Daniel B. Taylor v. Donal Campbell, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a prisoner and the Department of Correction regarding the prisoner's request for access to the Department's rules governing prisoner sentence credits. The Department responded by informing the prisoner that its policies governing prisoner sentence reduction credits could be found in the prison law library. Thereafter, the prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County complaining that he had been wrongfully denied access to public records. The Commissioner of Correction moved to dismiss the complaint. Alternatively, the Commissioner sought a summary judgment and supported his motion with affidavits asserting that the prisoner had already received all the information he sought. Based on these affidavits, the trial court granted the Commissioner's summary judgment motion and dismissed the prisoner's complaint. We have determined that the Commissioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, reverse the summary dismissal of the prisoner's complaint. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Alton F. Dixon v. Nike, Inc.
Plaintiff, Alton F. Dixon, appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendant, Nike, Inc. Nike is a manufacturer of sporting goods, footwear, and apparel, and Dixon was an at-will employee of Nike. Nike encourages its employees to actively participate in improving their work environment and in implementing ideas for new products on the market 2 through a program called “I Got It.” The program invites Nike’s employees to submit ideas that “eliminate waste, improve the way we work, increase productivity, prevent accidents, save time, money, or energy.” Employees can also submit ideas for new products or inventions. In a weekly bulletin for employees, Nike stated, “If what you are suggesting is an idea for a new product or invention, to protect you and NIKE, a letter of understanding will be sent for your signature stating, in essence, that NIKE will not use your product idea until a written contract is negotiated and signed.” |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Johnny L. Butler, v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, who is serving a sentence for a federal court conviction, has filed two petitions attacking prior state convictions which were used to enhance the sentence for the federal conviction. These two petitions, called petitions for the writ of coram nobis or for habeas corpus, were dismissed by the trial court without a hearing on the basis that they were actually petitions for post-conviction relief and barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Gant v. Kenneth Broadway, County Executive and Chmn of the Decatur County Commission, et al.
Petitioner, James Edward Gant, appeals the judgment of the chancery court denying his application for a beer permit. |
Decatur | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gussie Willis Vann - Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s resolution of every issue in this case but one: the effect of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on second-degree murder. The majority concludes that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the offense of second-degree murder is not error because the evidence in the record does not support that offense. Because I find the evidence can indeed support a conviction of seconddegree murder, I respectfully dissent. |
McMinn | Supreme Court | |
Robert L. Delaney v. Brook Thompson, et al.
This Court has been appointed by the Governor to decide the case of Delaney v. Thompson, et al., in which the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the uniquely statutory merit selection system for appellate judges called the Tennessee Plan. Rather than contend with the constitutional issues, the majority, deciding this case by statutory construction, utilizes a construction which reflects neither the meaning of the statute nor the positions of the parties. In doing so, the majority opinion neither clarifies issues of importance to the electorate and judiciary, nor discourages future litigation on the same issues. |
Supreme Court | ||
April Wallace, Vickie Guinn, et al., v. National Bank of Commerce, et al.
This case presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's award of summary judgment for the defendants. The trial court found that the |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Deborah Lorraine Brooks v. Rickey Lamar Brooks - Dissenting
It is apparent that this Court has based its finding that Mr. Brooks is willfully and voluntarily underemployed simply on the fact that he, at one time, was more lucratively employed. Simply because a parent is not as lucratively employed as during the marriage, or for a time thereafter, no automatic inference that he or she is willfully and voluntarily underemployed should be drawn. We must remain cognizant of a parent’s right as a citizen to the pursuit of happiness and to the freedom to make reasonable employment decisions, while at the same time heeding the duty to support. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Dorothy Owens, as Conservator of Mary Francis King, et al. v. National Health Corporation, et al.
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Rutherford | Supreme Court | |
Cybill Shepherd v. Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc.
The plaintiff brought suit against a manufacturer of windows and doors for allegedly supplying defective products which allowed substantial leaks into her dwelling and caused rotting because of excessive moisture. Following a nonjury trial, the trial court denied the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act but awarded judgment to the plaintiff on her claim that the defendant supplied defective doors and windows. Based upon our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act claim. Finding that the plaintiff did not provide notice to the defendant of its allegedly defective product within the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse the award of damages to the plaintiff and dismiss her complaint. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Knight vs. Knight
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Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
David John Erdly v. Janene Marie Erdly - Concurring
The plaintiff, David John Erdly, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing his suit for divorce, dividing the marital estate, awarding plaintiff child custody and support and awarding the defendant, Janene Marie Erdly, alimony for the remainder of her life. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Totty v. The Tennessee Department of Correction and the State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to enforce a plea bargain agreement. The prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in theCircuit Court for Davidson County after the Department of Correction refused to release him in accordance with his understanding of the agreement. The trial court granted the department’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition because it fails to state a claim upon which relief pursuant to a common-law writ of certiorari can be granted.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
01C01-9508-CC-00257
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Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lesa Johnson v. South Central Human Resource Agency, Roy Tipps, Executive Director, and John Ed Underwood, Jr., Deputy Director
This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Tamara E. Lowe, Administrator of the Estate of Terry Allen Lowe, Deceased, v. Gransville Simpson, and wife, Judy Simpson
This is a wrongful death action. On April 28, 1998, Cynthia Low Armes ("Sister"), the sister of the late Terry Allen Lowe ("decedent"), instituted this action against Granville Simpson ("Granville") and his wife, Judy Simpson ("Judy"), (collectively, "the Simpsons"), alleging that the Simpsons were negligent in allowing three men, including Granville, to go armed on the Simpson's premises on December 10, 1995, and that their negligence directly contributed to the shooting death of the decedent. The trial court granted the Simpsons summary judgment on the ground that the complain was not filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Sister appeals, raising the following issue for our consideration: Did the trial court err in holding that Sister was aware of the injury and the cause of action on December 10, 1995, and therefore her action was barred by the statute of limitations?
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Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
M2001-01866-CCA-R3-DD
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Supreme Court | ||
01C01-9606-CR-00230
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Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Tony Dale Crass
The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Tony Dale Crass, Defendant, with driving under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, and possession of a firearm while under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the State did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that video evidence of Defendant’s driving was erased and deleted as a result of a malfunctioning recording system in Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) Trooper Joey Story’s patrol car. The trial court concluded that the loss of video evidence constituted a violation of the State’s duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence recognized in State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and deprived Defendant of the right to a fair trial. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment, and the State appealed. We conclude that the video was not lost or destroyed by the State, (2) that a Ferguson violation is not applicable to a suppression hearing based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a traffic stop, (3) that the trial court misapplied the “degree of negligence” Ferguson factor by equating perceived public policy decisions on the part of the State to negligence, and (4) that Defendant’s right to a fair trial can be protected without dismissal of the indictment. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings. |
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Sarah Berl v. Thomas Berl
This appeal stems from a post-divorce custody modification in which the father sought increased parenting time with his minor daughter, I.B. The trial court agreed with the father that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that a modification of the father’s parenting time was warranted. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00, or roughly half, of his attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court proceedings. The mother appeals the trial court’s decision. Because the father was, for the most part, the prevailing party at trial and proceeded in good faith, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a portion of his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to attorney’s fees. However, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s final judgment placing a price cap on the minor child’s therapy fees. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Finally, we decline to award either party their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
WELFT, LLC v. Larry Elrod Et Al.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial real property. The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the appellants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
ROAR NORMANN RONNING v. LESLEY ANNE RONNING
This appeal concerns divorce related issues including property division, alimony, and child custody. Roar Normann Ronning (“Father”) sued Lesley Anne Ronning (“Mother”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”). The parties have a minor daughter, Freya (“the Child”). Over the course of multiple hearings, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and ultimately approved a parenting plan whereby Mother was named primary residential parent and received more parenting time with the Child than Father. One of the relevant factors in the child custody determination was Father’s career as a commercial airline pilot, which means he has a varied schedule. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the Trial Court erred in designating Mother primary residential parent, granting Mother more time with the Child than Father, and granting Mother major decision-making authority. Mother raises separate issues, including whether this appeal is frivolous. We find, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in making its custody determination. We find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s judgment. Mother’s separate issues are without merit. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Denver Joe McMath, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Denver Joe McMath, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |