Mina Woods and Robert Woods v. World Truck Transfer, Inc. and Edward J. Seigham
This appeal involves a personal injury action that was dismissed because the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Davidson County refused to accept and file a summons that had not been prepared on an original form provided by the clerk. By the time the plaintiff provided another summons acceptable to the clerk, the time for filing the complaint and the summons had elapsed. Accordingly, on motion of one of the defendants, the Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed the personal injury claim because it was time-barred. We have determined that the clerk’s office exceeded its authority when it declined to accept and file the summons and, therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing the personal injury claims and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
01C01-9508-CC-00257
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Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lesa Johnson v. South Central Human Resource Agency, Roy Tipps, Executive Director, and John Ed Underwood, Jr., Deputy Director
This is an action pursued by the appellant, Lesa Johnson (Johnson), for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment with South Central Human Resource Agency (SCHRA). The Chancery Court for Bedford County dismissed the complaint upon motion of the appellees, SCHRA, and its executive and deputy directors, Roy Tipps and John Ed Underwood, Jr., respectively. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
David John Erdly v. Janene Marie Erdly - Concurring
The plaintiff, David John Erdly, has appealed from the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing his suit for divorce, dividing the marital estate, awarding plaintiff child custody and support and awarding the defendant, Janene Marie Erdly, alimony for the remainder of her life. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Knight vs. Knight
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Court of Criminal Appeals | ||
ROAR NORMANN RONNING v. LESLEY ANNE RONNING
This appeal concerns divorce related issues including property division, alimony, and child custody. Roar Normann Ronning (“Father”) sued Lesley Anne Ronning (“Mother”) for divorce in the Circuit Court for Claiborne County (“the Trial Court”). The parties have a minor daughter, Freya (“the Child”). Over the course of multiple hearings, the Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and ultimately approved a parenting plan whereby Mother was named primary residential parent and received more parenting time with the Child than Father. One of the relevant factors in the child custody determination was Father’s career as a commercial airline pilot, which means he has a varied schedule. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the Trial Court erred in designating Mother primary residential parent, granting Mother more time with the Child than Father, and granting Mother major decision-making authority. Mother raises separate issues, including whether this appeal is frivolous. We find, inter alia, that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in making its custody determination. We find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s judgment. Mother’s separate issues are without merit. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE ESTATE OF NANN-ALIX WICKWIRE-MAGRILL
The trial court dismissed a will contest based upon the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) and awarded the defendant attorney’s fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119(c). Plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
WELFT, LLC v. Larry Elrod Et Al.
This appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial real property. The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the appellants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Totty v. The Tennessee Department of Correction and the State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a state prisoner’s efforts to enforce a plea bargain agreement. The prisoner filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari in theCircuit Court for Davidson County after the Department of Correction refused to release him in accordance with his understanding of the agreement. The trial court granted the department’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the prisoner has appealed. We affirm the dismissal of the petition because it fails to state a claim upon which relief pursuant to a common-law writ of certiorari can be granted.1 |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
01C01-9606-CR-00230
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Supreme Court | ||
Tamara E. Lowe, Administrator of the Estate of Terry Allen Lowe, Deceased, v. Gransville Simpson, and wife, Judy Simpson
This is a wrongful death action. On April 28, 1998, Cynthia Low Armes ("Sister"), the sister of the late Terry Allen Lowe ("decedent"), instituted this action against Granville Simpson ("Granville") and his wife, Judy Simpson ("Judy"), (collectively, "the Simpsons"), alleging that the Simpsons were negligent in allowing three men, including Granville, to go armed on the Simpson's premises on December 10, 1995, and that their negligence directly contributed to the shooting death of the decedent. The trial court granted the Simpsons summary judgment on the ground that the complain was not filed within the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Sister appeals, raising the following issue for our consideration: Did the trial court err in holding that Sister was aware of the injury and the cause of action on December 10, 1995, and therefore her action was barred by the statute of limitations?
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Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
M2001-01866-CCA-R3-DD
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Supreme Court | ||
In re Conservatorship of Bill Bartlett
This is a conservatorship case. Appellee hospital filed a petition for appointment of an expedited limited healthcare fiduciary for the Appellant patient because the hospital believed that Appellant could not be safely discharged without assistance. The trial court determined that the appointment of a limited healthcare fiduciary was appropriate and in the Appellant’s best interest. The trial court then granted Appellee’s motion to amend its petition to include the appointment of a conservator. The trial court found that Appellant is an individual with disabilities, and further found that it is in the Appellant’s best interest to have a conservator appointed. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
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Denver Joe McMath, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Denver Joe McMath, Jr., appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
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Jaselyn Grant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jaselyn Grant, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Klowii W., Et Al.
This is a parental rights termination case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Zoey O. Et Al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to her two oldest |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Anderson
Defendant, Ricky Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for two counts of first |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kristina Cole v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sarah Berl v. Thomas Berl
This appeal stems from a post-divorce custody modification in which the father sought increased parenting time with his minor daughter, I.B. The trial court agreed with the father that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that a modification of the father’s parenting time was warranted. The trial court also awarded the father $15,000.00, or roughly half, of his attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court proceedings. The mother appeals the trial court’s decision. Because the father was, for the most part, the prevailing party at trial and proceeded in good faith, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the father a portion of his attorney’s fees. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to attorney’s fees. However, we vacate the portion of the trial court’s final judgment placing a price cap on the minor child’s therapy fees. Consequently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified. Finally, we decline to award either party their attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Dale Crass
The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted Tony Dale Crass, Defendant, with driving under the influence (DUI), DUI per se, and possession of a firearm while under the influence. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the State did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and that video evidence of Defendant’s driving was erased and deleted as a result of a malfunctioning recording system in Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) Trooper Joey Story’s patrol car. The trial court concluded that the loss of video evidence constituted a violation of the State’s duty to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence recognized in State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999), and deprived Defendant of the right to a fair trial. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the indictment, and the State appealed. We conclude that the video was not lost or destroyed by the State, (2) that a Ferguson violation is not applicable to a suppression hearing based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a traffic stop, (3) that the trial court misapplied the “degree of negligence” Ferguson factor by equating perceived public policy decisions on the part of the State to negligence, and (4) that Defendant’s right to a fair trial can be protected without dismissal of the indictment. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings. |