Paul Harrison Gant v. Wanda Norene Gant
In this divorce action, Wife appeals contending the trial court erred in classifying Husband’s interest in his family’s business as his separate property and by failing to classify the appreciation in value of this asset as marital property. Wife contends she should have been awarded more than one-half of the marital estate, given that she is in poor health, unable to work and Husband has separate assets of significant value. She contends the award of alimony in futuro is insufficient and the trial court erred by requiring her to pay her attorney’s fees and expenses. Husband contends the trial court erred by failing to award him certain items of personal property that are of sentimental value. We affirm the classification of Husband’s interest in his family business as his separate property. We modify the division of the marital property by increasing Wife’s share of the cash proceeds from the sale of the home, the adjoining land, cattle, and farm equipment from fifty (50%) percent to fifty-five (55%) percent. As for the specific items of tangible personal property Husband seeks to recover, we remand this issue to the trial court to make specific findings of fact and enter judgment accordingly. As for alimony in futuro, we have determined that Husband has the ability to pay more, and Wife has a need that is greater than what was awarded; therefore, we modify the award of alimony in futuro by increasing the amount to be paid monthly. We affirm the trial court’s discretionary decision denying Wife’s request to recover the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial. As for the attorney’s fees and expenses Wife incurred on appeal, we conclude that she should be awarded the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses she incurred in this appeal and remand for the trial court to make the award it deems appropriate in its discretion. |
Warren | General Sessions Courts | |
Ronnie Hughes v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ronnie Hughes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Shelby County Criminal Court. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Deangelo Lee
Pro se Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. DeKarlos Johnson
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Dekarlos Johnson, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of nine years with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. On appeal, Johnson argues: (1) the admission of his redacted statement negatively impacted the jury's verdict; (2) he was denied the opportunity to present evidence in his own defense; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jonathan D. Grigsby v. Alexandra Alvis-Crawford
This custody dispute involves the child born to Jonathan D. Grigsby (Father) and Alexandra Alvis-Crawford (Mother). In July 2014, the parties were residing together when Mother moved out of the house with the child and refused to let Father see or talk to him. Shortly thereafter, Mother had medical issues and was admitted to the hospital where she remained until September 2014. During this time, the child lived in the home of the maternal grandparents of the child. Because the maternal grandparents refused to allow Father to see or speak with the child, he filed a petition seeking an ex parte order for immediate custody of his minor child. Based on Father’s petition, the trial court entered an order finding that the grandparents were unlawfully keeping the child from Father. The trial court gave Father immediate temporary custody of the child. The trial court did not make a permanent custody determination at that time. In December 2014, Mother filed a petition for custody. In January 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s amended emergency petition and Mother’s petition. The trial court found that it is in the best interest of the child to stay with Father. Accordingly, the court designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appeals. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
James Floyd Thomas v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Floyd Thomas, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2014 Bedford County Circuit Court |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
F&M Marketing Services, Inc. v. Christenberry Trucking And Farm, Inc. et al.
The question presented is whether the corporate veil of Christenberry Trucking and Farm, Inc. (CTF), should be pierced and its sole shareholder, Clayton V. Christenberry, Jr., be held personally liable for a debt owed by CTF to F&M Marketing Services, Inc. In 2012, F&M obtained a judgment against CTF for breach of contract. By that time, CTF, a trucking company, had suffered mortal setbacks primarily owing to the great recession. CTF was administratively dissolved that same year. CTF had no assets to satisfy the judgment. F&M brought this action, seeking to hold Mr. Christenberry personally liable for the debt. After a bench trial, the court held that F&M did not meet its burden of proving that CTF’s corporate veil should be pierced. F&M appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Parris Keane, et al v. John P. Campbell, III et al
This cause came on to be heard upon the record on appeal from the Davidson County Circuit Court, the briefs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel. Upon consideration of the entire record, this court finds and concludes that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Sipes, et al. v. Terry Sipes, et al.
This appeal concerns a dispute between a father and his adult son over the transfer of real property. In 1997, the father constructed a house on a portion of his two-acre tract of land for his son. Several years later, the son agreed to purchase the house. Subsequently, a disagreement led the parties to discover identical errors in the legal descriptions in the warranty deed executed by the father transferring the property to the son and the deed of trust securing the son’s purchase money loan. The trial court, upon its finding of mutual mistake, reformed the incorrect legal descriptions in the deeds, but the court also granted the father a right to use a shed and garden on the son’s land. We affirm the trial court’s reformation of the legal descriptions in the deeds. However, because we conclude that the evidence is less than clear and convincing that the parties intended the deeds to include the father’s right of use, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant the interest. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: C.H.
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. Biological grandparents of a child at issue in a termination of parental rights action sought to intervene in the termination proceeding. The child had lived in the grandparents' home with them and the child's parents. The Department of Children's Services removed the child from that home and later sought to terminate the parental rights of the child's parents. The grandparents filed a motion to intervene. The trial court denied their motion, but granted their request for an interlocutory appeal. Thereafter, we also granted their request for interlocutory review. We affirm the decision of the trial court and now remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corey Forest
The Defendant, Corey Forest, was indicted for possession of twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell in a drug-free school zone, possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession of a firearm. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the warrantless search of his vehicle. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and the Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of possession of more than .5 grams of a Schedule II substance and to unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) about whether the stop of the Defendant’s vehicle by law enforcement was lawful. After review, because the Defendant has failed to properly comply with Rule 37, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Lydia N.-S.
The minor child at the center of this appeal was born on April 3, 2012, in El Paso, Texas. Mother and child moved to Nashville, Tennessee, three months later. Father subsequently moved to Delaware. While living in Delaware, Father pled guilty to two counts of rape and was sentenced to concurrent twenty-five year sentences beginning June of 2013. Mother married Stepfather in late 2013, and in October 2014, Stepfather and Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights and to allow Stepfather to adopt the child. The petition, as amended, alleged abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, abandonment by failure to visit or support in the four months prior to Father’s incarceration, and Father’s incarceration under a sentence of ten or more years with the child being under eight years of age as grounds for termination. Following a trial at which Father, who was incarcerated, participated by telephone, the court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and incarceration under a sentence of ten years or more and upon a finding that termination was in the child’s best interest; the petition for adoption was also granted. Father appeals the termination of his rights, stating that the court erred in denying a motion to continue so he could appear in person and in determining that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the minor child. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rocky M. White
Pro se Petitioner, Rocky White, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court‟s summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Because the sentences in this action have expired, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mahlon Johnson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Mahlon Johnson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief for his convictions for sexual battery and aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terrell Loverson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Terrell Loverson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred by concluding that appellate counsel rendered effective assistance. According to the petitioner, appellate counsel should have raised, as an issue on appeal, the trial court's denial of his request for a self-defense jury instruction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William M. Cole
The defendant, William M. Cole, was indicted for rape of a child and entered a best-interest guilty plea to incest on May 6, 2015. He was sentenced on September 8, 2015, to six years as a Range I, standard offender. On September 14, 2015, he filed a timely notice of appeal of his sentence. On September 28, 2015, he filed in the trial court a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, arguing that he was not related to the victim by blood or marriage and, therefore, could not be found guilty of incest. In this direct appeal filed after his plea of guilty and sentencing, but before he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, he argues that his plea of guilty was involuntary and should be set aside and that the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors in sentencing him. The State responds that the defendant may attack the voluntariness of his plea only in a petition for post-conviction relief and not in a direct appeal. We agree with this response, as well as the State’s assertion that the defendant was properly sentenced. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Battery Alliance, Inc., et al. v. Allegiant Power, LLC, et al.
In this dispute among competing battery distribution companies, the plaintiff companies appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant company and its employees. The plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim on jurisdictional grounds. Having determined that the trial court granted summary judgment without stating the legal basis for its decision prior to instructing the defendants' counsel to prepare a template for the court's order, we conclude that the trial court failed to fully comply with the procedural requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04. We therefore vacate the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. We affirm the trial court‟s denial of the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the defendant company's counterclaim. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the defendants' motion for summary judgment in compliance with Rule 56.04 and of the plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jack Osborne, et al. v. Michael Hardin
Jack Osborne, Margaret Howell, and Kathy Street (collectively “Plaintiffs”) sued Michael P. Hardin (“Defendant”) seeking to extinguish any right Defendant had to a right-of-way (“the Right-of-Way”) on real property located in Unicoi County, Tennessee. After a trial, the Chancery Court for Unicoi County (“the Trial Court”) entered a judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the Right-of-Way is for the benefit of both Plaintiffs and Defendant and neither may block or impede the other’s use of the Right-of-Way. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in setting aside a judgment by default and proceeding with trial, whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with trial in the absence of two of the Plaintiffs, and whether the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the judgment by default, that Plaintiffs never objected to proceeding with trial in the absence of the two Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. |
Unicoi | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Prewitt, et al v. Kamal Brown
This appeal arises from a two-car accident. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained irreparable damage and that Defendant, the driver of the other vehicle, was 100% at fault. Prior to the commencement of this action, the automobile insurance carrier for Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, paid the lien-holder of Plaintiff’s vehicle $7,852.57, the amount Allstate believed to be the fair market value of the vehicle. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant to recover the balance of the fair market value of her car and damages for loss of use. She also asserted a direct action against Allstate, alleging that Allstate reached a settlement with her lien-holder before exploring the full extent of her damages. The trial court dismissed the direct action against Allstate for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), because Tennessee law does not permit a direct action against an insured’s insurance carrier “without first establishing that the insured . . . has become ‘legally obligated’ to pay damages.” Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 42, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Seymour v. Sierra, 98 S.W.3d 164, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). Following the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Allstate, the trial court summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant upon the finding that Plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the fair market value was more than Allstate paid on behalf of Defendant. The court also summarily dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for the loss of use of her car, because it could not be repaired and she never sought to rent a replacement vehicle. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandra Jo Robbins v. Robert Scholze Robbins
The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Robert Scholze Robbins, stated that the appellant was appealing from a final judgment entered on July 28, 2016. However, there is no final judgment in the proceedings below and the case remains pending in the Trial Court. As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stephanie Lynn Ferguson
The Defendant, Stephanie Lynn Ferguson, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of vehicular assault in the Criminal Court for Davidson County. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that her effective sentence does not comport with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing. Specifically, she contends that the sentence imposed was not the “least severe measure necessary,” that the trial court ignored applicable mitigating factors, and that the court improperly determined she was a dangerous offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Radames Antonio Rivera
The defendant, Radames Antonio Rivera, was indicted for one count of first degree murder, one count of attempted tampering with evidence, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. Following trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of one count of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Spirit Broadband, LLC, et al v. Joseph Anthony Armes, et al
This case arises from the sale of the assets of a small cable television system. DirecTV program channels constituted the majority of the system’s programming. Three years after the sale, DirecTV stopped providing its programming signal to the cable system, claiming the signal had been obtained illegally. The buyer of the cable system filed suit against DirecTV for breach of contract and defamation. After reaching a settlement with DirecTV, the buyer filed this action against the seller of the cable system, seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud and a declaratory judgment that the promissory note the buyer had executed as part of the purchase was not yet due and payable. The seller filed a counterclaim, seeking payment of the promissory note. After a bench trial, the trial court dismissed the buyer’s claims against the seller. The court also dismissed the seller’s counterclaim under the doctrine of unclean hands. After a review of the record, we conclude that the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the doctrine of unclean hands barred the seller’s counterclaim. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gale Marleen Krizka v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Gale Marleen Krizka, appeals from the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief, in which she alleged that her counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert witness, failing to call witnesses, and failing to give an opening statement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Bass
The Defendant, Robin Bass, was convicted of first degree murder in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, arguing that there was no proof that he intended to rob the victim or that the murder occurred during the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery. Additionally, the Defendant argues that the extrajudicial confessions used to convict him were uncorroborated. Following our review, the judgment is affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |