Steak N Shake v. Thomas Yeager
This cause of action originated when Thomas Yeager (“Employee”) sustained an on the job injury when he slipped and fell while performing duties in the course and scope of his employment with Steak N Shake (“Employer”). Employee was originally treated at Hendersonville Medical Center in the Hendersonville Medical Center Emergency Department. Employee was treated for acute neck and back pains and was released on said day with limiting instructions as well as various prescriptions. On October 21, 2012, Employee returned to the emergency department with abdominal pain. It was determined that Employee had a gastrointestinal bleed. Employer maintained that neither the abdominal pain nor gastrointestinal bleed and resulting medical treatment were related to the work injury. After a request for assistance and based on medical records then available, the Department of Labor ordered Employer to pay medical expenses arising from said gastrointestinal condition. Employer brought this action, seeking recovery of payments made pursuant to the Department of Labor Order. Employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied by the trial court. After certain stipulations were entered, a trial was had on the merits at which time the trial court found that Employee’s gastrointestinal bleeding and accompanying treatment was caused by medications prescribed to treat the initial work-related injury. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the trial court judgment. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Conoly Brown, Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, Tennessee
Landowners appeal the trial court’s dismissal of their petition seeking a declaratory judgment that the requirement in the Metropolitan Nashville zoning ordinance that alternative financial services providers be located 1,320 feet apart violates the due process and equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Upon our de novo review, we affirm the judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steak N Shake v. Thomas Yeager
This cause of action originated when Thomas Yeager (“Employee”) sustained an on the job injury when he slipped and fell while performing duties in the course and scope of his employment with Steak N Shake (“Employer”). Employee was originally treated at Hendersonville Medical Center in the Hendersonville Medical Center Emergency Department. Employee was treated for acute neck and back pains and was released on said day with limiting instructions as well as various prescriptions. On October 21, 2012, Employee returned to the emergency department with abdominal pain. It was determined that Employee had a gastrointestinal bleed. Employer maintained that neither the abdominal pain nor gastrointestinal bleed and resulting medical treatment were related to the work injury. After a request for assistance and based on medical records then available, the Department of Labor ordered Employer to pay medical expenses arising from said gastrointestinal condition. Employer brought this action, seeking recovery of payments made pursuant to the Department of Labor Order. Employer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied by the trial court. After certain stipulations were entered, a trial was had on the merits at which time the trial court found that Employee’s gastrointestinal bleeding and accompanying treatment was caused by medications prescribed to treat the initial work-related injury. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Worker’s Compensation Appeals Panel for hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the trial court judgment.
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Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Carl Allen v. Joseph S. Ozment
Appellant appeals the dismissal of his legal malpractice claim, arguing that the affirmative defenses raised by the defendant attorney were waived. Because we conclude that the defendant attorney’s affirmative defenses were not waived, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Thomas Grosse
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Appellant, Carl Thomas Grosse, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary and received consecutive sentences of eight years and three years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Appellant to serve his sentences in confinement. In this delayed appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Camdon H.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s and father’s parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to support, to visit, and to provide a suitable home; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Adam Lee Ipock
The defendant, Adam Lee Ipock, appeals his Fentress County Circuit Court jury convictions of vehicular assault, driving under the influence (“DUI”), and simple possession of methadone, claiming that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred by permitting the State to question him about the facts underlying his prior convictions and that the charges of vehicular assault and DUI must be dismissed because the State relied on a blood toxicology report obtained in violation of his right to due process. The prosecutor improperly inquired into the facts underlying the defendant’s prior convictions, and the error was not harmless when viewed in light of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt of vehicular assault and DUI. In consequence, we affirm the defendant’s conviction of simple possession but reverse the convictions of vehicular assault and DUI and remand those charges for a new trial. |
Fentress | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eliot Russell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Eliot Russell, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for attempted rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in (1) excluding expert testimony and (2) denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy Thomas Rogers, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Roy Thomas Rogers, Jr., was convicted by a Gibson County jury of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, possessing drug paraphernalia, and criminal impersonation, see T.C.A. §§ 39-16-301(a)(1); 39-17-425(a)(1), -433(a)(1), -435(a), for which he received an effective sentence of twelve years. Thereafter, Petitioner’s trial counsel filed an untimely motion for new trial, which was denied, and an untimely notice of appeal. On direct appeal, this court held that the Petitioner had waived his issue regarding the admissibility of certain evidence because trial counsel failed to file a timely motion for new trial and then dismissed the appeal without addressing the insufficiency of the evidence claim because the interest of justice did not warrant waiver of the requirement for timely filing of a notice of appeal. State v. Roy Thomas Rogers, No. W2015-00988-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 1045352, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 2016). The Petitioner, following his unsuccessful direct appeal, then filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely motion for new trial and notice of appeal and in failing to challenge the admission of illegal evidence at trial. After conducting a non-evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court entered a written order granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal and giving the Petitioner “30 days from the entry of this order to file a notice of appeal with the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals based on the Motion for New Trial previously filed in this cause.” The Petitioner subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to this court, arguing (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After conducting a thorough review, we conclude that the trial court did not follow the post-conviction procedures prior to granting the Petitioner a delayed appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the order granting a delayed appeal and remand the case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We also remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 5 reflecting an indicted and conviction offense of criminal impersonation in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-301(a)(1). |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Wenzler v. Dr. Xiao Yu, et al.
This is a health care liability case filed against a dentist and the dental practice that employed him. Before filing the complaint, the plaintiff gave written notice to the two potential defendants of her health care liability claims against them. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the health care provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with the statute, as the defendants alleged that the HIPAA authorizations provided by the plaintiff did not contain all of the required information and were therefore invalid. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the authorizations provided by the plaintiff were not HIPAA compliant and therefore the plaintiff did not substantially comply with the statute. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee James Allen Jenkins
The Defendant-Appellant, James Allen Jenkins, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, and theft of property $1,000 or less, for which he received an effective sentence of eleven years. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-402, -102; 39-14-103; 39-17-1307(c)(1). On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine the Defendant regarding his prior convictions because the parties had previously entered a stipulation as to his status as a convicted felon; (3) the trial court erroneously permitted the testimony of a forensic expert regarding a Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) “hit” as inadmissible hearsay; and (4) whether his aggravated robbery and theft convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon our review, we merge the Defendant’s theft conviction and remand for entry of amended judgments reflecting merger of the theft conviction into the Defendant’s aggravated robbery conviction. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Jenkins - concurring in part, dissenting in part
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Defendant-Appellant is not entitled to relief from his convictions. However, I write separately to address the admission of evidence during Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Agent Michael Turbyville’s testimony related to CODIS and DNA profiles contained in CODIS. I conclude that the evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to establish the presence of the Defendant-Appellant’s DNA on the cigarette butt found at the scene. Agent Turbyville’s testimony, in addition to other witness testimony, regarding CODIS and DNA profiles was offered to explain why the investigating officers obtained a sample of the Defendant- Appellant’s DNA, which, upon analysis by Agent Turbyville, matched the DNA profile on the cigarette butt. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Freddie Armstrong v. Shelby County Juvenile Court, et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a county employee for insubordination and intentional failure to carry out instructions. The employee appealed to the Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board, which upheld his termination after a hearing. The employee then sought review in chancery court, and again his termination was upheld. He now seeks review before this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the chancery court and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Steven E. Warrick, Sr., et al. v. Penny Mullins
Steven E. Warrick, Sr. and Cindy Heffernan (petitioners) filed this action to enforce a settlement agreement and partition a parcel of real property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-27-101 (2012) et seq. Penny Mullins (respondent) filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court, relying on the terms of the settlement agreement filed as an exhibit to the petition, granted the motion. We hold that the agreement conclusively establishes that petitioners have no present ownership interest in the property, and thus have no standing to ask the court for partition. We consequently affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Charles P. Maxwell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Charles P. Maxwell, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his conviction for driving while his license was suspended and his thirty-day sentence, which was suspended to probation after twenty-four hours in confinement. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Frederick E. Braxton v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Frederick E. Braxton, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his attempted second degree murder conviction, for which he received a nineteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re E.W.N.
This case involves a custody dispute between M.J.L. and J.L. (paternal grandparents) and B.G. and M.N. (maternal grandparents) with respect to their grandchild, E.W.N. Paternal grandparents initiated a dependency and neglect action in juvenile court. The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and awarded full custody to paternal grandparents. Soon thereafter, maternal grandparents filed a petition to intervene, seeking custody or joint custody of the child. The juvenile court entered a final order that granted all grandparents joint legal custody of the child. The court’s order further provided that during the school year paternal grandparents would have primary physical custody and that during the summer maternal grandparents would have primary physical custody. Both sets of grandparents were also awarded visitation. Maternal grandparents appealed the decision of the juvenile court to the circuit court. After a hearing, the circuit court ordered a custody arrangement essentially identical to the one ordered by the juvenile court. Maternal grandparents appeal. We affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Bailey Cooper, et al. v. Pete Patel
This is a breach of contract case. Defendant-lessee operated a motel pursuant to a lease with plaintiffs-lessors, which contained two options to renew for two additional 25-year terms that allowed the renewal options to be exercised if there had been no breaches of the lease terms. When defendant attempted to exercise the option for the second additional 25-year term, plaintiffs-lessors refused and subsequently brought suit, alleging defendant had breached several provisions of the lease. The chancery court agreed with plaintiffs, assigning to defendant six breaches of the terms of the lease and holding that, as a result, defendant could not exercise the renewal option. Finding all of the alleged breaches to be either de minimis or non-issues to the case, we reverse. |
Gibson | Court of Appeals | |
James Curtis Pierce v. Hollie Marie Pierce (Marszalek)
In this post-divorce matter, the trial court determined that the father’s child support obligation should be increased due to the father’s significant increase in income subsequent to the parties’ divorce. In calculating the father’s new child support obligation amount, however, the trial court included the children’s private school expenses, which the father had previously agreed to bear, as a “work-related childcare” expense for the father on the respective child support worksheet, thereby reducing the father’s child support obligation. The mother has appealed. We vacate the trial court’s modifications to the parties’ permanent parenting plan and its calculation of child support, including its inclusion of private school tuition and health insurance premiums paid by a stepparent on the child support worksheet. We remand the child support issue to the trial court for recalculation of the father’s child support obligation consistent with this opinion. We also vacate the trial court’s partial award of attorney’s fees to the mother and remand that issue to the trial court for determination of a reasonable award of all attorney’s fees incurred by the mother concerning her petition to increase the father’s child support obligation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. In addition, we grant the mother’s request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rebecca Doles
The Defendant-Appellant, Rebecca Doles, appeals from the revocation of supervised probation by the Hardeman County Circuit Court. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering her to serve the balance of her sentence in confinement. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edna Green v. St. George's Episcopal Church
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Catherine Caton v. Kyle Austin Caton
About a year after the parties’ divorce, the mother, who had been named primary residential parent, decided to move to Murfreesboro. Alleging that her move constituted a material change in circumstance, she filed a petition in the divorce court requesting a change in the residential parenting schedule. Because she planned to move less than fifty miles, the mother asserted that the parental relocation statute did not apply. But, in case the court disagreed, the mother also asked the court to approve the move. In response, the father filed a counter-petition seeking to change either the primary residential parent designation or the parenting schedule. After a hearing, the trial court denied both modification petitions. And although the court agreed that the parental relocation statute did not apply, the court ordered the mother to remain in Sumner County, Tennessee. The mother has appealed the court’s restriction on her ability to move. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court had no legal basis for prohibiting the mother from moving. So we reverse that part of the court’s order. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Craighead and Sinead St.Omer
The State appeals the trial court’s order dismissing the charges against the Defendants, Terry Craighead and Sinead St. Omer, for two counts of felony murder, aggravated child abuse, and aggravated child neglect. The trial court found that the State failed to collect and preserve certain evidence in accordance with the mandates of State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). We conclude that the State’s failure to collect evidence did not result in a Ferguson violation and that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe King v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner was convicted of rape in 1988, served a six month sentence of incarceration, and successfully completed five and a half years of probation; in 2016 he was advised that he was required to register as a sex offender. After registering, he filed a petition for declaratory judgment, challenging the constitutionality of the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act of 2004, as written and as applied to him, and requested that he not be required to register as a sex offender. The court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our de novo review, we reverse the dismissal of his as-applied challenge to the Act and remand the case for further proceedings; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John Orise Adams, III
The Defendant, John Orise Adams III, was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. The trial court then imposed an eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s drug use; (3) that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that the Defendant was “aware” of certain events prior to the robbery because the witness could not have had personal knowledge of what the Defendant was “aware” of; and (4) that the cumulative effect of these errors denied the Defendant a fair trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals |