’s membership interest because he willfully and persistently breached his fiduciary duty, and because it was no longer reasonably practicable for the two men to continue operating the business. Brinkman also claimed he was entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-249-804 and -805, and the operating agreement. Upon Raley’s pre-trial motion, the trial court summarily dismissed Brinkman’s claim for attorneys’ fees under the operating agreement, holding that the attorneys’ fees provision only pertained to disputes submitted to arbitration. Following a lengthy bench trial, the court ruled that (1) Brinkman breached the operating agreement by failing to make a $175,000 capital contribution; (2) Raley was liable for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conversion for underpaying Brinkman’s distributions and salary and for using 4 Points’ funds to satisfy unrelated, personal expenses; (3) Raley was not liable for punitive damages because his conduct was not egregious; and (4) Brinkman was not entitled to attorneys’ fees under §§ 48-249-804 and -805. The court also terminated Raley’s membership interest in 4 Points in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-249-503(a)(6)(B) and (C), finding that Raley’s wrongful conduct adversely and materially affected the business, and it was no longer reasonably practicable for the members to continue operating the business together. Brinkman filed a motion to alter or amend the court’s order, and the court denied his motion in all respects but one, ruling, in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-805, that Brinkman was entitled to equitable relief in the form of attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the court revised its order to allow half of the $240,275.59 Raley owed 4 Points as reimbursement for personal expenses to be paid to Brinkman, individually. Brinkman then filed notice that 4 Points intended to purchase Raley’s membership interest in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-249-505 and -506, which necessitated an evidentiary hearing to determine the “fair value” of Raley’s interest. In preparation for the hearing, Brinkman’s expert prepared a valuation report applying shareholder-level discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability and adjusting 4 Points’ income for the corporate income tax. Raley responded by filing a motion in limine to determine the meaning and components of “fair value” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-506(3), arguing that any testimony or other evidence relating to discounts for lack of control and marketability and the corporate income tax should be excluded at the evidentiary hearing. In response, Brinkman submitted the affidavit of his valuation expert, explaining the expert’s valuation methodology and the reasons for applying a corporate income tax rate. The court ruled that because the company, rather than a third-party, was purchasing the membership interest, the fact that the interest was non-controlling was irrelevant to its fair value. The court also excluded evidence and testimony on discounts for lack of marketability. As for the applicability of the corporate income tax, the court ruled that “no entity level tax should be applied in the valuation analysis for a non-controlling interest in an electing S corporation, absent a compelling demonstration that independent third parties dealing at arms-length would do so as part of a purchase price negotiation.” Following the evidentiary hearing, the court determined that the fair value of 4 Points was $4,774,278.18, and that Raley’s 50% interest was $2,387,139.09. Brinkman timely filed this appeal contending the trial court erred in determining that (1) Brinkman breached the operating agreement by failing to make a capital contribution; (2) Raley was not liable for punitive damages; and (3) Brinkman was not entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to the operating agreement and/or §§ 48-249-804 and -805. As for the trial court’s valuation of Raley’s membership interest, Brinkman contends the trial court erred in (1) disallowing discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability and (2) determining that tax-affecting did not constitute relevant evidence of the fair value of Raley’s membership interest in 4 Points. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in every respect but one. We have determined that the trial court erred by failing to consider evidence relative to tax-affecting when determining the fair value of Raley’s membership interest, because Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-506 provides that relevant evidence of fair value includes the “recommendations of any of the appraisers of the parties to the proceeding.” Brinkman’s valuation expert stated in his affidavit that the application of a 38% tax rate “comports with generally accepted valuation standards and methods” and reasoned that, there is a risk of inaccurate valuation when the components of the capitalization rate are based on after-tax values, and no tax-affecting is applied to the income of the company. Therefore, we vacate the judgment valuing Raley’s interest and remand for the trial court to consider evidence relative to tax-affecting in determining the fair value of Raley’s membership interest and to enter judgment accordingly. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Allison Muse v. Robert Jolley, Jr.
In this divorce proceeding, the wife appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate and the amount of income set for the husband in determining his child support obligation. We find no reversible error in the court’s division of the marital assets and debts and the amount of Husband’s monthly income it set for the purpose of calculating child support; accordingly, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Womac
A McMinn County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricky Lee Womac, of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of reckless endangerment. In a separate proceeding, the Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder and that his trial counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Womac - concurring and dissenting
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction in Count Two of attempted first degree murder of Deputy Presswood. In my view, the evidence does not show that the Defendant took a substantial step toward killing Deputy Presswood. See T.C.A. § 39-12-101(a)(3) (2018) (criminal attempt). Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that while standing in a Walmart checkout aisle, the Defendant looked over his left shoulder and saw Deputies Presswood and Redrup, who were in uniform, approaching him. Deputy Redrup, who was wearing a body camera, stepped to the Defendant’s right side and advised him that he was being arrested, and Deputy Presswood stood behind the Defendant. After some discussion with Deputy Redrup about the Defendant’s desire to purchase a drink, the Defendant put money that was in his hand into his pocket, produced a loaded gun with his left hand, and pointed the gun at Deputy Redrup. By the time the Defendant pointed the gun at Deputy Redrup, the hammer was cocked, and the Defendant had his finger on the trigger. The struggle for the gun and to take the Defendant into custody ensued, during which Deputy Redrup forced the web of his left hand into the gun’s breach in order to thwart any attempt by the Defendant to pull the trigger and fire the gun. The gun’s hammer was released, catching and injuring Deputy Redrup’s hand but preventing the gun from discharging. During the struggle, Deputy Redrup was the first officer to engage with the Defendant, who had turned to his right toward Deputy Redrup during the initial struggle for the gun. Deputy Presswood first attempted to assist in restraining and disarming the Defendant while standing behind Deputy Redrup and later moved to the Defendant’s side. The Defendant fought against the deputies’ efforts to restrain him and held onto the gun while Deputy Redrup kept his hand in the gun’s breach until a third deputy, who was in civilian clothing, joined the struggle and struck the Defendant. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jerome Perkins v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
The Petitioner, Jerome Perkins, appeals the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his conviction of possession of one-half gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver and resulting fifteen-year sentence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Trousdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Garcia v. Shelby County Sheriff's Office
A sheriff’s office demoted an employee for failing to follow official policies and procedures during an arrest. The employee appealed to the civil service merit board. After a hearing, the board found the employee had neglected his duty as the ranking officer at the scene of the arrest. But the board modified the disciplinary action to a 30-day suspension and ordered the employee’s reinstatement to his former rank. The employee then sought judicial review. The chancery court determined that the board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and modified the disciplinary sanction. We conclude that the board’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious. So we reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Donnell Golden, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Larry Donnell Golden, Jr., appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief from his 2016 convictions for second degree murder and reckless endangerment. Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Powell
The defendant, Edward Powell, appeals his Dyer County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of cocaine, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roosevelt Bigbee, Jr. v. Jonathan Lebo, Warden
The Petitioner, Roosevelt Bigbee, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mary Ann Scates
A Henderson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Mary Ann Scates, with alternating counts of driving under the influence and driving under the influence (second offense) (counts 1 and 2); following another vehicle too closely and speeding (counts 3 and 4); reckless aggravated assault by use of an automobile as a deadly weapon causing Faith Coleman, Cassandra Coleman, and Alexandria Springer to fear and suffer bodily injury (counts 5, 6, and 7); and vehicular assault of Grace Coleman by reckless operation of an automobile as a result of intoxication (count 8). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401; 55-8-124; 55-8-152; 39-13-102; 39-13-106. The Defendant entered an open guilty plea to the offenses as charged, with the trial court to determine sentencing. After a hearing, the trial court imposed a four-year consecutive term of imprisonment for the reckless aggravated assault in count 5 and the vehicular assault by intoxication in count 8, for an effective sentence of eight years’ confinement. The remaining counts were to be served concurrently. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamie Thomas
Defendant, Jamie Thomas, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 as amended to correct illegal sentences. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that relief was not available because his illegal sentence as to Case Nos. 06-09288 and 06-08706 had expired and thus was not subject to correction under Rule 36.1. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to Case Nos. 06-09288 and 06-08706, but as to allegations that concurrent sentencing in Case Nos. 06-02344 and 06-04638, which the trial court did not address, the amended motion is remanded to the trial court for disposition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Yancey Lee Williams, II
The Defendant, Yancey Lee Williams II, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation; (2) the trial court erred by finding that he was engaged in unlawful activity and thereby omitting the “no duty to retreat” language from the self-defense instruction; (3) the prosecutor made improper and inflammatory comments regarding religion and race during closing arguments; and (4) plain error occurred when the State failed to provide pretrial documentation of a witness’s statement to law enforcement despite an order being in place directing such disclosure. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Josiah Nixon
The Defendant, Josiah Nixon, was convicted by a Houston County Circuit Court jury of sale of methamphetamine, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-434 (2018). He received a sentence of six years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence does not support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in allowing a “still-frame” image from a video recording into evidence, and (3) the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant to six years’ confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Houston | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Steven Treuchet
The Defendant, Mark Steven Treuchet, was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to seventeen years, six months’ incarceration. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the court erred by excluding police testimony regarding the victim’s state of mind; (4) the court erred by admitting a portion of the Defendant’s police statement referring to a prior bad act; and (5) the court erred by giving a jury instruction on transferred intent and by declining to give jury instructions on private arrest and defense of a business. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re K.L.E. Et Al.
A mother and her husband petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the father of two of the mother’s children. The mother and father of the children were married when the children were born. The father was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment when the children were six months and two years old. The mother subsequently divorced the father and married another man who now is interested in adopting the two children. The trial court terminated the father’s rights, and the father appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating the father’s rights. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Candice Mosby v. Fayette County Board of Education, et al.
This case involves a challenge to a decision to non-renew the employment of a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff brought suit challenging her non-renewal on the basis that she did not receive six required observations per school year. In her complaint, the plaintiff challenged the non-renewal decision itself, stating it was procedurally flawed, and alleged the director improperly delegated the decision. After the plaintiff presented her proof at trial, the defendants moved for an involuntary dismissal. The trial court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case and remand. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
Mitzi Sue Garner v. Robert Allen Garner
This appeal arises from a long-running divorce case. In 2009, Mitzi Sue Garner (“Wife”) sued Robert Allen Garner (“Husband”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). The matter was tried in 2010. An appeal to this Court was dismissed in 2012 for lack of a final order. In 2019, a final order at last was entered. Husband appeals. Husband raises several issues, including whether the Trial Court erred in its valuation of certain marital property, in determining his income for purposes of child support and temporary alimony, as well as in granting Wife an award of transitional alimony to secure certain marital debts assigned to Husband. We discern no reversible error. However, we modify the Trial Court’s characterization of Husband’s marital debt obligations from transitional alimony to alimony in solido. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court as modified. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carroll Dean Yocum
Carroll Dean Yocum (“Defendant”) appeals the trial court’s full revocation of his probationary sentence and the imposition of his sentence in confinement. Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion and argues his probation should be reinstated. Following a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. John Pritchard
The City of Memphis appeals the dismissal of a parking ticket issued by the staff of the Downtown Memphis Commission. The City argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment against it based on a wrongful interpretation of the authority delegated by city ordinances. Additionally, The City argues that genuine issues of material fact remained that prevented summary judgment and contends that the circuit court erred in not granting a motion to alter or amend its order. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Jace England v. Amber Leigh Lowry
A husband and wife were divorced after three years of marriage. The trial court divided the marital assets and debts and designated the husband as the primary residential parent. The wife appeals the court’s finding of transmutation and designation of the husband as the primary residential parent, and both parties challenge aspects of the division of property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Amanda Faye Layne
Defendant, Amanda Faye Layne, was convicted by a jury of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the arresting officer regarding a pretrial statement, that the State committed improper prosecutorial argument in closing argument, and cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert Rodgers v. Rent-A-Center East Inc. ET AL.
Employee was injured in an automobile accident in the course and scope of his employment with Employer. The authorized treating physician and an authorized second opinion physician concluded that Employee suffered zero percent (0%) permanent impairment from his injury and released Employee to return to work. Employee did not successfully return to work and sought private medical treatment, including an independent medical examination (“IME”). The Employee’s IME physician assigned a seven percent (7%) permanent impairment rating. Employer then sought an independent medical evaluation from a physician chosen from the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”). The MIR physician assigned a two percent (2%) permanent impairment rating. The trial court adopted the seven percent (7%) permanent impairment rating and awarded permanent partial disability benefits based on a multiplier of three, having determined Employee failed to make a meaningful return to work, for an award of 21% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court further awarded 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits and certain discretionary costs. Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in adopting the rating of Employee’s IME physician rather than the MIR physician’s rating; in determining Employee did not make a meaningful return to work; in awarding extended temporary total disability benefits; and in awarding Employee his discretionary costs. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Following our review of the trial court’s judgment and the record on appeal, we modify in part, affirm in part, and reverse in part. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Campbell
The State appeals as of right from the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment against the Defendant, Gary Campbell. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(c)(1); State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 721 (Tenn. 2008). Campbell was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1003. Campbell filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the search warrant affidavit failed to establish probable cause for the search of his residence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed Campbell’s indictment. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting the suppression motion and in dismissing the indictment because (1) the affidavit in support of the search warrant for Campbell’s property was sufficient to establish probable cause and (2) exigent circumstances supported the search. After carefully reviewing the record and the applicable law, we reverse the order of the trial court granting the motion to suppress, vacate the order dismissing the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Ward
A jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Ward, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit aggravated burglary, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence regarding identity was insufficient to support the conclusion that he was the culprit, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s show-up identification, and that the trial court erred in denying relief when the State produced discovery mid-trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William A. Reese, Jr. v. Dominick Amari
This is an action to revive a judgment originally entered in 1987; the judgment debtor moved to have the judgment set aside, contending that the judgment was void. The trial court denied the motion and renewed the judgment; the judgment debtor appeals. Upon our review, we conclude that the record shows that the debtor answered the complaint but failed to appear at the trial, which proceeded in his absence and led to the judgment; consequently, the judgment was valid. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside the judgment. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals |