State of Tennessee v. Christian Devon McDuffie
The Defendant, Christian Devon McDuffie, was found guilty by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of three counts of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. §39-15-402 (2014) (amended 2016). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of fifteen years for each conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dominique Dantwan Simons v. State of Tennessee
Dominique Dantwan Simons (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising him concerning his guilty plea and therefore the plea was not knowing and voluntary. Discerning no error, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
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Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Glenn Black
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Glenn Black, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in allowing a trial exhibit, the front door from the victim’s apartment, to remain in the courtroom for a period of time during the trial and (2) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharon Daugherty
The Appellant, Sharon Daugherty, appeals the Macon County Criminal Court’s order denying her motion to recover firearms confiscated during a search of her home. On appeal, the Appellant contends that she is entitled to the return of the property because the State dismissed the criminal charges against her. Because the Appellant has no appeal as of right from the denial of a motion to recover confiscated property, we dismiss the appeal. |
Macon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte Lynn Frazier and Andrea Parks
The Defendants, Charlotte Lynn Frazier and Andrea Parks, along with ninety-five other co-defendants, were charged through a presentment with conspiracy to manufacture, sell, or deliver 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with at least one defendant having committed an overt act within 1,000 feet of a school, park, library, recreation center, or child care facility. The Defendants each filed a motion to suppress evidence seized during the execution of search warrants at their homes. The Defendants alleged that the magistrate, a circuit court judge, lacked the authority to issue the search warrants because the Defendants’ homes were located outside the magistrate’s judicial district. The trial court granted the Defendants’ motions. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal in both cases pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, and this court consolidated the appeals. We hold that the magistrate did not have the authority to issue search warrants for property located outside his judicial district and that, as a result, the searches of the Defendants’ homes were unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders granting the Defendants’ motions to suppress and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Hopkins
The Defendant-Appellant, David Hopkins, appeals his conviction for first degree felony murder, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Lynn Poston v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Lynn Poston, appeals from the White County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an eleven-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that the court applied an erroneous legal standard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and that the trial judge engaged in improper ex parte communication with the jury during its deliberations. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
White | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Erika Louise Dewald v. Baya Paul Dewald
This is a divorce case involving numerous pleadings. Because the order appealed is not final in that it fails to adjudicate husband’s petition for contempt and motion for sanctions, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Church Of God In Christ, Inc., Et Al. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc., Et Al.
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s decision dismissing this lawsuit involving a dispute over the right to use and control church property for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. This doctrine derives from the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and prohibits civil courts from resolving church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. We conclude that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply in this lawsuit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal is reversed. Furthermore, we conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment, and we remand this matter to the trial court for any other further proceedings and orders that may be necessary to afford the plaintiffs possession and control of the disputed church real property and to address the plaintiffs’ requests for an accounting and control of the disputed church personal property. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
Church Of God In Christ, Inc., Et Al. v. L. M. Haley Ministries, Inc., Et Al. - Concurring
I am pleased to concur in the well-written majority opinion but write separately on the question of whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is a bar to subject matter jurisdiction or an affirmative defense. |
Fayette | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. David Black
The defendant, David Black, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the trial court erred by improperly admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ferryl Theresita McClain v. Richard Perry McClain
This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court (“divorce court”) in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 (“2009 PPP”) upon the parties’ stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother’s 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother’s request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court (“trial court”) in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in “technical contempt” and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 (“2015 PPP”). The 2015 PPP maintained the father’s designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an “emergency motion” for modification of the 2015 PPP, as well as for criminal and civil contempt against the father, averring violations of the 2015 PPP. The parties subsequently filed competing “emergency” motions concerning physical custody of the younger child, who under one temporary order entered by the trial court in October 2015, was to reside primarily with the mother. Following a two-day bench trial in October 2015, the trial court maintained the prior designation of Father as the primary residentialparent for both children pending further order, but the court took the custody matter under advisement pending receipt of a court-ordered assessment of the parties and the children by a forensic psychologist. Upon receipt of the psychologist’s report, the trial court conducted a second two-day bench trial in June 2016, ultimately finding that this was a case of severe parental alienation in which the father had actively supported the children’s alienation from the mother without reasonable cause. The court awarded exclusive custody of the children to the mother and directed that the children participate with the mother in a workshop in California that had been recommended by the forensic psychologist as a therapeutic methodology for parental alienation at an estimated cost of approximately $28,000.00. The court directed that the workshop costs, including a mandatory post-workshop vacation for the mother and the children, would be substantially paid by the father. The court further found, inter alia, that the father was in contempt of court for failing to follow certain provisions of the 2015 PPP and sentenced the father to eight days in jail, with the sentence suspended provided no further violations occurred. Also finding that the mother was entitled to attorney’s fees, the court reduced the $38,594.99 fee amount requested by the mother to an award of $20,000.00 to offset the amount paid by the father toward the workshop. The father has appealed. Having determined that the father was not provided with sufficient notice of criminal contempt charges pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b), we vacate the trial court’s order finding the father in contempt. We remand for a determination of whether the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to the mother was appropriate given our vacation of the contempt finding against the father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. The mother’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
Mardoche Olivier v. City of Clarksville, et al
The trial court dismissed this action as a matter of law for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton, et al.
This appeal addresses the authority of a county election commission to make a factual determination on the qualifications of a candidate seeking to be placed on a ballot. In this case, the defendant filed a petition to run for circuit court judge. A registered voter filed a complaint with the county election commission arguing that the defendant did not reside in the judicial district and, consequently, should not be placed on the ballot. The election commission held a hearing on the complaint and voted unanimously to place the defendant on the ballot. The defendant won the election. The plaintiff, the defendant’s defeated opponent in the election, filed this election contest based solely on the defendant’s alleged failure to meet the residency requirement. The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. Both held that the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint was a challenge of the election commission’s administrative decision on the defendant’s residency, governed by the 60-day statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 for a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because the complaint was not filed within sixty days of the county election commission’s final decision, it was dismissed as untimely. On appeal to this Court, we hold that, by necessary implication, the county election commission had the authority under Tennessee’s election statutes to hold a quasi-judicial hearing to make a factual determination to resolve the voter’s complaint challenging the defendant’s residency. We also hold that the county election commission’s decision to certify the defendant as a qualified candidate on the ballot was a final administrative decision subject to judicial review by common-law writ of certiorari. The plaintiff, who had actual notice of the county election commission’s actions, was “aggrieved” by the election commission’s final administrative decision within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-101 and, thus, had standing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Though the plaintiff’s complaint was styled as an election contest, the gravamen of the complaint is a request for judicial review of the county election commission’s decision, reviewable through a petition for a writ of certiorari and subject to the 60-day statute of limitations for such a petition. Because the plaintiff’s complaint was filed well after expiration of the 60-day period, we affirm the lower courts’ dismissal of the complaint as untimely |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton, et al. - dissenting
The majority’s decision misapplies Tennessee statutory and case law and creates practical problems for candidates for public office. For these reasons, I join in Justice Clark’s dissent and write separately to express my concerns. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
Eric S. Stone v. Tennessee Board of Parole
Petition for writ of certiorari; inmate appeals the trial court’s order affirming the Tennessee Board of Parole’s decision to rescind its earlier grant of parole and deny parole. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William Thomas McFarland v. Michael S. Pemberton, et al. - dissenting
I cannot join the majority’s decision affirming the dismissal of William Thomas McFarland’s election contest lawsuit. No statute expressly authorizes a county election commission to convene a quasi judicial hearing and resolve a pre-election challenge to a circuit judge candidate’s satisfaction of constitutional residency requirements. Furthermore, the majority’s conclusion that county election commissions implicitly have such authority ignores the fact that, where the General Assembly intends for a county election commission to exercise such authority, it has enacted statutes expressly providing such authority. The majority compounds this error by applying its holding recognizing implicit authority in a manner that negates a statute explicitly granting Mr. McFarland the right to file this election contest lawsuit challenging Michael S. Pemberton’s satisfaction of constitutional residency requirements. Because the majority’s decision is inconsistent with relevant statutes, with longstanding decisions of this Court, and with commonsense, practical considerations, I dissent. |
Roane | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. John David Altenhoff
John David Altenhoff, the Defendant, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and agreed to an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After finding that the Defendant had an extensive history of criminal behavior, that society needed to be protected from the Defendant, and that measures less than incarceration had unsuccessfully been applied to the Defendant, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Savannah Humphrey
Defendant, Savannah Humphrey, was convicted of one count of aggravated child abuse and one count of aggravated child neglect for injuries sustained by the three-month-old victim while in Defendant’s care. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gabriel C. Torres v. State of Tennessee
The State appeals after the post-conviction court granted Petitioner, Gabriel C. Torres, post-conviction relief in the form of a new trial. Because the proper remedy was the grant of a delayed appeal, we reverse and remand the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Halley M.
Jerome V. and Teresa V. (“Petitioners”) appeal the May 26, 2015 order of the Circuit Court for Sumner County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing their Petition for Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights (“the Petition”) based upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-119. We find and hold that Petitioners have shown good cause why the Petition should not be dismissed, and we vacate the Trial Court’s May 26, 2015 order, reinstate the Petition, and remand this case for further proceedings. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Jeanie Holsclaw v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc.
This case is on appeal from a trial court judge’s decision not to recuse herself based on a telephone call to a university department director concerning a potential expert witness’ qualifications. Upon the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for recusal of the trial court judge, the defendant filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that recusal of the trial judge was necessary. We granted the plaintiff’s accelerated application for permission to appeal to this Court. Having thoroughly reviewed the filings of both parties and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse was appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
Jeanie Holsclaw v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc. - Dissenting
I maintain that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that recusal was necessary in this case. While I adhere to the position expressed by both the appellate court’s majority and concurring opinions that “[n]othing in the record on appeal leads this Court to believe that the trial judge holds a prejudice or bias against any party or that the trial judge cannot remain impartial despite this communication,” Holsclaw v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc., No. E2016-02178-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 7364901, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2016), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2017), I nonetheless perceive an appearance of impropriety that is expressly disfavored by the Canons of Judicial Conduct, see Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 1.2 (“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”). Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the decision of the majority of this Court that recusal is unnecessary. |
Carter | Supreme Court | |
Jerry Alan Thigpen v. Trousdale County Highway Department, et al.
Jerry Thigpen sued the Trousdale County Highway Department and two individuals, alleging damage to his home caused by roadway resurfacing. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that the claims were barred by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). We affirm. |
Trousdale | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin J. Mamon v. Geico Indemnity Insurance Company, et al.
Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claims against all three defendants and the award of $400 to defendant Master Muffler on its counterclaim following a bench trial. We affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |