State of Tennessee v. James Hawkins - Concurring
I concur fully with the Court’s opinion except for the analysis regarding the proportionality review. In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D) by limiting its consideration to only those cases in which the death penalty had been sought. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013). In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrows the proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39 13 206(c)(1)(D). Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all first degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review more closely resembles cases that have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty than those that have not. Id. at 230-31 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Carolyn Ann Talley v. Clinton Eugene Talley
In this divorce action, the trial court valued and allocated the parties’ marital assets. The court also awarded the wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,800 per month while awarding the wife attorney’s fees as alimony in solido in the amount of $35,710. The husband has appealed. Discerning no error in the trial court’s marital property division, we affirm that distribution. Furthermore, we affirm the award of alimony in futuro and attendant life insurance requirement. We modify the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the wife to the amount of $29,060. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garry Baker
The Defendant, Garry Baker, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211 (2014), 39-12-101 (2014), 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court merged the convictions into a single count of aggravated assault and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by permitting the State to introduce evidence of his previous conviction and (2) by imposing consecutive service. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ola Halim v. Tarek G. El-Alayli
This is a post-divorce child support modification case. Ola Halim filed a petition against her former husband, Tarek G. El-Alayli, seeking an increase in child support based upon a material change in circumstances. The parties’ final divorce decree had incorporated a permanent parenting plan setting child support at $3,000 per month. The day before the hearing on the petition, mother filed a request for relief seeking an upward deviation in child support for the specific needs of one of the children; a special needs trust for that child; and an educational trust for another one of the parties’ children. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order setting monthly child support at $4,009 and denying mother’s other requests. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: River C.
Justin C. (“Father”) appeals the order of the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child River C. (“the Child”) on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g)(2) and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Koczera, et al v. Christi Lenay Fields Steele, et al.
Plaintiffs brought suit asserting that defendants’ negligence prevented the proper defendant from being served with process in a healthcare liability action, as a result of which that defendant was dismissed from the suit. Contemporaneously with answering the complaint, Defendants moved for summary judgment on various grounds. Plaintiffs responded to the motion, disputing certain material facts and asking for additional time to conduct discovery. After settlement was reached in the healthcare liability suit, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their suit on the ground of mootness. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motions for additional time for discovery and to dismiss their suit and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for default judgment against one defendant, which the trial court denied. Plaintiffs appeal the various rulings of the court. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of Plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment, to dismiss their complaint, and for additional time to conduct discovery in order to respond to the motion for summary judgment; we vacate the order granting summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Courtney R.
This case concerns the applicability of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”). After the mother abandoned her child, the juvenile court found the child to be dependent and neglected and placed the child in state custody. The State sought provisional placement of the child with her father, who was unaware of the child’s existence until the dependency and neglect proceedings. Because the father lived in another state, the State made a request under the ICPC to the father’s state of residence for a home evaluation. The response to the request recommended against the placement. In light of the response, the juvenile court held a hearing on disposition in which it ordered the child to remain in State custody. After the father appealed, the circuit court awarded custody to the father and relieved the State of any further responsibility for the child. On appeal to this court, among other things, the mother argues that the ICPC precluded awarding custody to the father. Because we conclude the ICPC did not apply, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Jade C. Nunnally v. Adam Nunnally
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s designation of Husband as the primary residential parent for their daughter. For his part, Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding Wife unsupervised visitation. He also contends the child support award is based on an erroneous determination of the parties’ gross monthly income. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Raquel Hayes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Raquel Hayes, appeals from the dismissal of her petition for postconviction relief. At oral argument, the State acknowledged that the post-conviction court erred, and we agree. As a result, the judgment of the Criminal Court is reversed and the matter is remanded for a full evidentiary hearing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John N. Porterfield
The Defendant, John N. Porterfield, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the challenged sentences are expired, the Defendant is not entitled relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sinan Gider v. Lydia Hubbell
On the petition of a father, a juvenile court held the mother of father’s child in civil contempt. The court found 19 separate instances of mother violating three orders enjoining her from making certain derogatory comments, both in person and on social media. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the mother violated only two of the orders cited by the father. We also conclude that the court erred in holding the mother in contempt for two of the counts alleged by the father. Even so, the juvenile court properly found the mother in contempt for 17 violations of court orders, and we find the sanctions imposed by the court to be appropriate. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Thompson
Defendant, Ricky Thompson, appeals from his conviction for reckless aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to declare a mistrial after a potential juror made highly prejudicial remarks that undermined the authority of the trial proceedings and contaminated the rest of the venire. Additionally, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted photographs of surgical procedures performed on the victim. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Additionally, we conclude that the surgical photographs were improperly admitted into evidence but find the error to be harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Thompson - dissenting opinion
I agree with the majority’s discussion of the photographs and subsequent legal analysis of their admissibility; however, I do not agree that the error in admitting the surgical photographs was harmless. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ashley Bradshaw v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ashley Bradshaw, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated child endangerment, for which she received a sentence of 20 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robert L. McCullough, Jr. et al. v. Carla Vaughn, et al.
This action arises out of a two-car accident. Prior to the commencement of this action, the driver of the vehicle who is the defendant in this action filed a petition in bankruptcy court. Shortly thereafter, and being unaware of the bankruptcy proceeding, Plaintiffs commenced this action naming the driver of the other vehicle as the only named defendant. Summons was issued for the defendant driver as well as Plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insurance carrier. Summons was served on the carrier; however, summons for Defendant was returned unserved, and more than a year passed before Plaintiffs requested issuance of an alias summons. Upon motions of the defendant and the uninsured motorist carrier, the trial court dismissed all claims as time barred upon the finding that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 by obtaining the issuance of a new summons for service of process on the defendant within one year of the issuance of the previous summons that was not served. Plaintiffs appeal contending their claims are not time barred because the defendant filed her bankruptcy petition prior to the commencement of this action and Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-109 expressly states, “When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction is not to be counted.” We agree. The bankruptcy court’s automatic stay not only enjoined the commencement of this action but the issuance of process, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-109 expressly states that the time of the continuance of an injunction is not to be counted in calculating the statute of limitations. The bankruptcy injunction remained in effect for 202 days; therefore, that period is not to be counted. With the addition of 202 days to the period within which Plaintiffs could obtain the issuance of an alias summons under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, the issuance of the alias summons was timely. As a consequence, the trial court’s order dismissing this case is vacated, and this matter is remanded with instructions to reinstate the complaint as to the defendant driver and the uninsured motorist carrier for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roger L. Holt v. Jimmy Cantrell, et al.
This appeal concerns access to real property (“the lake property”) owned by Roger L. Holt (“Holt”). Holt sued Jimmy Cantrell,1 Shirley Carroll and Tommy Cantrell (“Defendants”) in the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that he was entitled to access his property by means of a road bed (“the Disputed Road Bed”) on Defendants’ property (“the Cantrell property”). Holt advanced three alternative theories: that he was entitled to a prescriptive easement; that he was entitled to an easement by necessity; and that the Disputed Road Bed is a public road by implication. After a hearing, the Trial Court rejected all three of Holt’s theories and dismissed his complaint. Holt appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Craig Dillon v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
A policyholder brought suit to recover under personal fire and extended coverage policy for damage caused when burglars broke into his property and removed copper wiring, causing considerable damage. The trial court determined that the majority of the loss was excluded from coverage because it was caused by theft and awarded policyholder the amount previously tendered under the vandalism coverage, less his deductible. Policyholder appeals, contending that the plain language of the policy provides coverage for the damage caused by burglars. Holding that the damages covered under the policy are not limited to damages caused by vandalism, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for reconsideration of the amount of damages due the policyholder. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Suzanne Gillett v. Jason Steven Molthan
A man who pled guilty to charges of aggravated stalking and harassment was ordered to stay away from the woman he was stalking and harassing. When the initial term of the order of protection was nearly over, the woman filed a motion seeking to have the order of protection extended for another year. The trial court granted the motion, and the man appealed. The man does not deny engaging in the acts that formed the basis for the order of protection; the issues he raises on appeal are procedural and tangential to the reasons for the order. Concluding that none of the issues raised entitle the appellant to any relief, we affirm the trial court’s judgment extending the order of protection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Swanger v. Carrie Lowery
In this appeal of the extension of an order of protection for five years, the appellant contends that the appellee did not prove an allegation of domestic abuse, stalking, or sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence. Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence supports the finding that the initial order of protection was violated and that the court had the authority to extend the order; accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Delta Gypsum, LLC v. Michael Felgemacher
A supplier of drywall was a creditor of a company that installed drywall. The owner of the indebted company signed a promissory note in the amount of $370,615 payable to the supplier and paid a small portion of the note before selling the business to his son for $12,000. The supplier filed suit to obtain a judgment for the balance owed on the promissory note after the transfer of the business to the son. The supplier obtained a judgment against the former owner, but not against the company, for the amount owed on the note. The supplier then filed this action against the son in an effort to have the sale set aside on the basis that it was a fraudulent conveyance. The trial court found the supplier was unable to satisfy the elements of either the actual fraud statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-305(a)(1), or the constructive fraud statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-3-306(a). We agree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Lamar Baker
The defendant, Timothy Lamar Baker, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea arguing that he provided fair and just reasons in support of his motion and that the trial court failed to engage in the proper analysis. After our review of the record, briefs and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Douglas Gwinn
Defendant, Jeffrey Douglas Gwinn, was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”). On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the arresting officer to testify about Defendant’s fitness to drive a motor vehicle and his performance on field sobriety tests; and (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its rebuttal closing argument. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the lay opinion testimony was proper. We also conclude that remarks in the State’s rebuttal were improper, but we find the error to be harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph L. Smith
Joseph L. Smith (“the Defendant”) was convicted of attempted arson under a theory of criminal responsibility and received a three-year sentence; he was ordered to serve one year in the workhouse and the remainder of the sentence on community corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for new trial because the testimony of the accomplices was not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. The Defendant also contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty of attempted arson beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on the offense of attempted arson. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joe Travis Northern v. State of Tennessee
Joe Travis Northern, Jr. (“Petitioner”) appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and of counsel appointed to represent him in a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Andrew Oliver v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, David Andrew Oliver, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his rape of a child conviction and twenty-five year prison sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, arguing that trial counsel should have advised him to testify at trial. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals |