Paul Thomas Jackson v. Susan Denise Jackson
In this divorce action, the trial court granted the wife a divorce, divided the marital assets, and awarded her alimony in solido but denied her request for alimony in futuro. The wife appeals. We reverse and grant a divorce without fault to either party. We also modify the judgment to reflect an award of alimony in futuro in the amount of $2,000 per month. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Kent L. Booher v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Kent L. Booher, appeals the Loudon County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2014 guilty plea convictions for two counts of statutory rape and his effective three-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We conclude that the Petitioner stated sufficient facts to constitute a colorable claim, and we remand the case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leroy Myers, Jr.
After a bench trial, the trial court issued a written order finding the Defendant, Leroy Myers, Jr., not guilty of the charged offense, aggravated assault, but guilty of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. On appeal the Defendant asserts that reckless endangerment is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault under the facts of this case and that there was not an implicit amendment to the indictment to include reckless endangerment. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Corrin Kathleen Reynolds
We granted this appeal to determine whether the warrantless blood draw violated the defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and, if so, whether the exclusionary rule applies and requires suppression of the evidence. We conclude that the warrantless blood draw violated the defendant’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Nevertheless, we adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), and as a result, hold that any evidence derived from testing the defendant’s blood need not be suppressed because the warrantless blood draw was obtained in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance on binding precedent. On this basis, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Corrin Kathleen Reynolds - Dissenting
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the warrantless blood draw violated Ms. Reynolds’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. I dissent from the Court’s decision to excuse these constitutional violations by adopting a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The adoption of this exception for a constitutional violation erodes our citizens’ rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Therefore, I would hold that the test results of Ms. Reynolds’ warrantless blood draw must be suppressed. Moreover, given the unusual facts of this case, the adoption of a good-faith exception for a constitutional violation based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on binding judicial precedent, as set forth in Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011), is ill-conceived for many reasons. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Estate of J. Don Brock
This is an appeal of an order dismissing a will contest for lack of standing. The Contestants sought to challenge the testator's will, alleging that it was the product of fraud and/or undue influence. The Estate introduced multiple prior wills that appeared to be facially valid and properly executed in which all or some of the Contestants were disinherited. The chancery court found that the Contestants would not benefit if the testator's will was set aside and dismissed the contest for lack of standing. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Knox C.
Shane L.B. (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating his parental rights to the minor child, Knox C. (“the Child”), after finding and holding that grounds for terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Trial Court's findings made by clear and convincing evidence that grounds were proven to terminate Father's parental rights to the Child and that the termination was in the Child's best interest. We, therefore, affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Kempson, et al. v. Pamela Casey, et al., - DISSENTING
I cannot concur in the majority’s decision. The issue of whether the collision of the vehicles “caused damage to the Plaintiffs” was fairly presented to the jury. The jury rejected the Plaintiffs’ theory that Mr. Kempson was injured in the accident. I would affirm the jury’s verdict in toto. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to remand for a new trial on damages. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
J.A.C., by and through her next friend and mother, Lesha Carter v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, et al.
In this health care liability action, Defendants moved to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs‘ failure to provide the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") medical authorization required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Based on its determination that the Plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with the foregoing statute, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations and repose under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) and accordingly concluded that the Plaintiffs‘ claims were time-barred. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs‘ constitutional challenges to the viability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 were without merit. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Quincy Terrell Brando Sharpe
Defendant, Quincy Terrell Sharpe, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury, along with his co-defendant DeAndre D. Rucker, for premeditated first degree murder. Defendant and Rucker were tried jointly, and both were convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct by the State during closing argument. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lamonez Deshaun Thaxton
The defendant, Lamonez Deshaun Thaxton, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of reckless endangerment and attempted especially aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to exclude evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin Dean Atkins
The Defendant, Kevin Dean Atkins, appeals the trial court’s order setting aside a plea agreement whereby the Defendant pled guilty to public intoxication and admitted violating the terms of his probation for a prior conviction. The Defendant filed a motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, and his motion was granted. On appeal, the State concedes that the trial court’s order violated the Defendant’s double jeopardy rights. We agree and accept the State’s concession. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Kempson, et al. v. Pamela Casey, et al.
Pickup truck driver sued to recover for injuries he allegedly sustained when his truck was rear-ended while he was stopped for traffic on the interstate. His wife asserted that she had suffered from the loss of consortium with and services of her husband. The defendant driver acknowledged responsibility for the collision but disputed that the plaintiffs had proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the accident in question caused any injury. The jury found that the collision caused no damage to the plaintiffs. On the jury’s verdict, the trial court entered judgment, awarding the plaintiffs no damages and denying the motion for a new trial. The plaintiffs appeal. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial on damages alone. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
James Robert Wilson v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, James Robert Wilson, of especially aggravated robbery and first degree felony murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life in prison. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. James Robert Wilson, No. M2000-00760-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1050259, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 24, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 12, 2002). In 2003, the Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. James Robert Wilson v. State, M2004-00933-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 WL 1378770, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 10, 2005), perm. app. denied (Oct. 31, 2005). In 2016, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief contending that the trial court “constructively amended the indictment in this case” when it charged the jury using language that did not fully comport with the language used by the grand jury when it indicted him. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arianna A. George et al. v. Tessa G. Dunn
This case involves a trustee's disbursement of funds from two trusts, without authorization of the trusts' respective beneficiaries, in order to pay legal expenses incurred in defending against a prior action filed against the trustee on behalf of the beneficiaries. The trial court had dismissed the prior action with prejudice in an agreed order entered on August 31, 2012, which further provided that the funds at issue would be disbursed by the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries. On April 13, 2015, the beneficiaries filed a complaint, alleging that the trustee had violated the terms of the August 2012 order and her fiduciary duty by writing checks against the trust funds in an amount totaling $30,563.16. The trustee filed an answer, asserting that pursuant to Maryland law governing the establishment of the trust accounts, she was entitled to be reimbursed from the trust accounts for legal fees incurred in defense of the prior lawsuit filed on behalf of the beneficiaries and ultimately dismissed. The beneficiaries filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the beneficiaries, awarding each beneficiary, respectively, $15,281.58 plus prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. The trustee appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney's fees upon the finding that the trustee breached her fiduciary duty, we further determine an award to the beneficiaries of attorney's fees on appeal to be appropriate. We remand for the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the beneficiaries during the appellate process. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Scott Barnum
The Defendant, Gregory Scott Barnum, was convicted of Class E felony indecent exposure and received a sentence of two years’ incarceration. On appeal from his conviction, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously found that he was a “sexual offender” based on his 1998 Kentucky convictions for indecent exposure and thus subject to enhanced punishment under Tennessee’s indecent exposure statute. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cephus D. Spicer
The defendant, Cephus D. Spicer, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm on a college campus, claiming that his due process rights were violated by the State’s reading of the indictment to the jury without proper instructions, that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bridget Bondurant Shirer
The appellant, Bridget Bondurant Shirer, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to five counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; seven counts of theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; one count of failure to appear, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery in the amount of $500 or less, a Class E felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective fourteen-year sentence to be served as eight years in confinement followed by six years on community corrections. On appeal, the appellant contends that the length and manner of service of her effective fourteen-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
George Moore, Jr., et al v. City of Clarksville, TN
Appellant landowners filed a complaint against the City of Clarksville under the theory of implied- in-fact contract, alleging that the City should repair and maintain Appellants’ sewer line and arguing that the broken sewer line is an extension of the City’s public sewer system. Appellants also requested compensatory damages resulting from the back-up of sewage into their home. The City argues that the broken sewer line is a private sewer, for which the City has no responsibility. The City filed a motion for summary judgment. Upon hearing the City’s motion, the trial court found that Appellants’ claim sounded in tort under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and that the complaint was time barred. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. The Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, et al
American Honda wanted to establish a new motorcycle dealership in Kingsport, Tennessee and notified the current dealerships of this intent. Jim’s Motorcycle, located in Johnson City, filed a notice of protest with the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission, and a hearing was held in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-17-114(c)(20). The Commission determined that the Kingsport area was within the relevant market area of Jim’s Motorcycle and ruled that American Honda was not authorized to establish a new dealership in Kingsport. American Honda appealed, and we affirm the Commission’s ruling. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jeramyah H., et al
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two children. The juvenile court terminated his parental rights on three grounds: abandonment by willful failure to support, failure to provide a suitable home, and persistence of conditions preventing reunification. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. After reviewing the record, we conclude that DCS did not meet its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home or persistence of conditions. But, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence of willful failure to support and that termination was in the best interests of the children. Therefore, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Lewis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Christopher Lewis, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his second degree murder conviction and resulting fifteen-year sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition due to various deficiencies in the petition. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief without first providing the petitioner with the opportunity to correct the deficiencies. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christopher Lewis v. State of Tennessee - Concurring
I unenthusiastically agree with the conclusion reached by the majority. The legal soundness and logical result reached by the post-conviction court effectively delivers a wound to Petitioner by the hand of his out-of-state post-conviction attorney. Such a wound is a mortal shot to Petitioner’s chances of post-conviction review. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
C.W.H. v. L.A.S.
This is a custody case involving two children.2 C.W.H. (Father) and L.A.S. (Mother) modified, by an agreed order, an existing parenting plan for their children, P.H. and V.H. The modification continued Mother as the children's primary residential parent. Soon thereafter, Father learned that Mother worked in Nevada as a prostitute. He filed a motion seeking an emergency temporary custody order and a temporary restraining order. The juvenile court magistrate found that a material change in circumstances had occurred. It changed the identity of the children's primary residential parent from Mother to Father. Mother appealed to the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court (1) confirmed the magistrate's decision and (2) designated Father as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed to this Court. In the first appeal, we held that the trial court's order lacked a “best interest” analysis. As a result, we vacated that order and directed the trial court to (1) make a best interest analysis and thereafter (2) enter a new permanent parenting plan. On remand, the trial court (1) incorporated its past findings, (2) conducted a best interest analysis, and (3) held in Father's favor. Mother again appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence preponderates, in part but significantly, against the trial court's factual findings supporting its judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John C. Hoynacki et al. v. Jerome Hoynacki
Plaintiff John C. Hoynacki was helping his father, defendant Jerome Hoynacki, wax defendant‟s recreational vehicle (RV). He worked on a ladder in reaching the high places on the RV. The ladder fell with plaintiff on it, causing him injury. He brought this negligence action, alleging that defendant breached his duty to exercise reasonable care in securing and stabilizing the ladder. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, holding that defendant had no legal duty to hold the ladder at the time the plaintiff attempted to “climb down prior to his accident.” We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether defendant was negligent under the circumstances. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Washington | Court of Appeals |