State of Tennessee v. Jay Aaron Jackson
Defendant, Jay Aaron Jackson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of coercion of a witness, two counts of domestic assault, and one count of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to elicit impermissible and prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for coercion of a witness and one count of domestic assault; (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a Range II multiple offender; and (5) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. Following a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for coercion of a witness (Count 1), domestic assault (Count 3), and domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact (Count 4) and reverse the conviction for domestic assault (Count 2). Because the sentence in Count 2 was ordered to be served concurrently with Count 1, we affirm the effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days’ incarceration. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ashley Carver
Ashley Carver, Movant, appeals from the summary dismissal of her Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion to correct what she claims is a clerical error concerning pretrial jail credits. In a one sentence order, the trial court summarily dismissed the “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence” without making any findings. Because this was a Rule 36 motion to correct an alleged clerical error, not a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, we vacate the order dismissing the motion and remand for further consideration by the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Sluder
The Defendant, Gerald Sluder, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a five-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve one year in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of split confinement. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Wayman
The defendant, Michael Wayman, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (Count 1) and delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (Count 2). The trial court merged the two counts and imposed a sentence of nine years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his request for alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgements of the trial court. |
Union | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Wayne Keith Wallen
The defendant, Wayne Keith Wallen, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion. Though conceding the challenged sentence has expired, the defendant, relying on Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251 (Tenn. 2007), argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition. The trial court, relying on State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015), found that the defendant’s sentence had expired and that the defendant’s claim required relitigating the case in order to determine whether the sentence was illegal which is not proper under Rule 36.1. Thus, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rudolph Munn v. State of Tennessee
In 1999, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Rudolph Munn, of killing his college roommate, Andrew Poklemba. State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tenn. 2001). This court affirmed his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder, see State v. Rudolph Munn, No. 01C01-9801-CCA-00007, 1999 WL 177341, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 1, 1999); however, a dissenting judge would have remanded the matter for a new sentencing hearing. Id. (Tipton, dissenting). The Tennessee Supreme Court agreed that a new sentencing hearing was necessary and held, inter alia, that the Petitioner had a lawful expectation of privacy, and thus, police secret videotaping of the Petitioner’s communications with his parents constituted an illegal seizure under the federal and state constitutions, as well as under the federal and state wiretapping statutes. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486. Upon remand in 2002, the Petitioner received a sentence of life without parole. Sixteen years later, on November 13, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that one of his trial counsel was “slightly biased” based upon his “unequivocal ties” to the university attended by the Petitioner and the victim at the time of the offense. The Petitioner further alleged that he was entitled to due process tolling of the statute of limitations because he became aware of these ties on or about November 17, 2017. Two days after the petition was filed, it was summarily dismissed by the coram nobis court as untimely and unsupported by due process considerations to toll the statute of limitations. The Petitioner now appeals, and upon our review, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandra Ann Pippin v. Christina Michelle Pippin
The non-biological parent of a child born by artificial insemination to a woman with whom the non-biological parent had maintained a long term relationship and who had lived with the child, holding herself out as one of the child’s parents, filed a petition to establish her parentage of the child and to set a parenting schedule; the petition was dismissed on the basis that she lacked standing; the trial court also awarded the petitioner visitation with the child. Upon our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition and vacate the order setting visitation. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Ann Pippin v. Christina Michelle Pippin (Dissent)
This opinion is stuck in the past. In my opinion, Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), altered the way we must interpret many statutes relating to marriage and parentage. In Obergefell, the United State Supreme Court legalized samesex marriage in the entire United States. It has met with resistance, just like Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and other United States Supreme Court cases that required society to alter its thinking about its institutions. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Henry Floyd Sanders v. State of Tennessee
In 2011, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Henry Floyd Sanders, of five counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed his convictions to this court, and this court and our supreme court affirmed the judgments. State v. Sanders, 452 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2014); State v. Henry Floyd Sanders, No. M2011-00962-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 4841545 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 9, 2012). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Clarence William Groves
The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Clarence William Groves, for aggravated child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury (Count 1), aggravated child abuse by use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrumentality (Count 2), aggravated child neglect (Count 3), and criminal impersonation (Count 4). On the first day of trial, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the misdemeanor criminal impersonation charge in Count 4. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted as charged in Counts 1 and 2 and was convicted of the lesser included offense of child neglect in Count 3. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years for all four counts. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the State violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing arguments; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in Counts 1, 2, and 3; however, because the record shows that the defendant entered a guilty plea to the criminal impersonation charge in Count 4, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the portion of the defendant’s appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that conviction. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan James Nicholas Milam
The Defendant, Bryan James Nicholas Milam, pleaded guilty to multiple offenses over the course of three years, and in each case the trial court sentenced him to alternative sentences, including Community Corrections. Following multiple violations of the terms of his release, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his total effective fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antwon Young
The Defendant, Antwon Young, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; eight counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39 12-101, -13-102, -13-202, -13-210, -13-402, -13-403, -17-1324(b), -17-1324(i)(1). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life, to be served partially consecutively to the Defendant’s sentence in Shelby County case numbers 15-05135 and 15-109300. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a reference was made to the Defendant’s being previously incarcerated; (3) the trial court erred by not allowing evidence of a witness’s gang affiliation; and (4) the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection during counsel’s closing argument. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, but remand for the correction of clerical errors in the judgments in Counts 1, 2, 5 and 15. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Casey Colbert v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Casey Colbert, challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he attacked his jury convictions for first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner raises numerous grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct reasonable investigation; failing to call various witnesses; failing to impeach and thoroughly cross-examine the State’s witnesses; failing to present viable alibi and third-party perpetrator theories of defense; failing to object to the co-defendant’s surprise testimony placing the Petitioner at the scene when notice of alibi had been given; and failing to object to improper closing argument by the State at trial. In addition, he raises allegations of newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we are constrained to agree with the Petitioner that the post-conviction court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable appellate review of his claims. According, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Connie Ellis v. Mike K. Modi
Following a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded a substantial verdict against the defendant for both compensatory and punitive damages. After the defendant’s motion for a new trial was denied, he appealed to this Court. The defendant now argues, among other things, that the trial court erroneously excluded his expert psychologist from testifying at trial and, further, that the trial court erroneously allowed certain prejudicial evidence against him to be admitted. For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s judgment entered in this matter and remand the case for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tiffany C. Roby v. NationStar Mortgage, LLC, et al.
This appeal stems from a dispute involving real property that Plaintiff acquired online. The property was previously purchased in a foreclosure action by one of the defendants. The previous owners were holdover occupants of the property. After purchasing the property, Plaintiff signed a real estate purchase contract and closed approximately two and one-half months thereafter. Due to delays in litigation involving the holdover occupants, Plaintiff was unable to take possession of the property for nearly two years after purchasing it online. In this case, Plaintiff brought suit against NationStar Mortgage, LLC; U.S. Bank, N.A.; Auction.com, LLC; and WFG National Title Insurance Company on several contract-related claims and alleged violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Auction.com and WFG were dismissed prior to trial. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the claims, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. A jury trial was held on the remaining claims. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof at trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the court again granted in part and denied in part. One claim under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act went to the jury, which found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded a verdict of $250,000. The parties filed separate post-trial motions. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied the other requests of the parties or found them to be moot. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the decisions of the trial court and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Freddie Lewis Osborne v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Freddie Lewis Osborne, of sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a Drug-Free School Zone (“DFSZ”), and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to thirty-two and a half years of incarceration. The Petitioner contested his conviction by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, and by petition for habeas corpus relief. Subsequently, he filed a “Petition for Sentencing Relief,” which the trial court denied by written order. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred because the Petitioner had: (1) sufficiently stated a claim for re-opening his petition for post-conviction relief; (2) stated a claim that the application of the DFSZ Act violated his right to equal protection; and (3) sufficiently stated a claim for the correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Merle Aaron Degroat v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Merle Aaron Degroat, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition. Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to adequately consult with him prior to his guilty pleas to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and burglary of a motor vehicle. Following a review of the briefs of the parties and the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager
This appeal arose from a dispute involving an unpaid promissory note. In May 2014, Plaintiff filed its first suit for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the case under Rule 41.02 for failure to prosecute. Opposing the dismissal, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reconsider. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion and stated the dismissal was neither “with nor without prejudice” and that Plaintiff was “welcome to refile.” Relying on the trial court’s statements, Plaintiff declined to appeal and filed a second action. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the second suit, arguing it is barred by res judicata. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion and denied Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion to Reconsider. We agree with the trial court’s dismissal of this suit and subsequent denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. We therefore affirm the circuit court’s decision and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Nathan I. Prager - Dissent
I again find myself in disagreement from my learned colleagues as to the application of res judicata. Because I cannot conclude that Defendant met its burden to show all the elements of the defense, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamarian Cortez Jordan
The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jamarian Cortez Jordan, for aggravated robbery, and a jury convicted Defendant as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to ten years’ incarceration with an eighty-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred by failing to suppress Defendant’s confession, (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) that Defendant did not have a fair and impartial jury, (4) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendant’s mother to testify at trial as to Defendant’s disability, (5) that Defendant should have received the minimum sentence, and (6) that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for new trial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deangelo Love
The Defendant-Appellant, Deangelo Love, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and criminal attempt aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to bolster a witness’s testimony with a prior consistent statement; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s request for an alibi instruction; and (4) whether the Defendant is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the relevant facts and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Eli H.
The grandparents of a minor child filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the child’s biological mother. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, determining that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish two statutory grounds for termination: (1) abandonment by failure to visit and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Following our thorough review of the record, we modify the trial court’s judgment to include a determination of clear and convincing evidence of the additional statutory ground of persistence of the conditions leading to the child’s removal from the mother’s custody. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald Ledford, Et Al. v. John Ben Sneed, Et Al.
This appeal concerns the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiffs concerning their claim for surreptitious recording of their conversations, namely wiretapping. We affirm. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
THOMAS K. BALLARD, III, M.D. ET AL v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Appellants, a doctor and a medical clinic, challenge a final order of the Tennessee Commissioner of Health imposing monetary fines and costs. The order followed the investigation and prosecution of numerous violations of state statutes and regulations governing pain management clinics. After review of an initial decision from an administrative law judge, the Commissioner’s Designee found three additional violations and increased the assessment of civil penalties and costs issued in the initial ruling. Appellants argue that the new violations were not supported by substantial and material evidence and were arbitrary and capricious under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Further, they argue that the increase in penalties and costs was arbitrary and capricious. Because the decision appealed was supported by substantial and material evidence and neither arbitrary nor capricious, we affirm. |
Davidson | Circuit, Criminal & Chancery Courts | |
Torrance Johnson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Torrance Johnson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 1997 conviction for first-degree felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |