City of La Vergne v. Randall T. LeQuire
This appeal arises from a traffic citation issued to the appellant by a municipal police officer. The citation charged the appellant with a violation of “SPEEDING 55-8-152,” a reference to Tennessee’s statutory prohibition on speeding codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-152 (2012). The appellant was found guilty of speeding in the municipal court and appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court judge entered a judgment against the appellant for a violation of a municipal ordinance rather than for a violation of the state statute charged on the citation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the citation was insufficient to provide him with notice of the charge for which he was convicted. We agree. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss this case. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Emily Mae Kelly v. Ryan Marshall Kelly
This is an appeal of an order denying Father’s petition to modify custody and visitation and for Rule 60.02 relief from a previous judgment of the court. Father appeals the trial court’s finding that no material change in circumstance existed that warranted a change in the parties’ parenting plan. Additionally, Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that Father is not voluntarily underemployed. We affirm. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Dorothy Denise Cross v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dorothy Denise Cross, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. The State concedes that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for an evidentiary hearing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Frank C. Massengill
Pro se petitioner, Frank Massengill, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his motion, his sentences have not expired, and the trial court failed to follow the sentencing procedures under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-210(b). Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Zachary Gale Rattler
A Sevier County jury convicted Zachary Gale Rattler (“the Defendant”) of attempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a prohibited weapon. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on flight, violating the Defendant's right to trial by jury; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant's subsequent arrest in North Carolina as evidence of flight; (3) the trial court erred when it would not permit backstriking of potential jurors; (4) the trial court erroneously refused to reconvene the jury for the Motion for New Trial hearing; (5) the Defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose knowledge of two of the State's witnesses; (6) the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for especially aggravated robbery; (7) the trial court erred in failing to require the jury to further deliberate after returning an “incorrect verdict”; (8) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive; (9) the jury improperly considered the Defendant's decision not to testify to the prejudice of the Defendant; and (10) cumulative error requires a new trial. Following a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Myrtle Robinson, et al. v. Edward Todd Robbins, MD
This is a health care liability action. The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendant concerning the inadequate care and treatment received by the decedent. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the saving statute did not apply because there was no identity of parties between the actions. He explained that the second complaint was filed against him in his individual capacity while the initial complaint was lodged against him in his corporate capacity. The court agreed and held that the second action was barred for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Stewart
The defendant, Roger Dale Stewart, was convicted of one count of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and two counts of reckless endangerment, Class E felonies. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; that the trial court erred when it refused to provide a requested jury instruction; that his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy and the Due Process Clause; and that the trial court erred by imposing a two-year sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger Dale Stewart - concurring and dissenting
I agree with most of the conclusions set forth in the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s merger of the defendant’s reckless endangerment convictions does not constitute plain error. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicholas Cole
Nicholas Cole (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to fifteen counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less and eighteen counts of burglary of an automobile. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. In this delayed direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly sentenced him to serve partially consecutive sentences, erred in sentencing him to continuous confinement, erred in denying probation, and erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon a thorough review of the record below and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the length of the Defendant’s sentences, the partial consecutive sentence alignment, and the denial of probation, but reverse the trial court’s order of continuous confinement for his convictions of “burglary of an auto,” a specifically enumerated non-violent property offense in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(c)(18). We remand for resentencing consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(a) and section 40-35-104(c). |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Lynn Brummitt v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Lynn Brummitt, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Lishun Brewer
The Defendant, Joshua Lishun Brewer, entered a guilty plea to carjacking, a Class B felony, with an agreed-upon sentence of eight years and with the manner and method of service to be determined by the trial court. See T.C.A. § 39-13-404 (2014). The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anita Marie Strickland
The Defendant, Anita Marie Strickland, pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). The sole issue presented for our review is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Vonner
The Defendant, Terry Vonner, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (2014) (second degree murder), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2012) (amended 2013) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1324 (2010) (amended 2012) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt). The Defendant also pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (2010) (amended 2012, 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of fifty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by not placing more weight on the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, to reflect 100% release eligibility. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Russell Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Russell Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arturo Jaimes-Garcia v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Arturo Jaimes-Garcia, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 drug-related convictions and his effective eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Catherine Cright v. Tijuan Overly, M.D. et al.
Catherine Cright's husband passed away on August 4, 2008, due to complications arising from a stent placement procedure. Cright1 subsequently filed a medical malpractice action2 against Dr. Tijuan Overly, Knoxville Cardiovascular Group, P.C. (KCG), and University Health Systems, Inc. (UHS) (collectively the defendants). Cright nonsuited that action in April 2013 three days into trial. She later sent a notice letter to each of the defendants advising them of her intent to refile her action. She neglected to attach a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. Thereafter, Cright refiled her complaint against the defendants, all of whom filed a motion to dismiss because of her failure to comply with the HIPAA-compliant authorization requirement set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a) (Supp. 2009). The trial court granted the motions. Cright appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Richard Singleton v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy R. Singleton, appeals as of right from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged the validity of his guilty plea to aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily because he did not understand the agreement due to his mental illness. Additionally, he claims his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history and using such information to arrange a better plea deal with the State. Finally, the Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress his confession. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. D&H Machine Service, Inc.
Aqua-Chem, Inc. contracted with D&H Machine Service, Inc. for D&H to machine three large, identical pieces of equipment. The piece of equipment is referred to in the record as a “cooler.”The work was not done properly, rendering them unusable. Aqua-Chem sued D&H for breach of contract, seeking damages for the replacement cost of the coolers and for lost profits. Aqua-Chem also sought attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the terms of its agreement with D&H. Following a two-day bench trial, the court awarded Aqua-Chem $191,870 in replacement costs, but declined to make an award for lost profits. The court did award Aqua-Chem $50,000 in attorney’s fees and out-of-pocket expenses. D&H appeals. Both sides raise issues. D&H argues that the trial court erred when it held that the terms and conditions of the purchase orders presented to D&H were applicable to the facts of this case. It also argues that the award of damages is not supported by the evidence. Aqua-Chem contends that the trial court erred in refusing to award damages for lost profits. It also asserts that the trial court should have awarded it the full amount of its fees and expenses, the total of which was $64,739.48. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of James Kemmler Rogers
Appellant, as a purported creditor of Decedent, appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition to open primary or ancillary probate of Decedent’s estate in Tennessee. Appellees, the Decedent’s surviving children, argued, inter alia, that Appellant lacked standing to pursue probate in Tennessee. The trial court did not address the standing issue before denying probate. We conclude that, in the absence of a ruling on standing, the trial court’s order is not final and appealable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3(a). As such, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Appeal dismissed. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. v. Stephen C. Duggan, et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over the fair value of stock in a dissenting shareholders case. Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. (“Athlon”) completed a merger (“the Merger”) which converted the minority dissenting shareholders’ (“Defendants”) shares into cash consideration and terminated their rights as shareholders. Athlon offered cash consideration for the shares at $0.10 per share. Defendants contend that their shares are worth at least $6.48 per share. Athlon sued Defendants to determine judicially the fair value of these shares. This case was tried before the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, applying the Delaware Block Method for determination of share value, found that the share value was $0.10 per share as of the date of the Merger. Defendants appeal to this Court, arguing that (1) the Delaware Block Method is ill-suited for a business like Athlon attempting a new venture, and is antiquated, generally; and, (2) that the Trial Court erred in its application of the Delaware Block Method. We find and hold that, under Tennessee law, the Trial Court properly utilized the Delaware Block Method. We find and hold further that the Trial Court considered the competing expert testimony, accredited Athlon’s expert, and the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Geico General Insurance Co. v. G & S. Transportation, Inc.
This appeal arises from the circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss. Appellant Geico filed an action in general sessions court against Appellee G&S Transportation, seeking subrogation damages resulting from an automobile accident. The general sessions court entered a default judgment in favor of Geico. G&S appealed the case to circuit court. Three years later, G&S filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure of Geico to prosecute. Geico did not file a response and the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Geico appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rhakim Martin
A jury convicted the defendant of carjacking and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective sixteen-year sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. In this Court, the defendant presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him because the victim previously viewed his photograph on a county-operated “mug shot” website; (2) whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (3) whether the failure to name the predicate felony of the firearm offense voids that count of the indictment; (4) whether the defendant’s conviction for the firearm offense violates the prohibitions against double jeopardy and the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c); and (5) whether the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. We hold that the victim’s prior viewing of the defendant’s booking photograph on the county-operated website did not constitute state action and that the trial court therefore properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him. We further hold that the defendant failed to establish that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony affected a substantial right, so the defendant is not entitled to plain error relief. Based on our holding in State v. Duncan, No. W2013-02554-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL ____, at * _ (Tenn. ___ ___, 2016), released on the same date as this opinion, we conclude that the failure to name the predicate felony of the firearm offense does not void that count of the indictment. We hold that the defendant’s convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not violate either double jeopardy or Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(c). Finally, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David Lynn Jordan v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, David Lynn Jordan, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his convictions of three counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident and his sentences of death. On appeal, the petitioner contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; (2) the venue of the trial in Madison County, Tennessee, violated his rights to a fair trial and due process; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by suppressing evidence; (4) the selection and impaneling of the grand jury was unconstitutional; (5) the post-conviction court erred in denying his motion to continue the evidentiary hearing; (6) the post-conviction court erred in allowing trial counsel to assist the State during the evidentiary hearing; (7) the post-conviction court erred in excluding an expert witness; (8) Tennessee's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional; (9) his death sentence is disproportionate; and (10) cumulative error warrants a new trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
LeAnn Barnes v. David Ellett Barnes
This appeal comes before us a second time. In the first appeal, we affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for the trial court to determine the manner in which to divide the marital estate given the adjustments we made and the nature of the marital assets; we also vacated the trial court’s amended order modifying the original award of alimony and reinstated the original award. On remand, the court entered an order providing that the Wife’s interest in Husband’s 401K Plan would be increased in the amount of the adjustments ordered by this court, to be made pursuant to the Qualified Domestic Relations Order which was also entered by the court; the court awarded Wife a judgment for the difference in the alimony awarded in the original decree and that paid by Husband pursuant to the amended decree. In this appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s compliance with this court’s instructions. We find that the orders entered by the court comply with the instructions of this court as to the division of the marital estate; we modify the order relating to the award of alimony to specifically state the amount and type of alimony awarded. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Athena of S.C., LLC et al. v. James F. Macri, Jr. et al.
The plaintiffs sued an attorney for legal malpractice related to the enforcement of two promissory notes. The plaintiffs purchased these notes, which were secured by property at a real estate development, from the two other defendants in this lawsuit. During the purchase of these notes, the sellers were represented by the defendant-attorney in this lawsuit. Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired the same attorney to help them collect the amounts due under the notes from the real estate developer. The attorney drafted a complaint and an agreed judgment for each of the promissory notes and filed these documents in the Circuit Court for Knox County. The circuit court entered the agreed judgments the same day they were filed. When the plaintiffs attempted to sell the property that secured the promissory notes, the real estate developer's former business partner filed a motion for an injunction in federal court. The federal district court issued two injunction orders, one in May 2012 and one in August 2012. Both orders were based on findings that the transaction by which the plaintiffs acquired the promissory notes was likely fraudulent. On January 6, 2014, the parties who sold the notes to plaintiffs filed an affidavit that, according to the plaintiffs, admitted that the sale of the notes to plaintiffs was fraudulent. On January 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed this action against their former attorney and the parties that sold them the promissory notes. The attorney filed a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), arguing that the plaintiffs' claim was time barred because it accrued in August 2012. The trial court granted this motion because it determined that the plaintiffs knew they had suffered an injury when the district court issued the second injunction order in August 2012. We affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals |