Andrew Taylor v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andrew Taylor, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his guilty pleas to carjacking and aggravated robbery and his effective sentence of eight years in prison at eighty-five percent. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel, which rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario Jones
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Mario Jones, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child involving two different victims. He now appeals as of right from those convictions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, noting that there was no forensic evidence to bolster the victims' narratives and asserting that those narratives lacked credibility. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's convictions. Therefore, the trial court's judgments are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Sophie O. et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The minor children at issue were removed from Mother’s custody after the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) received referrals alleging that Mother was abusing drugs and that one of the children tested positive for opioids at the time of his birth. Thereafter, the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and found that Mother’s drug use while pregnant constituted severe child abuse. The children were subsequently placed in the custody of their father, and Mother was ordered to have no contact with the children. After it was discovered that Mother had violated the order by living with the children and their father, the children were once again placed in state custody. DCS then filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of severe abuse, abandonment by wanton disregard and failure to support, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, and persistence of conditions. The juvenile court found that each of these grounds existed and that termination was in the children’s best interests. Mother appealed; we affirm |
Sevier | State Court Clerks | |
Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope
In this divorce action, the wife appeals, contending the trial court erred in calculating her child support obligation by failing to impute income to the husband and by not deviating downward from the child support guidelines for the private school tuition and expenses she pays. The wife also contends the trial court erred in awarding the husband alimony in futuro in the amount of $2,400, and ordering her to pay $10,000 of the husband’s attorney’s fees. The wife further contends the trial judge made statements during opening arguments regarding the issue of alimony that indicated bias. As for child support, the wife is correct in stating that the trial court did not consider a deviation in child support for extraordinary educational expenses; however, the wife did not request a deviation and the parties agreed that the wife is not required to pay for private school tuition after the divorce. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court not considering a deviation based on the possibility that the wife may or may not incur extraordinary educational expenses in the future. As for the amount of alimony to be paid, the trial court’s findings of fact concerning the wife’s ability to pay and the husband’s need for alimony fail to satisfy the mandatory requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Therefore, we vacate the award of alimony in the amount of $2,400 per month and remand for the trial court to make findings of fact and state separately its conclusions of law concerning the wife’s ability to pay and the husband’s need for alimony, and direct the entry of a judgment setting the appropriate amount of alimony in futuro. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald E. Thomas, Jr.
The Defendant, Gerald E. Thomas, Jr., pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective seven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marty E. Hughes
The Defendant-Appellant, Marty E. Hughes, was convicted by a Hawkins County jury of two counts of aggravated assault. Although he was represented by appointed counsel at trial, Hughes signed a waiver of his right to appointed counsel prior to his sentencing hearing. He was subsequently sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to concurrent sentences of ten and fifteen years for his convictions. Thereafter, Hughes filed a pro se notice of appeal before filing an untimely pro se motion for new trial. On appeal, Hughes argues: (1) the trial court violated his due process rights and committed plain error when it failed to expand the jury instruction on self-defense to include the rights of a person in a dwelling; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault; (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) his due process rights were violated when he proceeded to the sentencing hearing as a pro se defendant who was unaware and improperly advised of his right to file a motion for new trial. Because the record shows that Hughes did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel prior to his sentencing hearing, we vacate the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for appointment of new counsel and a new sentencing hearing. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Heaven J.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his daughter. The trial court terminated the father’s parental rights upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination were proven and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We conclude that the record contains insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to grounds for termination. We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kathy Bell Noble
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kathy Bell Noble, was convicted of driving on a suspended license, violation of the vehicle registration law, and failure to obey a traffic control device. The trial court imposed a sentence of six months and the jury’s fine of $500 for driving on a suspended license and concurrent sentences of thirty days each for violation of the vehicle registration law and failure to obey a traffic control device. Defendant was ordered to serve forty-eight hours for driving on a suspended license with the remainder of the sentence subject to supervised probation. The thirty-day sentences for violation of the vehicle registration law and failure to obey a traffic control device were suspended. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sandra L. Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, et al
The plaintiff’s husband collapsed and died after participating in a cycling class at a fitness and recreation facility owned and operated by the church. Although the cycling class instructor and others present at the fitness facility attended the plaintiff’s husband and called 911 soon after his collapse, they did not utilize the automated external defibrillator (“AED”) on site at the facility. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the church, alleging, among other things, that the church had negligently failed to utilize the onsite AED, to train facility personnel on the proper use of the AED, and to comply with applicable state statutes. The church denied negligence and subsequently filed a third-party complaint against the company that sold it the AED, asserting that the seller had contractually agreed to provide a physician oversight program, which, among other things, included oversight of the church’s compliance with federal, state, and local regulations. The church alleged that, should the plaintiff recover a judgment against it for failing to comply with statutes, the seller should be solely responsible for the judgment. The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint naming the seller as a defendant and alleging, as relevant to this interlocutory appeal, that: (1) the seller had negligently breached a duty it owed to her husband and others using the fitness facility to properly maintain the AEDs, to ensure that they were accessible, and to ensure that the church’s employees had the knowledge, training, and ability to operate the AEDs; (2) the seller had breached its contract with the church; (3) her husband was a third-party beneficiary of the contract; and (4) the seller’s negligence and breaches of contract caused her husband’s death, entitling her to recover against the seller on her wrongful death and loss of consortium claims. The seller moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff and the church, arguing that: (1) it owed no duty of care to the plaintiff or her husband; (2) the church had no common law or statutory duty to acquire or use an AED; (3) neither the plaintiff nor her husband were third-party beneficiaries of the seller’s contract with the church; (4) the undisputed facts established that the seller had not breached its contract with the church; and (5) the undisputed facts failed to establish that any of the alleged breaches of contract caused the plaintiff’s husband’s death. The trial court denied the seller’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that disputes of material fact remained, but it granted the seller permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the seller’s application for an interlocutory appeal, but this Court granted the seller permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We conclude that the seller did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff’s husband or other users of the fitness facility independent of its contract with the church and that the church had no statutory or common law duty to acquire or use the AED it purchased from the seller, and as a result, the plaintiff’s husband was not a third-party beneficiary of the church’s contract with the seller. For these reasons, the seller is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s second amended complaint and the church’s third-party complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the seller on all claims and for any other necessary and appropriate proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Hamilton | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Dewayne Melton
Travis Dewayne Melton (“the Defendant”) appeals his Overton County convictions for reckless homicide and assault, for which the Defendant received an effective sentence of four years’ incarceration. The Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on lesser included offenses when the Defendant requested that the trial court not charge any lesser included offenses; (2) his dual convictions for assault and reckless homicide violated double jeopardy principles; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory A. Snow v. Turney Center Disciplinary Board, et al
An inmate was relocated from one cell to another in 2012 as part of a large-scale inmate reassignment, and two knives were found in the door to the inmate’s cell in 2015. The inmate was charged with the possession of a deadly weapon and was found guilty by the disciplinary board following a hearing. The inmate claimed he did not know anything about the knives and that he did not believe the cell was searched prior to his reassignment, as the prison policies require. The inmate exhausted his administrative appeals before filing a petition for writ of certiorari. In an effort to prove his cell was not searched prior to his reassignment and that the evidence did not support his conviction, the inmate sought permission to discover documents from the State, which the trial court denied. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari but denied the inmate any relief. The inmate raises several issues on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Vernon Lockhart v. Commissioner of The Tennessee Department of Safety
This appeal arises from a civil forfeiture. Vernon Lockhart (“Lockhart”) was charged and later convicted on a number of criminal counts related to the distribution of large amounts of marijuana. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security (“the Department”) declared as forfeited certain of Lockhart’s properties alleged to be derived from illegal drug transactions. An Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”) found in favor of the Department by a preponderance of the evidence, a decision which was affirmed on appeal by the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). Lockhart appeals to this Court, arguing, in large part, that the evidence used against him should have been suppressed and that the ALJ and Trial Court erred by failing to conduct an analysis of his suppression issue independent of the resolution of that issue in the criminal court proceedings. We hold, inter alia, that the ALJ’s order of forfeiture was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Lockhart from re-litigating whether the evidence should have been suppressed as that issue has been resolved finally on appeal in his criminal proceedings. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court upholding the ALJ’s order declaring Lockhart’s designated properties forfeited to the state. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Linette B.
This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of: (1) failure to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plan; and (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal from Appellant’s custody. The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Erin Alford Fuller v. Roger Darnell Fuller
This appeal stems from a divorce action involving, inter alia, issues of proper valuation of a marital asset, child support, and alimony. The trial court found that the “trail” income from the father's financial planning business was a divisible marital asset, valuing it according to the evidence presented. The trial court set child support and alimony based on its determination of the father's income as an average of the prior two years' gross revenues from his business. The father has appealed. We determine that the trial court properly classified and valued the father's trail income from his business. We also determine, however, that the trial court erred by including in the father's income, for child support and alimony purposes, the amount of the trail income distributed as a marital asset. We vacate the trial court's determination regarding the amount of child support and alimony to be paid by the father. We remand this matter for a proper determination regarding the father's income, as well as an appropriate calculation of child support and determination of alimony in favor of the mother resulting therefrom. We determine the father's issue regarding the allocation of days in the permanent parenting plan to be moot. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects. We decline to award attorney's fees on appeal to either party |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Moufak Sakaan v. FedEx Corporation, Inc., et al.
The Plaintiff filed suit against a number of corporate and individual Defendants alleging claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation. After filing answers to the complaint, the Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the asserted claims were time-barred. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. Discerning no error in this decision, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company v. Estate of Richard M. Archie and Jessica Cossitt
This appeal involves a dispute regarding a household exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy. Following a motorcycle accident in which the defendant was injured while riding as a passenger of the insured, the insurance company filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the exclusion relieved it of liability for the defendant’s claims because the defendant was residing in the insured’s household at the time of the accident. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant was not residing in the insured’s household at the time of the accident for purposes of determining liability coverage and denied the insurance company’s request for declaratory relief. The insurance company appealed. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Martez D. Matthews v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Martez D. Matthews, of first degree felony murder, and a life sentence was imposed. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. See Deangelo M. Moody and Martez D. Matthews, No. M2011-01930-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1932718, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 9, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2013). Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court denied. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief. See Martez D. Matthews v. State, No. M2014-01663-CCA-R3-ECN, 2015 WL 3814164, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 19, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 15. 2015). The Petitioner also filed a post-conviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gai D. Kuot v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Gai D. Kuot, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Gai D. Kuot, No. M2012-01884-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4539020, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 26, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel had failed to obtain a translator to explain to him his rights. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Elwood R. Darken
The sons of the decedent challenge the executrix’s administration of the decedent’s estate, contending that she breached her fiduciary duty by, inter alia, refusing to provide them with certain documents and by converting personal property they claim their father intended for them. They also claim that the antenuptial agreement their father entered into with the executrix prior to their marriage established a trust that nullifies the specific bequest in their father’s will that gives his tangible personal property to the executrix. The executrix denied breaching any of her duties or converting any assets. She also disputed the contention that the antenuptial agreement created a trust. The trial court found that the executrix had not breached her fiduciary duties or converted any assets and that the antenuptial agreement did not create a trust. The court also ordered that the estate pay the fees of the attorney who represented the executrix in her fiduciary capacity. The decedent’s sons appeal, challenging each of the foregoing rulings. They also contend that the trial court erred in limiting their cross examination of the executrix at trial. We affirm in all respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Dement Construction Company, LLC v. Lucas C. Nemeth, et al.
This case arises from landowners’ counter-suit for damages allegedly resulting from a construction company’s use of the landowners’ property to store excess topsoil from a road construction project. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the construction company, finding that the construction company was not responsible for the alleged damage to the property. The landowners appeal, asserting that the trial court made erroneous evidentiary rulings and failed to properly instruct the jury. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Kobie Turner v. City of Memphis
Appellee sued the City of Memphis, alleging that he was injured in a car accident caused by a police officer employed by the City. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in Appellee’s favor, awarding him $90,000.00 in damages. Appellant appeals. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found that Appellee had proven that Appellant was the proximate cause of Appellee’s injuries and when it awarded Appellee what Appellant deemed to be an excessive amount of damages. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Hannah Turner Ex Rel. Liam Turner v. Charles Michael Howe, et al.
This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over the Appellees, Georgia and Alabama corporations. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(2) motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
Aarene Contracting, LLC v. Krispy Kreme Doughnut
A contractor sued an owner for violations of the Prompt Pay Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 66-34-101 et seq., and notified the owner of its violations by Federal Express and e-mail. The owner moved for summary judgment on the ground that the contractor failed to strictly comply with the notice provision requiring notice be sent by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The trial court found strict compliance was required and dismissed the contractor's claims under the Act. The contractor appealed, and we reverse the trial court's judgment, holding substantial compliance is sufficient under the facts of this case. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dylan Ward Hutchins
The defendant, Dylan Ward Hutchins, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his request for judicial diversion from his mitigated statutory rape conviction, arguing that the trial court failed to consider and properly weigh all relevant factors and improperly considered facts outside the record in rendering its decision. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying diversion. However, we remand to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the conviction offense as mitigated statutory rape. |
Washington | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In re Lynx C.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed the child at issue from the mother’s home prior to his first birthday. Four months later, DCS filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of two grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We, however, conclude that DCS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the child by willful failure to support. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence of the remaining ground— abandonment by willful failure to visit—and that termination was in the best interest of the child, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals |