In Re Estate of Veronica Stewart
This appeal arises from a will contest. The contestant insists the purported Last Will and Testament of the decedent, dated June 19, 2015, is invalid because the attesting witnesses, who duly executed the attestation affidavit, failed to affix their signatures to the will as required by the Tennessee Execution of Wills Act at the time the will was executed. The proponent insists the will was validly executed based on a 2016 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104, which applies to wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, and states “to the extent necessary for the Will to be validly executed, witness signatures affixed to an affidavit meeting the requirements of § 32-2-110 shall be considered signatures to the Will.” The trial court ruled that the 2016 amendment did not apply because the testator died before it went into effect. Consequently, the 2015 will was invalid because it was not executed in accordance with the law then in effect. We have determined that the 2016 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 applies retrospectively to wills executed prior to July 1, 2016, because that is the clear and unambiguous intent of the legislation. We have also determined that the retrospective application of the law does not impair any vested legal right of the contestant. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Wade Harvey, Ex Rel. Alexis Breanna Gladden v. Cumberland Trust And Investment Company, Et Al.
In this interlocutory appeal, the trustee of a trust executed an investment/brokerage account agreement that included a provision requiring the arbitration of disputes. The trust beneficiary filed a lawsuit asserting claims against the investment broker, and the defendant broker sought to compel arbitration under the arbitration provision in the account agreement. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration and granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the signature of the trustee on the account agreement binds the beneficiary of the trust to the predispute arbitration provision. We hold that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intended to give trustees broad authority to fulfill their duties as trustee. We also hold that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code gives trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements, so long as doing so is not prohibited under the operative trust instrument. We hold that the trust instrument in this case gives the named trustee broad authority and does not prohibit the trustee from entering into a predispute arbitration agreement. As a result, we interpret the trust instrument as authorizing the trustee to execute the account agreement with the defendant broker, including the predispute arbitration provision therein. Thus, under both the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the operative trust instrument, the trustee had authority to enter into the arbitration agreement contained within the account agreement. The question of whether the trust beneficiary in this case is bound by the arbitration provision is governed by the principle that a third party who seeks the benefit of a contract must also bear its burdens. Applying this principle, the trust beneficiary in this case may be bound to arbitrate claims against the investment broker that seek to enforce the account agreement. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and vacate the trial court order compelling arbitration of all claims. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, including a determination as to which if any of the claims asserted by the trust beneficiary seek to enforce the account agreement. |
Hamblen | Supreme Court | |
In Re Elizabeth Beck Hoisington Living Trust
Appellant appeals the trial court’s determination that settlor’s holographic notations on her trust agreement did not operate to modify the original trust. Specifically, the trial court held that settlor neither satisfied the requirements for modification of the trust as set out in the trust agreement, nor manifested a clear intent to amend the trust under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 35-15-602(c)(2)(B). Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joe David Erwin, et al. v. Great River Road Supercross, LLC, et al.
At oral argument, the parties agreed that the trial court made a finding concerning the reliance element of Appellants’ fraud claim that was not supported by the record. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Corey M. Searcy, et al. v. Walter Axley, et al.
Parents filed suit against dog owners following their son’s injury from a dog bite that occurred at the owners’ home. The trial court granted the dog owners’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that parents failed to show that owners knew or should have known of their dog’s dangerous propensities as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 44-8-413. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
Mark T. Thomas v. Richard J. Myers, et al.
This is a legal malpractice case. Appellees, who are licensed attorneys, represented Appellant in a trademark infringement and consumer protection lawsuit in federal court that resulted in a judgment against Appellant. On October 21, 2015, more than a year after the federal court judgment, Appellant filed a complaint for misrepresentation and negligence against Appellees. The trial court interpreted Appellant’s claims against Appellees as a legal malpractice action and granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the one-year statute of limitations had expired prior to commencement of the action. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(c)(1). We affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Milon
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Eric Milon, of being a felon in possession of a firearm and of being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the Defendant to five years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a stop and search of the Defendant and when it admitted inadmissible hearsay. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tray Simmons v. John Cheadle, Et Al.
This appeal involves a dispute between a judgment debtor and the attorneys for the judgment creditor. In an effort to collect on a final judgment, attorneys for the judgment creditor served the judgment debtor with a notice of deposition. After some discussion, it became clear that the debtor failed to bring the requested documents with him to the deposition, and the attorneys for the creditor refused to go forward with the deposition that day. The debtor then filed this separate lawsuit, pro se, against the creditor’s attorneys alleging that they had taken an “unlawful deposition” of him. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the attorneys for the judgment creditor. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James William Mabe
The Defendant, James William Mabe, was found guilty by a Warren County Circuit Court jury of three counts of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2014) (child rape); 39-12-101 (2014) (attempt); 39-13-504 (2014) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court merged the attempted child rape convictions with the aggravated sexual battery convictions and imposed eleven-year sentences for each conviction. The court ordered partial consecutive sentences, for an effective twenty-two-year sentence at 100% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred by failing to require the State to make an election of the offenses, (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of child rape; and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dianne Elizabeth Lutzak, Trustee Of The Dianne Elizabeth Lutzak Family Revocable Trust v. Phoenix American Development Partners, L. P. Et Al.
The owner of undeveloped property sought a declaratory judgment that restrictive covenants governing an adjacent subdivision did not apply to its property. The developer of the subdivision and the homeowners’ association of the subdivision filed counterclaims seeking a declaratory judgment that the restrictive covenants applied to the undeveloped property and attorney’s fees and costs. On cross-motions for summary declaratory judgment, the trial court granted summary declaratory judgment to the owner of the undeveloped property. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding no express restrictive covenants applicable to the undeveloped property and in refusing to enforce negative reciprocal easements by implication from an alleged common development plan. We conclude that the restrictive covenants, by their express terms, do not apply to the undeveloped property. We further conclude that the trial court properly declined to impose negative reciprocal easements on the undeveloped property. Thus, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamantez Desha Robinson
Lamantez Desha Robinson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a Facebook photograph of the Defendant posing with two handguns and that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Metz, Et Al. v. Metropolitan Government Of Nashville And Davidson County, TN, Et Al.
This appeal concerns a determination by the Planning Commission (“the Commission”) of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) that the Forest View Park planned unit development was “active.” Certain Forest View neighbors (“Petitioners”) filed a petition for writ of certiorari against respondents Metro and The Ridge at Antioch, Limited Partnership (“Respondents,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) challenging the Commission’s decision. Metro filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing the petition for writ of certiorari for lack of jurisdiction. The Trial Court found fatal defects in the petition for writ of certiorari, including that it was not supported by oath as required. Petitioners appeal to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Joe Nelson
Following a trial, a Coffee County jury found the Defendant, Billy Joe Nelson, guilty of aggravated rape, carjacking, robbery, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges whether the State sufficiently proved his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Thomas D. Thomas, Et Al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the statutory “rebuttable presumption rule” under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-9-626, in reversing the trial court and concluding that the Plaintiff, Regions Bank, was not entitled to recover a deficiency from the Defendants, Thomas D. Thomas, Helen L. Thomas, and The Thomas Family Living Trust. We conclude that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in their respective applications of the “rebuttable presumption rule.” Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the judgment of the trial court is vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as set forth herein. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephen Alexander Lyczkowski
The Defendant, Stephen Alexander Lyczkowski, entered a guilty plea in the Maury County Circuit Court to domestic aggravated assault with the length of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years. On appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alan Terry Stein
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant, Alan Terry Stein, of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se), and he received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and improperly denied his motions for special jury instructions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for entry of a judgment form as to count one reflecting that the Defendant’s DUI conviction was merged with count two. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carroll Crews v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carroll Crews, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Dyer County Circuit Court. In this appeal, she argues that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Davis d/b/a Davis Auto Repair v. Tennessee Board of Water Quality, Oil, & Gas
After Appellant failed to comply with the terms of a storm water permit issued to him, he was fined $5,000.00 by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. The fine was upheld by an administrative law judge and, upon judicial review, by the Shelby County Chancery Court. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vincent D. Clark
In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of a probation revocation warrant as untimely. Because the probationary period of the defendant, Vincent D. Clark, had not expired at the time of the filing of the revocation warrant, the trial court erred in its dismissal. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new hearing. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Belinda Butler Pandey v. Aneel Madhukar Pandey
This action presents issues regarding the interpretation and application of a postnuptial agreement previously executed by parties who later filed for divorce. The trial court determined that the parties’ agreement was valid and enforced its terms, including a provision allowing for an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party who was attempting to defend the agreement. The trial court granted the wife an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to this provision. In addition, the husband filed two motions seeking the trial judge’s recusal, which the trial court denied. The husband timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We further determine that the wife is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kandi Sue Gaines
The Defendant, Kandi Sue Gaines, was convicted at a Lawrence County Circuit Court bench trial of shoplifting property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, for which she is serving an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence on probation. See T.C.A. § 39-14-146 (2014) (amended 2017) (theft of property involving merchandise). On appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dennis Miller
The Defendant, Dennis Gregory Miller, entered a guilty plea to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, with the punishment to be determined by the trial court. The Defendant requested judicial diversion and a sentence to be served on probation. After a hearing, the trial court denied diversion and imposed a two-year sentence, with sixty days to be served incarcerated and the remainder on probation. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Raymond Hunter, Jr. v. City Of Chattanooga Beer Board
The petitioner seeks reversal of the denial of a beer permit by the city. City’s board asserts that the property is unsuitable for a beer permit as it has lost its zoning status as a “grandfathered in” restaurant, bar, or event hall. The trial court affirmed the board’s action. The petitioner filed this appeal. The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider it. We vacate the trial court’s order and dismiss this case. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jonah Paul Anders v. Mayla Anders
Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brennen T.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother and father’s parental rights to their minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of each parent’s parental rights on the statutory groundof abandonment for failure to remit child support. The court further found that termination of each parent’s rights was in the best interest of the child. The parents appeal. We affirm. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals |