State of Tennessee v. Robert Antwan McElmurry
The Defendant, Robert Antwan McElmurry, was convicted by a Dyer County Circuit Court jury of aggravated statutory rape, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Guthrie
Defendant, Kenneth Guthrie, entered a best interest plea to attempted rape in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. After the hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve six months day-for-day with the balance of the sentence to be served on probation. Defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly denied a sentence of full probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heun Kim, et al. v. State of Tennessee
Plaintiffs/Appellants brought a negligence suit against the State of Tennessee after their six-year old son fell from the fifth floor balcony of the state owned and operated Paris Landing State Park Inn. The Plaintiffs alleged that the State was negligent in two respects: 1) in allowing their son to gain access to an unoccupied guest room and the attached balcony, and 2) in maintaining balcony railings that were shorter in height than was required by applicable building codes. Following a bench trial, the Tennessee Claims Commissioner concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to establish that the State’s negligence was the proximate cause of their son’s injuries. Because we have determined that the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are deficient and only address one of the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, we vacate the judgment and remand for further consideration. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Stevie Gibson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Stevie Gibson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his Shelby County Criminal Court convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to argue at trial that Petitioner could not form the requisite mens rea for the charges of first degree murder and aggravated robbery due to his voluntary intoxication at the time of the offense. Additionally, Petitioner asserts that he was denied a full and fair hearing due to the post-conviction judge’s refusal to recuse himself. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable law, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Julian J. Et Al.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to two children. The juvenile court found four statutory grounds for termination of mother’s parental rights and two statutory grounds for termination of father’s parental rights. The court also found that termination of both parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination against Mother and two grounds for termination against Father. We further conclude that termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharrad Sharp
The Appellant, Sharrad Sharp, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of aggravated child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; one count of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony; three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and two counts of child abuse of a child eight years of age or less, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that six of the |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Scott Hunley
The Defendant, William Scott Hunley, was convicted of possession with intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession with intent to deliver more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. He received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only his conviction of possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Upon reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Keshawn J., et al.
In this dependent and neglect proceeding, the maternal grandparents of four children appeal an order entered in the Shelby County Juvenile Court dismissing a petition in which they sought visitation with the children pursuant to the grandparent visitation statute at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306. For the reasons set forth hereinafter we affirm the juvenile court’s dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Maddox G.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to support and abandonment by willful failure to visit. With respect to the former ground, we reverse, finding insufficient evidence to support a finding that Father had the ability to pay child support. However, we affirm the latter ground, finding ample evidence that father had failed to exercise his visitation rights for over two years prior to the filing of the termination petition. We further find that termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the child. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Ray Parker
The defendant, James Ray Parker, appeals his Monroe County Circuit Court jury conviction of first degree murder, claiming that the trial court erred by concluding that the defendant was competent to stand trial, that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements to the police and the fruits derived from those statements, that the trial court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained via an invalid search warrant, that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to continue, that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of insanity, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Kelly
Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Steven Kelly, was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. By agreement of the parties, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to a suspended nine-year sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence failed to prove that he had the intent to sell the cocaine. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Crystal L. Gregoire
The Defendant, Crystal L. Gregoire, pled guilty in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to tampering with evidence and was convicted following a jury trial of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of a retired Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agent of the facts surrounding the victim’s 1982 kidnapping convictions and the victim’s having put out an “open contract” on the agent and the agent’s family, by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction pertaining to the victim’s having become “disarmed or helpless” during the killing, and by admitting prejudicial crime scene and autopsy photographs. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jeffery Smith, et al. v. Methodist Hospitals of Memphis, et al.
This appeal stems from a healthcare liability action filed nearly two decades ago. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that neither of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses was competent to testify and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not establish their claim. After the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment along with a new affidavit of one of the previous experts, which purported to establish the expert’s competency to testify. The trial court, however, denied the motion to alter or amend, and the plaintiffs specifically appealed the trial court’s order denying their motion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Audra Snapp Olinger v. Travis Jackson Olinger
In this divorce case, the trial court decreed that husband, Travis Jackson Olinger, would be liable for the attorney’s fees and expenses of, his spouse, Audra Snapp Olinger. The court treated the assessing of fees to husband as alimony in solido to wife. A portion of those fees were to be satisfied by transfering to wife husband’s interest in the parties’ equity in the martial residence. The remainder is to be paid over time with a monthly payment of $370 until husband’s obligation is paid in full. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it assessed the subject fees to husband. He appeals. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Audra Snapp Olinger v. Travis Jackson Olinger - Concurring and Dissenting
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., concurring and dissenting. I concur with the majority in its affirmance of that portion of the Trial Court’s award to Wife which can be classified distinctly as discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04.1 Wife was granted a divorce based upon Husband’s stipulated adultery and inappropriate marital conduct. To that extent, Wife prevailed, and I agree with the majority that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting her an award of discretionary costs in the amount of $2,270. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Sammie L. Brookins, et al. v. Saint Francis Hospital Foundation, et al.
After husband’s health care liability complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution, husband and wife re-filed in reliance on the savings statute. The intended defendant, who had neither been served nor named in connection with the first complaint, was eventually named in an amended complaint after the second complaint had been filed. The trial court later dismissed the action against the intended defendant, holding, among other things, that the case was barred by the statute of limitations. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Brown v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kenneth Brown, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing (1) that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present Agent James Davis and Beatrice Vaulx as witnesses at trial and in failing to request an instruction on proximate cause of death; and (2) that he is entitled to a second post-conviction hearing based on post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Shawn Gibson Delosh
The Defendant-Appellant, Shawn Gibson Delosh, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433(a)(1), for which he received a sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to his prior sentences and parole revocations. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly ordered his sentence to be served consecutively to “all prior sentences and/or parole revocations.” Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Troy Lee Springfield
Defendant, Troy Lee Springfield, was found guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He was sentenced to eight years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, ten years for aggravated assault, four years for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and ten years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court ordered the sentences for aggravated assault and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with the remaining counts for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the State did not prove his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Jake Reynolds v. Kevin Genovese, et al.
The pro se Petitioner, Christopher Jake Reynolds, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Septian Valentine
The Defendant-Appellant, Septian Valentine, appeals from the revocation of supervised release by the Lake County Circuit Court, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Fennell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kevin Fennell, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm due to trial counsel’s failure to inform him that his sentence was required to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randy Roy Jordan
On December 9, 2008, the defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, fourth offense driving under the influence, and simple possession. The trial court imposed an effective 12-year sentence, ordering the defendant to serve 365 days in confinement with the balance suspended to supervised probation. On June 6, 2011, the trial court found the defendant had violated the terms of his probation by, among other things, failing to report, testing positive for the use of illegal drugs, failing to verify his employment and address, and failing to pay fees and restitution, and the court ordered the defendant to serve one year in confinement followed by completion of the Steps House program and a return to supervised probation. On January 14, 2014, the trial court found that the defendant again violated the terms of his probation by providing a fraudulent address and by failing to report as instructed and sentenced the defendant to time served and returned him to supervised probation. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation a third time, and, on September 23, 2014, the trial court ordered him to serve 60 days in confinement and to undergo an alcohol and drug assessment and intensive outpatient treatment. On October 3, 2016, the defendant again admitted to violating the terms of his probation, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to time served and returned him to supervised probation with a requirement that he return to treatment at Steps House. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Demarcus Williams
The Defendant, Kenneth Demarcus Williams, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class B felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class B felony, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony, and unlawful possession of a firearm while being a convicted felon, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403 (2018) (aggravated burglary); 39-11-403 (2018) (facilitation of a felony); 39-13-102 (2018) (aggravated assault); 39-12-302 (2018) (felony classification when acting in concert); 39-17-1324 (2018) (possession of a firearm during dangerous felony); 39-17-1307 (2018) (unlawful firearm possession). After the appropriate merger, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to terms of confinement of four years for facilitation of aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated burglary, twelve years for aggravated assault, five years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and ten years for unlawful possession of a firearm. The court imposed partial consecutive service, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his facilitation of aggravated burglary convictions and (2) the trial court erred by admitting photograph evidence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Francisco Gomez
Defendant, Francisco Gomez, was convicted of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery by a Rutherford County jury. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve a total effective sentence of twenty-five years with release eligibility after service of 100% of the sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding his testimony that he was living in Kentucky during the time period when the offenses occurred because Defendant failed to give the State the notice required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 for alibi evidence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we conclude that Defendant’s proffered testimony was not alibi evidence, and thus, the trial court erred in excluding it on the ground that Defendant failed to provide notice to the State. However, we also conclude that the error was harmless, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |